Rep. Jamaal Bowman (D-N.Y.) and Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) are leading an effort to push the Biden administration to investigate whether U.S. arms sales to Israel are being used to commit human rights abuses in violation of U.S. law, Jewish Currents first reported.
In a letter to President Biden and Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Bowman, Sanders and a handful of other House members — including Reps. Alexandria Ocasio Cortez (D-N.Y.), Ilhan Omar (D-Minn.), and Betty McCollum (D-Minn.) — cited “the rapidly escalating violence in the occupied Palestinian West Bank and the alarming actions of the new extreme right-wing Israeli government” as a catalyst for the investigation “to prevent the further loss of Israeli and Palestinian lives.”
The letter refers to manyinstancesof violence over the past several weeks that have killed both Israelis and Palestinians and that their concern about the “Israeli government’s worsening systemic violations of Palestinian human rights … have only deepened and grown more urgent under the new Israeli government.”
The letter calls on the administration to ensure that the United States is not underwriting illegal settlements and to determine whether U.S. arms sales to Israel are being used to violate American law (i.e. the so-called “Leahy Laws”) or commit human rights abuses.
“Furthermore,” the letter concludes, “we call on your administration to ensure that all future foreign assistance to Israel, including weapons and equipment, is not used in support of gross violations of human rights, including by strengthening end-use monitoring and financial tracking.”
For FY2023, Congress appropriated $3.8 billion in aid to Israel for defense, and nearly another $100 million “in funding for other cooperative defense and non-defense programs.”
“It's long past time for the Biden administration to take a hard look at the use of U.S.-supplied weapons in ongoing human rights abuses committed by the Israeli military, and to impose consequences for those abuses,” said the Quincy Institute’s Bill Hartung. “More members of Congress need to join Rep. Bowman and Sen. Sanders in calling for accountability over the billions in annual U.S. military aid to Israel.”
Jewish Currents adds that nearly two dozen non-governmental organizations have offered support for the letter, but that prominent left-leaning pro-Israel group J Street has not yet to publicly support it.
“This letter is a welcome step forward, reflecting not only a reaction to the naked extremism of Israel’s new government but also broadly the political space created by expanding support for Palestinian rights among American voters,” said Sarah Leah Whitson, executive director of Democracy for the Arab World Now, who charged that giving weapons to Israel “violates U.S. laws prohibiting arms transfers to human rights abusers and undermines our global interests as well.”
Ben Armbruster is the Managing Editor of Responsible Statecraft. He has more than a decade of experience working at the intersection of politics, foreign policy, and media. Ben previously held senior editorial and management positions at Media Matters, ThinkProgress, ReThink Media, and Win Without War.
Photos: Sheila Fitzgerald and lev radin via shutterstock.com
President Trump kicked off his Gulf tour this week in Saudi Arabia by delivering a speech at the Saudi Arabia Investment Forum on Tuesday, in which he announced the lifting of U.S. sanctions on Syria.
Then on Wednesday morning, local time, he met briefly with Syria's President Ahmed al-Sharaa on the sidelines of the regional summit — the first such meeting of Syrian and American leaders in 25 years.
"After discussing the situation in Syria with the Crown Prince [Mohammed bin Salman (MbS)] and also with President [Recep Tayyip] Erdogan of Turkey, who called me the other day and asked for a very similar thing ... I will be ordering the cessation of sanctions against Syria in order to give them a chance at greatness," declared Trump on Tuesday to his audience, which responded with a standing ovation.
Describing the U.S. sanctions as “brutal and crippling,” Trump went on to say that now is the time for the Syrians “to shine” and he wished the war-torn country “good luck.”
Implemented in mid-2020, the Caesar Syrian Civilian Protection Act (a.k.a. the Caesar Act) constitutes the most stringent U.S. sanctions ever imposed on Syria. These derivative sanctions have been strangling the Syrian economy, both before and after Bashar al-Assad’s fall. The lifting of U.S. sanctions marks a significant shift in Washington’s approach to Syria a little more than five months into the post-Assad era.
Trump's meeting with Sharaa — described in papers Wednesday as an "encounter" — took place after the new Syrian leader paid his first trip to Bahrain since Assad’s ouster. The last time the presidents of the U.S. and Syria met in person was in 2000, when Bill Clinton and Hafez al-Assad were in Switzerland discussing efforts to broker an Israeli-Syrian peace deal.
“This indicates that Trump is willing to break with the precedent that has been set by the U.S. since the fall of the regime and introduction of [Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)] leadership, entertaining not only direct engagement, but a monumental shift in U.S. Syria policy through sanctions relief,” Caroline Rose, a director at New Lines Institute, told RS.
Even if just a "hello" to Sharaa, who remains on Washington’s “Specially Designated Global Terrorist” list, this illustrates how “Trump is open to pragmatism when there’s a regional consensus,” according to Francesco Salesio Schiavi, an Italian analyst and Middle East expert, who spoke to RS.
“It reflects a shift from doctrinal isolation to transactional engagement, especially if Sharaa is seen as a potential bulwark against Iran and a vehicle for stabilizing post-conflict Syria,” he added.
“While this is far from formal recognition, I think it plants the seeds for a phased normalization process, starting with limited contact and possibly leading to re-engagement on counterterrorism, reconstruction, and border security, provided Sharaa can credibly distance himself from his militant past,” commented Schiavi.
This move on Trump’s part speaks to the extent to which Turkey and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states have significant influence with the current U.S. administration. Notably, Israel, which is extremely skeptical of the Sunni Islamist leadership in Damascus that took power late last year, has been lobbying the Trump administration to avoid moves that could legitimize Syria’s new government or ease the pressure that it is currently under. Thus, Trump’s decision to disregard Israeli interests on this issue fits into a trend that has been emerging whereby Trump is increasingly sidelining Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government to align U.S. foreign policy more closely with Ankara, Doha, and Riyadh.
The administration’s approach to diplomacy with Iran, the pact with the Houthis, the de-linking of possible U.S. support for Saudi Arabia’s nuclear ambitions and a Washington-Riyadh defense treaty from Israeli normalization, and the securing of Edan Alexander’s release through direct U.S.-Hamas talks all underscored this overall pivot away from an Israel-centered Middle East foreign policy.
“After almost six months of hard resistance against sanctions relief and direct engagement from cabinet members, congressional voices, and advisors, the fact that this policy shift occurred within less than 24 hours when Trump touched down in Riyadh signals the large weight that the Crown Prince MbS wields over Trump’s decision-making in the Middle East,” explained Rose.
“MbS was successful in encouraging Trump to open the ‘flood gates’ of relief efforts and allow both Saudi Arabia and Qatar to lead these initiatives for reconstruction — efforts that were blocked by U.S. sanctions and non-engagement,” she added.
The fact that the driving force was ultimately MbS — alongside the influence of advisers like Steve Witkoff, pressure from President Erdoğan, and some competition on the part of France whose president hosted Sharaa last week — highlights the extent of Trump’s flexibility on Middle East policy.
Trump has signaled his desire to offer Syria an opportunity to begin its long journey of reconstruction and redevelopment, which will require luring a massive amount of foreign investment. Nonetheless, because many elected officials in Washington remain extremely suspicious toward the HTS-dominated government in Damascus, certain aspects of sanctions relief which require congressional approval might not necessarily move ahead as quickly as Trump and his friends in Turkey and the Gulf would like.
Regardless of how sanctions relief plays out in practice, Trump making this bold announcement and meeting Sharaa in Riyadh are major wins for the Saudi leadership, which has proven to be an effective bridge between post-Assad Syria and the U.S. With Saudi Arabia taking the lead within the GCC when it comes to outreach to the new Syrian government, the Kingdom has demonstrated its ability to use its influence to advance interests shared by all the Gulf Arab monarchies amid a period of regional crises and intensified geopolitical instability worldwide.
“The Trump-Sharaa meeting in Riyadh reflects Saudi Arabia’s capacity to align U.S. policy with shared strategic goals, notably containing Iran and managing the risks posed by HTS. For Trump, the Saudi setting offers political cover, framing the engagement as part of a broader Arab-led initiative rather than a unilateral move,” Schiavi told RS.
Trump’s decision to lift U.S. sanctions on Syria marks a bold reset. Originally designed to isolate and squeeze Syria’s Ba’athist government, the argument in favor of maintaining the Assad-era sanctions following the change of regime late last year has grown unconvincing. Trump now extends not just economic relief but a political overture — offering Syria’s Sunni Islamist leadership a chance to gain greater recognition and legitimacy in the eyes of Western leaders and statesmen, reflecting Trump’s characteristically transactional foreign policy approach.
If Sharaa, in this upcoming period, delivers on access to resources, economic openings, and regional stability, Trump may come to find the former militant as a leader whom he can make many deals with. This factor is particularly important within the context of a possible complete withdrawal of American military forces from Syria. Under that scenario, the White House would have greater incentive to foster positive relations with whichever government holds power in Damascus given that the U.S. would lack any presence on the ground.
In a wider context, great power competition probably played a significant role in Trump’s decision. Continuing to strangle Syria with U.S. sanctions would only open the door to China and Russia to gain greater clout in the country, particularly in the domains of defense and reconstruction.
Ultimately, although certain voices in the U.S. will inevitably find Trump’s move controversial and reckless while pointing to Sharaa’s extremist past, Trump is, to his credit, choosing to be pragmatic above all else.
keep readingShow less
Top image credit: U.S Vice President JD Vance arrives at the U.S. military's Pituffik Space Base in Greenland on March 28, 2025. Jim Watson/Pool via REUTERS
According to a report in the Wall Street Journal last week, Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard has instructed U.S. intelligence agencies to increase collection of information on Greenland.
The topics of interest include independence sentiment among Greenlanders, attitudes regarding U.S. mining interests, and individuals in Greenland and Denmark who might be supportive of U.S. objectives in Greenland.
It is not unusual, and can be appropriate, for the intelligence community to respond positively to peculiar interests of whoever is the incumbent administration. Such intelligence directives do not necessarily foreshadow actual administration policy and may be part of an exploratory effort to see what the possibilities are.
In this instance, the leak of the reported directive evoked sharp negative reactions in both Denmark and Greenland. The Danish government summoned the U.S. ambassador in Copenhagen for an explanation. The newly elected prime minister of Greenland, Jens-Frederik Nielsen, stated that the reported intelligence collection was “completely unacceptable,” “entirely abnormal” and “disrespectful toward an ally.”
A further downside of devoting intelligence resources to an administration hobby horse is that such resources are limited. Thus, there inevitably are opportunity costs in having fewer resources available to monitor matters more important for U.S. interests, including threats to U.S. national security, elsewhere in the world.
Gabbard’s directive may or may not point to future U.S. policy, but President Donald Trump has repeatedly indicated that he is serious about wanting U.S. ownership of Greenland. His sending of Vice President JD Vance on a trip to Greenland in March demonstrated the depth of the administration’s interest in the island.
The key policy question at hand is not whether Greenland is relevant to U.S. interests, but rather whether those interests are better advanced through current ownership and sovereignty arrangements or through the United States somehow acquiring the island.
The security interests stem from Greenland’s geographic location. It is underneath many air and missile routes between Russia and the United States. The location also is relevant to naval operations, with Greenland being on one side of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap between the North Atlantic and Arctic Ocean, as well as next to Northwest Passage navigation routes that will see increasing usage with the melting of arctic sea ice.
Under a 1951 treaty with Denmark, the United States already has what amounts to military sovereignty in Greenland. It is free to erect installations and conduct operations there without compensation to the Danes. During the Cold War, the United States constructed more than a dozen military installations in Greenland. Most have since been abandoned, only because they became obsolete or unneeded and not because of resistance from Denmark.
The United States still operates the Pituffik Space Base, the northernmost U.S. military installation in the world. The base’s main declared mission is to keep watch on the atmosphere and space to the north for any Russian and Chinese missiles and satellites.
The Danish and Greenlandic authorities have fully cooperated with the United States on security matters in other respects. This has included responding positively to U.S. prompting, from both the Biden and Trump administrations, to rebuff Chinese attempts to establish investments and infrastructure in Greenland. Greenland’s own foreign, security, and defense strategy published last year states that the territory “plays a key role in the defense of the United States against external threats, especially from the Arctic region.”
NATO ally Denmark recently has expressed its willingness to expand further its security cooperation with the United States in Greenland. Denmark also is augmenting its own defense activities in Greenland.
The economic interests, in a land that has only about 57,000 people and is mostly covered with ice, are minimal. Most talk on economic matters in Greenland focuses on minerals, echoing what Trump has talked about concerning Ukraine. And also like Ukraine, mineral exploitation in Greenland is mostly a matter of potential that is as yet unproven and undeveloped.
To the extent there is valuable potential to be developed, Greenlandic officials are not only willing but eager for the United States to participate in that development. This is part of a larger Greenlandic eagerness for U.S. economic involvement, to include tourism and other forms of investment.
Greenland’s minister of business and trade wrote earlier this year — while pointing out that 39 of the 50 minerals that the United States has classified as critical to national security and economic stability can be found in Greenland — that “the big obstacle to development of Greenland’s mineral resources is a lack of capital.” He noted that Greenland “has been collaborating with the U.S. State Department for several years to provide new knowledge about our critical minerals.” The latest agreement on this subject was signed in 2019 during the first Trump administration, and the minister expressed his “high hopes of signing a new agreement with the United States as soon as possible.”
In short, it is hard to imagine anything in Greenland that would serve U.S. security or economic interests that the United States cannot get already, simply by working harmoniously with the Danes and Greenlanders. Acquiring U.S. sovereignty over the island would not serve those interests any better.
The downsides of the act of acquisition also need to be factored in. So far, Trump has been vague about how this would be accomplished and has not ruled out any method, including even armed force. If it did come to a military operation, this would be an even more cataclysmic turnabout of the U.S. security posture than Trump already has caused with his shattering of alliances and cozying to authoritarians. It would be not only a naked act of aggression, but one against the territory of a NATO ally.
Even if military force were not used, acquisition would be an act of coercion because it would be contrary to the clear and strong preference of the people of Greenland. A recent poll showed that 85 percent of Greenlanders are opposed to becoming part of the United States. The Greenlandic prime minister before last month’s election in the territory reflected this sentiment in declaring “we do not want to be American.” The government of Denmark has supported this position and emphasized that the future of Greenland is for Greenlanders to decide, including eventually through a referendum.
It is not hard to understand this preference. While Greenland has had self-government since 2009, its people still have full Danish citizenship and mobility within the European Union. They also enjoy Nordic-type welfare rights including health care, social security, and free education.
Although most Greenlanders eventually want complete independence, the substantial support they get from Denmark — including a direct subsidy that amounts to $12,500 per capita — is the main reason they have hesitated to make that move by holding the promised referendum. The Trump administration has tried to exploit the pro-independence sentiment as a wedge issue between Greenland and Denmark, but the administration’s approach has backfired. Greenlanders’ anger over the U.S. attempt at a takeover has pushed them closer to Denmark.
This result is similar to what occurred in recent elections in Canada and Australia, in which right-of-center parties were punished by voters who associated them with Trump’s policies. In each case, citizens of an allied nation responded to what they perceived as unfriendly actions — either a trade war or threat of annexation — in a direction opposite to what the Trump administration presumably preferred.
The problems of coercively taking over a nation whose people do not want to be taken over would occur partly within the nation itself. A taste of that came during Vance’s visit, when concerns about popular demonstrations in opposition resulted in scrapping most of the planned itinerary and limiting the visit to a stop at a U.S. military base.
The problems also extend to other parts of the world, with the green light that coercive annexation would give to Russia, China, or other powers that might want to seize territory whose residents do not want to be annexed.
The overall conclusion is that U.S. acquisition of Greenland would be a clear net negative for the United States.
Trump’s determination nonetheless to pursue this project probably has multiple motivations. Partly it is nostalgia for his view of the late nineteenth century, in which imperialism as well as tariffs were the external counterparts of a domestic Gilded Age dominated by robber barons. Partly it is a desire to show a highly visible “accomplishment” as something some of his predecessors considered but never achieved. Partly it is a crude acquisitiveness that was reflected in Trump’s resistance to surrendering classified government documents that he claimed to be “my” documents.
What it is not is a well-reasoned pursuit of U.S. interests.
keep readingShow less
Top image credit: Vietnam's communist party general secretary To Lam (R) poses with Chinese President Xi Jinping (L) during a meeting at the office of the Party Central Committee in Hanoi on April 14, 2025. NHAC NGUYEN/Pool via REUTERS
On April 2 — christened “Liberation Day” — President Donald Trump declared a national emergency in response to the “large and persistent U.S. trade deficit” and “unfair” economic practices by foreign countries that, according to Trump, hurt the American people by undermining the U.S. industry and employment.
In response, the president announced a minimum 10% tariff on all U.S. imports, plus higher tariffs, ranging from 11% to 50%, on imports from nearly 60 countries. These “reciprocal tariffs,” based on trade deficit calculations, targeted over 180 countries and territories. After a week of turmoil in the stock and bond markets, Trump announced a 90-day pause on reciprocal tariffs over 10 percent for most countries except China.
However, the reality of imposing tariffs and changing global trade dynamics is more complex. For example, Vietnam, like other Southeast Asian countries, has long maintained a non-aligned stance on the global geopolitical front and navigating through the choppy waters of great power competition. Hence, Vietnam's response to Trump’s moves should be seen as a reflection of its foreign policy priorities rooted in its national interests, including economic development, and its commitment to non-alignment.
Vietnam has long been a central figure in the escalation of U.S.-China trade tensions since they began in earnest back in 2018, when President Trump placed 10% tariffs on Chinese imports. In the years since, the U.S. trade deficit with Vietnam has tripled, reaching $123.5 billion in 2024, the last year with complete data. One of the key catalysts for this change is the strategic “decoupling” approach by companies that have relocated production and manufacturing from China to other countries, including Vietnam, in an effort to diversify their supply chains and appease Washington’s concerns about Beijing’s economic ascendancy. With rising geopolitical uncertainties, cheap alternative manufacturing hubs, of which Vietnam has become a prime example, have become attractive substitutes for China.
Vietnam is also a backdoor for Chinese exports, importing and assembling Chinese goods with minimal added value before reexporting them to the United States. Peter Navarro, Trump’s senior counselor for trade and manufacturing, alleged in a recent interview that Vietnam is guilty of “nontariff cheating,” by which he meant Hanoi permits China to ship its products through Vietnam to disguise their origin and thus avoid U.S. tariffs. These reasons, coupled with Vietnam’s large trade surplus, have resulted in the administration’s perception that the country poses a major threat to the U.S. economy and the welfare of American workers.
Vietnam has tried to be responsive to the Trump administration’s demands, which have centered around reducing the trade deficit, addressing transshipment issues, and enhancing intellectual property rights. Vietnam’s Ministry of Finance is currently working on enhancing customs information-sharing with the U.S. and drafting a comprehensive bilateral trade agreement that includes provisions on taxation and intellectual property rights — all in response to concerns raised by the Trump administration. In fact, Vietnam was the first and remains the only Southeast Asian country whose leader has spoken directly to Trump about the tariffs.
After receiving a whopping 46% tariff rate on Liberation Day, Vietnam’s Communist Party General Secretary To Lam reached out to Trump in a call that the U.S. president would later describe as “very productive,” Vietnam offered to reduce tariffs on U.S. goods to zero, according to Trump, who said Hanoi is also addressing non-tariff issues raised by U.S. officials. Vietnam’s various ministries are tasked with examining existing legal frameworks and proposing changes.
Vietnam also authorized the operation of Starlink, the satellite internet service owned by Elon Musk, and agreed to expedite approvals for a proposed $1.5 billion Trump resort. Most important, Vietnam sent a top official, Deputy Prime Minister Ho Duc Phoc, to the U.S. for negotiations centered on improving the trade imbalance and tackling transhipment issues, where goods (specifically Chinese goods) are shipped through Vietnam to avoid tariffs or other trade restrictions imposed on countries such as China. To increase U.S. exports to Vietnam, Hanoi has struck a deal under which Hanoi agreed to buy a fleet of F-16 fighter jets.
So why is Vietnam yielding and moving to comply with the Trump administration’s demands?
One of Vietnam’s core interests includes defending its territorial claims in the South China Sea against Chinese pressure and aggression. Over the past few years, China has harassed Vietnamese fishermen near the Paracel Islands, most recently in an assault and seizure incident last October. By maintaining close diplomatic, economic, and military relations with Washington, Vietnam feels more protected from Chinese aggression. There is, however, a fine line between enhancing military cooperation with the Americans in pursuit of deterrence and provoking escalation in a potentially explosive conflict. The F-16 fighter deal could “stir up troubles” in the region, signaling to China increased U.S. military influence in the region that could call Hanoi’s non-alignment into question.
The Trump administration should realize that Vietnam is centering its foreign and trade policy on its own national interests and will happily engage with whichever foreign power is willing to help it enhance its economic development and bolster its national security. As a result, at the same time that Vietnam is responding in a friendly manner to Trump’s trade demands, it continues to cultivate close trade relations with Beijing, whose large manufacturing base, high technological capacity, and vast market make it its most important trade partner.
For example, during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Vietnam on April 14, the two countries signed 45 deals ranging from increasing digital connectivity and infrastructure to cooperating in emerging fields such as artificial intelligence and green energy, to further deepen bilateral economic ties. For his part, Xi vowed to expand Vietnam’s access to the Chinese market.
Vietnam’s recent actions with regard to the trade war are ultimately a reflection of its own national interests. Its decision to strike a deal with the U.S. for the purchase of fighter aircraft signals that, even while looking to cater to Trump’s trade demands, it will do so only in ways that enhance its economic and national security interests, as defined by the national government.
The U.S. should work with like-minded countries to strengthen bilateral and multilateral ties while decreasing its dependence on Chinese manufacturing exports. Through strategic partnerships, the U.S. can help address important issues like the transshipment of Chinese goods. Targeting Vietnam alone on that issue, however, will likely result only in Chinese companies diverting goods to Vietnam’s neighbors, such as Cambodia, Thailand, or Myanmar.
Rather than growing frustrated at Vietnam’s burgeoning trade relationship with China and seeing it as a direct threat to U.S. interests within the prism of great power competition, Washington should take the opportunity presented by Hanoi’s vow to open its markets much wider to U.S. exports. Indeed, there have been recent talks of collaboration between the two in areas such as energy, technology, and education.
By embracing policies based on pragmatism and mutual interest, the U.S. can remain a strategic partner to Vietnam while addressing its concerns amid the historic shifts in global trade dynamics.
Subscribe now to our weekly round-up and don't miss a beat with your favorite RS contributors and reporters, as well as staff analysis, opinion, and news promoting a positive, non-partisan vision of U.S. foreign policy.