Two recent developments indicate that Syria’s future is at an important crossroads.
In early May, the Arab league announced that it would re-admit Syria after a nearly 12-year suspension dating back to the outbreak of the civil war in 2011. In response, a bipartisan group of 35 U.S. lawmakers introduced the “Assad Regime Anti-Normalization Act of 2023,” which, among other things, calls for an inter-agency “report of the steps the United States is taking to actively deter recognition or normalization of relations by other governments with the Assad regime.” It also expands the Caesar Act sanctions on the Syrian regime, which have been in place since 2020.
The Biden administration has also stated its opposition to the Arab League’s decision.
A Quincy Institute panel hosted on Friday sparked several moments of interesting debate between University of Oklahoma professorJoshua Landis, (who wrote recently for RS in favor of normalization), and former U.S. Ambassador William Roebuck, on the effectiveness of the Caesar Act sanctions and whether it makes sense to keep them in place.
See the exchange here:
Watch the full event, which also featured Quincy Institute senior research analyst Steve Simon, former Special Representative for Syria Engagement James Jeffrey, and Duke University Law professor Mara Revkin, here:
Blaise Malley is a freelance writer and a former Responsible Statecraft reporter. He is currently a MA candidate at New York University. His writing has appeared in The New Republic, The American Prospect, The American Conservative, and elsewhere.
Despite positive recruitment reports from Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, the Army is struggling with high attrition rates. Nearly 25% of recruits have failed to complete their contracts since 2022.
The Army reported in September that it exceeded its FY2024 recruitment goals. It even witnessed a backlog of new recruits waiting for training, as around 11,000 were placed in the delayed entry program. The question seems to be, can they keep them? The numbers aren’t promising.
Army data reviewed by Military.com suggests that, since 2022, nearly 25% of recruits have left the military before completing their initial contracts. The quality of recruits is one of several factors contributing to high attrition rates. According to service data, the military placed 25% of all enlistees in at least one of the Future Soldier Preparatory Courses, a series of trainings designed to assist recruits who do not meet academic or health standards set by the Pentagon. Of those who attend these courses, 25% do not complete their first contract. Those who did not attend the course still had a 20% attrition rate.
The number of eligible recruits in the country has also shrunk dramatically. According to a senior Army official, only 8% of the population is eligible for “clean enlistment” with no waivers, much lower than the 23% found in a 2020 DOD study. To combat this, the Army more than doubled the number of medical, academic, and criminal waivers granted to recruits in 2024 compared to 2022. More than 400 felony waivers were included in the 2024 waivers, up from 98 in 2022.
Not only did the Army reduce its recruitment goal to 55,000 from 65,000 in 2023, but the previous recruitment gains are muddled by the high attrition rates.
Hegseth previously mentioned the need to strengthen the military’s standards. President Trump signed an executive order in January to end the Department of Defense's Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion programs but has not addressed slipping academic or health standards within the recruitment pool.
The military has been suffering from a credibility problem overall. A survey from 2022 found that only 48% of the public “expressed a great deal of trust and confidence” in the military. Of the respondents, 47% said that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were reasons for their lack of confidence. Some have blamed the post-9/11 wars and growing mistrust in government institutions for lagging recruitment over the last several years. In addition, broader access to secondary education and job training have offered other options to kids who, in years past, would see the military as the only ticket to school and work after high school.
But that doesn’t explain the crisis of attrition, which appears to be a much more complicated issue.
“I don't know what an acceptable attrition rate is, but we have to meet people where they are," stated a senior Army official. "The quality of new soldiers is an enormous problem we're paying for. But that's just where the country is."
When asked about the quality of recruits, service spokesperson Madison Bonzo said, “U.S. Army Recruiting Command remains committed to recruiting young men and women into our Army that are ready and qualified to join the most lethal fighting force in the world to ensure our nation's security."
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Top image credit: Ecuador's President and presidential candidate for reelection Daniel Noboa addresses supporters during his closing campaign event for the upcoming Sunday presidential election, in Quito, Ecuador February 6, 2025. REUTERS/Karen Toro
As Ecuador heads to a second round of presidential elections on April 13, incumbent Daniel Noboa has made headlines by calling to incorporate foreign military special forces into the country’s fight against drug traffickers and transnational organized crime.
The announcement came just months after Noboa, the 37-year-old Miami-born heir to the South American country’s banana fortune, sought to amend Ecuador’s constitution to permit the installation of foreign military bases amid the country’s rapidly deteriorating security landscape.
Since Noboa won snap elections in October 2023, Ecuador has become the most violent country in Latin America, with 1,300 homicides in just the first 50 days of 2025 — a 40% increase over the same period in 2023. Nestled between the world’s two largest cocaine producers, Ecuador has also emerged as the global leader in cocaine exports to Europe, with a growing presence of Mexican, Colombian, and Albanian cartels taking advantage of the country’s weak institutions, porous borders, and strategic location.
After heavily-armed gangs took over a live news broadcast early last year, U.S. security analysts and editorial boards have called for a "Plan Colombia" — the largest U.S. military and counternarcotics aid package ever in the Western Hemisphere — for Ecuador, which just years prior had been hailed as an “island of peace.”
The $15 billion aid plan to Colombia, Washington’s top security partner in the Americas, brought down crime in the country's urban centers. But after a 2016 peace deal with Colombia’s largest insurgency led to its partial demobilization, transnational actors moved in to fill the void and drug trafficking was rerouted through neighboring Ecuador.
The Biden administration responded to Ecuador’s de facto declaration of war on 22 criminal gangs in January 2024 by sending its SOUTHCOM commander, the “drug czar,” and White House and State Department officials to meet with Noboa, leading to agreements in defense, intelligence and law enforcement.
These visits came on the heels of signing a bilateral “status of forces” agreement (SOFA) that granted U.S. military personnel the exemptions and immunities typically afforded to diplomats. As part of a five-year, $93 million aid package promised by SOUTHCOM, the U.S. delivered 20,000 bullet-proof vests, deployed a mobile border police unit and FBI agents, and donated a Lockheed Martin C-130H aircraft and two island-class Coast Guard patrol boats.
In July 2024, South Florida-based Matrix Aviation Inc. registered with the Department of Justice as a foreign agent for Ecuador’s Defense Ministry to help the Noboa administration access new funds under the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program and implement the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Ecuador program. Its objective is to “secure U.S. government funding and assistance programs to combat drug trafficking, border defense, human trafficking and other crimes,” according to the FARA records.
The foreign principal, Defense Minister Gian Carlo Loffredo, has no formal military experience, but was previously a counter-terrorism instructor at the Israeli Tactical School, which was founded by former Mossad officials, and has claimed to be the only certified National Rifle Association instructor for Latin America.
Meanwhile, Noboa is actively courting the Trump administration to shore up his electoral bid and urge increased U.S. military support amid the country’s worsening security environment. Noboa was one of few foreign leaders at President Trump’s inauguration, and some U.S. lawmakers are openly urging Ecuadorians to not vote for Ecuador’s progressive opposition candidate, Luisa Gonzalez, who is currently favored to win the run-off after major third-party candidate Leonidas Iza signaled his support.
Gonzalez, who lost to Noboa in the 2023 contest, is a protégée of former President Rafael Correa (2009-2017), whose administration reduced levels of violent crime and enjoyed relative economic prosperity during a period of high commodity export prices. In October 2024, Correa and former Vice President Jorge Glas — whom Noboa had arrested six months earlier as he sought asylum at the Mexican Embassy in Quito — were sanctioned by the U.S. in what was perceived as a signal of support for Noboa.
Despite a 16% reduction in crime during Noboa’s first year, 35 “states-of exception” have been declared since Correa left office in 2017, and conflict zones across the country’s Pacific coast have become thoroughly militarized. Noboa’s approval ratings have suffered as a result, plummeting from 72% to 45% through 2024.
According to Pedro Labayen Herrera, a research associate at the Washington-based Center for Economic and Policy Research, the victor of next month’s election can reduce spiralling crime by strengthening state presence in long-neglected areas and adopting social policies to curb poverty and inequality — rather than allowing U.S. naval patrols around the Galapagos Islands or re-inviting U.S. forces to operate out of the Manta air base after they were expelled by Correa in 2009.
Isabel Chiriboga, assistant director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, similarly cautions against the adoption of a “Plan Colombia”-like U.S. security package for Ecuador, arguing that investment in education and youth development programs, as well as securing preferential tariffs for Ecuador’s U.S.-bound exports, as contemplated in the bipartisan IDEA Act, could help stem the tide of violence.
A May 2024 SOUTHCOM publication similarly recognizes the perils of an overly militarized approach to Ecuador’s multi-faceted crime problem, finding “the increased presence of U.S. military forces in Ecuadorian territory may provoke public opposition among some segments of the population who argue that the SOFA grants unprecedented privileges and immunities to foreign military personnel, which undermine Ecuador’s legal jurisdiction and sovereignty.”
The country’s grim economic reality could further complicate the Noboa administration’s hopes of scoring a robust U.S. security package. After Ecuador agreed to turn over its Soviet-era arms scraps to the U.S. for transfer to Ukraine in exchange for $200 million in modern materiel, Russia retaliated by cutting off imports of Ecuadorean bananas and flowers. Unwilling to jeopardize nearly $700 million in annual sales to Moscow, Noboa backtracked on the deal.
In late 2022, Congress passed the U.S.-Ecuador Partnership Act aimed at expediting bilateral assistance and shoring up investment for the country, but the framework has proven ineffective as Ecuador’s economy contracted 1.5% in late 2024, compounded by IMF-imposed austerity measures and 14-hour blackouts in some areas of the country.
Amid surging U.S.-bound migration, a feud with his vice president and the residual economic fallout from Covid, Noboa faces an uphill battle on April 13, hoping that foreign military presence in Gonzalez’s coastal stronghold can stabilize conditions and give him a last-minute electoral boost, Chiriboga explains.
Yet as Ecuador becomes the new front line of the U.S. war on drugs, Noboa’s reliance on worn-out strategies has so far failed to yield concrete results — and April 13 may not give him enough time to prove to voters that he’s the man to usher in the peace and security that Ecuador desperately seeks.
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Top photo credit: Donald Trump (Anna Moneymaker/Shutterstock) Volodymyr Zelensky (miss.cabul/Shutterstock) and Vladimir Putin (paparazzza/Shuttterstock)
The Trump administration’s suspension of military aid and intelligence to Ukraine has some justification, but also involves serious dangers.
The argument in favor is that it is the only way to get the Ukrainian government to engage in serious negotiations and eventually agree to a compromise peace. Previously, it refused to do so, by ruling out talks with Putin and setting public terms not for peace but for “victory.”
Even at President Zelensky’s notorious meeting with President Trump and Vice President Vance in the Oval Office on February 28, it was still clear that Zelensky was hoping to get the U.S. administration to support Ukrainian positions that would make any peace settlement with Russia impossible and require the U.S. to go on indefinitely providing Ukraine with military and financial aid.
However, for a peace settlement to be reached it is clear that Russia will also have to compromise on its previous demands, especially vis-a-vis Ukraine, as some of these could not – and should not – be accepted by any Ukrainian government. And so, very appropriately, Trump has also threatened Russia with damaging new sanctions if it rejects agreement and chooses to continue the war.
These unacceptable Russian conditions include Putin’s demand that, in return for a ceasefire, Ukraine must withdraw from the whole of the four provinces that Russia claims to have annexed but that Ukrainian forces still hold – including the provincial capitals of Kherson and Zaporizhia; and that Ukraine should reduce its armed forces to a point where it would be effectively defenseless.
It is clear that a debate is taking place among the Russian elites on whether to press these demands or compromise on them. In the end of course, President Putin will decide, and we do not know what is going on in his mind. It seems likely that he has not yet decided, if only because the course of events on the battlefield remains unclear. Until now, Russia has been advancing, but only very slowly and with heavy casualties.
But in the view of a member of the Russian elite (previously close to Putin) with whom I spoke last June, while Putin is a pragmatist who is willing to compromise if that is the best option, if Ukraine were to collapse militarily, then, within Putin’s mind, “Peter and Catherine are still waiting” – a reference to the two Russian monarchs who conquered most of Ukraine from the Turks and Poles in the 17th and 18th centuries. The risk then of Trump’s suspension of aid to Ukraine is that it will embolden Russian hardliners – including the hardline side of Putin – to reject compromise and hold out for a greater victory.
This would be a dreadful mistake on the part of the Russian government. For Moscow now has within sight the possibility of something that it has been seeking in vain for more than three decades, under Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Putin: a great and lasting agreement with the United States, that will end Washington’s efforts to exclude Russia from consultation on European security issues and destroy its status as a great power. It would be an act of historic folly on Moscow’s part to throw this away for the sake of capturing some ruined cities in eastern Ukraine, inhabited by bitterly resentful people.
However, by radically alienating U.S. Democrats and many Europeans and encouraging a hostile (and false) rhetoric that the present peace process involves “surrender” to Russia, the Trump administration may have aggravated one weakness in the Ukraine peace process and indeed any other agreements entered into by the U.S.: that, in the words of one Russian official (echoed by remarks of those from many countries), “No agreement signed with Washington can be relied on for more than four years at the most.”
In other words, there can be no guarantee that if U.S. elections lead to victory for the opposite party, a new administration will not simply tear up everything that the previous administration agreed — something exemplified by the behavior of the previous Trump administration with respect to the nuclear deal with Iran in 2017. If the Democrats and their political allies in Europe believe or can plausibly claim that an agreement made by Trump simply constitutes “betrayal” of Ukraine, democracy, the “ruled-based order” and so on, then, if they win in 2028, they may well be tempted to cancel or undermine any agreement with Russia.
And it must be remembered that, while Western governments and the media talk endlessly of how “Russia cannot be trusted,” and that therefore Ukraine must be given “permanent, ironclad guarantees” of future security (as if such things have ever existed, or could exist in history), a long series of abandoned treaties and broken promises over the past 30 years give Russians at least equal reasons to distrust the West.
Two things are therefore essential for any stable peace settlement: First, and obviously, it must be one that both Ukraine and Russia can live with, however grudgingly, and that therefore meets their most basic conditions. Second, it must be as formal, detailed, and diplomatically strong as possible. As Putin has reportedly suggested, this need not delay a ceasefire as long as the basic framework for peace is firmly and publicly nailed down in advance. This means among other things that it must be signed under the auspices of the United Nations and involve peacekeepers from leading members of the “Global South,” whom Russia would be deeply unwilling to alienate.
However, the threat of, at some stage, violating a settlement does not only come from Russia. Ukrainian extremists will be deeply unhappy with any compromise peace and may well be tempted to continue their campaign of assassinations of pro-Russian officials in the occupied areas of Ukraine as well as leading figures in Russia itself. If this occurs after a peace settlement, it will be regarded by Russia (and much of the international community) as terrorism, and responded to accordingly.
This is why any peace settlement, however painful for Ukraine, must also meet its genuine needs. It is also why the Trump administration must go on trying to work with the British and Europeans, while telling them clearly and unequivocally that a U.S. “backstop” for a European “peacekeeping” force in Ukraine — and the peacekeeping force itself — are out of the question, as they would amount in effect to a NATO pledge to fight Russia in the event of a new war. Especially as Washington reduces its role in Europe, the EU and European states will play the key future role in reconstructing Ukraine, funding Ukraine, and therefore influencing Ukraine.
For a peace settlement to last, it is essential that the European states employ their aid and influence Ukraine in ways that do not maintain or restart deep tensions with Russia. Long-term, carefully planned European rearmament is necessary if European countries are to assume responsibility for their own defense, relieve the burden on the U.S., and also — paradoxically — develop the self-confidence and sense of security necessary to establish a stable and peaceful relationship with Russia. This rearmament is a quite separate issue from that of arming Ukraine for indefinite war, let alone intervening there.
At present, the (exaggerated) appearance of a break with the U.S. has reduced many of the European establishments to a condition approaching hysteria. This includes encouraging the Ukrainian government to set conditions for peace that will make agreement with Moscow impossible and suggestions that they can support Ukraine in rejecting compromise and continuing the war without Washington’s help. This would not only risk catastrophe for Ukraine; it would virtually ensure it.
The U.S., Europe, Russia and Ukraine now have the chance to achieve the historic opportunity offered by Mikhail Gorbachev, of a “Common European Home” that is also a European “house with many rooms” ensuring peace and security on the continent, and allowing the U.S. to escape the costs and dangers of its European commitments. We lost that chance after the end of the Cold War, and numerous disasters have resulted, greatest among them the Ukraine War. We must not lose it again.
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