We all know that the U.S. spends obscene sums of money on defense. But the actual amount tends to be a moving target, one that is described by official Washington and its enablers in the media in the smallest terms possible.
Thus in unveiling the Pentagon’s 2024 budget request on March 6, DoD Comptroller Mike McCord demurely highlighted $842 billion as the “top line” a figure dutifully cited in relevant news reports. In his remarks, McCord took pains to remind us that, actually, we’re spending much less than we used to: “When I was born [1959] we, the United States, were at nine percent of GDP on defense. Ronald Reagan was considered high at six percent. We're now at three. So it's a big number, but in other contexts, you know, you could look at it another way.”
So what do we actually spend on the defense of the United States? Unearthing the true figure demands tireless application combined with a sure grasp of the subterranean pathways along which our dollars travel to fuel the national security machine.
Fortunately, we can spare ourselves the effort, thanks to the work of defense analyst Winslow Wheeler. Wheeler learned his budget-navigator’s skills over many years in the congressional branch of the military industrial complex in assorted U.S. Senate offices, including the budget committee and the staffs of both Democratic and Republican senators, before transitioning to the GAO and then the watchdog Center for Defense Information. He had now applied his hard-won knowledge to our current and imminent outlays. As he tells us:
“The big spenders, especially, like to distort the size of our spending — and to mis-measure it -— with gimmicks and yardsticks that have almost nothing to do with dollars spent. As it did in the past, this has prompted me to put together a table showing all the spending that goes into US national security for the current and next fiscal years.
Some can’t even get Pentagon spending right (usually intentionally, I believe) by undercounting it. Others ignore enormous and entirely relevant amounts outside the budget of the Department of Defense — such as for nuclear weapons, protecting the homeland from terrorists and other criminals, or international security. One should also include a fair share of the costs that this spending adds to the annual deficit.”
His findings are laid out in the table below, sourced mainly from OMB's presentation materials for the 2024 budget request.
Spoiler alert: The number is much, much, bigger than they want you to know.
The column labeled "Comments" offers descriptions of just what monies are included, or not, in each category, plus some discussion of past and present gimmicks used to manipulate the public's perception of the "defense" (or "national security") budget.
Andrew Cockburn is the Washington editor of Harper’s Magazine and the author of several nonfiction books, including his latest, The Spoils of War: Power, Profit and the American War Machine (2021). He also published Kill Chain: The Rise of the High-Tech Assassins (2016). He has written for The New York Times, The New Yorker, Playboy, Vanity Fair, and National Geographic, among other publications.
President Donald Trump’s unorthodox diplomacy has alarm bells ringing around the world, not least in Washington, D.C. While much of the inside-the-beltway elite is horrified at the prospect of America supposedly reorienting toward Russia, administration insiders have hinted at an ambitious plan to drive a wedge between Moscow and Beijing.
They’ve raised the possibility of a so-called “Reverse Nixon” maneuver aimed at fostering a global balance of power more favorable to America. But can it work?
President Richard Nixon famously visited China in 1972, ending a 25-year freeze between Washington and Beijing. The table had been set for his diplomacy years earlier with bloody skirmishes along the Chinese-Soviet border in 1969. This fracture between the Eurasian communist giants effectively opened a door for Nixon.
Nixon’s decisive move on the global chessboard proved an immense geopolitical blow to the Soviets. Now, the Kremlin had to contend with powerful military blocs on both its western and eastern frontiers. And, as would become clear in the 1980s, the combination of America’s technological prowess and China’s immense demographic resources and hunger for modernization would prove more than a little unnerving for the USSR, which was already overextended.
Today’s world is very different, of course, but could Trump’s attempted rapprochement with the Kremlin bring about a similarly stunning transformation in world politics?
Unfortunately, such an outcome is unlikely. Beyond the acute antagonism in U.S.-Russia relations, there’s another important factor at work: the broad and deep solidarity that characterizes the China-Russia relationship.
Some Western experts have characterized the ties that bind Beijing and Moscow as a mere “marriage of convenience,” suggesting that a hypothetical break — akin to what occurred in the 1960s — remains conceivable. It’s not that the relationship is devoid of tensions, whether with respect to environmental issues, such as rapacious logging in Siberia for the Chinese market, or lingering foreign policy questions like how to deal with India or Vietnam. After all, Beijing is not pleased that Moscow sells myriad armaments to China’s regional rivals.
Moreover, neither side is eager to discuss the painful history of the Sino-Soviet conflict. Many have pointed out there is an obvious power asymmetry between the two countries that has created some instability.
Yet the overall picture is of a harmonious bilateral relationship. China-Russia trade has boomed in recent years. The vast Chinese market has allowed Russia to divert exports previously meant for Europe to Chinese customers. This has meant cheap energy for Beijing and, more critically, has played a key role in stabilizing Russia’s finances amid the heavy sanctions that have been slapped on the country since 2022.
Beijing has done much more for the Kremlin than simply stabilize Russia’s finances and fill in its large consumer markets. Crucially, it has provided both key components to Russia’s war machine as well as timely logistics aid, including non-lethal assistance that has proven significant too.
Chinese excavators seem to have proven quite important to building the Russian “Surovikin Line” that decisively defeated Ukraine’s summer 2023 offensive aimed at reaching the Sea of Azov. Just as importantly, Beijing leaders and experts have provided a steady stream of statements that are generally supportive of the Kremlin in its struggle against the West.
And while China has refused to send lethal weapons let alone troops to Ukraine, it has continued regular joint military exercises with Russia that now routinely include both strategic forces and irregular forces. In October 2024, Chinese and Russian coast guard forces linked up for their first ever joint patrol through the Bering Strait — proximate to Alaska’s shoreline. The Arctic forms an arena of multi-domain partnership between China and Russia wherein their interests are quite well-aligned. In short, China seeks natural resources, while Russia badly needs both capital and technical expertise to spur development of the High North.
Notably, the Sino-Russian military partnership now sometimes embraces third countries, such as Iran. A 2024 Chinese academic analysis suggests, moreover, that the pressure from “U.S. maritime hegemony” can be felt simultaneously in both the Black Sea and also the South China Sea, implying a genuinely common strategic viewpoint.
The many cooperative domains suggested above imply a deeply rooted bond between China and Russia that will not be easily broken. This casts major doubt on the viability of a so-called “reverse Nixon” maneuver.
Yet there are still sound reasons to pursue improved relations between Washington and Moscow. First and foremost, there is the humanitarian necessity to stop the awful bloodletting in Ukraine.
Second, the best way to mitigate nuclear war dangers and curb nuclear proliferation is to reinvigorate arms control by improving relations between the leading nuclear weapons states. Improved relations with the Kremlin could yield strategic dividends with other problematic states like North Korea and Iran.
Finally, it is conceivable that a more confident Russia will be slightly less beholden to China and thus less likely to share the “crown jewels” of Russian military technology. This includes the sensitive domains of nuclear submarines and nuclear weapons development.
Enjoy our new column by the Democratizing Foreign Policy team exposing stealth corruption infecting our system — in plain sight.
Disclosure under the nation’s preeminent law for regulating foreign influence in America is plummeting.
A review of Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) filings shows that disclosure of informational materials — items such as one-pagers and lobbyist talking points that are distributed to influence policy and public opinion — is down over 30 percent in the first quarter of 2025, compared to this time last year and over 40 percent compared to 2022.
This follows repeated efforts by the Trump administration to curtail investigations and enforcement of FARA and other foreign influence laws.
In one of her first acts as attorney general, Pam Bondi — who was previously registered under FARA to represent the Qatari government — took a sledgehammer to FARA in a memo making clear that FARA was no longer a priority and that she would only bring criminal charges under the law in “instances of alleged conduct similar to more traditional espionage by foreign government actors.”
The Trump administration took the memo in stride, gutting efforts to combat foreign influence in America. The new administration is reportedly forcing out dozens of government officials flagging foreign interference in U.S. elections, including teams tracking cyberattacks and influence operations. Several government bodies working on these issues have been dismantled entirely, including the State Department’s Global Engagement Center and the FBI’s Foreign Influence Task Force. A Justice Department memo from late March reportedly called to reduce “the number of attorneys working on investigations and prosecutions related to the Foreign Agents Registration Act.”
The result of all this is a perverse incentive system where foreign powers are emboldened to disclose far less about their efforts to influence the American political system. We’re already seeing the results of this in reduced filings under FARA and multiple sources that spoke to us on condition of anonymity confirmed that foreign embassies are reviewing their FARA disclosures in light of the Bondi memo.
Even before the Trump administration gutted foreign influence oversight, foreign governments were seeking ways to avoid FARA registration altogether. The Trump administration has effectively given foreign powers the green light to move their foreign influence operations entirely underground, while Americans still have to play by the rules. If an American organization hires a lobbying firm, for example, they have to report it to the U.S. government under the Lobbying Disclosure Act, which has not been gutted.
In short, we’re quickly approaching the point where American citizens that want to influence their own government have to be more transparent about it than a foreign dictator.
Foreign influence is also on the rise in America — making this the worst possible time to pump the brakes on FARA enforcement. In 2016, the top 10 most active countries disclosed a combined $205 million on lobbying. In 2023, that number ballooned to a whopping $742 million. Similarly, foreign governments have increased their funding across D.C.’s foreign policy think tanks by 30% in the past five years, with the highest donor being the United Arab Emirates, as we discovered in creating the Think Tank Funding Tracker.
Incidents of foreign powers being caught engaging in illicit influence operations have also gone up in recent years, many of which included prominent elected officials. But now, because of the Trump administration’s changes to foreign influence enforcement, lawyers for the people caught up in these cases are seeking — and in some cases getting — reprieve from a sympathetic Trump administration.
“Some have requested that the Justice Department drop pending charges, or have suggested they are planning to make such requests,” wrote Ken Vogel in the New York Times. “Others are expected to use the directives to seek clemency from Mr. Trump or leniency in dealings with prosecutors, according to people familiar with the reactions to the changes ordered by the new administration.”
Former Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chair Bob Menendez (D-N.J.), for example, was caught taking gold bars from Egypt in exchange for political favors such as giving the go-ahead for arms sales. After being convicted and sentenced to prison for 11 years, Menendez appealed to the president on X.“President Trump is right. This process is political and has been corrupted to the core,” he said.
Similarly, lawyers for Rep. Henry Cuellar (D-Texas) — who was indicted last May for bribery and acting as a foreign agent while a sitting member of Congress — see the Trump administration’s shift on FARA as an opportunity. “The new policy largely affirms our position in the case,” Eric Reed, a lawyer for Mr. Cuellar, said in an interview with the Times. “We’re evaluating the new policy and assessing the best manner to address it with the Department of Justice.”
While Menendez and Cuellar are still seeking a reprieve from their alleged transgressions, New York City Mayor Eric Adams has already gotten it. Adams was indicted last year for allegedly accepting $123,000 in travel benefits and tens of thousands of dollars in illegal campaign contributions from Turkish nationals. Then the charm offensive began; Adams met with Trump in Mar-a-Lago, praised Elon Musk, and skipped two scheduled events in New York in order to attend the inauguration. With Trump’s intervention, last week a judge begrudgingly dismissed the charges against Adams, writing that he couldn’t force federal prosecutors to pursue charges.
"Everything here smacks of a bargain: dismissal of the Indictment in exchange for immigration policy concessions," the judge said.
All of this flies in the face of Bondi’s justification for crippling America’s ability to counter foreign influence operations: that it had been politicized. To be sure, FARA is an overbroad, vague statute that can be, and has been, politicized. The International Center for Non-Profit Law has tracked dozens of congressional investigations into U.S. non-profits, many of which called for the non-profit to be investigated for not registering under FARA. But, these are politicized accusations by Congress, not prosecutions by the Department of Justice.
The fact is that actual prosecutions for FARA related charges in recent years have not been politicized, despite the well-meaning concerns of non-profit groups and the self-serving alarmism of law firms that have created a cottage industry advising clients concerned about FARA compliance. In fact, all of the high-profile cases brought during the Biden administration were Democrats, including Cuellar, Menendez, and Adams (a Democrat whose case was dismissed by Trump). Sue Mi Terry, the wife of ardent Trump critic Max Boot who once called Trump a foreign asset, was also indicted for FARA violations during the Biden administration.
But, the larger problem is that even if you buy the argument that FARA has been politicized, that doesn’t mean that you should dismantle our government’s ability to track foreign influence operations in America. While it’s still too early to know exactly how the Trump administration’s FARA sledgehammer will play out, we are barrelling towards a wild west of unregulated foreign influence with a sheriff that is nowhere to be found. In this lawless land, foreign powers will be all too eager to work toward secretly bending U.S. foreign policy to their will.
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Top photo credit: U.S. President Donald Trump speaks during a meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in the Oval Office at the White House in Washington, U.S., April 7, 2025. REUTERS/Kevin Mohatt
During Monday’s last-minute meeting between President Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Trump announced that the U.S. will meet directly with Iran on April 12 to talk about a potential agreement over Tehran’s nuclear program.
Prior to this statement, Iran had declared that it was willing to engage in indirect talks with the U.S. about the possibility of renegotiating a nuclear deal. When reporters asked for more information on this previously undisclosed plans for a direct meeting, which Tehran had not yet confirmed, Trump merely reiterated that the talks would be at “almost the highest level” and “on Saturday.” Later reports indicated that U.S. envoy Steve Witkoff would be representing Washington in those talks.
Meanwhile, it was reported that Iran’s Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi, said they would be indirect talks in Oman, through a mediator.
“Everyone agrees that doing a deal is preferable to doing the obvious,” Trump said, referring obliquely to the possibility of direct American military action against Iran, a long-held goal of Netanyahu’s. Recent U.S. military deployments — most notably B-2 bombers to Diego Garcia and additional assets to the eastern Mediterranean — suggest contingency planning is well underway.
“I think everybody agrees that doing a deal would be preferable to doing the obvious," he added. "And the obvious is not something that I want to be involved with, or, frankly, that Israel wants to be involved with, if they can avoid it."
Prior to the meeting, Israel had voiced concern that Washington might reengage Tehran without obtaining sufficient guarantees on curbing or ending its nuclear program or curtailing its regional activities, particularly in Syria and Lebanon. Netanyahu’s team reportedly pushed for closer coordination with the administration on potential red lines, while also discussing enhanced air-defense cooperation, including recent deliveries of THAAD and Patriot systems.
During the press conference, several journalists pressed Trump for more information on his administration’s protectionist trade policy, including the 17% tariffs the U.S. levied on Israeli goods. When asked if those might be reduced, Trump demurred, replying, “We help Israel a lot, we give them four billion dollars a year,” and acknowledged that the amount the U.S. sends annually to Israel is among the highest. “We take good care of our friends,” he concluded.
The 17% duty imposed by the Trump administration on Israeli exports has created widespread concern among Israel’s economic sectors. Even after Israel removed the tariffs on American goods in a bid to escape Trump’s tariffs, the administration declined to exempt Israel. An Israeli manufacturing association estimated that the tariffs will result in a $2.3 billion decline in Israeli exports every year, as well as a possible loss of 18,000 to 26,000 jobs.
Netanyahu arrived in Washington seeking to reverse or at least soften the policy, underscoring Israel’s longstanding dependence on U.S. markets and the symbolic weight of reciprocity in the alliance; on that, he seems to have failed.
Despite Trump’s unwillingness to lift tariffs, Trump and Netanyahu projected a sense of camaraderie, with Trump falsely declaring that “this man is working very hard to get the hostages out, I hope he’s being appreciated,” despite abundant evidence that Netanyahu prioritizes bombing Gaza over rescuing Israeli hostages. Netanyahu responded, “I have a good partner.”
In his opening remarks, Netanyahu asserted that he wishes to allow Palestinians to leave Gaza, echoing Trump’s plan — aired during Netanyahu’s February visit, when he became the first foreign leader hosted by Trump at the White House since his inauguration — to remove all Palestinians from Gaza. Contrary to recent reporting, Netanyahu claimed that Israel is not preventing Palestinians from leaving the enclave.
Netanyahu appears to be trying to soften his tone on ethnic cleansing by emphasizing “voluntary” removal. In that vein, his government has now established a new agency to help facilitate the emigration of Palestinians who wish to leave Gaza, as his military expands its occupation of the territory, wreaking even more destruction and rendering it uninhabitable.
Netanyahu’s announcement of plans to create a so-called “Morag Corridor” in southern Gaza — an Israeli-controlled zone intended to split the enclave — has drawn criticism for institutionalizing fragmentation under the pretext of enhancing security. At the same time, the situation on the West Bank remained tense following the killing of 14-year-old Amer Mohammad Saada Rabee, a Palestinian-American fatally shot by Israeli forces during a raid on the town of Beit Rima, as well as the killing of 15 humanitarian workers by Israeli forces in Gaza.
The incidents have reignited scrutiny of U.S. policy toward Israel's military conduct, particularly in light of Washington’s continuing weapons transfers and staunch diplomatic support.
According to a recent poll, 70 percent of Israelis want Netanyahu to resign. He was supposed to appear on Monday and Wednesday in the Jerusalem District Court due to his ongoing efforts to escape prosecution for corruption and fraud. Netanyahu’s last-minute trip to Washington followed a visit to Budapest that prompted Prime Minister Victor Orban to begin the process to withdraw Hungary from the International Criminal Court in order to avoid its legal obligation to detain Netanyahu as a wanted war criminal.
During the briefing, a journalist asked about the reaction of Palestinian Americans who had voted for Trump because they believed he would end the war in Gaza. “I’d like to see the war stop,” Trump replied, adding that he hoped it would soon, but then shifted to discussing the U.S. bombing campaign against the Houthis in Yemen, as well as his plans to provide the Pentagon with a trillion-dollar budget, its largest ever. The journalist’s question remained unanswered.
(Editor's note: The story has been updated to accommodate new developments as of Tuesday)
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