A large majority of Americans support talks aimed at reducing tensions with North Korea and China, according to a survey released Friday by The Harris Poll. The results are at odds with the state of opinion in Washington, where policy elites continue to one-up each other over how to respond to an incident in which an apparent Chinese surveillance balloon flew over the U.S. in recent days.
Two-thirds of respondents agreed that the U.S. should “engage in dialogue as much as possible to reduce tensions” with China, while 20 percent said Washington should “not restart official dialogue and instead spend more money on military build-up.” Support for talks focused on deescalation went up by five points since 2021, when Harris last asked the question.
Meanwhile, 68 percent of Americans polled told Harris that President Joe Biden should offer to hold direct talks with North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un, and 58 percent said the United States should offer diplomatic or economic incentives “in exchange for steps toward denuclearization.”
In Washington, optimistic views of China’s geopolitical rise have soured in recent years, as demonstrated by the ongoing controversy over what appears to be a Chinese surveillance balloon. While some experts (including Pentagon officials) were quick to point out that the Chinese balloon posed no threat, the incident caused an uproar among many foreign policy elites, which no doubt contributed to Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s decision to postpone a scheduled trip to Beijing this past weekend.
As for North Korea, Biden has balked at the idea of changing U.S. policy toward the isolated state, opting instead to leave severe sanctions in place while expanding military cooperation with South Korea. And increased tensions with Russia and China have largely pushed issues related to North Korea to the periphery of policy making conversations.
Harris conducted the online survey from January 17-19 on behalf of the American Friends Service Committee, a prominent Quaker anti-war organization. The results are weighted to be representative and are based on a sample of 2063 American adults.
The pollsters also found increased support (59 percent) for establishing a diplomatic presence in North Korea since 2021, when a slim majority of respondents (52 percent) approved of the idea.
Notably, Americans appear to have warmed to the idea that the U.S. should formally end the Korean War by seeking a full peace agreement to replace the ceasefire accord that has largely held since 1953. Slightly more than half (52 percent) of respondents endorsed such a policy, an 11 point jump since 2021.
Connor Echols is the managing editor of the Nonzero Newsletter and a former reporter for Responsible Statecraft. Echols received his bachelor’s degree from Northwestern University, where he studied journalism and Middle East and North African Studies.
South Korea Army 1st Lt. Choi Min Kyu, left, points across the border into North Korea while briefing U.S. Vice President Joe Biden Dec. 7, 2013, during a visit to Observation Post Ouelette in South Korea. Biden's three-day visit underscored the commitment of the U.S. administration to its alliance with South Korea. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Chris Church/Released)
Top Image Credit: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy, European Council President Antonio Costa and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen attend a European Union leaders special summit to discuss Ukraine and European defence, in Brussels, Belgium March 6, 2025. REUTERS/Stephanie Lecocq
The Trump administration's decision to first host direct talks with Russia in February has left Ukraine and its European backers wondering how long they will be left on the sidelines. Brussels, particularly, is trying to put on a unified front to promote its interests in Ukraine’s future.
But a flurry of statements and summits over the last few weeks shows that the EU, and Europe more generally, may be less “unified” on the subject than they had initially hoped to convey.
The inconclusive summit in London last week, which took place after the recent Trump-Zelensky spat in the White House, was followed by an emergency meeting of the EU in Brussels. Prior to that conclave, European leaders did their best to up the stakes. French President Emmanuel Macron darkly warned about the Russian threat not only to Ukraine, but also to France and Europe, in a dramatic TV address to the nation.
Meanwhile, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk vowed to win an arms race against Russia and predicted its “defeat,” much like the one suffered by the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War. Other European leaders issued like-minded statements.
Despite this rhetorical escalation, however, the summit in Brussels exposed the cracks in the European facade of unity. Indeed, the bloc failed to agree on a common position due to Hungary’s veto. That did not come as a surprise, as Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban has long advocated for a negotiated end to the war in Ukraine. He has forged close ties with President Donald Trump on this issue and on others.
Emboldened by the new U.S. position, Orban called on EU Council President Antonio Costa, the former prime minister of Portugal, to launch EU diplomatic talks with Moscow. Orban shared his conviction with Costa that “the EU — following the example of the U.S. — should enter into direct discussions with Russia on a ceasefire and a sustainable peace in Ukraine.”
Just days before the summit, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio met with his Hungarian counterpart Peter Szijjarto to emphasize the two countries’ “commitment to ending the war in Ukraine.” That is a meaningful step for Rubio who, just days earlier, canceled a scheduled meeting with Kaja Kallas, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, at the last minute. An unbridled Russia hawk, Kallas has repeatedly riled Trump administration officials with accusations of “appeasement” of Putin.
Speaking to the Washington Examiner after the meeting with Rubio, Szijjarto made it clear that on Ukraine, Budapest sees eye to eye with Washington, not Brussels.
Another noted representative of the European “anti-war party,” Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico similarly decried the European Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen’s “peace through strength” strategy as “unrealistic,” positing that it serves “as a justification for continuing the war in Ukraine.” Echoing Trump’s line, Fico proposed to include “the necessity of an immediate ceasefire, regardless of the moment a final peace agreement is reached” in the summit’s decisions.
Even in more hawkish European countries, like France, there are influential dissenting voices. Right-wing opposition leader Marine Le Pen, a leading candidate to succeed Macron in 2027, dismissed the idea of sending French troops as peacekeepers to Ukraine, promoted by the president, as “sheer madness.”
Meanwhile, Henry Guaino, national security adviser to former conservative president Nicholas Sarkozy (2007-2012), called Macron to task for deliberately inflaming tensions with Russia for years, which he said led to the self-fulfilling prophecy of Russia now indeed becoming a threat. Former defense minister Hervé Morin, another high-ranking security official of the Sarkozy era, hammered Macron for over-dramatic rhetoric and fearmongering. Morin bluntly warned that peace will not be achieved by provoking Putin through media statements.
The lengths to which the European elites are prepared to go to snuff out alternative voices have been demonstrated in Romania. Indeed, Romania’s constitutional court annulled the first round results of its presidential elections on flimsy grounds: although the first round found anti-war candidate Călin Georgescu in the lead, he would subsequently be banned from the race altogether. The outgoing president, the staunchly Atlanticist Klaus Iohannis, implied that Georgescu’s success was a result of “Russian influence campaign,” a convenient bogeyman to disqualify popular challengers to the status-quo.
In the end, however, none of this seems to be helping to forge a robust, unified European position. The Brussels summit’s final document, signed by 26 member states (Slovakia was finally mollified into joining it after a reference to its gas dispute with Ukraine was added) — which, due to Budapest’s veto, cannot be considered the bloc’s official position— makes only oblique references to the new realities created by Trump’s initiatives.
It only acknowledges the “new momentum for negotiations that should lead to comprehensive, just and lasting peace.” Otherwise, the statement merely repeats that any ceasefire “can only take place as part of the process leading to a comprehensive peace agreement” and that “any such agreement needs to be accompanied by robust and credible security guarantees for Ukraine.”
But the document is devoid of details as to how exactly the European powers plan to implement these policies. The British-French plan to send European peacemakers to Ukraine was met with a distinct lack of enthusiasm by other major countries, notably Germany, Italy and even Poland. Their leaders correctly assessed that, in the absence of a U.S. backstop and Russia’s agreement to such a deployment — and Moscow has categorically ruled it out — the “peacekeepers” would in fact become combatants against Russia.
Moreover, Britain may be weighing the relative importance of Ukraine against its other, arguably more salient, priorities, such as a new trade deal with the U.S. Peter Mandelson, influential British ambassador in Washington and close confidant to UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, has said that the only chance to end the war is to narrow differences with the Trump administration, which insists on an immediate and indefinite ceasefire. That may leave Macron isolated in Europe.
It seems that the only thing the majority of European leaders could agree on is that Ukrainians should continue fighting. Lithuanian President Gintanas Nausėda said the quiet part out loud by arguing that Ukraine is winning “precious time” for Europe until it rearms and is ready to confront Russia.
The question is whether Kyiv will succumb to European encouragement to continue an unwinnable war when its representatives meet with the high-level U.S. team in Saudi Arabia on Wednesday, or judge that further antagonizing Washington is not in Ukraine’s interests.
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Top Photo: Military trainer giving training to military soldier at boot camp. Shutterstock
Despite positive recruitment reports from Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, the Army is struggling with high attrition rates. Nearly 25% of recruits have failed to complete their contracts since 2022.
The Army reported in September that it exceeded its FY2024 recruitment goals. It even witnessed a backlog of new recruits waiting for training, as around 11,000 were placed in the delayed entry program. The question seems to be, can they keep them? The numbers aren’t promising.
Army data reviewed by Military.com suggests that, since 2022, nearly 25% of recruits have left the military before completing their initial contracts. The quality of recruits is one of several factors contributing to high attrition rates. According to service data, the military placed 25% of all enlistees in at least one of the Future Soldier Preparatory Courses, a series of trainings designed to assist recruits who do not meet academic or health standards set by the Pentagon. Of those who attend these courses, 25% do not complete their first contract. Those who did not attend the course still had a 20% attrition rate.
The number of eligible recruits in the country has also shrunk dramatically. According to a senior Army official, only 8% of the population is eligible for “clean enlistment” with no waivers, much lower than the 23% found in a 2020 DOD study. To combat this, the Army more than doubled the number of medical, academic, and criminal waivers granted to recruits in 2024 compared to 2022. More than 400 felony waivers were included in the 2024 waivers, up from 98 in 2022.
Not only did the Army reduce its recruitment goal to 55,000 from 65,000 in 2023, but the previous recruitment gains are muddled by the high attrition rates.
Hegseth previously mentioned the need to strengthen the military’s standards. President Trump signed an executive order in January to end the Department of Defense's Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion programs but has not addressed slipping academic or health standards within the recruitment pool.
The military has been suffering from a credibility problem overall. A survey from 2022 found that only 48% of the public “expressed a great deal of trust and confidence” in the military. Of the respondents, 47% said that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were reasons for their lack of confidence. Some have blamed the post-9/11 wars and growing mistrust in government institutions for lagging recruitment over the last several years. In addition, broader access to secondary education and job training have offered other options to kids who, in years past, would see the military as the only ticket to school and work after high school.
But that doesn’t explain the crisis of attrition, which appears to be a much more complicated issue.
“I don't know what an acceptable attrition rate is, but we have to meet people where they are," stated a senior Army official. "The quality of new soldiers is an enormous problem we're paying for. But that's just where the country is."
When asked about the quality of recruits, service spokesperson Madison Bonzo said, “U.S. Army Recruiting Command remains committed to recruiting young men and women into our Army that are ready and qualified to join the most lethal fighting force in the world to ensure our nation's security."
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Top image credit: Romanian far-right presidential candidate Calin Georgescu greets his supporters as he arrives at a rally celebrating the Unification Day, in Bucharest, Romania, January 24, 2025. Inquam Photos/George Calin via REUTERS
It’s been often warned that democracy dies in darkness, yet Romanian democracy is dying not just in broad daylight but with support from broad swathes of the transatlantic establishment.
The Sunday decision by Romania’s Central Electoral Bureau to block Călin Georgescu, a right populist and nationalist who emerged from obscurity to become Romania’s frontrunner for the presidency, was far from unexpected, but remains deeply concerning in its implications both for Romania’s constitutional order and U.S.-EU relations.
Georgescu’s trouble began with a December 2024 decision by Romania’s constitutional court to annul his victory in the first election round on allegations (without adequate evidence) of Russian TikTok interference, followed by recurring police raids against his supporters and his arrest several weeks ago on the basis of equally murky criminal charges, which include “incitement to actions against the constitutional order,” the “communication of false information” and involvement in the establishment of an organization “with a fascist, racist or xenophobic character.”
This culminated with the court decision on Sunday to block his candidacy without adequate explanation.
As previously explained in these pages, the allegations that led to the initial annulment are so substantively weak so as to make it astonishing that a court would even contemplate overturning a democratic election on these grounds. The Central Electoral Bureau’s published explanation largely recapitulates the court’s position, justifying this drastic intervention into the democratic process on the somewhat ironic grounds that Georgescu, victor of the first round and frontrunner by a wide margin, failed to uphold his “very obligation to defend democracy.” This is not democracy but “democratism” — an official ideology that like Soviet Communism, has no necessary connection to actual practice.
One cannot but reasonably infer from this deliberate sequence of events — the poorly explained and constantly evolving allegations of criminal conduct, invections of foreign meddling without so much as even circumstantial proof, relentless attempts by law enforcement to target his supporters and allies, and the government’s miraculously well-timed discovery of a nominally unrelated far-right, pro-Russian putsch — that a united Romanian establishment is grimly determined to prevent Georgescu, who has maintained a commanding lead in virtually every poll conducted since December of last year, from standing in the presidential election.
It is likewise difficult for even the most fervid epistemological optimist to ignore that all of this is happening under the noses of EU leaders who've so far refrained from raising even the mildest procedural or substantive objections. The contrast with the EU’s approach to Viktor Orban’s far milder infringements of democracy is stark.
To the degree that EU organs have weighed in, it was to unreservedly lend support to the Romanian government’s actions. The European Court of Human Rights tossed Georgescu's bid to overturn the annulment of the first election round. Former Commissioner for Internal Market of the European Union Thierry Breton cryptically said in an interview that the EU is prepared to do in Germany’s February federal elections what it did in Romania, feeding the impression — one which Brussels has certainly not taken steps to dispel — that the EU has become a witting observer, if not a partner, in Georgescu’s political defenestration.
Romania’s roiling constitutional crisis is a perfect simulacrum of a larger dispute over the shared democratic values purportedly at the heart of the transatlantic alliance. Scores of Western and European capitals have indulged the proclivity, kicked into high gear after the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, of gatekeeping access to democratic politics in the name of defending democracy from malign external influence and radical domestic actors.
The Trump administration has sharply criticized this approach, with Vice President JD Vance expostulating in Munich that Romania’s election was annulled “based on the flimsy suspicions of an intelligence agency and enormous pressure from its continental neighbors.” If Vance’s speech was, as it appears, a gauntlet thrown down before European and Romanian authorities, then the decision to block Georgescu from running makes clear that the European stakeholders in question have no intention of changing course even when directly pressed by the White House to do so.
It remains to be seen how far the administration will push this issue, whether in the form of closed door consultations with Romanian or EU officials, public expressions of concern for the state of Romanian democracy, or even punitive measures against Bucharest.
There are two conclusions that can be drawn at this early stage. The Georgescu affair will cast a further pall on EU-U.S. relations in the short to medium term, as it will be taken by key figures in the administration as a reification of their concerns and suspicions toward Europe. The policy and philosophical rift that emerged principally over competing visions for seeking peace in Ukraine will continue to widen and harden in ways that will make a future mending of fences more difficult to achieve.
The costs of this estrangement will be more keenly felt by Europe, which is geopolitically, economically, and militarily much more dependent on the United States than the other way around.
In the longer term, such episodes serve to gradually build the American case for retrenchment away from Europe. American transatlanticism and the security relations that underpinned it were sustained after 1991 not by concrete U.S. national interests but by a combination of U.S. global ambition and the perception of a special relationship built on a unique ideological affinity between the two poles. That genie is now out of the bottle in ways that cannot be reversed.
The U.S. has and will continue to hold vital interests in Europe, but they will be articulated a great deal more narrowly and pragmatically than under previous administrations. Transatlanticism, as it has existed for the past three decades, cannot be saved, nor should we try to. The pacing goal on both sides of the Atlantic should be to renegotiate a framework for cooperation based not on abstract values, over which there is clearly growing disagreement, but on concrete economic and defense interests.
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