On Thursday night, President Joe Biden — acting without congressional approval — ordered airstrikes on Houthi targets in Yemen, an escalation in the regional spillover from Israel’s war in Gaza that now directly involves US military personnel.
Biden chose to escalate the conflict and bomb Yemen in response to Houthi fighters' Red Sea attacks. His unconditional support and steady flow of weapons to Israel appears to be increasing the likelihood of a regional war. Instead of using the U.S.’s considerable leverage over Israel to push for a ceasefire, Biden is enabling a brutal war that has killed more than 23,000 Palestinians, and ties his administration to Israel’s decisions as it inches toward an all out war with Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Biden should be honest with Americans: the longer Israel's siege of Gaza persists, the greater the chances of a regional conflagration that will put American lives in danger.
Eli Clifton is a senior advisor at the Quincy Institute and Investigative Journalist at Large at Responsible Statecraft. He reports on money in politics and U.S. foreign policy.
Khody Akhavi is Senior Video Producer at the Quincy Institute. Previously he was Head of Video for Al-Monitor and covered the White House for Al Jazeera English, as well as produced films for the network’s flagship investigative unit.
Top image credit: Sudan's Sovereign Council Chief General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, is received by South Sudanese President Salva Kiir upon arriving at the Juba International Airport, in Juba, South Sudan September 16, 2024. REUTERS/Jok Solomun
The people of South Sudan are once again forced to flee their homes and endure severe hunger as the country is on the brink of civil war. The escalating violence and skyrocketing tensions between leaders in South Sudan threaten the country's stability and regional security and risk worsening the humanitarian crisis.
President Salva Kiir’s recent detention of the country’s main opposition leader, Vice President Riek Machar, and his aides is raising fears of military clashes and violence across the country between the national force (SSPDF) and the military wing of Machar's party (SPLM/A-IO).
On March 18, in response to the detention of its officials and the deployment of Ugandan forces, the SPLM/A-IO announced the immediate suspension of its participation in key security mechanisms established under the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS). Conversely, the government accused Machar of plotting a rebellion to disrupt peace and upcoming elections. The United Nations issued multiple warnings that South Sudan is on the verge of civil war and urged all sides to uphold the peace agreement.
Tensions have been building between the factions for months, with Kiir dismissing several officials from SPLM/A–IO without consultation. Furthermore, Kiir’s move to appoint businessman Benjamin Bol Mel as his successor, sidelining allies and the opposition, has further escalated tensions. Bol Mel has been on the U.S. sanctions list since 2017 for his role in government corruption.
The most recent outbreak of violence erupted on March 4, when the White Army, a youth militia loyal to Machar, seized control of Nasir, a town in oil-rich Upper Nile State, following intense fighting with government forces. The White Army militia also attacked a U.N. helicopter, which resulted in the killing of 28 SSPDF soldiers and one U.N. crew member.
In response, government forces launched air strikes on civilian areas with barrel bombs. The U.N. says the attacks killed 180 people, injured over 250, and caused at least 125,000 people to flee the area. The deployment of the Uganda People’s Defense Forces (UPDF) to support Kiir and the government further worsened the security situation as it violated the U.N. arms embargo, while the opposition charges that it is taking part in airstrikes and attacks in Upper Nile State.
The current situation carries similarities to early warning signs seen before the 2013-2018 conflict, such as accusations of attempted coups, violent clashes, a rise in misinformation, disinformation, and hate speech, both sides mobilizing people for confrontation, and the involvement of foreign forces.
Threats to South Sudan’s fragile peace
Political strife between Kiir and Machar dates back to pre-South Sudan independence in 2011 and comes from two main conflicting tribes in South Sudan, Kiir from the Dinka and Machar from the Nuer. Both were key figures in the Sudan People Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), a rebel movement founded and initially led by John Garang (Dinka), which fought with Khartoum for independence.
However, leadership styles and differences in movement visions caused tension between Garang and Nuer colleagues, resulting in the infamous “1991 split” and the formation of the Nuer-dominated SPLM-Nasir faction. Machar ascended to vice president after his 1997 peace deal with the Sudanese government, which deepened tensions with Kiir and his allies. Both groups are accused of committing grave human rights violations in South Sudan.
Furthermore, lack of effective governance, corruption, unaddressed grievances and the ongoing competition for control over South Sudan’s resources and military forces are reasons for political deadlock that fuels violence.
A democratic election, as agreed in the 2018 peace deal, has been postponed multiple times. And given the ongoing political crisis, it’s unlikely there will be one any time soon.
Regional implications
Meanwhile, the war in Sudan between the Sudanese military under General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) under General Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo “Hemedti” has significantly impacted South Sudan.
The conflict led to the destruction of key oil infrastructure in Khartoum, cutting off South Sudan’s primary source of income. Initially, President Kiir aligned himself with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). However, as the RSF gained control over major oil facilities, Kiir realigned his support toward the RSF and its key sponsor, the UAE, to restore the flow of oil and gold crucial to South Sudan’s economy. This strained his relations with Al-Burhan and SAF.
Conversely, SAF might have reactivatedits ties with Machar and SPLA-IO after Kiir and RSF grew closer. This suspicion is strengthened by reports indicating that the SPLA-IO has received weapons and other forms of support from SAF. Moreover, the recent fightingbetween SPLA-IO and RSF in Upper Nile and Blue Nile states signals a move by SAF to prevent RSF/SPLA-N movements in the border area and to squeeze them out of areas on the border with South Sudan.
The proxy war between South Sudan and Sudan, fueled by each government's support for opposing militias threatens to destabilize both nations and the Horn of Africa further, undermining already fragile peace processes. It could risk a full-scale conflict that could drag both countries into a direct war. In addition to Sudan, other neighboring countries like Uganda, Ethiopia, and Kenya face the prospect of increased refugee flows, cross-border insecurity, and economic disruption.
Next steps
The U.N., the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the African Union, regional leaders, the U.S., Britain, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Norway, as well as the European Union, have all called the South Sudanese leaders to de-escalate the crisis, release detained officials, recommit to peace, and resolve issues through dialogue.
Meanwhile, the recent U.S. aid cut will likely have severe impacts on the humanitarian crisis, weaken peacebuilding efforts, and diminish American influence and commitment. Instead of scaling back, Washington should combine diplomatic pressure on political leaders with consistent support for civilian protection and long-term peacebuilding initiatives. At the same time, it must ensure that aid is used appropriately and not diverted toward corrupt activities.
Furthermore, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) must take all necessary actions to increase its protection of civilians in Juba, Bentui, and Malakal and establish temporary operating bases in conflict and high-risk areas in Western Bahr-el-Ghazal state, Western Equatoria state, Unity state, Jonglei state and in Upper Nile state, particularly in, Akobo, Nasir, Ulaang, and Longochuk. In addition, the U.N. Security Council and African Union should urge warring parties to immediately end unlawful attacks on civilians and to recommit to the peace agreement.
keep readingShow less
South Vietnamese refugees walk across a U.S. Navy vessel. Operation Frequent Wind, the final operation in Saigon, began April 29, 1975. (U.S. Marine Corps in Japan, official photo)
The Trump administration has ordered U.S. diplomats in Vietnam not to attend ceremonies marking the 50th anniversary of the Vietnam War on Wednesday, according to a report in the New York Times.
Although mere ceremonies that look backward in history may seem unimportant compared to the current problems that diplomats must address, this decision to shun official representation at events that the Vietnamese government is organizing is regrettable. It represents a failure to recognize one of the greatest transitions in U.S. foreign policy from a destructive to a constructive path.
No better example of the opposite of a policy of restraint can be found than the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. The costs of the war to the United States were so great and varied as to be, in many respects, incalculable. Those costs included more than 58,000 American deaths and over 300,000 wounded. Estimates of the monetary costs vary but are around a third of a trillion dollars.
Direct U.S. involvement in the war ended with the withdrawal of the last U.S. troops in March 1973, 60 days after the signing of the peace agreement that Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho negotiated. The South Vietnamese regime collapsed two years later. The fall of Saigon on April 30, 1975 to forces of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam — the North Vietnamese regime — marked the end of the fighting and is the date whose anniversary is being observed this month.
In the five decades since, the United States and Vietnam forged a warm, multifaceted relationship. Diplomatic relations were normalized in 1995. In the words of a State Department fact sheet published this January, “U.S.-Vietnam relations have become increasingly cooperative and comprehensive, evolving into a flourishing partnership that spans political, economic, security, and people-to-people ties.” Bilateral trade grew from $451 million in 1995 to nearly $124 billion in 2023.
In 2023, during a visit to Vietnam by President Joe Biden, the two nations declared a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership that extends to defense and security matters. A key shared interest underlying such cooperation is to limit the expanding influence and power of China.
This later history has demonstrated how badly wrong the major assumptions underlying the U.S. decision to go to war in Vietnam were. The military adversary there was not, as was assumed, part of a communist monolith led by Moscow and Beijing. The subsequent history has shown how the United States can have a mutually beneficial relationship even with a regime that still avows an ideology foreign to America’s own.
The 50th anniversary this week marks not just a victory of North Vietnam over the South. More fundamentally — and more importantly for the United States — it marks the end of an extremely costly misdirection of U.S. foreign policy and a clearing of the way to embark on a peaceful, profitable, and mutually beneficial relationship between the United States and Vietnam. That is worth observing, for reasons that go well beyond respect for the host country.
Much effort by multiple U.S. administrations, of both parties, has gone into building that beneficial relationship. Now, under the current administration, that work risks being undone. The demolition of programs administered by the U.S. Agency for International Development has halted U.S.-funded efforts to undo some of the damage left over from the war, involving such things as finding unexploded munitions and the remains of missing soldiers, and cleaning up areas contaminated by the Agent Orange defoliant.
President Trump’s trade war has threatened Vietnam with a 46% tariff — one of the highest of the so-called “reciprocal” tariffs to be directed at any country — even though the tariffs that Vietnam actually applies to U.S. exports are well below that. How much tariff-related damage will yet occur is uncertain as of this writing and depends on further negotiations.
Now, the administration appears ready to add insult to injury with a boycott of the end-of-war anniversary observances. The Times report speculates that one possible motivation for this posture is not wanting to detract from the 100-day mark of Trump’s second term. Another is not wanting to draw any attention to a war that Trump avoided thanks to bone spurs while hundreds of thousands of his contemporaries were being drafted into military service.
Perhaps a more fundamental reason is Trump’s tendency to view nearly everything in zero-sum terms, with a winner and a loser. From that viewpoint, what happened 50 years ago was nothing more than a win by North Vietnam and a loss by the U.S. client South Vietnam. But the world, and international relations, are by no means zero-sum. This certainly is true of relations between the United States and Vietnam, as the subsequent half century of history has demonstrated.
As a U.S. Army officer in Vietnam in 1972-1973, I was involved in administering the final phases of the U.S. troop withdrawal. Because of having to process everyone out first, I returned to the United States on the last plane of that final withdrawal in March 1973. Being the very end of the U.S. part of the war, there were ceremonial aspects, including a red-carpet welcome when our plane landed in California. I participated in a ceremony de-activating my unit, the 90th Replacement Battalion, which had seen service in several other conflicts beginning with World War I.
I expressed to a reporter covering the event my hope that the unit would never need to be activated again.
The ceremonies provided a sense of closure that so many others who had served in Vietnam, and who returned unappreciated to a divided country, were not as fortunate as I was to have. Now, in a nation that seems at least as bitterly divided as ever, a little bit of ceremony, recognizing a past transition from a tragic phase of U.S. foreign relations to a more beneficial phase, might do the nation some similar good.
keep readingShow less
Top photo credit: Iranian president Masoud Pezeshkian ( Tasnim News Agency/Wikimedia) and US special envoy Steve Witkoff (Office of President of Russian Federation/Wikimedia)
Alarmed by reports of dissension in the White House on U.S. Iran policy, the director of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies recently warned that Iran will “exploit these different negotiating positions…as soon as the regime smells desperation.”
This alert was probably prompted by the White House’s chief negotiating envoy, Steven Witkoff, who stated on Monday, April 14, that “Iran does not need to enrich [uranium] past 3.67 percent,” only to declare on Tuesday that “Iran must…eliminate its nuclear enrichment and weaponization program.” In one day, he went from a position that could offer the basis for a negotiated deal to echoing administration hawks, such as national security adviser Mike Waltz, who insists that the total dismantling of Iran’s nuclear program is the only acceptable goal.
Where is this all going? While making predictions when it comes to Donald Trump is risky, multiple press reports (including from Iranand Israel) suggest that the April 19 indirect talks between the U.S. and Iran in Oman made progress. The same for the latest round in Oman on Saturday, which were described as “hopeful but cautious” by the U.S. side.
That Trump might push for a deal despite the opposition of his own security adviser, not to mention that of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, may suggest how desperate he is for a foreign policy win that poses risks but also possible benefits. The bigger question is where such a deal fits into a wider Middle East strategy, or indeed if such a strategy is even in the offing.
Potential benefits of a deal
Critics will likely charge that Iran will cheat — although Tehran adhered to the 2015 accord — or that the deal doesn’t cover Iran’s missile program given that the talks are singularly focused on nuclear issues. They will also argue that sanctions relief could give Iran an opening to partially revive its badly damaged “axis of resistance” strategy.
Such possible downsides must be weighed against the potential benefits of a new agreement — even for those countries (including Israel and especially the U.S.) that will continue to face a formidable and untrustworthy foe. A deal would undercut Iran’s hardliners while opening more space for reformists. In their efforts over the last year to further entrench their already considerable power in advance of the battle over who will succeed Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei — a struggle that cannot be far off — hardliners have run into obstacles, including an economy in full meltdown and a tricky “no peace/no war” strategy that has been wrecked by the near collapse of the “axis of resistance.”
A revival of the reformists’ fortunes will not, of course, lead to liberal democracy. Still, it could foster a domestic power shift that promotes political decompression at home and wider engagement abroad. And while the March 2 resignation of former Foreign Minister Javad Zarif from his vice presidential post signals the hardliners’ enduring influence, a deal could also help President Masoud Pezeshkian’s reach out to more mainstream conservatives, thus widening his de facto coalition even as he retains the support of the Supreme Leader.
Moreover, a deal might in fact reduce the dangers for Iran that will definitely come with any bid to create an effective nuclear weapons option. Although it has enough enriched uranium for one bomb — and, according to some reports, may have enough for four or five more — there are still complex steps (such as testing) that Iran must take to build a comprehensive system that can provide a “second strike” capacity that would deter an Israeli assault. While estimates vary as to how long this will take, the very effort to move in this direction would provoke a massive attack by the U.S. and Israel. This is the last thing Iranian leaders want.
Indeed, press reports suggest that Israel was preparing to launch such an attack in May but was prevented from doing so by Trump and a handful of security officials. Paradoxically, Iran and the U.S. have been drawn together by their mutual desire to prevent a wider regional war that could have multiple costs. With some 20 percent of oil and gas flowing through the Gulf — and with Trump’s tariff policy wreaking global havoc — a no-deal scenario could propel the U.S., Israel and Iran into a sustained military conflict that would set the stage for an international economic crisis. In short, a deal would give Iran a much-needed assist off a perilous path that its own accelerated enrichment program has helped to create.
Finally, many U.S. military experts have questioned whether any such attack would permanently destroy Iran’s nuclear program. While it would set it back for some years, it could also prompt a decision by Iran to exit the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) andrebuild its nuclear program without the constraints of any international system of controls and inspections. Such a development could trigger a conventional and even nuclear arms race with many of its Arab neighbors. This is not something many Iranian hardliners want.
Deal is no substitute for a coherent US strategy
Writing on his Substack page “Clarity,” former Israeli ambassador to the U.S. Michael Oren, recently argued that given the very real possibility that American and “Iranian envoys are negotiating a new nuclear deal,” Israel must “prepare for the worst” by getting “ironclad U.S. security guarantees…that [Israel] will always have the means to defend ourselves against Iranian aggression. We must, for the first time, be permitted to purchase strategic bombers and train our crews to fly them.”
This remarkable statement underscores Israel’s total failure to use its military might to advance a diplomatic regional and global strategy that would have the support of the U.S., Europe and even Russia and China. Israel, as Aaron David Miller and Steven Simon have recently argued, may now be the regional hegemon. But in projecting its military might in Syria, Lebanon, Iran and most of all Gaza, Israel has also advanced the goals of messianic Jewish supremacist parties that want to impose a theocracy at home, permanent occupation over three million Palestinians, and the banishment of some two million hapless souls in Gaza.
Trump seems ready to embrace this version of Israeli hegemony. But he is unlikely to provide all the weapons that Israel will demand. And yet his resistance to providing the “bunker busting” munitions Israel needs to penetrate Iran’s deepest nuclear facilities does not suggest a wider regional vision. Beyond sustaining the Abraham Accords between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Morocco, Trump has no larger plan other than trying to keep the U.S. out of Middle East wars. But as his recent decision to withdraw half of U.S. troops just as ISIS appears to be expanding in Syria suggests, he may have to contend with a region that drifts into chaos in ways that could force him to change course or take military steps that could trigger a wider conflict. As he prepares for a mid-May trip to Saudi Arabia, the Emirates and Qatar, Gulf leaders will not be reassured by his often ad-libbed foreign policy that is abetting what they see as genocide and war crimes in Gaza.
Indeed, while preferable to the black hole of regional war, a nuclear deal is no substitute for a coherent U.S. strategy. These dangers of tactical improvisation were amply displayed by President Joe Biden. But Trump is no less wedded to a clear strategy than his predecessor. On the contrary, what appears to count most for Trump is securing and demonstrating power. Iran’s leaders grasp this fact and thus may be willing to indulge his desire to get at least one “win” to get a deal.
With the third round of negotiations now concluded, it appears that enough progress was made to sustain the talks. There is no doubt that the question of enrichment will be the biggest sticking point. Moreover, opponents of a deal in Israel, Iran and the U.S. will exploit every chance to wreck the talks. Whether the April 26 explosion on the Iranian port of Bandahar was the result of sabotage or a tragic accident, they are a reminder that the very prospect of a wider regional conflict that has galvanized the talks remains a real threat.
Subscribe now to our weekly round-up and don't miss a beat with your favorite RS contributors and reporters, as well as staff analysis, opinion, and news promoting a positive, non-partisan vision of U.S. foreign policy.