Follow us on social

Joe and Jill Biden

It's over: Biden is last gasp of failed post-Cold War internationalism

Whether with neoliberalism or neoconservatism, the last four presidents helped to squander the peace. And now a new era begins.

Washington Politics

Joe Biden’s place in history is as the man under whom the liberal international order unraveled.

America has suffered bouts of inflation before, and while Biden’s domestic failures will be remembered, they will not stand out as singular. In foreign policy, however, Biden has written the end of a chapter not only in America’s story but in the world’s as well.

Far from representing “hope and change,” the slogan on which he and Barack Obama were elected in 2008, Biden has personified the hopelessness and stagnation of the West’s post-Cold War foreign policy.

In 2008 voters demanded something new and trusted Obamas ticket to deliver it. The regime-change projects of the “Global War on Terror” under George W. Bush had been sold to the public as a “cakewalk” and a liberation of foreign populations who would greet our soldiers with flowers. Seven years into the Afghan War and after five in Iraq, it was clear that Bush and those who followed him had no way out of these conflicts, which were being fought not in order to be won — since victory could hardly even be defined — but simply to postpone defeat.

These were open-ended “forever wars.” Obama, with Biden by his side, was handed a mandate to end them and chart a different course. They failed to do so and instead maintained the disastrous direction that had been set in the early 1990s.

The failure of the post-Cold War presidents

George H.W. Bush had never really been able to end the 1991 Gulf War, which continued under Bill Clinton with the enforcement of no-fly zones and sanctions, as Washington entertained a series of neoconservative dreams and schemes for regime change in Iraq.

The 2003 invasion of Iraq, then, was a drastic escalation of a war that had already been underway. Yet once Saddam Hussein was overthrown, the war still didn’t end. Washington’s aims of nation-building, regional transformation, and promoting democracy and liberalism were so ill-defined and unrealistic that even a supposedly successful war could only be a prelude to further conflict.

Iraq was a clear symbol of how far American policy had gone awry, but the same mentality of doubling-down on misjudged commitments was to be seen on a grander scale, too. After each wave of NATO expansion, for example, Russia became more rather than less threatening. If the purpose of NATO expansion was to make Europe more secure, the contrast between the security environment of 1992 and that of 2025 delivers a damning verdict — all the more so when contrasted with the success a more limited NATO enjoyed in checking the Soviet Union until its demise.

As if on autopilot, and heedless of results, America’s post-Cold War presidents and the Washington foreign-policy “Blob” pursued a comprehensive neoliberal (and neoconservative) agenda, which included expanding international institutions, promoting global economic integration, castigating nationalist movements of all sorts, deploying U.S. military forces as police and social workers in trouble spots anywhere and everywhere, and fostering regime change by any means necessary in certain targeted countries. All this required not only the continuation but the amplification of America’s Cold War intelligence and surveillance apparatus.

As a senator, Biden marched in step with Washington’s consensus, with a few exceptions that put his capacity for independent thought to the test. He voted against authorizing the 1991 Gulf War, for example, but enthusiastically supported the invasion of Iraq in the policy debates of 2002 and 2003. He then voiced opposition in 2006 to the “surge” of additional troops into Iraq.

The most straightforward explanation for these swerves is that Biden was merely playing politics: he’d first run for president in 1988, after all, and opposing Bush in 1991 may have seemed like a smart move ahead of a future bid for the White House; in contrast, opposing the second Bush’s plans for a new war in the years right after 9/11 would have been politically costly. By 2006, the political logic had changed again, and a would-be contender for the 2008 Democratic nomination — which Biden did indeed try for — would have been wise to position himself as relatively anti-war.

That was, of course, the cycle when Obama, who did not support the Iraq War, defeated the hawkish Hillary Clinton (and the “triangulating” Biden) for the Democratic nomination. Biden was then seen by the political establishment as a vice presidential pick who would balance the ticket — giving the inexperienced, seemingly idealist Obama a long-serving figure as a running mate, one trusted by Washington’s foreign-policy elites in a way the newcomer from Illinois was not.

They need not have worried: Obama did withdraw troops from Iraq, but in many other respects he maintained the direction of U.S. foreign policy that had been set in the early 1990s. He kept the system in place, even as he opened relations with Iran and Cuba.

Just how little Obama changed his party — let alone Washington — was showcased by the fact that his successor as the Democratic Party’s presidential nominee was the very Iraq War supporter he had beaten in 2008. Hillary Clinton, not hope or change, was Barack Obama’s legacy.

The beginning of the end of (this) history

After Clinton lost in 2016 to a Republican outsider, Donald Trump, the Democratic Party and Washington’s foreign-policy elites had only one place left to turn. Joe Biden was a symbol of politics past, but that’s exactly what Washington wanted: a return to what had been considered normal since the 1990s. Biden and Obama have together played a role as America’s Gorbachev — leaders that insiders hoped would allow just enough change to keep the status quo standing.

But like Gorbachev, Biden instead presided over its collapse.

Biden withdrew from Afghanistan, then pursued the same strategic vision that had failed there in Ukraine. There was never a realistic definition of victory in Afghanistan, and Biden had none for Ukraine. Instead of an obtainable goal, in both conflicts Washington elites promoted idealistic dreams: a democratic and liberal Afghanistan, a Ukraine with Crimea restored and NATO membership, Russia too weak and frightened to cause trouble for anyone.

Biden involved America in a new open-ended war, and his policies were perverse even on their own terms. If American support was meant to win the war for Ukraine, or at least provide maximum leverage, then providing the utmost aid up front would have been the logical thing to do.

Instead, Biden followed a pattern of incremental escalation, giving Ukraine more powerful arms and more leeway to use them only as Ukraine weakened — as if the administration’s conscious aim was to protract the war as long as possible, no matter the cost in Ukrainian lives or the danger of the conflict taking a nuclear turn.

And while Biden was prolonging one war, another erupted in the Middle East, with Hamas’s savage attack on Israel and Israel’s relentless, far-ranging response. In this conflict too, Biden’s administration was at war with itself, lecturing Israel while also arming Israel and exerting no effective influence. A deployment of American forces to a “pier” in Gaza for humanitarian purposes — soldiers as social workers again — was predictably useless but thankfully brief, ending before Americans in uniform could die in a warzone doing everything but fighting.

Biden himself is senescent, but so, more importantly, is the worldview he represents. From the George H.W. Bush and Clinton years through the George W. Bush and Obama administrations, and then again with Biden in the White House, Washington has had one way of operating, attempting to engineer a universal system and preferring to prolong conflicts indefinitely rather than admit idealistic aims cannot be realized.

When Donald Trump attempted to shift away from a liberal ideological foreign policy toward a more realistic and negotiation-ready one, the media and official Washington went to extraordinary lengths to stop him. In his first term, Trump’s foreign policy was frustrated from within his administration by unelected officials, and even presidential appointees, who sought to prevent any deviation from “the Blob’s” prescribed path.

But last November’s election gave America’s voters a simple choice, pitting Trump and his foreign policy against a unified establishment, with Kamala Harris having the support not only of liberal Democrats but also neoconservative Republicans like Liz Cheney. Americans chose Trump in greater numbers than ever before, handing him a victory in every swing state.

Both at the ballot box and in the disastrous record of the Biden administration, the old order was put to its final tests and failed. Biden is the epitaph to the epoch of neoconservatism and neoliberalism that defined American policy for decades and that lost the peace after the Cold War.


Top photo credit: U.S. President Joe Biden walks accompanied by U.S. first lady Jill Biden after delivering remarks on what he calls the "continued battle for the Soul of the Nation" in front of Independence Hall at Independence National Historical Park, Philadelphia, U.S., September 1, 2022. REUTERS/Jonathan Ernst
Washington Politics
Iran
Top image credit: An Iranian man (not pictured) carries a portrait of the former commander of the IRGC Aerospace Forces, Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh, and participates in a funeral for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commanders, Iranian nuclear scientists, and civilians who are killed in Israeli attacks, in Tehran, Iran, on June 28, 2025, during the Iran-Israel ceasefire. (Photo by Morteza Nikoubazl/NurPhoto VIA REUTERS)

First it was regime change, now they want to break Iran apart

Middle East

Washington’s foreign policy establishment has a dangerous tendency to dismantle nations it deems adversarial. Now, neoconservative think tanks like the Washington-based Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and their fellow travelers in the European Parliament are openly promoting the balkanization of Iran — a reckless strategy that would further destabilize the Middle East, trigger catastrophic humanitarian crises, and provoke fierce resistance from both Iranians and U.S. partners.

As Israel and Iran exchanged blows in mid-June, FDD’s Brenda Shaffer argued that Iran’s multi-ethnic makeup was a vulnerability to be exploited. Shaffer has been a vocal advocate for Azerbaijan in mainstream U.S. media, even as she has consistently failed to disclose her ties to Azerbaijan’s state oil company, SOCAR. For years, she has pushed for Iran’s fragmentation along ethnic lines, akin to the former Yugoslavia’s collapse. She has focused much of that effort on promoting the secession of Iranian Azerbaijan, where Azeris form Iran’s largest non-Persian group.

keep readingShow less
Ratcliffe Gabbard
Top image credit: Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard and CIA director John Ratcliffe join a meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump and his intelligence team in the Situation Room at the White House in Washington, D.C., U.S. June 21, 2025. The White House/Handout via REUTERS

Trump's use and misuse of Iran intel

Middle East

President Donald Trump has twice, within the space of a week, been at odds with U.S. intelligence agencies on issues involving Iran’s nuclear program. In each instance, Trump was pushing his preferred narrative, but the substantive differences in the two cases were in opposite directions.

Before the United States joined Israel’s attack on Iran, Trump dismissed earlier testimony by Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, in which she presented the intelligence community’s judgment that “Iran is not building a nuclear weapon and Supreme Leader Khamanei has not authorized the nuclear weapons program he suspended in 2003.” Questioned about this testimony, Trump said, “she’s wrong.”

keep readingShow less
Mohammad Bin Salman Trump Ayatollah Khomenei
Top photo credit: Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman (President of the Russian Federation/Wikimedia Commons); U.S. President Donald Trump (Gage Skidmore/Flickr) and Iran’s Ayatollah Khamenei (Wikimedia Commons)

Let's make a deal: Enrichment path that both Iran, US can agree on

Middle East

The recent conflict, a direct confrontation that pitted Iran against Israel and drew in U.S. B-2 bombers, has likely rendered the previous diplomatic playbook for Tehran's nuclear program obsolete.

The zero-sum debates concerning uranium enrichment that once defined that framework now represent an increasingly unworkable approach.

Although a regional nuclear consortium had been previously advanced as a theoretical alternative, the collapse of talks as a result of military action against Iran now positions it as the most compelling path forward for all parties.

Before the war, Iran was already suggesting a joint uranium enrichment facility with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on Iranian soil. For Iran, this framework could achieve its primary goal: the preservation of a domestic nuclear program and, crucially, its demand to maintain some enrichment on its own territory. The added benefit is that it embeds Iran within a regional security architecture that provides a buffer against unilateral attack.

For Gulf actors, it offers unprecedented transparency and a degree of control over their rival-turned-friend’s nuclear activities, a far better outcome than a possible covert Iranian breakout. For a Trump administration focused on deals, it offers a tangible, multilateral framework that can be sold as a blueprint for regional stability.

keep readingShow less

LATEST

QIOSK

Newsletter

Subscribe now to our weekly round-up and don't miss a beat with your favorite RS contributors and reporters, as well as staff analysis, opinion, and news promoting a positive, non-partisan vision of U.S. foreign policy.