On Thursday night, President Joe Biden — acting without congressional approval — ordered airstrikes on Houthi targets in Yemen, an escalation in the regional spillover from Israel’s war in Gaza that now directly involves US military personnel.
Biden chose to escalate the conflict and bomb Yemen in response to Houthi fighters' Red Sea attacks. His unconditional support and steady flow of weapons to Israel appears to be increasing the likelihood of a regional war. Instead of using the U.S.’s considerable leverage over Israel to push for a ceasefire, Biden is enabling a brutal war that has killed more than 23,000 Palestinians, and ties his administration to Israel’s decisions as it inches toward an all out war with Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Biden should be honest with Americans: the longer Israel's siege of Gaza persists, the greater the chances of a regional conflagration that will put American lives in danger.
Eli Clifton is a senior advisor at the Quincy Institute and Investigative Journalist at Large at Responsible Statecraft. He reports on money in politics and U.S. foreign policy.
Khody Akhavi is Senior Video Producer at the Quincy Institute. Previously he was Head of Video for Al-Monitor and covered the White House for Al Jazeera English, as well as produced films for the network’s flagship investigative unit.
In its July 31 Executive Order modifying the reciprocal tariffs originally laid out in early April, the White House repeatedly invokes the close linkages between trade and national security.
The tariff treatment of different countries is linked to broader adhesion to U.S. foreign policy priorities. For example, (relatively) favorable treatment is justified for those countries that have “agreed to, or are on the verge of agreeing to, meaningful trade and security commitments with the United States, thus signaling their sincere intentions to permanently remedy … trade barriers ….and to align with the United States on economic and national security matters.”
The president is well-known for his long-standing dislike of all American trade deficits. But the more specific linkages between trade and security were also foreshadowed by Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent before he took office when he spoke of a traffic-light system of tariffs, with “green, yellow, and red” tariff levels determined by the extent of a country’s alignment with U.S. national security concerns.
A similar framework can be found in the work of Stephen Miran, the head of the Council of Economic Advisers, who has suggested that U.S. allies with large bilateral trade surpluses could do any one of the following in order to narrow trade imbalances: accept higher tariffs without complaint, buy more American goods — particularly energy or defense equipment, or promise to invest large sums of money in the U.S.
And it is precisely such expedients that some countries or regions have followed (at least in the administration’s telling) to arrive at the deals that have delivered lower tariffs. For example, the White House readout on the deal with the European Union that led to a uniform 15% tariff points to EU commitments to buy $750 billion of American energy in the next three years, invest $600 billion in the U.S. over the same period, and to purchase “significant amounts of U.S. military equipment.” The agreement with Japan over a 15% tariff was reported to feature $550 billion of inbound investment, 90% of the profits from which would be “retained” in the U.S.
Thus, the administration seems to be getting closer to its stated goal of making market access for countries conditional on acquiescence with other U.S. priorities. So can the White House succeed in using the sheer size of the American market to force other countries to align with its economic and national security priorities?
Despite the announcements, things might prove more difficult than they seem. For one thing, both sides don’t agree on the numbers and there are no actual formally drafted and signed trade agreements yet, just rather vague “deals.” America’s counterparts have tried to dampen expectations, with the EU noting that most investment and purchasing decisions will ultimately be made by corporations.
Similarly, officials in Tokyo say the White House numbers on inbound investment from Japan reflect a maximum that might be mobilized with support from Japanese government affiliated financial institutions (the figures do not appear to include Japanese institutional purchases of Treasury Bonds, the scale of which would make the number meaningless). And with significant uncertainty about the investment promises embedded in the deals, it could be too soon to conclude that tariff rates have finally settled.
A broader point is that the world has changed a lot since the international economy was based on the tightly-linked security and trade linkages of the immediate postwar era. Back then, the U.S. was the world’s predominant economic and technological force while the Soviet Union chose near-autarky and forced its clients to do the same. Large parts of the Global South, including India, also had deep reservations about integrating with global markets. So interlocking trade and security networks united the major economies of North America, Europe and Japan.
But beginning in the 1980s, China began to integrate more deeply with the global economy, and was joined by the former Soviet bloc and India in the 1990s. Now, the U.S. remains the world’s largest economy but China has risen to second place and is deeply embedded in global industrial and trading networks as the world’s largest exporter of manufactured goods and its largest importer of commodities.
More than a decade ago, the U.S. launched its first attempt to change these patterns of interconnection. This was the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), a free-trade area specifically designed to exclude China, while granting improved market access to other countries of the Pacific Rim. However, this attempt foundered on a bipartisan concern that the domestic political costs in the U.S. of using trade incentives to deepen security alignments would prove too high. So in October 2015, Hillary Clinton disavowed a project she had championed as secretary of state.
Conversely, TPP was of interest to countries in Asia precisely because participation in global industrial supply chains making goods for advanced economies had been a very successful development strategy that they wished to continue (or emulate). At the time, easier access to the American market was seen as a strategy to pull alliance and trading structures into closer alignment but it failed the test of domestic politics.
Current American policies try to deal with the domestic considerations that caused that failure by relying on a high tariff rate floor with some flexibility for security allies. However, the fast-changing and opaque considerations that determine tariff levels now could also cause them to change in the future and make it harder to convince other countries to embrace the White House’s preferred security/tariff/investment linkages for the long term.
For example, India is a member alongside the U.S., Japan, and Australia of the Quad — a maritime group designed to counter China in the Indo-Pacific. The country has benefited from accelerated efforts by Apple and other U.S. companies to diversify their production locations away from China. And yet it has been hit with a 25% tariff justified in part by its continuing purchases of Russian oil. But these tariffs come from an administration whose own attitudes on Russia have been somewhat variable over the last six months.
Similarly, the tariff structures revealed last week are at odds with another national security principle that has come to the fore since the pandemic — “nearshoring” or the deepening of geographically resilient supply chains closer to home. But Canada and Mexico, the U.S.’s fellow-members in the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) have been hit with 30% and 35% tariffs. Even with certain exemptions, this means that partner countries where U.S. automakers have located substantial productive capacity over the past 30 years will be hit with higher tariffs than those levied on European or Japanese automakers.
These issues might be resolved in a USMCA review that is scheduled to begin soon, a subject I have explored in greater detail here. But even so, this would be another instance of a constant policy flux that adds to business uncertainty and chills investment decisions.
The above examples hint at some of the persistent contradictions in current administration attempts to tie national security and economics together through tariff policy. One consequence might be further attempts by countries to offer headline-making “deals” with the U.S. even as they work in parallel to deepen trade links with each other through other, more institutional mechanisms. This would be a rational strategy, but could provoke the administration into fresh tariff escalations that deepen global instability.
keep readingShow less
Top photo credit: A security official stands near site of the Sarsang oilfield operated by HKN Energy, after a drone attack, in Duhok province, Iraq, July 17, 2025. REUTERS/Azad Lashkari
In May, Secretary of State Marco Rubio declared that a strong Kurdistan Region within a federal Iraq is a "fundamental and strategic component" of U.S. policy. Two months later, that policy was set on fire.
A relentless campaign of drone attacks targeting Iraqi Kurdistan’s military, civilian, and energy infrastructure escalated dramatically in July, as a swarm of Iranian-made drones struck oil fields operated by American and Norwegian companies. Previous strikes had focused on targets like Erbil International Airport and the headquarters of the Peshmerga’s 70th Force in Sulaymaniyah.
The attacks slashed regional oil production from a pre-attack level of nearly 280,000 barrels per day to a mere 80,000.
The arrival of Iraqi National Security Advisor Qasim al-Araji in Erbil personified the central paradox of the crisis. His mission was to lead an investigation into an attack that Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) officials had already publicly blamed on armed groups embedded within the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF)—components of his own government.
Weeks earlier, the KRG Prime Minister’s Chief of Staff, Aziz Ahmad, had bypassed diplomatic channels to accuse "criminal militias on the Iraqi government payroll" of conducting the devastating drone attacks.
This system of state-sponsored destabilization did not emerge overnight. Its roots stretch deep into the fissures opened by the 2003 U.S. invasion, which shattered Iraq’s Ba’athist state and created a power vacuum that Iran, sharing a 1,400-kilometer border, swiftly moved to fill. Tehran nurtured proxy militias, now embedded within Iraq's political structures including the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMFs).
Key among them are hard-line factions like the Badr Organization – forged in exile within Iran during Saddam Hussein's rule and battle-hardened, having fought alongside Iranian troops in the Iran-Iraq War – and Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), a U.S.-designated terrorist organization responsible for thousands of attacks on American forces.
These groups are now integral components of the ruling Coordination Framework that backs Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani. Yet, they are simultaneously implicated by Kurdish officials, and some American law-makers, in the latest attacks on the U.S.-allied KRG.
The July 2025 drone strikes come just after an eleventh hour agreement between Erbil and Baghdad. The deal’s terms force the KRG to hand over its entire daily oil production to Baghdad's State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO). In return, the Iraqi federal government made good on a promise to disburse long-overdue salaries for May, a desperate lifeline for 1.2 million Kurdish public sector workers who hadn't been paid in months.
This desperate bargain was the direct result of the March 2023 shutdown of Kurdistan’s sole export route —the Iraq-Turkey Pipeline. That shutdown was triggered by an international arbitration ruling, which fined Turkey $1.5 billion for facilitating the KRG oil sales (without Iraqi government consent) since 2014.
The pipeline closure instantly severed the KRG’s independent revenue stream, and forcing it into total dependence on federal funds from Baghdad.
While Iran-aligned PMF factions publicly denied involvement in the July drone attacks, veteran Kurdish statesman Hoshyar Zebari levelled accusations against “the loyalist factions” (al-Fasa’ill al-Wilaiyah), a term specifically used to imply that these group’s ultimate loyalty is to the Supreme Leader of Iran, not the Iraqi state.
This conclusion is reinforced by the rhetoric of some PMF factions, which have consistently framed Kurdish autonomy as a foreign-backed conspiracy. As drone payloads struck Kurdish oil fields, Abu Ali al-Askari of Kata’ib Hezbollah, a powerful PMF faction, writing in a Telegram post, accused the KRG’s Peshmerga of maintaining ties with the “Zionist entity.” This open animosity fuels speculation that PMF factions were the perpetrators, leading analysts to view their subsequent public denials as strategic maneuvers to avoid direct U.S. retribution.
For the PMF, a perpetually weak Kurdistan is a strategic imperative, because in their worldview, Kurdish autonomy is synonymous with a hostile American military and commercial presence — a perception that is openly declared. Jafar al-Husseini, spokesman for the powerful Kata’ib Hezbollah faction, made this explicit during the 2017 independence referendum, declaring: “Officials in Kurdistan are American tools… Americans and the Zionist enemy are behind the separatism scenario.”
This long-standing conviction was only solidified in the months leading up to the attacks, when KRG Prime Minister Barzani signed new multi-billion dollar energy deals with U.S. firms, effectively confirming the PMF’s narrative and anchoring the region's economy to the West.
Moreover, beyond the immediate crisis within Iraq, Washington's own policy towards Iraqi Kurdistan is caught in a strategic trap, defined by three interlocking dilemmas.
The first is the autonomy trap, which stems from Washington’s critical need for a stable, pro-Western Kurdistan not only as an intelligence platform but as the primary vehicle for achieving a key U.S. strategic goal: countering Iranian influence. This was a central topic in the February phone call between Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Prime Minister al-Sudani, where making Iraq "energy independent" — a project reliant on the KRG’s gas reserves — was explicitly linked to the goal of "reducing Iran's malign influence."
However, successfully empowering the KRG to fulfill this role as an economic counterweight immediately triggers the fear that a sovereign, militarily self-sufficient Kurdistan might reignite its independence bid, potentially shattering Iraq and destabilizing neighboring Syria, where the U.S. is simultaneously working to integrate Kurdish Syrian Defense Forces (SDF) into the Syrian Army.
An empowered and independence-seeking KRG would also provoke a severe reaction from NATO ally Turkey, where the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) is in the process of disarming following decades of armed confrontation against successive Turkish governments for an Independent Kurdish state.
This autonomy trap leads directly to the defense paradox. The fear of emboldening independence drives Washington's hesitation to provide advanced air defense systems, despite direct and public appeals. In a February 2024 interview, following Iranian missile strikes on Erbil, KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani made the case plainly: “We don’t have the capabilities of defending ourselves... We are not necessarily talking about more U.S. troops. We want more military capabilities.”
Yet, for Washington, providing such capabilities would be interpreted by Baghdad as arming a sub-state actor against the central government. Consequently, U.S. military aid is limited by design.
Finally, beneath the immediate crisis lies a longer-term energy struggle. The Kurdistan Region possesses significant untapped natural gas reserves, coveted by U.S. firms operating under KRG contracts, but every barrel of oil produced without central oversight in Kurdistan is seen by Baghdad as a threat to its authority. Notably, the Oil Ministry in Baghdad swiftly characterized a string of oil and gas deals concluded independently between KRG and U.S. firms as "flagrant” breaches of Iraqi law.
This fundamental conflict places Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani at the epicenter of the storm. His political survival is mortgaged to the ruling Shiite coalition containing some of the very armed groups believed to have orchestrated the attacks.
Yet, his government’s ability to function is entirely dependent on the U.S., as Iraq’s oil revenues still flow into an account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Secretary Rubio’s demands — to hold attackers accountable, ensure consistent payment of KRG salaries, resume oil exports through Turkey, and, crucially, block the pending legislation that would formally institutionalize the PMF and entrench "Iranian influence" — were therefore not just reminders of this dependency, but a set of conditions that are politically impossible for al-Sudani to fulfill.
This paralysis is a mirror reflecting the deep and irreconcilable contradictions of two-decades of American policy in Iraq, which have engineered a system of perpetual gridlock in which no single actor — neither Baghdad, Erbil, Iran-aligned actors, nor the United States — can achieve a decisive victory.
keep readingShow less
Sudanese protester stands in front of a blazing fire during a demonstration against the military coup, on International Women's Day in Khartoum, Sudan March 8, 2022. REUTERS/El Tayeb Siddig
In a dramatic move last week, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) announced the selection of its own prime minister and presidential council to compete with and directly challenge the legitimacy of the Sudanese government.
News of the new parallel government comes days before a new round of peace talks was expected to begin in Washington last week. Although neither of the two civil war belligerents were going to attend, it was to be the latest effort by the United States to broker an end to the war in Sudan — and the first major effort under Trump’s presidency.
But the United States, which was planning to host the foreign ministers of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), called off the talks scheduled for July 30 just before they were to begin because of disagreement with the Egyptians over the wording of a communique that was expected to be released as part of the summit.
The Egyptians, which have been closely aligned with the military-backed Sudanese government over the course of the civil war, opposed a portion of the document that declared that neither the current Sudanese government nor the paramilitary RSF could play a leading role in the new post-war transitional government. Egypt’s support for the Sudanese government places it in direct opposition to the UAE, which has provided military support to the RSF.
The RSF’s decision to form a new government took root in meetings in Kenya with leaders of other factions also opposed to the Sudanese government, led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, in February of this year. The different groups joined forces to outline what a future regime should look like, ultimately launching the Government of Peace and Unity in mid-April
As announced on July 26, the prime minister chosen to lead Peace and Unity is Mohamed Hassan al-Ta’aishi. He served as a member of the Transitional Sovereignty Council which was instituted to rule over Sudan in the wake of the 2019 coup that led to the ouster of long-time ruler Omar al-Bashir. The presidential council, which will be headed by Mohamed Dagalo (widely known as Hemedti), is composed of 15 members, many of whom are RSF military personnel. Hemedti is the leader of the RSF military operation and the key rebel in the initial split with General al-Burhan, which served as the catalyst for the ongoing civil war.
The war, which has pitted the rival generals al-Burhan of the Sudanese government and Hemedti of the RSF against each other since it began in April 2023, has displaced over 12 million people and has caused arguably the most intense humanitarian crisis in the world.
The latest move by the RSF to put in place political figureheads to take charge of the new government increases the chance that the country’s political and territorial division will continue for years. Sudan is continuing to resemble other countries whose divided governments have caused years of political, economic, and security instability and chaos.
In Libya, for example, two opposing governments led by political and military rivals have each claimed sovereignty over the country and maintained legitimacy over portions of the nation’s territory since the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) 2011 military intervention in the country. The result has been incongruent policy objectives between the rival governments, continued military engagements, and a stifled economy unable to escape from the grip of political and security turmoil.
Similarly divisive political systems have dominated Somalia’s recent history, with the northern regions of Somaliland and Puntland both claiming independence from the Somali government, which is in the throes of a years-long counterterrorism campaign against terrorist organizations.
The RSF’s announcement of a prime minister and presidential council was swiftly condemned by regional organizations. The African Union’s Peace and Security Council publicly asked that international actors “not recognise the so-called ‘parallel government’ which has serious consequences on the peace efforts and the existential future of the country” and also “refrain from providing support and assistance” to the new government.
Meanwhile, the Arab League Secretariat warned that the new government would “impose a de facto reality by military force” and risks turning Sudan — which is a member of the Arab League — into a country of “warring cantons.”
With Sudan further fissuring, the United States should follow up on its diplomatic success in the DRC by working intensely with Egypt to correct the point of discord in the communique, and bring together the three foreign actors in a postponed peace summit in Washington aimed at getting each to end its support for its preferred faction in the war. Ending the constant stream of outside military supplies and support for the two major sides in the civil war is the only practical way for the United States to broker an end to this war.
Subscribe now to our weekly round-up and don't miss a beat with your favorite RS contributors and reporters, as well as staff analysis, opinion, and news promoting a positive, non-partisan vision of U.S. foreign policy.