On Thursday night, President Joe Biden — acting without congressional approval — ordered airstrikes on Houthi targets in Yemen, an escalation in the regional spillover from Israel’s war in Gaza that now directly involves US military personnel.
Biden chose to escalate the conflict and bomb Yemen in response to Houthi fighters' Red Sea attacks. His unconditional support and steady flow of weapons to Israel appears to be increasing the likelihood of a regional war. Instead of using the U.S.’s considerable leverage over Israel to push for a ceasefire, Biden is enabling a brutal war that has killed more than 23,000 Palestinians, and ties his administration to Israel’s decisions as it inches toward an all out war with Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Biden should be honest with Americans: the longer Israel's siege of Gaza persists, the greater the chances of a regional conflagration that will put American lives in danger.
Eli Clifton is a senior advisor at the Quincy Institute and Investigative Journalist at Large at Responsible Statecraft. He reports on money in politics and U.S. foreign policy.
Khody Akhavi is Senior Video Producer at the Quincy Institute. Previously he was Head of Video for Al-Monitor and covered the White House for Al Jazeera English, as well as produced films for the network’s flagship investigative unit.
The Trump administration’s new Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) claims it’s out to cut wasteful government spending. A
new video by the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft asks: why not start with the Pentagon?
“The Pentagon is the largest government bureaucracy. It employs nearly 3 million people, has an annual budget of $850 billion — and has never once passed the audit,” says Ben Freeman, director of the Quincy Institute’s Democratizing Foreign Policy program.
Indeed, the Pentagon is infamous for wasteful projects. “At the very top is the F-35: it's the most expensive weapons program in world history. Ultimately, it's going to cost taxpayers around $1.5 trillion — and for what? It doesn't work, it’s overpriced and overdue,” explains Freeman.
And what about all that under-used and even unused space the Pentagon owns, in particular, its military bases in the U.S.?
They are ripe for cutting.
Also deserving of scrutiny are Washington's many weapons contractors, which receive about half the Pentagon’s annual budget— over $400 billion annually — through extensive congressional lobbying, and an infamous
revolving door between leaders in the weapons industry and government alike.
“We've heard too many stories about waste, fraud and abuse in Pentagon contracting. They're overcharging for spare parts, toilet seats, hammers, you name it,” Freeman says. “Taxpayers are paying too much for the things our troops need. We know there's wasteful spending at the Pentagon and we're not really doing anything about it. That costs American taxpayers money, and that makes all of us less safe.”
To learn more about how DOGE could cut the Pentagon’s wasteful spending, watch the video:
Reports this week, based on satellite footage and witness testimony from IDF soldiers, reveal that Israel has carved out a nearly one-mile deep "buffer zone" inside Gaza along the border with Israel. Almost all economic and residential infrastructure within this region has been demolished and Gazans living and working in the area have been forcibly relocated.
Israel’s ongoing conquest of the Gaza Strip, the expulsion of Palestinians residing there, and the re-establishment of Israeli settlements are the principal parameters defining the new map created by the blood and fire of the Second Palestine War.
Israeli policies for the future of Gaza and its 1.8 million inhabitants based upon this foundation have been most enthusiastically embraced by Israel’s resurgent rightwing.
Whatever their differences, Israeli and Palestinian leaders recognize that sooner or later, for better or worse, the fate of hostages and prisoners will be decided.
As important as the resolution of this issue is, the broader contest between Israel and Palestine is of even greater and lasting magnitude. Not only the fate of individuals, the destiny of peoples and nations are in the balance. Without a sober appreciation of this fact, the current dispute over hostages loses its defining context.
The magnified attention awarded to this issue is also reflected in plaintive demands for Israel to define its plans for the so-called “day after.” These calls are easily parried by an Israeli government less concerned about addressing legitimate questions about its intentions than in forging a path to victory. The Netanyahu government has found a fast friend for this approach in the new administration in Washington.
While the dogs bark, Israel continues to pursue the destruction of Hamas as a political and military/security factor, an objective that has, from the war’s outset, defined victory in the campaign that Israel is waging.
Underlying this broad military-security objective, however, are even greater, indeed existential if not always articulate imperatives, born of a century of competition between Palestinians and the Zionist movement for the national identity of Palestine.
Revenge is the first and foremost strategic policy objective, defining Israel’s conduct of the war and indeed its very purpose. For the Hamas movement itself, one need look no further than an abiding, incessant desire for retribution, all but divorced from sober political calculation, to explain its actions.
For Israelis dumbfounded by the assault of October 7, vengeance provides the vital political foundation upon which popular support for the war is being waged.
Hamas’ brutal assault forces Israelis to acknowledge that Palestinians remain unwilling to be reconciled to the results of the First Palestine war. Gaza, chock a block with families enduring generations of national trauma, has always been the most active source of its national movement.
The Israeli public, in turn, supports a policy of reprisals against the Gaza for the latter’s stunning success in calling into question the holy of holies in the Zionist pantheon – that Jewish settlement, protected by the IDF, establishes the basis for personal security and protection of Israeli state-building.
The ferocity of Israel’s campaign aims not only at burning defeat into Palestine’s national and political consciousness, but also convincing Israelis as well that its founding principles remain sacrosanct and credible instruments of national policy.
Since the early 1950s, a Palestinian “Return” to homes lost in Israel has been unachievable — all but unthinkable. Indeed, the iron law underpinning Israel’s conduct of the First Palestine War — that Palestinians must pay with territory and sovereign control for any effort to challenge Israel, also defines a key Israeli strategic objective in the war now being waged in Gaza.
Israel’s conduct of the Gaza war and its humanitarian aftermath make clear its abiding intention to make certain that Palestinians will not even be permitted to dream of “Return.” Indeed, when Palestinians in Gaza (or Jenin) dream of going “home” today, it is not to Ashqelon or Ramla, but rather to all but obliterated refugee camps in Jabaliya and Beit Hanoun.
Expulsion
If Benjamin Netanyahu and Donald Trump have their way even this forlorn aspiration will be denied them.
Minister of Security Israel Katz official pointedly explained in February that Israel’s approved entry of “a very limited quantity” of mobile shelters and heavy equipment into Gaza “does not affect the feasibility of implementing Trump’s voluntary migration plan or creating a new reality in Gaza, which Prime Minister Netanyahu is fully committed to.”
Moreover, Katz said the IDF will move to clear areas “of terrorists and infrastructure, and capture extensive territory that will be added to the State of Israel’s security areas.”
These “security areas” now comprise about a third of Gaza’s territory and a large percentage of Gaza’s agricultural and employment capacity.
The Trump administration’s extraordinary endorsement of large-scale Palestinian transfer and its ongoing effort to win Arab support for it, has raised the profile of an option long considered taboo outside of a right-wing Israeli minority.
In an April 2 address, Netanyahu reflected the change in policy that the White House endorsement has produced. Israel’s policy, he declared, would be defined by four elements — Hamas’ complete demilitarization and the expulsion of its leadership, complete Israeli security control over Gaza in its entirety, and the realization of Washington’s plan for large-scale transfer of Palestinians out of the Gaza Strip.
Settlement
The dramatic developments produced by the war have empowered Israeli proponents of Jewish settlement in the Gaza Strip. The IDF, by establishing sovereign security control over Gaza, including its most productive agricultural areas along the perimeter with Israel, is creating the security infrastructure for a “return” ...of Israeli civilian settlement.
As bizarre as this option seems, the purpose and utility of Jewish settlement in Gaza fit neatly into Israel’s national experience. Palestinian attacks upon Israel have always been met with demands for a “Zionist response” — Jewish settlement — whether in Hebron or the hills of Samaria. And now Gaza.
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s evacuation of all Israeli settlements and their population of 7,000 in 2005 appeared to have ended the prospect of settling the Gaza Strip. An aging Sharon was pursuing the creation of a new security paradigm. But the re-entry of the IDF into Gaza 18 months ago destroyed this model. It has instead energized the intense lobby behind the re-establishment of civilian settlements in Gaza in order to realize both nationalist and security objectives.
Proponents remain a vocal and influential minority, but even their opponents acknowledge the extraordinary success of the settlement movement in the West Bank in the decades since the conquests of June 1967.
Israel’s conquest of Gaza has broken many taboos, but then again so too did the Hamas assault on October 7. Whether Israel stands guilty of the charge of genocide, it is certainly the case that it is pursuing a policy of “politicide” — aimed at destroying for all time any Palestinian hope for sovereignty west of the Jordan River.
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Top photo credit: Donald Trump (Anna Moneymaker/Shutterstock) Volodymyr Zelensky (miss.cabul/Shutterstock) and Vladimir Putin (paparazzza/Shuttterstock)
Ukraine’s best hope for peace looks a lot like Donald Trump
On the question of an early temporary ceasefire in Ukraine, the Trump administration might be described as being wrong for the right reasons, and the Putin administration as right for the wrong reasons.
The hideous cost of the war was emphasized last week when a Russian missile struck a playground in Krivyi Rih in Ukraine, killing 20, including nine children. This should be a spur to all sides to move as fast as possible towards a peace settlement.
However, the goal should be a full peace settlement, not a temporary ceasefire that would risk entrenching a very dangerous and damaging situation for the U.S., Europe, and Ukraine. A ceasefire that lasted only a month would be pointless. The goal should be to make the ceasefire permanent while talks continue. This however would risk replicating the Donbas ceasefire of 2015-22, that solved none of the underlying issues, was repeatedly broken by clashes and provocations on both sides, and eventually led to full-scale Russian invasion.
Such a ceasefire would encourage hardliners on both sides to reject a peace settlement in the hope of successfully renewing the war later. Russian hardliners would hope that the breathing space would allow the Russian army to be decisively strengthened for a new offensive. Ukrainian hardliners would hope that a Democratic victory in the U.S. 2028 presidential elections would renew unconditional U.S. aid for Ukrainian victory. If it saw good reasons to fear this, the Russian government would surely be tempted to launch a preemptive strike.
Absent a peace settlement, and in circumstances of repeated exchanges of fire, it is highly unlikely that neutral countries could be persuaded to send peacekeeping forces. That would make the outbreak of a new war even more likely. It is also possible that in circumstances of an unstable ceasefire and continuing clashes, the Zelensky administration might be encouraged to continue martial law and go on delaying presidential elections. This would reduce its international legitimacy and risk growing political instability in Ukraine.
With Ukraine no longer under military pressure, the EU and some European governments would continue to press for a European “reassurance force” in Ukraine — something that is absolutely unacceptable for Russia and which would make a peace settlement impossible.
On the other hand, a ceasefire without a settlement could endanger European support for Ukraine, because with Ukraine seemingly no longer under imminent threat, other leaders and populations would be tempted to reduce or end their military aid to Ukraine. President Trump would undoubtedly also be tempted to do this.
Perhaps most importantly, absent a peace settlement it will be far more difficult for Ukraine to begin economic reconstruction and institute the economic, judicial and administrative reforms necessary if the country is to have any chance of progressing towards membership of the European Union.
The war has led to severe restrictions on media independence, freedom of speech, and political pluralism in Ukraine. Several formerly leading political parties and media outlets remain banned, and critics of the Zelensky government have been hounded into exile. Strengthening liberal democracy in Ukraine will be impossible if the country remains on a war footing. In Russia, a continued state of semi-frozen conflict will also give cover to the Putin administration’s intensified authoritarianism.
Ukrainian economic reform will be equally impossible if the economy is mobilized for war; and of course private investors will be far less likely to put their money into Ukraine if they think that there is a likelihood of the war resuming. The $300 billion in Russian assets seized by the EU would either be left in limbo, or used unilaterally by the EU to pay for Ukrainian reconstruction — thereby removing a major incentive for Russia to agree to a compromise peace.
A long-term semi-frozen conflict in Ukraine will also be extremely bad for the economies of the EU; and we have seen in Romania and elsewhere how allegations of Russian influence have been used to justify extremely undemocratic measures by ruling elites.
But if the Russian government is right in saying that a ceasefire must be preceded by real progress in addressing the “root causes” of the war, that does not of course mean that the demands or proposals being made by the Russian government are correct. Three in particular are completely unacceptable, at least in the form originally stated.
Last June, Putin demanded that as a condition of a ceasefire, Ukraine withdraw from the territory it still holds in the five provinces that Russia claims to have annexed (including the capitals of two of these provinces); and that Ukraine reduce its armed forces to a level where they could not hope to defend the country. Putin has not repeated these demands in his recent statements. On the other hand, he has suggested that Ukraine be placed temporarily under an external, U.N.-supervised government that would be charged with negotiating a peace settlement.
Any viable peace settlement must be based on the principles that the ceasefire line should run where the eventual battle line runs (possibly with limited and equal land swaps); that any limitations on the Ukrainian armed forces and Western arms supplies to Ukraine must apply only to certain limited categories of weapons (for example long-range missiles); and that the choice of a Ukrainian government must be entirely for the Ukrainian people themselves.
There are essentially two ways (either independently or combined) to get Russia to accept these principles and compromise on its maximalist demands. The first is for the Ukrainians with Western help to fight the Russian army to a standstill or near-standstill on the ground. This is indeed possible. The Russian army has advanced in recent months, but at a grindingly slow rate.
If Russian troops fail to make much greater progress this year, Moscow will presumably be much more inclined to compromise. This is however a very risky strategy for Ukraine and its Western backers. Given the huge imbalance in resources between Ukraine and Russia (especially in manpower) and the reported exhaustion of Ukrainian units, the possibility of a Ukrainian collapse cannot be excluded.
The other fruitful path towards peace would be for the Trump administration in talks with Moscow temporarily to set the issue of Ukraine to one side, and concentrate instead on drafting a comprehensive set of formal bilateral agreements with Moscow, in return for Moscow abandoning its maximalist demands on Ukraine and reducing its ties to Iran and North Korea.
The basis for the first of these agreements is already in place, with the Trump administration’s statements excluding NATO membership for Ukraine. This could be extended to a U.S. guarantee of no further NATO enlargement beyond the alliance’s existing borders (though also guaranteeing that EU enlargement to the countries concerned would be open, and no U.S. backing for any troops from NATO countries in Ukraine).
In line with the Trump administration’s desire to reduce U.S. military commitments in Europe, Washington could guarantee the withdrawal of U.S. troops from countries on Russia’s borders, in return for certain reciprocal withdrawals by Russia. A new intermediate missile agreement could guarantee that the U.S. would not carry through on its plan to deploy such missiles in Germany, in return for Russia withdrawing its missiles from Kaliningrad and Belarus.
Both sides could agree jointly to propose a permanent consultative mechanism on European security, possibly involving the five members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany and any neutral states willing to contribute significant peacekeeping forces to Ukraine. This would aim to ward off in good time the sort of unintended crises that led to the revolution and civil war in Ukraine in 2014, and the war in Georgia in 2008.
Such draft agreements between the U.S. and Russia, leading in turn to a draft peace treaty for Ukraine, could be achieved without the direct involvement of the EU and Ukraine. Of course, the agreement of both would be necessary for the peace settlement to become final and formal. The Ukrainian government by definition would have to agree to the terms of a ceasefire, and any guarantees for minority rights in Ukraine. The EU would have to agree to suspend its sanctions against Russia, and on the fate of Russian assets.
If however the U.S. and Russia had already reached a viable agreement between themselves, it would be very hard — and very foolish — for Brussels and Kyiv to reject it, unless they were willing to risk the Trump administration abandoning Ukraine altogether.
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