Increasingly frequent and aggressive North Korean provocations since the breakdown of inter-Korean and U.S.-North Korean talks in 2019 are part of a clear historical trend — tensions on the peninsula tend to escalate significantly when the U.S. and South Korean approach is centered primarily on sanctions and military pressure with little (if any) diplomacy.
Many attempts by Washington and Seoul to punish and pressure Pyongyang have been met with fierce resistance and aggressive actions instead of a white flag. We saw this trend throughout the Obama administration and the beginning of the Trump administration, and the result was a more confrontational security landscape on the peninsula.
It stands to reason that avoiding further escalation and another nuclear crisis will require urgent U.S. diplomacy and engagement with North Korea and China. Instead, Washington and Seoul alike have ramped up military deterrence while resisting the types of conciliatory steps that could encourage North Korea to re-evaluate its aggressive posture and return to dialogue; they have also failed to initiate a new dialogue with Beijing regarding the slow-motion crisis.
Pyongyang’s behavior underscores the urgent need for Sino-U.S. cooperation in the face of a seemingly very possible escalation on the Korean peninsula, given Beijing's long-standing role in facilitating dialogue with North Korea. The deterioration of U.S.-China relations in recent years has increased suspicion between them regarding each other's strategic intent on the Korean peninsula, thus making regional cooperation on the North Korea front more difficult.
Washington and Seoul must reconsider their current North Korea policies, break the vicious escalation cycle and work to reduce tensions. It’s been said that trying the same thing over and over and expecting a different result is akin to madness; in the face of a looming crisis that threatens regional stability and the security of U.S. allies, it’s time for Washington to stop the madness and try diplomacy — not just more tough talk.
James Park is a Research Associate at the Quincy Institute’s East Asia Program. His research interests include South Korean foreign policy and domestic politics, Chinese security issues, and U.S. policy vis-à-vis East Asia.
North Korean state television/You Tube coverage of recent Kim gave the speech Monday at the Defense Development Exhibition in October 2021. (screenshot)
Donald Trump’s nominee for U.S. secretary of state said this week that he wants the war between Ukraine and Russia to end.
“It is important for everyone to be realistic: there will have to be concessions made by the Russian Federation, but also by Ukrainians,” said Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.) during his Senate confirmation hearing on Wednesday. “There is no way Russia takes all of Ukraine.”
He added that “there's no way Ukraine is also going to push these people all the way back to where they were on the eve of the invasion.”
He also said sending American aid to Ukraine “for however long it takes” is “not a realistic or prudent position,” sentiment that echoes what Trump has said.
Trump had previously promised to end the conflict within 24 hours of taking office, but his incoming Ukraine envoy, Keith Kellogg, later amended that timeline to 100 days.
The establishment consensus in the U.S. and Europe on the Ukraine war has slowly evolved as the conflict moves increasingly toward Russia’s favor.
“We need a cease-fire line, and of course ideally this (the Ukrainian part) should include all areas currently under Russian control. But we see that this may not be realistically achievable in the immediate future,” former NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said in December. He added, “if the cease-fire line means that Russia continues to control all occupied territories, this does not mean that Ukraine has to give up the territory forever.”
Ukrainian officials have also reportedly been discussing the option of allowing for a ceasefire, with Russia still controlling part of Ukraine, although not officially or legally. Ukrainian President Volodomyr Zelenskyy even admitted, "if we want to stop the hot phase of the war, we should take under NATO umbrella the territory of Ukraine that we have under our control. That’s what we need to do fast. And then Ukraine can get back the other part of its territory diplomatically.”
During his hearing this week, Rubio emphasized this growing emphasis on diplomacy over a complete Ukrainian victory, saying that ending the war will not “be an easy endeavor… but it's going to require bold diplomacy, and my hope is that it can begin with some ceasefire.”
“Rubio's remarks reflect a pragmatic, constructive approach toward ending the Ukraine war — one that, encouragingly, the administration seems intent on institutionalizing throughout the foreign policy/national security bureaucracy,” said Quincy Institute research fellow Mark Episkopos. “The upcoming peace talks will demand an all hands on deck approach across the agencies if they are to succeed, and Rubio, as the nation's chief diplomat, is poised to play a major role in this difficult but necessary process.”
In other Ukraine war news this week:
Moscow accused Washington of assisting in attempting to sabotage the TurkStream pipeline, the only remaining pipeline that brings Russian gas into Europe. Russian Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov called the attack “energy terrorism”
The attack was thwarted, according to Al Jazeera, as the pipeline only suffered minor damage. Ukraine has thus far rejected claims of its involvement in the attempted attack.
This comes at a time when Ukraine has halted gas transits from Russia to Europe sparking a war of words and potentially an energy crisis this winter, wrote Stavroula Pabst in Responsible Statecraft this week. Despite claims from Zelenskyy that the gas transit halt was “one of Moscow’s greatest defeats,” the rest of Europe seems to be bearing the brunt of the consequences, facing high energy prices and outages in some countries.
The New York Timesreported on Monday that Ukraine launched a large drone barrage deep into Russian territory. According to the Russian Defense Ministry, more than 140 drones were launched from Ukraine, and U.S. and UK-made ATACMS and Storm Shadow missiles were included in the attack. The strikes were in three Russian regions, with some hitting over 700 miles into Russian territory. Industrial and military sites were reportedly damaged, with no reported casualties.
Russia responded the next day by launching dozens of missiles at Ukraine’s energy grid. President Zelenskyy responded to the attacks on social media, “It’s the middle of winter, and the target for the Russians remains unchanged: our energy infrastructure. Among their objectives were gas and energy facilities that sustain normal life for our people.”
There was reported damage but no casualties.
United Kingdom Prime Minister Kier Starmer says that he will deliver new mobile air defense systems and “more support to Ukraine than ever before,” according to The Guardian. This announcement is part of a 100-year partnership agreement between the two nations, meant to secure previously promised aid in addition to further military assistance under the shadow of Trump’s return to the White House. The deal, which also includes health care and agriculture partnerships, must be approved by the British parliament in the coming weeks.
From this week’s State Department briefing on 01/15
A journalist asked spokesperson Matthew Miller if the United States was considering designating Russia as a state sponsor of terror. Miller indicated that the U.S. had determined that the sanctions already in place were more effective. “If you look at the combined regime that we have put into place – sanctions and export controls – we determined that that would have more of an impact than a state sponsor of terrorism designation.”
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Top photo credit: US President Joe Biden meets with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for a bilateral meeting in the Oval Office at the White House on July 25, 2024 in Washington, D.C. (Photo by Samuel Corum/Sipa USA)
It would appear to be based on the text already made available by the Associated Press, which is very much like the deal brokered by the Biden administration in May 2024. That agreement was never ratified by either side and was never implemented.
It fell through then largely because of Israel’s refusal to accept Hamas’s demand that the ceasefire be permanent. A ceasefire of course is by definition impermanent, and Israel was scarcely likely to swear off renewed attacks. It could still collapse today for the same reason.
Hamas’s difficulty here is that it needs to justify its October 7 attacks and seizure of hostages with a significant achievement. An Israeli agreement to not attack Hamas in the future would rise to that level, but naturally, that is another reason Israel would resist agreeing to it in the first place. Netanyahu is not very motivated to help the Hamas leadership maintain credibility at his expense.
Otherwise, this agreement retains a phased structure in which the next 42-day phases do not automatically start when the preceding phase expires. During each period, the parties will still be negotiating the points of the succeeding phase. Thus, there is the possibility of many a slip between cup and lip.
If the parties follow up it will be phase one that is most likely to be carried out. Both sides need a win. Hamas needs to retrieve Palestinians in Israeli jails and that requires the release of some of the Israeli hostages in their possession. Both sides will retain plenty of fodder for future trades. Israel will not be required to withdraw its forces from Gaza right away, but rather to remove them to the perimeter. If fighting restarts, Israel won’t have to explain reentry into the strip; they’ll still be inside the wire.
The second phase, which, as drafted, requires complete withdrawal of IDF units from Gaza, seems unlikely to be implemented on the basis of Netanyahu’s consistently contrary position throughout the war that began on October 7. Hence the judgment of informed commentators back in May 2024 that phases 2 and 3 would not come to pass in the foreseeable future. But something is surely better than nothing.
For the Israelis, the first phase gives the IDF an opportunity to refit, get back to training cycles, restock munitions, spare parts and consumables and rotate and refresh combat personnel. It also provides a breathing space in which to assess options in the North, where a ceasefire still holds with Hezbollah and a new technocratic government has been formed, and in western Syria, where the IDF is positioned inside the country to the east of the Golan Heights. They need to plan for a clash with Turkish forces — Erdogan recently told the Turkish assembly that foreigners should “get their hands off Syria.” Evidently the Turks do not count as foreigners in Syria, at least for this purpose.
For Hamas, it’s a chance for Mohammed Sinwar, the late leader’s brother, to live for another 42 days.
There is the question, to whom should the Gaza ceasefire be attributed? One answer is Netanyahu. This is one version of a classic ceasefire, where the party that had resisted it has temporarily run out of targets and largely achieved its war aims.
If it is truly a ceasefire, that is, a temporary halt to the shooting, which is presumed to renew if and when the ceasefire is violated by the other side or expires, then the stronger party has every incentive to go with the flow. There wasn’t to be a ceasefire until these conditions were obtained.
For the Palestinians, it’s a bittersweet moment — a hoped-for respite from the death and destruction in the strip — and a profound political challenge. For the Israelis, some of whom will be reunited with loved ones, it will be a moment to think through how best to translate victory into lasting security.
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Top image credit: U.S. President Joe Biden, flanked by U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris and U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, speaks after negotiators reached a phased deal for a ceasefire in Gaza between Israel and Hamas, during remarks at the White House in Washington, U.S., January 15, 2025. REUTERS/Evelyn Hockstein
The achievement of a Gaza hostage deal and temporary ceasefire ahead of Trump's inauguration demonstrates the power that the U.S. had all along. The Biden administration simply refused to use American leverage to push Netanyahu, despite U.S. officials’ assertions that they were “working tirelessly towards a ceasefire.”
In his remarks about the deal, and in his response to journalists afterwards, President Biden sought to take full credit. He pointed out that this was the deal he proposed in May, yet did not acknowledge that it was Trump’s willingness to pressure Israel to reach a ceasefire in time for his inauguration that actually achieved the deal, which Biden had failed to for months. "A diplomat briefed on the ceasefire negotiations between Israel and Hamas credited progress in the talks in part to the influence of President-elect Donald Trump, saying it was 'the first time there has been real pressure on the Israeli side to accept a deal’,” according to the Washington Post.
Unfortunately, despite the jubilation of the population in Gaza as well as that of the families of hostages held by Hamas, there have already been signs that Netanyahu has no interest in a lasting ceasefire. Last month, Netanyahu told Channel 12 news that the Israeli military would resume fighting even if a deal were achieved.
“If there is a deal — and I hope there will be — Israel will return to fighting afterward,” he said. “There is no point in pretending otherwise because returning to fighting is needed in order to complete the goals of the war.”
This statement ignores the reality that Secretary of State Blinken acknowledged on Monday, that Israel’s war in Gaza has generated more recruits for Hamas than it had before October 7, 2023, demonstrating that Israel’s actions have been counterproductive to its alleged goal of reestablishing Israeli security. Bezalel Smotrich, Israel’s far-right Minister of Finance, stated on Tuesday that “the war must continue,” but did not indicate if he would exit Netanyahu’s government, as he had previously threatened to do if the prime minister agreed to a ceasefire.
In contrast to Israeli politicians’ pledges to keep fighting, and Biden’s efforts to take credit, President-elect Trump expressed his intention to build on the ceasefire. On Truth Social, Donald Trump posted, “This EPIC ceasefire agreement could have only happened as a result of our Historic Victory in November, as it signaled to the entire World that my Administration would seek Peace and negotiate deals to ensure the safety of all Americans, and our allies…”
Trump said that he would build on the ceasefire’s momentum to expand the Abraham Accords, something the Biden team tried and failed to accomplish. In particular, both Biden and Trump hoped to facilitate the normalization of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia. With Israel engaged in a brutal campaign of violence and starvation against civilians in Gaza, normalization with Saudi Arabia was impossible. If the ceasefire holds, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman may be more willing to normalize, although that agreement would be jeopardized by Israel’s ambition to annex the West Bank.
News of the ceasefire broke on the same day a new poll came out finding that the genocide in Gaza was the number one issue that kept Biden’s supporters from voting for Harris. Twenty-nine percent of those who had voted for Biden in 2020 but did not vote for Harris in 2024 cited Gaza as the reason. This outranked the economy (24 percent) and immigration (11 percent), according to the poll from YouGov and the Institute for Middle East Understanding (IMEU).
Trump’s success in achieving a temporary ceasefire and hostage deal, combined with the disastrous political effects of Harris’s unwillingness to break with her boss on foreign policy, both demonstrate the folly of Biden’s unconditional support for Israel. If Biden had used the United States’ considerable leverage to achieve a ceasefire, his party might not have lost the election.
The question that remains now is how long the ceasefire will last. The terms stipulate a six week cessation in fighting and an exchange of hostages by both sides, primarily 33 hostages held by Hamas over 42 days, in exchange for approximately 1,000 Palestinian prisoners.
Speculation on social media and after Biden’s remarks was rife about how long the deal is likely to last. After boasting that he achieved his goal of a ceasefire by his inauguration, Trump may lose interest in reining in Israel’s military operations in Gaza. The deal may last through the first phase of 42 days, but beyond that the Israeli press has reported that Netanyahu promised Smotrich that the fighting would resume.
If he wished, Trump could contribute to a more lasting ceasefire by maintaining pressure on Netanyahu and upholding U.S. laws that would end American security assistance to Israel due to its human rights abuses and blocking of humanitarian aid.
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