U.S. INDOPACOM commander Admiral Samuel Paparo’s comments on U.S. escorts of Philippine vessels on resupply missions being “entirely reasonable” has taken the jostling in the South China Sea up a notch.
Such missions to a Philippine military position on a beached ship on the Second Thomas Shoal, which China also claims, have drawn coercive responses from Beijing. An egregious example was the serious clash on June 17, during which Chinese coast guard personnel brandished weapons and forcibly boarded Philippine craft.
The latest incidents are however expanding to new sites — most prominently Sabina Shoal, located even closer to Philippines’ shoreline than the Second Thomas Shoal. These have involved blocking and multiple cases of ramming.
Provocative as Chinese behavior is, it is questionable if deeper involvement of the U.S. Navy is the answer. Direct insertion of U.S. troops between the sparring parties would up the ante and dare China to confront the U.S. directly. It would transform the current lower-level incidents into potentially a direct clash between two great powers. The risk-to-reward ratio from the standpoint of U.S. vital interests, not to mention regional stability, does not seem to merit such a step, especially when the jostling is over mere specks in the ocean. This is especially true as some of Washington’s policies are themselves contributing to the escalation. Besides, Manila too has demurred on any such escorts (but has indicated that they are not ruled out in the future.)
Admiral Paparo also mentioned the escorts “in the context of consultations,” a reference to Articles III and V of the 1951 U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT), which calls for such consultations and indicates invocation in case of “armed attack” on one of the parties. Manila itself has stated, in comments soon after the June 17 clash, that Chinese provocations do not rise to the level of “armed attack” thus far. President Marcos meanwhile drew a red line for the MDT’s invocation as the death of even a single Filipino during his remarks at this year’s Shangri La Dialogue in Singapore. Fortunately, we are not there yet.
Whichever way one slices the developments in the South China Sea, it is clear they are incrementally heading toward a military crisis. Avoiding such a crisis by finding a de-escalatory ladder should be the first priority of all three states involved.
Sarang Shidore is Director of the Global South Program at the Quincy Institute, and member of the adjunct faculty at George Washington University. He has published in Foreign Affairs and The New York times, among others. Sarang was previously a senior research scholar at the University of Texas at Austin and senior global analyst at the geopolitical risk firm Stratfor Inc.
A Philippine flag flutters from BRP Sierra Madre, a dilapidated Philippine Navy ship that has been aground since 1999 and became a Philippine military detachment on the disputed Second Thomas Shoal, part of the Spratly Islands, in the South China Sea March 29, 2014. REUTERS/Erik De Castro
Top photo credit: A member of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) sits inside a military aircraft at Qamishli International Airport, after rebels seized the capital and ousted Syria's Bashar al-Assad in Damascus, in Qamishli, Syria December 9, 2024. REUTERS/Orhan Qereman
The signing of an agreement between General Mazloum Abdi, the commander-in-chief of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and interim Syrian ruler Ahmed al-Sharaa on March 10 comes at a critical juncture. It follows nearly two weeks after Kurdish militant leader Abdullah Öcalan called on his followers in the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) to lay down their arms and dissolve the group.
Is there a connection between these two events?
Öcalan’s call for disarmament was not limited to the PKK but extended to “all groups.” Although Abdi distanced himself from this call, stating that it is “not related to us in Syria,” the Turkish ruling parties were quick to claim that Öcalan’s appeal includes the SDF. This assertion plays into Ankara’s long-standing strategy to equate the SDF with the PKK, thereby justifying its continued aggression against Kurdish self-rule in northeastern Syria, known as Rojava (Western) Kurdistan. According to Turkey, Öcalan’s call should lead to the dissolution of all PKK-affiliated groups, including those operating in the Şengal (Sinjar) Mountains in Southern Kurdistan (in Iraq). Ankara has long viewed the SDF as an extension of the PKK, justifying its repeated military interventions in the region. However, the persistence of these groups, despite Turkish pressure, underscores the broader resistance to Ankara’s influence across Kurdistani territories.
Turkey has consistently sought to dismantle Kurdish autonomy in Syria, aiming to establish a pro-Turkish administration in the region. The agreement signed by Abdi serves to counteract Ankara’s maneuvering. Although it does contain a provision about integrating “all civil and military institutions in northeastern Syria into the administration of the Syrian state, including border crossings, the airport, and oil and gas fields,” the merger of the SDF with the Syrian army does not outright imply disarmament. However, it strongly suggests that the SDF will no longer function as an independent entity. If all “civil and military institutions” are to be integrated into the Syrian army, it casts serious doubt on the future of self-administration in the region. Additionally, the fate of Rojava’s unique political institutions remains uncertain.
The agreement also includes a commitment to a “ceasefire on all Syrian territories.” This is a crucial clause, particularly in light of recent massacres committed by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the dominant force in Damascus. Alawite forces loyal to the ousted Assad regime had launched attacks against the government forces, prompting this retaliation, underscoring the necessity of such a provision. For the Kurds, this ceasefire is more than a political statement. It is a protective measure ensuring their survival under Rojava self-administration, which has been in place since 2012.
Another significant dimension of this agreement is the role of the United States. A U.S. helicopter shuttled General Abdi to Damascus to sign the memorandum. The presence of U.S. forces in SDF-controlled areas means that the implementation of any agreement must not put American troops at risk of confrontation with Turkey or Turkish-backed factions, including HTS and the Free Syrian Army (FSA). The FSA has long been a tool of Turkish influence in Syria, waging relentless attacks against Kurdish forces around Tishreen dam and Kobani since the fall of the Assad regime last December. Given this complex landscape, any agreement that preserves Kurdish autonomy while maintaining American support is a diplomatic success for the SDF. While Abdi’s maneuvering secures Kurdish protection, it may not align perfectly with the strategic goals of Israel, which has extended its support to the Kurds. However, none of the agreement’s provisions poses a threat to Israeli interests. Historically, the Kurds’ struggle for self-determination, either in form of autonomy or independence, has not conflicted with Israeli security concerns.
For Israel, a stable and secular Kurdish-controlled region is preferable to an Islamic Sunni regime aligned with Turkey or extremist factions. The prospect of a Turkey-backed Sunni Islamist government on Israel’s borders is a scenario Israelis would strongly oppose. Although the SDF-controlled areas do not share a border with Israel, unlike the Druze community to whom Israel has already committed to defending, the agreement ultimately does not undermine the broader strategic alignment between Israel and the Kurds.
The agreement is set to be implemented by the end of 2025, leaving a nine-month window during which developments in Syria’s volatile landscape could prompt adjustments. Given the absence of implementation guarantees, domestic or international, and the limited information about behind-the-scenes developments among all involved parties, various players such as Israel, Turkey, Iran, Russia, the UK, France, and Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, Qatar, and the interim government itself could push for modifications.
However, General Abdi’s pre-emptive engagement with Syria’s interim government is a strategically calculated maneuver, designed at least for now to block Turkey’s regional aspirations and efforts to disarm the Kurds and dissolve their self-rule. By ensuring a ceasefire and maintaining U.S. approval, the deal serves as a counterweight to Ankara’s plans. Although it introduces new variables into the regional equation, its ultimate impact could be positive in the long run. For this strategy to be truly sustainable and legitimate, any future political framework for Rojava Kurdistan should be carried out in direct consultation with the Kurdish people there.
Top image credit: U.S. President Donald Trump holds a chart of military hardware sales as he welcomes Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in the Oval Office at the White House in Washington, U.S., March 20, 2018. REUTERS/Jonathan Ernst
President Trump is working on delivering what could be a big win for U.S. arms contractors. Politico Pro reported on Thursday that the White House is currently “drafting an executive order aimed at streamlining the federal government’s process of selling weapons overseas.”
The text of the executive order has not yet been released, but a source familiar with the order confirmed it will boost arms contractor interests and reduce congressional oversight by stripping down parts of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), the law that governs the arms export process.
Close observers of the process say the order may track some initiatives promoted by the Biden administration, but worry about the possibility of significant weakening of the AECA. Among the Biden efforts to speed arms sales was the use of a “Tiger Team” to eliminate bottlenecks that were seen as slowing weapons deliveries to Israel. Former State Department official Josh Paul, who resigned over continued U.S. arms supplies to Israel despite its campaign of mass slaughter in Gaza, criticized Biden’s move.
“This shows that at all levels of government, from policy to implementation, the Biden Administration is doing all it can to rush arms to Israel despite President Biden’s recent explicit statement that Israel’s bombing of Gaza is ‘indiscriminate,’ and despite extensive reporting that the arms we are providing are causing massive civilian casualties,” he said back in December 2023.
The question is how widely a Trump administration initiative to rush weapons out the door will be applied, and how consistently it will be enforced. Given evidence to date from other policy areas, the Trump administration is likely to vigorously implement any pro-industry provisions of the new executive order. But only the formal release of the order will reveal how big a change the new policy will be from the Biden administration’s approach.
The arms industry is “helping shape” the order, according to Politico. Arms manufacturers — who have long criticized the Foreign Military Sales program — now see their opening to push for cutting what they see as red tape, but which may include further reducing essential human rights vetting of proposed sales, spurred by a newfound emphasis on government efficiency.
In January, General Atomics CEO Linden Blue wrote a letter to the Department of Government Efficiency criticizing “buck-passing” in the foreign military sales process and regulations on missiles and unmanned drone exports. Blue said that “execution is fragmented across the Department of State, multiple DoD agencies, and the military services, with none of them able to direct the others.” The new executive order will likely minimize the State Department’s role in the foreign military sales process while giving more deference to the Pentagon.
And it seems like Trump is listening. Out of one side of his mouth, the president lambastes the defense industry and their proponents as war profiteers; “I will expel the warmongers from our national security state and carry out a much needed clean up of the military industrial complex to stop the war profiteering and to always put America first,” he said on the campaign trail in Milwaukee.
Some inside the beltway appear to take this threat to arms exports seriously, namely in response to Trump's decision to pause funding to Ukraine. In an article titled, "How Trump is Killing the US Defense Industry,” an Atlantic Council senior fellow sounded the alarm that the "erosion" of the military industrial-complex had arrived, pointing to Lockheed Martin's stock dropping from $500 a share to $450.
But out of the other side of his mouth, Trump extols his record in enabling the very same warmongers to sell arms to destabilizing regimes. His first trip abroad as president in 2017 was to Saudi Arabia, which was then engaged in a military intervention in Yemen, where he proposed a staggering $110 billion arms sale. Major arms sale notifications reached an all time high, adjusted for inflation, under Trump’s stewardship. The Biden Administration continued the breakneck pace of sales set by Trump, despite policies on paper that acted as little more than a fig leaf to elevate human rights and civilian harm into consideration of the arms exports process.
Back in office, Trump has picked up right where he left off, with over $17 billion in major arms sales approved so far this year. On Thursday, the State Department announced the approval of another 2,000 laser-guided rockets to Saudi Arabia.
The AECA gives Congress authority to block major arms sales by passing a joint resolution of disapproval. This has yet to happen, since Congress would need a veto-proof majority; Congress invoked the AECA in an attempt to block arms sales to Saudi Arabia in the wake of the murder of Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi, only for Trump to promptly veto its effort. He justified his continued arming of Saudi Arabia because of the revenue it brought to major U.S. weapons contractors like Raytheon (now RTX) and Lockheed Martin — companies that produced bombs used by the Royal Saudi Air Force that were involved in prominent cases of killing of civilians.
It’s unclear what aspects of the AECA may be stripped, but defense contractors need more oversight, not less. Other Trump administration initiatives that may aid arms exporters large and small were decisions to suspend enforcement of laws prohibiting overseas bribery by U.S. companies, and revealing the beneficial owners of shell companies that are used for everything from money laundering and illicit arms trafficking.
Congress should oppose efforts to make it easier to export weapons by further reducing government vetting. Given the frequency with which U.S. weapons end up with aggressor nations and anti-democratic regimes, this is no time to be rushing them out the door without careful consideration of whether they serve long-term U.S. interests or foster peace and stability in key regions.
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Top photo credit: UNITED STATES - MARCH 17: President Donald Trump is seen on a monitor watching footage of military strikes on Yemen’s Houthi rebels, as Karoline Leavitt, White House press secretary, conducts a press briefing on Monday, March 17, 2025. (Tom Williams/CQ Roll Call/Sipa USA)
Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth told Fox News last weekend that the U.S. military had launched operations against the Houthis in Yemen because "ships haven't been able to go through for over a year without being shot at." He then said that in December-ish (not giving a specific date) that "we sent a ship through, it was shot at 17 times."
Military sources who spoke to Military.com are puzzled because there were two attacks they know of in December against a merchant vessel and U.S. warships but "the munitions used didn't appear to add up to 17." Then nothing after that, until of course, March 16, when Houthis launched missiles and a drone against the USS Harry S. Truman aircraft carrier in the Red Sea in response to the U.S. airstrikes on March 15. They were intercepted.
Reporter Konstanin Toropin said as of Thursday, "the Pentagon and Trump administration had yet to fully explain what prompted the resumption of operations against the Iranian-backed rebel group after months of relative quiet in the Red Sea." When he asked specifically, he was directed to public statements by Trump and other officials, but those have been less than clarifying.
Defense officials did tell Military.com that the air campaign could go on for a month "or so" and that there "there is also less reluctance to hold off striking targets based on the casualties that may result." They also said there was "a very clear end state to this." But as Toropin pointed out, the officials he spoke with would not "go into detail about what specific aims they were trying to achieve."
U.S. airstrikes began targeting Houthi infrastructure in Yemen last weekend but are now going into the sixth day and are hitting the capital of Sana'a and residential areas, according to reports. "Dozens of people" were killed in the initial strikes, and there have been reports of civilian casualties, but the mainstream media appears not to have no information on that.
The Houthis had pledged to restart their attacks on Israeli-linked vessels since Israel broke the ceasefire with Hamas last week and renewed its incursions and bombardments of Gaza, insisting that Hamas must turn over its hostages before it stops. Some 500 Palestinians have been killed there just in just the last few days.
Meanwhile, a single Houthi missile was reportedly intercepted yesterday, heading towards Israel.
Trump has vowed to "annihilate" the Houthis and link their every move to Iran. The Pentagon, meanwhile, says "Houthi terrorists have launched missiles and one-way attack drones at U.S. warships over 170 times and at commercial vessels 145 times since 2023." The spokesman doesn't say that the vast majority of the attacks were thwarted before they did any damage and no American or anyone else has been injured or killed in the attacks (Houthis did detain a crew of a seized merchant vessel for 14 months but released them in January. No one is diminishing their plight).
Moreover, Houthi attacks have caused economic disruption as merchant ships in a minority of cases have been damaged and global shipping, mostly connected to European commerce, has been rerouted away from the region. The Washington Post says the industry largely doesn't plan on returning to the Red Sea routes anytime soon, but "has largely adapted to the disruption, and has even profited from the surge in shipping rates." Defense Priorities military analyst Jennifer Kavanagh says "freedom of navigation" is a core U.S. interest when disruptions are impeding U.S. economic security, but in this case, it is not.
"First, U.S. vital interests and economic security are not at risk in the Red Sea, even if Houthi attacks continue. Second, U.S. military operations have not deterred or degraded the Houthis in a meaningful way and are unlikely to be so going forward, even if Trump expands the target list."
But the U.S. appears committed to fighting this war alone anyway, and is expending not limitless resources (over $1 billion in the anti-Houthi operations since October 2023) with no congressional war authority, or any obvious oversight at all. Washington is just too distracted.
Interestingly, Trump has all but pledged to "rain hell" on another country (Yemen) to destroy a militant group (Houthis) much like the Israeli government has vowed to relentlessly bomb Gaza to destroy Hamas. "Tremendous damage has been inflicted upon the Houthi barbarians, and watch how it will get progressively worse — It’s not even a fair fight, and never will be," Trump said on his Truth Social. "They will be completely annihilated!"
Analysts have long questioned, however, given the capabilities and guerrilla-like tactics of both groups, whether the goals of "destruction" can ever achieved without crippling the civilian populations of each place and diminishing the resources and credibility of the more powerful states.
“The idea that it is possible to destroy Hamas, to make Hamas vanish — that is throwing sand in the eyes of the public,” Israel Defense Forces (IDF) spokesman Rear Adm. Daniel Hagari said in June 2024 before his words were "clarified" by the government. They turned out, so far, to be very prescient.
For whatever reason the Hegseth-led Pentagon is doing this, it might want to consider the consequences short and longterm — the limits on our already stretched military and the instability/humanitarian crisis it will cause in Yemen after "a month or so" of airstrikes. If that is not compelling enough, how about the constant danger that this is putting our Navy in, and for what? For shipping costs? For Israel? To send a "message" to Iran, which likely no longer has control over the Houthis anyway?
Perhaps this is too much of a price to pay and we keep our powder dry for actual national security threats, and interests, to come.
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