Some advocates of an end to the Israeli military’s ongoing slaughter of Palestinians in Gaza have seen signs of hope in the Biden administration’s recent shift in rhetoric on the conflict, as well as its decision to abstain on a U.N. resolution calling for a ceasefire. The hope was that the administration was moving — albeit far too slowly — towards conditioning continued military aid to Israel on a ceasefire and an end to the shameful practice of blocking humanitarian aid at a time when large numbers of Gazans are on the brink of starvation.
The optimistic interpretation of the direction of Biden policy has been destroyed by the administration’s recent actions, from apparently giving the green light to an $18 billion transfer of F-15 combat aircraft to the Israeli Air Force.
Although the planes might not be delivered for years, agreeing to provide them in the midst of Israel’s war on Gaza sends a signal of support that runs contrary to the administration’s claims to be pressing the Netanyahu government to avoid civilian casualties and clear the way for humanitarian aid shipments. Of more immediate concern is a report by the Washington Post that the administration is poised to send thousands of bombs to Israel, including “2,000-pound bombs have been linked to previous mass-casualty events throughout Israel’s military campaign in Gaza.”
The sad truth is that there have been zero consequences from Washington for Israel’s crimes in Gaza. Regardless of the rhetoric, the weapons keep flowing and the killing continues. The Biden administration’s argument that it is simply giving Israel the means to defend itself willfully ignores the fact that killing over 32,000 people and attempting to deny them food and other essential goods goes far beyond defense, to the point that the International Court of Justice has suggested that Israel’s actions could “plausibly” be considered a campaign of genocide.
Even worse, the tragedy in Gaza has been compounded by Israel’s attack on Iran’s consulate in Syria, which has increased the chances of a wider Middle East war which could easily draw in U.S. personnel.
To put it bluntly, the policies of the current Israeli government are diametrically opposed to U.S. interests, and to the prospects for peace and stability in the Middle East. Cutting off arms supplies until the Netanyahu government stops the killing in Gaza and pledges to stop attacks on neighboring countries is not just a humanitarian gesture — it is essential to securing a peaceful, stable, forward looking Middle East, which should be in the interest of the entire international community.
President Biden’s stubborn attachment to a policy of “Israel Right or Wrong” is doing serious damage to U.S., regional, and global interests.
William D. Hartung is a senior research fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. His work focuses on the arms industry and U.S. military budget.
In half a century of public life, U.S. President Joe Biden has demonstrated unwavering support for Israel. In this photo Biden is welcomed by Israeli Prime Minster Benjamin Netanyahu, as he visits Israel amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas, in Tel Aviv, Israel, October 18, 2023. REUTERS/Evelyn Hockstein/File Photo
Top image credit: President Lula, Celso Amorim Chief Advisor of the Special Advisory to the President of the Republic, and Minister Mauro Vieira. The President of Brazil, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, receives a visit from the President of Croatia Zoran Milanovic, for a Bilateral meeting and lunch in Brasília, DF, Brazil, on June 3, 2024. (Photo by Ton Molina/Fotoarena/Sipa USA)
Three months into the Trump administration, there has been a conspicuous lack of confrontation with Brazil’s Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. The president of Latin America’s largest nation is an elder statesman of the global left and made clear his preference for the Democratic nominee in last year’s presidential race.
He has also hammered Elon Musk for the explicit way he has sought to undermine Brazilian law as it relates to Twitter/X operations in his country, insisting last September that “the world is not obliged to put up with Musk’s extreme right-wing anything goes just because he’s rich.”
Now, of course, Musk is perhaps the central policy player in Trump’s government. Yet compared to Gustavo Petro of Colombia, who forcefully and very publicly challenged Trump’s deportation policies as they concerned his country, Lula’s government has been restrained, opting for a behind-the-scenes engagement strategy that emphasizes the preservation of open diplomatic channels.
This approach does not merely reflect Brazil’s hope of avoiding Trump’s wrath; in fact, Lula will almost certainly sharpen his critiques of Trump during next year’s presidential campaign. Rather, the move to deliberately avoid provoking Trump more likely stems from the conclusion that the type of disruption he represents may offer novel opportunities for Brazil to deepen the foreign policy orientation Lula has embraced since his first stint in office from 2003-2011. The architect of that strategy, which prioritizes Brazilian leadership in a strong, unified South America and a dogged independence on the world stage, is Celso Amorim.
Amorim was Lula’s foreign minister during the entirety of his first two terms and minister of defense under Lula’s hand-picked successor, President Dilma Rousseff, from 2011 to 2014. Currently, he is Lula’s most important foreign policy adviser. Amorim normally shies away from the public spotlight, but he recently offered a glimpse into his current thinking.
Amorim sees some potential positives in Trump’s geopolitical shakeup. For one thing, he clearly welcomes Washington’s efforts to reengage Russia.
“I think Trump looks at the vast expanse of Russia, a country that spans 12 time zones, and imagines the investment possibilities,” he said during a recent interview. “He doesn't want to be at odds with Russia.” He also referred to Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s comments that the U.S. doesn’t want to see Russia as “totally dependent on China” nor enemies with Beijing as a “surprisingly sensible statement.” ‘
Talks between Trump and Russian president Vladimir Putin should be welcomed in the name of peace, Amorim argues. After returning to power in January 2023, Lula eagerly sought to aid in negotiating an end to the war in Ukraine. Such efforts never gained the support of the Biden administration — National Security Council spokesman John Kirby accused Lula of “parroting Russian and Chinese propaganda” — and went nowhere. Now, however, the U.S. president is making points similar to what Lula was saying two years ago.
“In his conversation with [Ukrainian President Volodymyr] Zelensky [in early March at the White House], which was very crude,” Amorim observes, “Trump said something interesting: ‘He [Zelensky] wants victory. I want peace.’ And that's true too.”
Predictably, Amorim is now linking the latest developments on this front back to the long-held Brazilian aspiration for greater international influence. Eventually, he posits, “they will have to multilateralize the process,” referring to attempts to end the war in Ukraine, “not least to avoid the natural frictions that exist between Russia and the U.S. Let things evolve. At the right time, we will, yes, have a role to play.”
As the fourth-largest democracy in the world and the producer of much of the world’s food, Brazil is not easy overlooked. This is especially true, as Amorim often reminds his interlocutors, given Brazil’s central role in important international fora like BRICS. Noting Lula’s upcoming foreign travel, including trips to Russia and China, Amorim stressed in the interview both that Lula remains engaged and personally undeterred as he seeks to continue carving out a lasting foreign policy legacy and that Brazil is not just a regional heavyweight. Instead, he said, Brazil “is part of the global South, active, together with the two largest powers in the world besides the U.S. It does not mean that we want to fight with the U.S., but we are showing that we have options. And this helps us to have influence on other issues as well.”
Amorim made a similar point in a separate interview last month, saying there is no anti-Western hostility to BRICS, which expanded dramatically last year.
“Brazil is, above anything else, a country that wants to defend its position and that of the developing countries without any aggression,” he said, pointing to a history of productive relations with governments of varying ideologies. What BRICS hopes to accomplish — indeed, what it was founded to do, according to Amorim — is to support a more inclusive international system where developing countries have a more substantial role than has often been possible in the U.S.-led postwar order.
“This is very important because it has shown the big Western, capitalist countries that they cannot dictate the rules; they can present initiatives, but they will have to discuss them with us,” he said. “And I think this did not exist because before, the G7 would speak and the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization would just follow. Now it is different.”
The strength of BRICS, Amorim believes, rests in its relative cohesion. Brazil seems less interested in BRICS as an alternative to the United Nations but as another body in which it can exert special influence while remaining deeply committed to eventually earning a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council. For that reason, he argues BRICS should not keep adding new members.
“My message is that the BRICS is a group of developing countries that want prosperity, but also want peace,” he said. “I believe that the world in which we live today is mostly in search of peace. I think it was that Pope Paul VI who said, ‘development is the new name for peace.’ The BRICS is the new name for development.”
Amorim sees a United States under Trump denuded of the frequent hypocrisies of the postwar era. “Sometimes it [hypocrisy] is worth it because it is civilizing. When there are solutions compatible with the rules, the situation always improves,” he said. “The U.S. ended up accepting the rules. I don't see that happening with Trump.”
Yet Amorim, the consummate diplomat, notes that this posture is clarifying — it will be up to Brazil to find fresh opportunities and to strengthen BRICS as well as its own independent activity on the world stage.
While Amorim (and Lula) believe Brazil is simply too big and well-connected not to be involved in the major conversations shaping global politics, it is worth noting that not all Brazilian leaders agree.
Former President Jair Bolsonaro, for example, said in a recent interview that it’s wrong for a Brazilian president to consider himself an equal to an American one. “I knew my place when speaking with [Trump],” Bolsonaro said.
A high court in Brazil has barred Bolsonaro from seeking office until 2030 for his role in undermining the last election, but his position helps elucidate the political stakes of next year’s race in Brazil. The Bolsonaro family, in stark contrast to the independent geopolitical profile the current government has insisted upon, is actively soliciting U.S. intervention in the hope of forcing the former president back into contention. “Me not being on the ballot is a negation of democracy,” he said.
For their part, Amorim and Lula imagine a world after U.S. primacy. They are jointly contributing to the construction of a global order that will be more responsive to their insights, demands, and aspirations. “Our great challenge, in this division of the world,” Amorim said, “is to not be anyone's colony.”
This is the basic tenet of Lula’s foreign policy. It is sure to be vigorously proclaimed and contested at home in the year ahead.
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Top photo credit: Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelensky (paparazzza/shutterstock)
There is no plan in place to fund the Ukrainian budget after 2025.
Even if the war ends by the summer of 2025, it will take some time to reduce military expenditures, leaving European nations on the hook. It’s not clear that European elites have fully understood the political costs, however much longer the war continues.
With intensive, U.S.-brokered negotiations ongoing in Saudi Arabia involving separate Ukrainian and Russian delegations, hopes are rising that the Trump administration will finally be able to bring an end to the war.
But even if the war ends tomorrow, it would be unwise to assume that Ukraine could reduce military spending close to prewar levels.
Ukraine now has almost 900,000 men and women at arms, a threefold increase from peacetime, and that doesn’t take into account irrecoverable losses through death and injury. Estimates vary widely, but the casualty rate is commonly thought to number in the hundreds of thousands, with compensation provided to the injured and families of the deceased.
The war in Ukraine has therefore come at a vast financial cost to that country. Ukraine’s defense spending has risen tenfold since the 2021 budget was announced, when social welfare payments were the country’s biggest expenditure.
This has left a gaping hole in Ukraine’s finances that no amount of tax increases or Western donations will be able to fill over a sustained period without political consequences.
Since 2022, Ukraine has run an average budget deficit of over 22% of GDP. Based on the current exchange rate, Ukraine’s budget shortfall in 2025 amounts to around $41.5 billion. And that assumes defense spending falling slightly this year. In the hopefully unlikely event that war continues to the end of the year, the Ukrainian state would need to revise its budget upwards as it did in 2024.
Today, Ukraine’s domestic revenue, including taxes, excise, and duties, just about covers the cost of the defense effort, which in 2024 accounted for 64% of its total budget expenditure. That includes significant tax increases as the war has gone on. Total tax revenue will have risen by more than 100% since the war started and personal income taxes by over 200%. This in a country in which, according to the Wilson Center, 50% of the population lives at a basic subsistence level.
As Ukraine is cut off from international capital markets, it has had to meet the difference through aid and loans from Western nations.
Put simply, Western donations and loans have paid the salaries of Ukrainian state officials and kept the lights on in their buildings. At the start of the war, donations took the form of free financial aid to meet the country’s budgetary and military needs. According to the Kiel Institute, the United States has provided just above $50 billion in direct budgetary assistance. The European Union provided $51.5 billion in financial assistance – i.e., budgetary support – between 2022 and 2024.
However, since the start of 2024, free aid has progressively shifted to lending as Western governments have felt the political and economic cost of unlimited financial assistance.
So, Ukraine has increasingly resorted to borrowing money. In some regards, that is to be expected. Governments tend to borrow heavily at times of war. The UK only settled its World War II war debts to the United States and Canada in 2006.
Ukrainian debt has therefore soared to over 100% of GDP and, critically, the cost of servicing its debt has tripled, and now makes up the second largest line of expenditure in Ukraine’s budget, after military spending. To put that into context, Ukraine will spend more than twice the amount on servicing its debt in 2025 than it spends on the health of its population. That ratio will only widen the longer the war continues.
Ukraine should just about be able to make ends meet in 2025 thanks to the G7 Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration loan agreed in June 2024. As part of a last-ditch compromise by the outgoing Biden Administration, the $20 billion U.S. contribution to the G7 loan was directed through the World Bank to provide specific project-based support – i.e., to help rebuild power infrastructure - rather than generalized budgetary support.
The crucial point is that I’ve seen no plans for how Ukraine’s budgetary needs will be met from 2026 onward. Even if the war ends tomorrow, Ukraine may still be at risk of running out of money in 2026 if Western donor countries falsely assume that it will be able to return to prewar spending on Day One.
Therefore, the big question is how quickly Ukraine can reduce military spending in 2026 and who will cover the shortfall. To balance the books in 2026, Ukraine would need to reduce its military spending by 80%, or around $41 billion.
But decision-makers in Kyiv may understandably push to maintain a big army against the threat of future Russian aggression. While the huge expenditure in weapons and ammunition from war fighting may fall away, maintaining a standing army, even if its numbers are reduced, would still carry a heavy price. Even if Ukraine’s future budget deficit wasn’t as high as $41 billion, it is easy to imagine that it might be $20 billion.
The International Monetary Fund also doesn’t expect Ukraine to be able to access international lending markets before 2027. That will leave the Ukrainian state reaching out to donor nations for additional funding. With the Trump administration looking to pare back its financial commitments to Ukraine and focus instead on investing, including in minerals, the pressure will be on European states.
There is significant political risk here. In the past few days, the Europeans struggled to agree to an additional weapons package of $5 billion for Ukraine. Funding $20 billion in budgetary support to Ukraine in 2026 following a ceasefire this year may still herald a backlash from those on the nationalist left and right who believe the war should have ended in 2022. I assess the UK and Europe would find it economically and politically unsustainable to prop up the war beyond this year without the United States. That’s another reason why European leaders should get behind ongoing peace negotiations.
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Top image credit: Secretary Marco Rubio arrives in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, February 19, 2025. (Official State Department photo by Freddie Everett)
As Secretary of State Marco Rubio visits the Caribbean this Wednesday, the region's leaders are threading the needle between standing up against threats to their national interests and safeguarding their need for trade, aid, and remittances from their powerful neighbor to the north.
Rubio's upcoming trip to Jamaica and the small, oil-rich countries of Guyana and Suriname will include high-level engagements focused on the rapidly deteriorating security situation in Haiti, the escalating border crisis between Guyana and Venezuela in the disputed Essequibo region, and the rising influence of China in Caribbean trade and political relations, among other issues.
The visit comes weeks after Suriname's foreign minister Albert Ramdin became the first Caribbean leader ever elected to lead the Washington-based Organization of American States (OAS), beating out Rubio's preferred candidate, Paraguay’s foreign minister Ruben Ramirez, and marking a shift away from the U.S.-aligned posture of the OAS's current secretary general, Luis Almagro.
It also comes as Caribbean heads of state have pushed back against an announcement by Rubio to deny entry to foreign officials determined to be contracting Cuban doctors, with nearly all regional leaders vehemently rejecting the administration’s allegations of forced labor and insisting they would rather give up their U.S. visas than jeopardize their public health systems' cooperation with Cuba, the largest Caribbean island.
On Friday, the 15-member Caribbean Community (CARICOM) convened an emergency meeting in anticipation of Rubio’s arrival, which stems from an invitation by the bloc’s president — Barbados’ Prime Minister Mia Amor Mottley, with whom Rubio will meet in Kingston — for President Trump to visit the region. In late February, the State Department’s Special Envoy for Latin America Mauricio Claver-Carone confirmed that he and Rubio would visit sometime in March, holding preliminary talks with Caribbean leaders in Washington amid Ramdin’s OAS election.
Speaking to reporters on Tuesday, Claver-Carone, the architect of “maximum pressure” sanctions against Cuba and Venezuela during Trump’s first term, said the region’s big opportunity is energy security, hoping U.S. oil investment can counter what he referred to as the “extortive” and “corrupt” Petrocaribe initiative developed by Venezuela in the prior decade.
While most policymakers regard the Caribbean as little more than a sunny destination for tourism, it is frequently referred to by security analysts as the United States’ “third border,” a front line in the hemispheric fight against drug and arms trafficking, according to Eric Jacobstein, a Biden administration official responsible for U.S. policy toward the region, writing in the Miami Herald on Monday.
The U.S. is by far the Caribbean's largest trade partner and provider of foreign assistance, and many islands have considerable percentages of their populations living in the U.S., which makes Trump's proposed travel ban — potentially affecting numerous Eastern Caribbean nations — another major threat to island economies dependent on remittances sent from the diaspora.
Ironically, St. Lucia and St. Kitts and Nevis, two of the countries on the leaked draft list, are, together with St. Vincent and the Grenadines, among the last few nations worldwide that have maintained full diplomatic recognition of Taiwan — a U.S. priority in the region — despite also being members of ALBA, the leftist regional alliance led by Cuba and Venezuela.
Yet the U.S. has no diplomatic presence in those countries, Jacobstein argues, urging Rubio to establish at least two new U.S. embassies in the Lesser Antilles to curb Chinese influence — as the Biden administration did in the Pacific Islands — despite announcements by the Trump team that it intends to reduce Washington’s diplomatic footprint worldwide.
Jacobstein also suggests Rubio sustain security assistance through the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative and maintain support for Haiti’s Multinational Security Support mission, which has suffered cuts, despite promised exemptions, as a result of Trump’s foreign aid freeze.
For Caribbean leaders, the prospect of mass deportations to Haiti of hundreds of thousands of migrants who have either had their temporary protected status rescinded or humanitarian parole terminated is also a major concern, potentially compounding the dire and deteriorating economic and security situation on the ground.
Moreover, recent announcements to revoke oil licenses to U.S. and European firms operating in Venezuela and impose 25% tariffs on countries importing Venezuelan oil could derail Trinidad and Tobago’s major natural gas project in Venezuelan territorial waters. It is being developed with oil giant Shell and was given the green light by Biden’s Treasury Department in 2023.
In Jamaica, Rubio is expected to meet with Trinidadian Prime Minister Stuart Young, who was previously in charge of the project and is certain to raise the Dragon gas field and request a license extension to continue exploration and commence production by 2028.
In Guyana — a country with less than one million inhabitants that has garnered significant attention in U.S. energy, defense and policy circles since it began extracting its offshore oil reserves in 2019 with the help of ExxonMobil — Rubio will meet with officials who have spent considerable resources lobbying Washington for greater attention in recent years.
Last month, Trump’s first-term ambassador to the OAS and nominee for the State Department’s top Latin America post, Carlos Trujillo, registered with the Department of Justice as a foreign agent for Guyana’s foreign ministry through his firm, Continental Strategy LLC, to help the country “increase U.S. trade and investment” and “enhance Guyana’s profile in the United States.”
Trujillo, a Cuban-American former Florida state representative with close ties to Rubio and Trump’s re-election campaign, will be compensated $300,000 for the six-month contract.
But even as Guyanese president Irfaan Ali has cultivated strong ties in Washington, aided by his intimate relationship with a U.S. oil major, other Trump policies have become a significant cause for concern, according to Bloomberg. At the emergency CARICOM meeting Friday, Ali pushed back on reported plans to fine Chinese-linked vessels entering American ports, arguing it could disrupt global shipping and increase the cost of inputs for Caribbean energy production.
He also rejected the proposed visa restrictions over collaboration with Cuba’s medical program, saying, “I don’t see abandoning Cuba as part of this equation.”
Barbados’ Mottley, for her part, argued that her country couldn’t have gotten through the COVID-19 pandemic without Cuba’s doctors, saying they are paid as much as local professionals, while Vincentian Prime Minister Ralph Gonsalves, whose government has played a key role in diffusing tensions between Venezuela and Guyana over the contested Essequibo border zone, said, “I would prefer to lose my visa than have 60 poor and working people die,” in reference to hemodialysis patients under Cuban care.
These predicaments have led leaders to walk a fine line between defiance and acquiescence to U.S. ultimatums, particularly in Suriname, “a Trump success story,” according to Claver-Carone, who claims U.S. support for an IMF adjustment program helped get the country out of its “China debt trap” and secure a $10 billion French-U.S. offshore oil and gas deal.
As the small Caribbean nations brace for the impacts of the Trump administration's energy, trade, immigration, and deportation policies, they are also, as a bloc, standing up for their shared interests — with their level of success bound to have important implications for regional stability and prosperity over the next four years.
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