Some advocates of an end to the Israeli military’s ongoing slaughter of Palestinians in Gaza have seen signs of hope in the Biden administration’s recent shift in rhetoric on the conflict, as well as its decision to abstain on a U.N. resolution calling for a ceasefire. The hope was that the administration was moving — albeit far too slowly — towards conditioning continued military aid to Israel on a ceasefire and an end to the shameful practice of blocking humanitarian aid at a time when large numbers of Gazans are on the brink of starvation.
The optimistic interpretation of the direction of Biden policy has been destroyed by the administration’s recent actions, from apparently giving the green light to an $18 billion transfer of F-15 combat aircraft to the Israeli Air Force.
Although the planes might not be delivered for years, agreeing to provide them in the midst of Israel’s war on Gaza sends a signal of support that runs contrary to the administration’s claims to be pressing the Netanyahu government to avoid civilian casualties and clear the way for humanitarian aid shipments. Of more immediate concern is a report by the Washington Post that the administration is poised to send thousands of bombs to Israel, including “2,000-pound bombs have been linked to previous mass-casualty events throughout Israel’s military campaign in Gaza.”
The sad truth is that there have been zero consequences from Washington for Israel’s crimes in Gaza. Regardless of the rhetoric, the weapons keep flowing and the killing continues. The Biden administration’s argument that it is simply giving Israel the means to defend itself willfully ignores the fact that killing over 32,000 people and attempting to deny them food and other essential goods goes far beyond defense, to the point that the International Court of Justice has suggested that Israel’s actions could “plausibly” be considered a campaign of genocide.
Even worse, the tragedy in Gaza has been compounded by Israel’s attack on Iran’s consulate in Syria, which has increased the chances of a wider Middle East war which could easily draw in U.S. personnel.
To put it bluntly, the policies of the current Israeli government are diametrically opposed to U.S. interests, and to the prospects for peace and stability in the Middle East. Cutting off arms supplies until the Netanyahu government stops the killing in Gaza and pledges to stop attacks on neighboring countries is not just a humanitarian gesture — it is essential to securing a peaceful, stable, forward looking Middle East, which should be in the interest of the entire international community.
President Biden’s stubborn attachment to a policy of “Israel Right or Wrong” is doing serious damage to U.S., regional, and global interests.
William D. Hartung is a senior research fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. His work focuses on the arms industry and U.S. military budget.
In half a century of public life, U.S. President Joe Biden has demonstrated unwavering support for Israel. In this photo Biden is welcomed by Israeli Prime Minster Benjamin Netanyahu, as he visits Israel amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas, in Tel Aviv, Israel, October 18, 2023. REUTERS/Evelyn Hockstein/File Photo
When the Ukraine aid bill hit President Joe Biden’s desk Wednesday, everything was already in place to speed up its impact. The Pentagon had worked overtime to prepare a massive, $1 billion weapons shipment that it could start sending “within hours” of the president’s signature. American officials even pre-positioned many of the arms in European stockpiles, an effort that will surely help get the materiel to the frontlines that much faster.
For Ukraine, the new aid package is massive, both figuratively and literally. Congress authorized roughly $60 billion in new spending related to the war, $37 billion of which is earmarked for weapons transfers and purchases. The new funding pushes Washington’s investment in Ukraine’s defense to well over $150 billion since 2022.
Beyond new weapons, the new outlays also provide a much-needed morale boost for Ukrainian soldiers, who have struggled to hold the line against Russia as their stockpiles have dwindled. But the key question remains the same as it did last week: Does Ukraine have a real chance to turn the tide and win the war?
Experts say it’s a mixed bag at best. On the plus side, the new aid dramatically reduces the chance of near-term disaster, like a collapse of the Ukrainian frontlines followed by a rapid Russian advance.
But the assistance has a limited impact on the fundamentals of the conflict, including Ukraine’s growing disadvantage when it comes to manpower. Put simply, the package can only help if Kyiv manages to dramatically expand the number of fighters at its disposal ahead of an expected Russian counteroffensive this summer.
“I would expect the situation to probably continue to deteriorate over the next three months, but if mobilization goes according to plan and the U.S. aid is unblocked then the situation should improve from autumn onwards,” a relatively optimistic Polish analyst told Reuters.
Ukraine recognizes this bind and is pulling out all the stops to swell the ranks of its military. Following the passage of a new law broadening eligibility for conscription, Kyiv temporarily suspended all consular services for military-age Ukrainian men living abroad — unless, of course, they need help to come home and join up. Ukraine is also offering incentives to boost voluntary recruitment, including new rules that allow recruits to choose their unit and specialization, as well as the length of time they will serve.
But none of these efforts will pay off before a likely Russian offensive this summer, meaning that Ukraine may well lose more territory this year. The outcome of Russia’s offensive will also provide an important indicator of Ukraine’s chances for long-term success, especially given the impact that even minor Russian advances could have on the internal politics of Kyiv’s backers.
When it comes to potential peace talks, the new aid package provides some notable upsides. “Importantly, it could reduce Russian optimism about the long game and thus make Moscow more inclined to compromise,” Samuel Charap of the RAND Corporation told Politico.
But that advantage remains hypothetical so long as both Kyiv and Washington remain committed to retaking all of Ukraine’s pre-2014 territory, according to George Beebe of the Quincy Institute, which publishes Responsible Statecraft.
“Additional aid would be justified — indeed, it would arguably be required — if it were to be used as leverage in a broader diplomatic strategy for negotiating a compromise settlement of the war,” wrote Beebe, who previously led Russia analysis at the CIA. “But it is tied to no such strategy.”
Beebe fears that, without a clear strategy for victory at the negotiating table, the new aid package “will almost guarantee that Ukraine will continue throwing its dwindling reserves of manpower into a war it cannot win.”
In other diplomatic news related to the war in Ukraine:
— Ukraine and Russia agreed to return a group of displaced children to their home countries following the countries’ first known face-to-face negotiations in months, according to France 24. The exact details of the swap remain murky. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said 16 Ukrainian children returned home via the Qatari-mediated deal, while Russian officials claimed that 29 Ukrainian minors and 19 Russian children would be repatriated.
The swap showed rare progress on a particularly thorny issue for the warring parties. Ukraine alleges that Russia essentially kidnapped Ukrainian children in Russian-occupied areas and forcibly shipped them out of Ukraine, a claim that has led to charges against Russian officials at the International Criminal Court. Moscow, for its part, claims that the children were mostly orphans who were sent away from the frontlines for their own safety.
— The Biden administration secretly sent long-range missiles to Ukraine after securing promises that the weapons would only be used to hit targets within Ukrainian territory, according to CNN. Washington had previously chosen not to give Kyiv the missiles due to fears about potential escalation as well as dwindling Western stockpiles. While the risk of escalation remains, increased missile production led the Pentagon to drop its readiness concerns.
— The Ukraine aid package quietly authorized the Biden administration to seize up to $5 billion in Russian assets held within the United States in order to help fund Ukraine’s war effort, AP News reported. In theory, the White House could start confiscating the money before the end of the year, though AP notes that Biden plans to work with allies on a coordinated set of seizures, which could delay the move. Such coordination would provide cover for European Union states that collectively hold over $200 billion in Russian assets. Moscow has pledged to fight any asset seizures in court and said it will retaliate in kind if the West moves forward with the plan.
U.S. State Department news:
In a Tuesday press briefing, State Department spokesperson Vedant Patel condemned Russia’s imprisonment of Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich and called for his immediate release. “Russia should stop using individuals like Evan Gershkovich and Paul Whelan, who has also been detained for five years, as bargaining chips,” Patel said. “Evan and Paul should be released immediately.”
The tit-for-tat strikes between Iran and Israel wrapped up, for now, on April 19 with Israel hitting Iranian targets around the city of Isfahan, with no casualties — just like the Iranian strike on Israel on April 14, which, in turn, was a response to an earlier Israeli bombing of the Iranian consulate in Damascus, Syria, with seven Iranian military officers killed.
That both Israel and Iran seemed to message their preference for de-escalation at this point is encouraging. However, the conditions for a re-escalation remain in place. Iran’s proxies in Syria and Lebanon keep posing a strategic security challenge for Israel. However, simply returning to the status-quo prior to April 1, when Israel bombed hostile targets at will (including the Iranian consulate in Syria) would no longer be tolerable for Tehran as it would violate the “new equation” described by IRGC commander Hossein Salami after the strike on Israel, namely, that henceforth Iran would directly respond to any Israeli attack on Iranian interests or citizens — broad enough a definition to cover the Iranian proxies as well. The dynamics that led to the April cycle of strikes and counterstrikes could thus be re-edited any time, with a far more destructive consequences, if it is not replaced with something else.
The time has thus come to entertain a radical idea: Tel-Aviv and Tehran have to move towards direct talks, initially through intermediaries, to agree on some principles of co-existence in the region. Political costs for doing so may look unpalatable for both sides at the moment. However, the alternative — a slide towards a full-scale war — would be even less appealing.
The strike on Israel is a continuation of the Iranian tactic to “escalate to de-escalate.” It was deployed on the nuclear file where Iran’s incremental violations of the JCPOA following the U.S. withdrawal from the agreement were designed to pressure other sides to deliver on their own commitments. Iran’s strike on the Saudi oil fields in 2019 was a precursor to a process that eventually led to a relative normalization of ties with Riyadh in 2023.
Admittedly, following the same path with Israel is fraught with additional difficulties. It is often alleged that Iran’s ideological hostility to Israel would preclude any talking with the “Zionist entity.” However, right from its outset, the Islamic Republic catalogued the “Wahhabi Saudi monarchy” as an enemy too, which did not prevent it from occasionally seeking a détente with Riyadh. Iran’s leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei may harbor a particular political and personal animus against Israel, but he is also known to display a pragmatic streak in matters of the national interest, as the limited nature of Iran’s strike on Israel attests.
Moreover, Khamenei is 85, and his successors may well turn out to be less ideological on Israel than he is. On a more strategic level, there is an ongoing debate in the Iranian elite and society about the extent to which hostility to Israel should keep conditioning Iran’s national security, foreign policy and economic prospects: as long as the conflict persists in its current form, not only are full normalization of Iran’s ties with the United States and Europe unthinkable but they will also be a source of tensions with Iran’s neighbors in the Arab world, Turkey, Azerbaijan and even partners like Russia and China. More immediately, for all the IRGC’s recent bouts of self-confidence, Israel remains a formidable military adversary, with the strongest army in the Middle East, and nuclear weapons.
From Israel’s standpoint, its conventional military superiority does not guarantee it invulnerability from the swarms of Iranian drones and precision strikes of its missiles. In fact, as the strike on April 14 has shown, even defenses as sophisticated as Israel’s cannot guarantee a 100% immunity given that 9 out of 30 ballistic missiles evaded the Iron Dome and struck several Israeli air force targets on two military bases.
Given Israel’s small territory, with a high level of concentration of valuable economic, infrastructure and military targets, any penetration of its air defenses could be highly damaging. Even more troublingly, the progress of the Iranian nuclear program after the derailment of the JCPOA (unwisely urged by the Israeli leadership) opens a prospect of those missiles to be armed with nuclear warheads.
While Israel can re-establish a short-term escalation dominance by striking back at Iran’s proxies or targets in Iran itself, it cannot win a protracted war against a 90 million-strong nation. While Israel retains strong support in both main political parties in the United States, it does not mean that Washington will get directly involved in a war with Iran — Biden’s urgings not to escalate testify to that. A possible comeback to the White House of his Republican rival Donald Trump might change that. Trump did after all signal he was willing to initiate a war with Iran by assassinating IRGC commander Qassem Suleimani. But even then, Trump faced considerable pressure from his political allies not to take the matter further.
In a longer term, even a bipartisan support for Israel in the U.S. could erode, albeit for different reasons: Democrats are increasingly repelled by Israel’s conduct of war in Gaza, while Republicans are growing skeptical of the U.S. entanglements in overseas conflicts on behalf of foreign nations.
There is a strong case, then, for both Iran and Israel to abandon the escalatory path and try to iron out some principles of co-existence in the region. Given the current state of hostility, it will require intermediaries trusted by both sides, such as Oman, possibly Qatar, Switzerland or Norway. The U.S. and EU cannot play that role due to their heavy pro-Israeli bias, but they should at least discreetly support such talks.
The Middle East has just stepped back from the brink of collapse. There are helpful ideas floating around about a “grand bargain” that would address all the conflicts in the region in a comprehensive manner. However, the long history of the Middle Eastern failures — the Oslo peace process between Israelis and Palestinians, derailment of the JCPOA, and finally the October 7 war — suggest that without achieving a modicum of co-existence between Israel and Iran, such schemes would remain inviable.
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ZHYTOMYR REGION, UKRAINE - APRIL 23, 2024 - Soldiers get instructions before the start of the drills of the Liut (Fury) Brigade of the National Police of Ukraine at a training area in Zhytomyr region, northern Ukraine. (Photo by Ukrinform/Ukrinform/Sipa USA) via REUTERS
If Washington were intentionally to design a formula for Ukraine’s destruction, it might look a lot like the aid package passed by Congress this week.
Of course, that is not the impression one gets from celebratory reactions to the legislation in Ukraine, Congress, and the media. The package “sends a unified message to the entire world: America will always defend democracy in its time of need,” said Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.).
“This support will really strengthen the armed forces of Ukraine,” commented Ukrainian President Zelensky, adding, “and we will have a real chance at victory.”
"We will stand with Ukraine until victory is won," proclaimed House Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries (D-N.Y.).
Such triumphalism is misplaced. The package includes enough military and economic support to sustain Kyiv’s hopes for a few more months, but nowhere near enough to defeat Russian forces. Of the roughly $61 billion it allocates, $14 billion is reserved for procuring weapons for Ukraine, and it includes an additional $8 billion in financial support to help keep the Ukrainian government afloat. The bulk of the package, however, will go toward replenishing America’s own diminished military stockpiles — which will take years to accomplish — and funding its broader operations in the region.
Some of Ukraine’s more sober-minded supporters concede as much. The package “will provide both a materiel and morale boost,” according to Washington Post columnist Max Boot, but “much more needs to be done. To wrest the battlefield advantage from Russia and to convince its dictator that he cannot win his cruel war of conquest … more U.S. aid will be necessary in the future.” Those hailing the package see the new aid as a holding action, staving off a collapse of Ukraine’s lines and buying time for the West to ramp up military production. This would allow Ukraine new opportunities to regain the offensive in 2025 and beyond.
This optimistic view ignores a discouraging reality, however. The package will not bridge the enormous gap between Russia’s artillery, bomb, and missile production and that of Ukraine and its Western supporters, because the West simply lacks the manufacturing capacity to meet Ukraine’s massive needs, and this will be the case for many years to come. Congressional funding can enable procurement orders, but it cannot create machinists and other skilled workers necessary to man new factories. And it cannot address the enormous manpower disparity between Ukraine, whose birth rate has plunged to one the lowest in the world, and Russia, which has almost five times the population and one of the highest birth rates in Europe.
Moreover, one key to the success of such a long-term approach is America’s own ability to provide Ukraine with large aid packages for many years to come. But the controversies in Congress over this package, coupled with trends in opinion polls that show growing American public skepticism about the war, strongly suggest that such largesse is not politically viable for much longer.
Additional aid would be justified — indeed, it would arguably be required — if it were to be used as leverage in a broader diplomatic strategy for negotiating a compromise settlement of the war that would secure Ukraine and allow its reconstruction while addressing Russian security concerns. But it is tied to no such strategy. The fact that the new aid package includes language requiring the Biden administration to articulate a strategy within 45 days after enactment is a testimony to its absence.
Does the White House intend to pursue negotiations after the November elections, when it might have greater political room to deal with Russia? Does it indeed believe that Ukraine can ultimately drive Russian forces off all of its territory, even though its counteroffensive clearly failed in 2023, when it had significantly more troops and weapons? Or does it intend to be Ukraine’s military benefactor for many years to come, keeping fingers crossed that it can maintain a battlefield stalemate or that Russia will break before the much smaller and much poorer Ukraine collapses?
Absent answers to these questions, the new aid is spending that lacks a coherent plan for making it effective. That makes it a formula for prolonging, not ending, the war. It will almost guarantee that Ukraine will continue throwing its dwindling reserves of manpower into a war it cannot win, and which is wreaking ever more havoc on Ukraine’s infrastructure and its prospects for future prosperity. It will amount to both a waste of money and, even more disturbingly, a waste of Ukrainian lives.