In a non-binding resolution adopted September 19, the European Parliament went on record urging EU member states to “immediately lift restrictions on the use of Western weapons systems delivered to Ukraine against legitimate military targets on Russian territory.”
The lawmakers said that existing restrictions “hinder Ukraine’s ability to fully exercise its right to self-defense under international law and leaves Ukraine exposed to attacks on its population and infrastructure.” The resolution was passed with 425 votes in favor, 131 against and 63 abstentions.
The lawmakers demand, in particular, to accelerate weapons deliveries, including Taurus missiles, and urge all EU members and NATO allies to “collectively and individually commit to supporting Ukraine militarily, with no less than one quarter of one percent of their GDP annually.”
The resolution confirms the European Parliament’s uncompromising position on the war. While there is no doubt that Ukraine is fully justified in defending itself against Russian aggression, the call to strike inside the Russian territory, if carried out, will further elevate the escalation ladder — indeed, Russian President Vladimir Putin clearly warned that Moscow would consider itself at war directly with NATO should such a step be taken.
Yet if one reads the European Parliament’s resolution, the conclusion can only be that the MEPs dismiss such risks. It is true that the specific paragraph on the strikes on Russian territory garnered less support than the resolution as a whole, but it still passed comfortably: 377 voted in favor, 191 against and 51 abstained.
All the major political groups — the center-right European People’s Party (EPP), the center-left Socialists & Democrats (S&D) and centrist liberal Renew Europe — voted in favor of that measure, with the support of the center-left Greens and hard-right European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR). The dissenting voices came from members of Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy party (ECR), fellow national-conservatives from the French National Rally and Hungarian Viktor Orban-dominated Patriots for Europe (PfE) group, Germany’s hard-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), Italian socialists, French leftists, and Irish, Austrian and Maltese MEPs across the political spectrum reflecting their countries’ neutral (non-NATO) status.
What is striking is that the resolution, while calling for robust support for Ukraine, almost completely neglects any diplomatic path to end the war. The only references to peace and negotiations found in the eight-page-long document are those unconditionally endorsing Ukraine Peace Formula — that is, peace entirely on Ukraine’s terms — and a call for the second Peace Summit. But the resolution failed to address whether Russia should be invited.
While such calls may be morally satisfying — Ukraine is the victim of an aggression, after all — they have no chance whatever of prospering as, despite the most optimistic assessments, Ukraine has no credible chance of winning militarily at an acceptable price (that is, without triggering a direct NATO-Russia war). The path to peace can only result from negotiations involving Russia.
Yet amendments to the resolution calling for such a diplomatic effort by the EU were massively rejected, even the one tabled by The Left that was crafted entirely in accordance with the EU’s own founding treaty; specifically, its Article 21 that commits the EU to “preserving peace, preventing conflicts and strengthening international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and the principles of the Helsinki Final Act.”
Other amendments proposed by The Left, such as stating that there is no military solution to the conflict and expressing disappointment at the EU’s lack of initiative to identify “concrete and realistic conditions under which negotiations could take place,” were similarly rejected. So were, predictably, the amendments calling for diplomacy from the opposite end of spectrum, the hard-right ESN.
The net outcome is that appeals for peace, diplomacy, and negotiations, once upon a time at the very core of the modern European identity — which, after all, was forged on the ashes of the World War II — are now considered beyond the pale and relegated to the extremes.
However, the image of unity that the European Parliament resolution sought to convey may be deceptive. The voting pattern, as detailed above, clearly sets the majority of the EU against the few neutral holdouts that are not part of NATO and, to date, have shown no intention to join it — Austria, Ireland, Malta, and Cyprus. Those countries are understandably uneasy about the EU’s increasing militarization that the resolution appears to promote.
Moreover, the success of the measures demanded by the MEPs depends largely on the two EU giants — France and Germany — acting in sync. Not only has that not been the case lately — French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz do not get along — but also the kind of unconditional support for Ukraine urged in the resolution is fraying in both countries.
In Germany, the rise of the far-left Sahra Vagenknecht’s party and the far-right AfD is, in part, fueled by concerns that the war’s continuation will further weaken the German economy. Scholz’s recent remarks that the time has come for diplomatic negotiations of which Russia should be a part reflects that shift. And Germany has still failed to authorize the use of its Taurus missiles to strike deep in Russia.
As to France, the new prime minister, Michel Barnier, depends on the support of Marine Le Pen’s far-right National Rally in the national assembly to remain in office, and the members of that party in the European Parliament voted overwhelmingly against the resolution to strike Russian territory. So did the majority of MEPs representing the biggest force in the French parliament – the left-wing New Popular Front.
There is also a transatlantic factor to be taken into account. Western leaders might like to act as if they had a crystal ball in determining Putin’s real intentions behind his warnings about the consequences of the authorization to strike targets in Russia. But they act more prudently than their rhetoric suggests: during his last trip to Washington, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer reportedly failed to secure U.S. President Joe Biden’s agreement to authorize Ukraine to carry out such strikes.
A victory for the Trump-Vance ticket in the U.S. presidential election will likely see a push from Washington to end the war. Even Vice President Kamala Harris may be less inclined to escalate matters with Russia than her current rhetoric suggests. Even a modest U.S. disengagement will require the EU to step in, and some countries, notably Hungary, Slovakia, to some extent Italy, as well as the recently ascendant political forces in France and Germany, are already showing signs of waning enthusiasm for war.
Finally, by embracing maximalist positions, the European Parliament is clearly diverging from European public opinion. Recent surveys show that the European public is supportive of Ukraine, but that support is geared, ultimately, to putting Kyiv in a better negotiating position to end the war.
