On Tuesday, a federal jury in San Francisco found former Twitter employee Ahmad Abouammo guilty for spying on behalf of Saudi Arabia.
While overseeing media partnerships in the Middle East and North Africa for Twitter between 2013 and 2015, a Saudi official — referred to in the criminal complaint simply as “Foreign Official-1” — recruited Abouammo to covertly divulge personal information of Saudi dissidents. Now, Abouammo is facing 10 to 20 years in prison for wire fraud, money laundering, falsifying records, and acting as an unregistered agent of a foreign government.
Two other Saudi citizens — Ali Alzabarah and Ahmed Almutairi — allegedly contributed to the scheme, but fled the country after being charged with acting as unregistered agents for Saudi Arabia. Alzabarah, also a former Twitter employee, accessed the personal information of an estimated 6,000 Twitter accounts across six months in 2015, according to the FBI.
But while much of the focus has been on Abouammo and his accomplices, the buck didn’t stop with them. “Foreign Official-1,” the real engineer behind the operation, has a name: Bader al-Asaker, a top adviser to Saudi Crown Prince and de facto leader Mohamed bin Salman. Al-Asaker's identity was revealed in 2019 not long after the charges were brought.
Abouammo and Alzabarah allegedly targeted accounts at the explicit direction of al-Asaker, who funneled them hundreds of thousands of dollars in return. During the trial, prosecutors described how Abouammo met with al-Asaker in London, only to fly back to San Francisco with a brand new $40,000 luxury watch, “That luxury watch was not free. It came with strings attached,” argued Assistant U.S. Attorney Eric Cheng.
According to the FBI’s criminal complaint, al-Asaker acted on behalf of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to cultivate “employees of Twitter in an effort to obtain private user information that it could not obtain elsewhere.” U.S. Attorney Colin Sampson described al-Asaker’s directions as a “shopping list of Twitter users that he wanted an insider to keep track of.”
Abdullah Alaoudh, the Research Director for Saudi Arabia and the UAE at Democracy for the Arab World Now, told Responsible Statecraft that the real mastermind — al-Asaker — has gone completely unscathed, presenting a contradiction in U.S. foreign policy. “It is weird that we have sanctions against Saoud al-Qahtani for the murder of Khashoggi, but not against Bader al-Asaker for infiltrating Twitter and doing this operation in US soil.”
In fact, al-Asaker is still in plain view and active on Twitter with over two million followers, even after the FBI tied him to the illegal activities of Twitter's now-former employees.
The full damage posed by al-Asaker and his accomplices is unknown since only a handful of the identities of the 6,000 accounts accessed are even public knowledge. Human rights activist Ali al-Ahmed claims that he was targetted by the spies, causing his sources in Saudi Arabia to be “killed, tortured, or dissapeared.”Quincy Institute Research Fellow Ben Freeman noted in January that “Continuing to only punish the pawns, not the malign foreign actors directing them, will lead to continued attacks on democracy in America.” Indeed, focusing attention on smaller actors tackles the symptom of the problem without addressing the underlying root causes — like carelessly weeding a garden.
Moreover, this incomplete strategy may not even work in the short-term. Two of the pawns in the Twitter spy scandal, Alzabarah and Almutairi, and are now believed to be in Saudi Arabia. According to a declassified intelligence bulletin, the FBI has determined that Saudi government officials “almost certainly assist US-based Saudi citizens in fleeing the United States to avoid legal issues, undermining the US judicial process.”
The scandal, and involvement of a top Saudi official, begs deeper questions about the U.S. relationship with Saudi Arabia that will surely go unanswered. With President Biden fistbumping al-Asaker’s boss on a state visit last month, the United States is likely to simply wash its hands of the scandal and move on; as it’s apparently much easier to focus on the pawns.
Nick Cleveland-Stout is a Research Associate in the Democratizing Foreign Policy program at the Quincy Institute. Previously, Nick conducted research on U.S.-Brazil relations as a 2023 Fulbright fellow at the Federal University of Santa Catarina.
Ahmad Abouammo, a former Twitter Inc employee accused of spying for Saudi Arabia, leaves Santa Rita jail after being freed pending trial, in Dublin, California, U.S. November 21, 2019. REUTERS/Kate Munsch||
Top Image Credit: A fighter plane takes off, said to be, for an operation against the Yemen's Houthis at an unidentified location in this screengrab taken from a handout video released on March 18, 2025. US CENTCOM via X/Handout via REUTERS
Amid its persistent, so-far largely ineffective aerial campaign against Yemen’s Houthis, the U.S. may now move to support Yemen’s internationally recognized government in a ground operation against them.
Indeed, the WSJ reported yesterday that the “U.S. is open to supporting a ground operation by local forces” in Yemen. U.S. officials told the WSJ, however, that the U.S. hasn’t finalized a decision to do so, nor is it leading relevant ground operation talks. However, the paper reported that American private contractors are providing advice to Yemeni factions.
Speculation of some sort of anti-Houthi ground campaign in Yemen has bubbled up for weeks, sparking fears that the country’s civil war, made dormant by a 2022 ceasefire that largely held after its lapse months later, could reignite.
CNN reported on April 6, for example, that Yemen ground operation preparations were underway, and could “involve Saudi and US naval support in an attempt to retake the port of Hodeidah." And Aida Chavez previously reported in the Intercept on March 17 that “U.S.-backed proxy forces in Yemen are likely to restart their ground operations against the Houthis — proxies that will almost certainly be receiving U.S. intelligence and other support."
“The idea that Trump may provide U.S. support to reignite this civil war is horrifying, because it will be extremely bloody,” Dr. Annelle Sheline, Research Fellow in the Middle East program at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, told Responsible Statecraft.
“Such a war would further immiserate the Yemeni population, already the poorest in the Middle East. In 2018, the UN declared Yemen to be the world's worst humanitarian crisis, with 22 million people at risk of starvation due to the war. Restarting the civil war would again put millions of people at risk of famine,” she said.
Publicly, U.S. officials have remained tight-lipped on possible involvement in on-the-ground operations in Yemen.
“I can't talk about that stuff from the podium, but we have ways of conducting sensitive site exploitations without ground troops on the ground,” Sean Parnell, United States Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs and Chief Pentagon Spokesman, said about possible U.S. involvement in ground operations in Yemen during a March 17 Pentagon press briefing.
Asked early last week about possible U.S. support for a ground operation in Yemen, likewise, a defense official told Responsible Statecraft on background that details surrounding possible future operations could not be disclosed “due to operational security to ensure the safety and security of…service members.”
The DoD and CENTCOM public affairs did not respond to requests for comment regarding yesterday’s WSJ reporting.
Possible U.S. assistance in a new Aden-led ground campaign may not only be deadly; if previous involvement in Yemen is of any indication, it may well prove ineffective.
"Under Presidents Obama, Trump, and Biden, the U.S. provided significant support to the Saudi-led coalition that fought a war to oust the Houthis from 2015 to 2022,” Sheline explained. “Even with a massive air campaign as well as a ground invasion led by the Saudis and UAE in southern Yemen, the anti-Houthi coalition was unsuccessful, partly due to the infighting among the Yemeni members, who beyond their antipathy towards the Houthis, agreed on little else.”
If the U.S. wants the Houthis’ Red Sea ship attacks to stop, rather, they might take the Houthis’ stated objectives for their attacks — namely, pressuring Israel to end its onslaught of Gaza — into account.
“The Houthis have consistently said that they will end their attacks on ships traversing the Red Sea when Israel ends its war on Gaza. During the period of the ceasefire from mid January to early March, the Houthis upheld this commitment and did not attack ships,” Sheline explained.
“It was only after Israel violated the ceasefire by preventing any aid from entering Gaza after March 2 that the Houthis declared that they would again attack Israeli ships, and subsequently, the Trump administration bombed them (as people may recall from Signalgate).”
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Top Photo: El Paso, TX USA December 21, 2022 National Guard troops and Texas State Troopers deployed to the border to deter migrants from crossing. Access via Shutterstock
Despite border crossings dropping, President Trump is continuing with his plan to militarize the U.S. border with Mexico. However, the soldiers will not be arresting illegal crossers but are instead focused on providing support and additional eyes and ears for the Border Patrol agents who are already on the ground.
We will not be actively on patrols," said Maj. Jaren Stafani at a press conference. "We'll be at detection and monitoring sites to provide that information to [the] Border Patrol to then go out and do their law enforcement function."Stefani is leading the Big Bend deployment area. This policy is consistent with the Posse Comitatus Act, which is meant to stop the military from participating in civilian law enforcement, with a few exceptions.
Regardless of this, some locals still feel as though their communities are being militarized. Local resident of Presidio, Texas, Anibal Galindo says, “I feel like they're basically turning this place into a military zone, or a wanna-be conflict zone when in reality it isn't.”
Indeed, the military is placing equipment at the border often seen in conflicts overseas, including Stryker vehicles and Navy destroyers. Additionally, the CIA has ramped up drone flights in Mexico, something that began under the Biden administration. The drones are not on mission to kill any fentanyl dealers but to provide information to the Mexican government.
While tensions may rise between the Mexican and American governments over this militarization, some experts worry that the real problem may exist in how the United States handles its fight against the Cartels.
The Trump administration slapped several major cartels with a “Foreign Terrorist Organization” designation earlier this year, granting the federal government broad law enforcement and immigration authorities against them.
“By designating drug cartels as FTOs, the Trump administration unlocks new powers for itself, creates a new media narrative that could fool many, and reinforces the rest of its anti-immigration and border enforcement agenda,” comments Alex Nowrasteh, Vice President for Economic and Social Policy Studies at the Cato Institute. According to Nowrasteh, this designation will enable the president to economically punish Latin American states that do not adequately cooperate with Trump’s immigration plan and push his narrative that America is being invaded through its southern border.
Congressman Dan Crenshaw (R-Texas) has supported the United States sending weapons of war into Mexico. “We need to somehow figure out diplomatically how to make this Mexico’s idea. That they’re asking for our military support, such as close air support, such as an AC-130 gunship overhead while they’re prosecuting a target and surrounded by sicarios… If I was in that situation as a Navy SEAL, we would just call in close air support, all those guys would be gone, and we’d move along our merry way.”
Cato’s Justin Logan has explained the faulty reasoning behind this policy. He explains that “despite seeing its homicide rate more than triple in less than two decades, Mexico is still nowhere near Colombia’s levels of violence during the Narcos era of the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the country reached the alarming rate of 85 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. Comparing Mexico’s violence in 2023 to that of Colombia in 1993 borders on the preposterous.”
When the Mexican government militarized its anti-Cartel effort in the mid-2000s, homicide rates there tripled.
For now, locals like Anibal Galindo must ready themselves for what comes next as the Trump Administration sends thousands of troops to border towns.
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Top photo credit: People walk past a gate of the Samsung Electro-Mechanics factory, following U.S. President Donald Trump's imposition of a tariff rate of 46 per cent on Vietnam — later paused — in Thai Nguyen province, Vietnam, April 9, 2025. REUTERS/Thinh Nguyen
Vietnam’s trade fortunes have taken a dramatic turn.
Once slapped with a staggering 46% tariff in President Donald Trump’s initial “Liberation Day” trade offensive, the Southeast Asian nation now finds itself in a much better spot — benefiting from a reduced 10% tariff rate, in line with most other countries. It’s a striking reversal that highlights Hanoi’s stepped-up diplomatic hustle on the global stage.
Vietnam made a significant diplomatic stride recently by dispatching a high-level delegation to Washington, D.C., with the strategic goal of addressing trade imbalances and strengthening economic ties with the United States. In a move that underscored Hanoi's sense of urgency and determination, the Vietnamese government wasted no time in mobilizing its top talent, led by Deputy Prime Minister Ho Duc Phoc, signaling just how seriously the Vietnamese leadership views the issue of trade relations with the U.S.
Deputy Prime Minister Phoc’s visit was carefully orchestrated to engage with key figures in Washington's political and economic spheres. Among the high-profile meetings on the itinerary was a crucial dialogue with U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent. Their Friday discussions reportedly centered on narrowing the trade gap between the two nations and pledges by Vietnam to tackle origin of goods fraud (China has been accused to shipping its products to be sold via countries like Vietnam to avoid tariffs). These and more fair and reciprocal trade practices that would benefit both economies were also reportedly discussed.
One of Trump's priorities has been to bring manufacturing back to the U.S. Textiles have all but moved overseas completely in the last 20 years resulting in the massive trade gap with Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam. Currently the U.S.trade deficit with Hanoi is $123.5 billion.
In anticipation of "Liberation Day" Hanoi cut its own tariffs on several U.S. products including LNG and cars, and also approved Starlink services, and pledged to bring in more imports from the U.S.
During the official visit last week, in addition to engaging with select members of former President Trump’s cabinet, the Vietnamese delegation also sought to strengthen ties within the U.S. legislative branch by meeting with key members of Congress. Notably, they held discussions with Republican Senators Bill Hagerty of Tennessee and Steve Daines of Montana, both of whom have demonstrated a strong interest in Asian economic affairs and the stability of global supply chains.
These meetings provided Vietnam with an opportunity to broaden its support base on Capitol Hill and reinforce bipartisan interest in deepening economic cooperation. By engaging lawmakers with strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific, Vietnam is positioning itself as a reliable partner in efforts to diversify supply chains and promote regional stability — an increasingly important priority amid shifting global dynamics.
The diplomatic charm offensive extended beyond just official meetings. The Vietnamese team engaged with think tanks, trade groups, and other stakeholders throughout the Capital Beltway, aiming to strengthen long-term partnerships and build goodwill. The delegation's proactive approach, clear messaging, and high-level representation were widely seen as a diplomatic win for Hanoi.
The stakes are high for Vietnam since they have the third-largest trade surplus with the U.S. after China and Mexico and export more than $100 billion in goods to the U.S. annually, including Nike shoes.
After all, the original punitive tariff imposed by Washington on Vietnam had threatened to strain ties between the two nations at a critical moment — just as they mark 50 years since the fall of Saigon on April 30. As strategic comprehensive partners, the U.S. and Vietnam have built a relationship centered on economic cooperation, regional stability, and shared security interests in the Indo-Pacific.
“As we near the 50th anniversary of Saigon’s fall, the U.S.-Vietnam relationship rests on pragmatism more than sentiment. Vietnam’s youth — over half its population is under 35 — barely recall the war. They’re focused on iPhones, K-pop, and global brands flooding Hanoi’s malls,” claims Alison Huynh, a Silicon Valley investor and host of the Vietnam Summit at Mar-a-Lago, dedicated to fostering U.S.-Vietnam economic ties.
Under the leadership of Communist Party Secretary-General Tô Lâm, Vietnam is charting an ambitious course toward a more advanced economic future. The country has set its sights on becoming an upper-income, knowledge-based, and tech-driven economy by 2045. To achieve this transformation, Hanoi is aiming for annual growth rates approaching 8%, backed by major investments in education, innovation, and digital infrastructure.
This strategic shift comes at a time when Vietnam’s global trade position is gaining new momentum. For American consumers, especially in the post-NCAA championship shopping rush for Nike and Adidas gear (much of it made in Vietnam), the lower tariffs mean more competitive prices. But for Vietnam, it’s more than a short-term win: it’s a signal that the country is ready to play a bigger role in the global economy, not just as a manufacturing hub, but as a rising player in tech and innovation.
Over the past few decades, the U.S. and Vietnam have worked steadily to rebuild and strengthen their relationship, culminating in a formal upgrade to a “comprehensive strategic partnership.” This partnership has been grounded in robust economic cooperation, mutual interests in maintaining regional stability, and shared security concerns across the Indo-Pacific.
However, the sudden imposition of a steep tariff risked more than just short-term economic pain. It threatened to disrupt key supply chains, rattle investor confidence, and weaken diplomatic trust — potentially nudging Vietnam closer to alternative economic alliances, including with China or regional blocs less aligned with U.S. strategic goals.
The recent decision by Washington to reduce and pause tariffs on Vietnam could also play a strategic role in managing tensions in the South China Sea. This move is more than an economic gesture — it signals a broader geopolitical alignment. As territorial disputes and regional rivalries escalate in the Indo-Pacific, particularly with China's growing assertiveness in the South China Sea, Washington’s approach to Vietnam reflects an effort to solidify alliances and partnerships in the region. By easing economic pressures, the United States is extending a hand to a key Southeast Asian partner, potentially bolstering Vietnam's economic resilience and encouraging closer diplomatic cooperation.
In an era marked by intensifying great power competition, maintaining relations with Vietnam is not only beneficial for trade but also pivotal for sustaining U.S. influence in the region. Vietnam occupies a strategic position both geographically and politically, sharing maritime boundaries with several contested zones in the South China Sea. Strengthening economic ties through tariff relief could deepen trust and pave the way for greater collaboration on security and regional stability. In this context, economic diplomacy becomes a tool for geopolitical strategy, helping to counterbalance China’s dominance and reaffirm the U.S. commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific.
From Vietnam's side of the court, by capitalizing on favorable trade conditions and embracing forward-looking reforms, Tô Lâm's team is positioning itself to not only maintain momentum, but also redefine its economic identity on the global stage. While the reduced tariffs may be a temporary advantage, if Vietnam sticks to its game plan, the rewards could be lasting.
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