In a poem that should be required reading for all aspiring diplomats, a duck-billed platypus attains high rank in the British Foreign Office, in part because, “He never made rash statements his enemies might hold him to. He never stated anything, for no-one ever told him to.”
When it comes to the war in Ukraine, this would seem to be a good time for the European Union and its member governments to follow the policy of the platypus and say as little as possible. At best, the present European course risks leaving the EU looking isolated and not a little foolish. At worst, it is helping to set up Ukraine for crushing defeat.
Instead, in recent months, the EU and most of its member governments have doubled down on rhetorical support for Ukrainian “victory.” French President Emmanuel Macron has declared that there are “no limits” to French support to Ukraine (obviously disingenuous given the state of France’s budget and economy) and urged that Ukraine be given a green light to strike targets deep in Russia with Western weapons.
Why would this instead be a good time for a platypine approach on the part of the Europeans? In the first place, of course, there are the U.S. presidential elections in November. If Trump wins, it is possible that U.S. policy towards a peace settlement will change radically. That would leave the Europeans looking isolated, and not a little foolish. According to a report in the Financial Times, “At the German foreign ministry, diplomats are scrambling to prepare for a scenario many had long thought implausible: Donald Trump’s return to the White House…a prospect that causes deep unease in Berlin.”
Why so many in the German and other European elites thought this scenario “implausible” can only be explained by the fact that they dread it so much that they didn’t want to think about it.
Some members of the French establishment whom I met in Paris claim to believe that Europe can continue to sustain Ukraine militarily without the U.S., but even very pro-Ukrainian German experts regard this as impossible. So too do retired French senior officers with whom I spoke. European countries are trying to build up their military industries, but given the low level to which they have fallen, this process will take several years, and strengthening their own armed forces will have to take priority. In the meantime, the signs indicate that Russia is getting stronger on the battlefield.
In the words of a retired French general:
“Under the surface, a majority of the French establishment now realizes that there must be a compromise peace. But they won’t take the initiative. To do this, we need the Germans, and the Germans are paralyzed. And Europe as a whole is too divided. So as usual, we will wait for the Americans.”
He was speaking before the French parliamentary elections in July — as a result of which the French government is also paralyzed. The result is that more and more power within the EU has accrued to Poland and the Baltic states, whose pathological hatred and fear of Russia are now being channeled by the EU’s new foreign policy chief, former Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas. She has dismissed the goal of “Russia must not win,” instead “advocating to really set [Ukrainian] victory as a goal.”
French officials, with the backing of certain optimistic media analyses, claimed to me that Western sanctions are working, and that next year the Russian economy will fall into deep crisis. Maybe, but there are very few signs of this so far. It is in fact EU economies that are stagnating, with 0.4 percent GDP growth in 2023, while Russian GDP grew by 3.6 percent and is expected to grow by a similar figure this year. Reflecting pressure on Germany’s budget and the huge cost of Germany’s own rearmament, the German government in mid-July cut its military aid to Ukraine by half, to 4 billion euros.
Meanwhile, according to opinion polls, European public support for continuing the war is visibly declining, while support for a compromise peace is on the rise. This in turn reflects a deepening domestic political crisis in Europe. The European and French parliamentary elections both saw a surge in support for populist right-wing parties.
Although these largely fell into line behind NATO and EU support for Ukraine in the wake of the Russian invasion, most are increasingly open about their desire for a compromise peace and their opposition to increased aid for Ukraine. In Germany, three state elections are due next month. If these show a strong vote for the right-wing populist Alternative fuer Deutchland (AFD) and the pro-peace left-wing Bundnis Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW), the pressure on the ruling coalition to change course in Ukraine is bound to increase.
As a French journalist remarked to me, “Rats leaving a sinking ship, sure; but whoever heard of rats joining a sinking ship?” Why this determination on the part of European establishments to sign up for a longer cruise on a visibly unseaworthy vessel, in the face of lowering skies, and under an American captain in at least two minds about what course to steer?
In the first place, there is what is called in academia “path dependency” (though there are less polite words for it). In the first months of the war, shock at the invasion, conviction of U.S. support and belief in the possibility of a crushing Russian defeat combined to produce public refusal to contemplate any deal with Moscow. Having nailed themselves so publicly to this mast, European officials and “experts” find it very difficult to reverse themselves in public.
It may also be that, in a familiar historical syndrome, the very depth of the EU internal crisis — and the lack of ideas for solutions — is helping to generate desire to “win” in Ukraine. Economic stagnation and aging populations are putting increasing strain on budgets for health and welfare. Birth rates are among the lowest in the world, but immigration is causing huge social tension and support for the populist Right. In Britain, we see signs of the start of actual ethnic conflict.
The EU example to the rest of the world is thus in visibly poor shape, and this is gradually destroying the mission to “spread European values” that lies at the EU’s very core. Logically, this should lead to a desire for peace with Russia so as to concentrate on urgent domestic challenges. Instead, perhaps subconsciously, “victory” in Ukraine is supposed to cancel all this out and restore European elites’ faith in themselves and the European project.
Perhaps in the end these European syndromes do not really matter much. No U.S. administration, Trump’s included, is going to withdraw from NATO or withdraw all U.S. forces from Europe. That continent is far too valuable to Washington for military bases, economic cooperation against China, and Washington’s self-image as “leader of the Free World.” On the other hand, the Russian establishment has no intention of undergoing the colossal risks of attacking NATO. And whatever Macron may say, no European government (except possibly Poland) is going to go to war with Russia over Ukraine.
So whatever happens, Europe is safe from external demons, though certainly not from internal ones. If the next U.S. administration does carry out a radical change of course on Ukraine, the European establishments will fall into line. All they will need to do is to accept a certain degree of public humiliation at Washington’s hands — and that is something at which they are experts.
