Sens. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.), Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), and Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) introduced a joint resolution on Thursday aimed at ending the unauthorized U.S. military role in the Saudi-led coalition’s war in Yemen.
The move comes amid President Biden’s unpopularvisit to the region, where he will visit with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in the coming days. In an op-ed explaining the reasoning behind the trip, Biden touted an ongoing truce in Yemen, but didn’t say whether he would press for an end to the war.
The House introduced a similar bill last month led by Reps. Pramila Jayapal (D-Wash.) and Peter DeFazio (D-Ore.). The senate companion will be considered “privileged,” meaning it can be voted on 10 calendar days after it is introduced.
“We must put an end to the unauthorized and unconstitutional involvement of U.S. Armed Forces in the catastrophic Saudi-led war in Yemen and Congress must take back its authority over war,” Sanders said in a press release. “More than 85,000 children in Yemen have already starved and millions more are facing imminent famine and death.”
Sen. Warren noted that “The American people, through their elected representatives in Congress, never authorized U.S. involvement in the war,” adding that “Congress abdicated its constitutional powers and failed to prevent our country from involving itself in this crisis.”
“The U.S. must immediately end its support for Saudi-led coalition in Yemen unless explicitly authorized by Congress,” she said.
Ben Armbruster is the Managing Editor of Responsible Statecraft. He has more than a decade of experience working at the intersection of politics, foreign policy, and media. Ben previously held senior editorial and management positions at Media Matters, ThinkProgress, ReThink Media, and Win Without War.
Photos: Rob Crandall, Trevor Collens, and Rich Koele via shutterstock.com
Top photo credit: U.S. President Donald Trump looks on next to Russian President Vladimir Putin during a press conference following their meeting to negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine, at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, in Anchorage, Alaska, U.S., August 15, 2025. REUTERS/Kevin Lamarque TPX IMAGES OF THE DAY
The much anticipated meeting between President Donald Trump and President Putin ended earlier than expected, but the two leaders addressed the press afterwards and appeared amicable while hinting at progress on an "agreement."
But no deal, nor a framework for a deal was announced. They did not take questions afterwards. Trump, who had said earlier that without a ceasefire at the end of the day he might slap Russia with new sanctions, did not go there. If anything they broached the issue of a second meeting. Putin even suggested it could be in Moscow.
"There were many, many points that we agreed on, most of them, I would say, a couple of big ones that we haven't quite gotten there, but we've made some headway. So there's no deal until there's a deal," Trump said in his own statement following the nearly three-hour closed-door meeting that included two members of each delegation in addition to the two leaders (Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and aide Yuri Ushakov for the Russian side; Secretary of State Marco Rubio and special envoy Steve Witkoff for the U.S.).
“I will call up NATO in a little while. I will call up, the various people that I think are appropriate and, of course, call up (Ukrainian) President (Volodymyr) Zelensky and tell him about today’s meeting. And so ultimately up to them,” he added, noting "we had real progress today."
For his part, Putin recalled shared history between the U.S. and Russia (World War II) and the shared desire to end the war, noting that he and Trump had open lines of communication after relations of the two governments fell to their "lowest point," and that "it's very important for our countries to turn the page to go back to cooperation." He actually referred to an "agreement" while reiterating his longstanding position of what needed to happen before a peace deal was struck.
"We're convinced that in order to, to make the settlement lasting and long term, we need to eliminate all the primary roots, the primary causes of that conflict, and we've said it multiple times, to consider all legitimate concerns of Russia and to reinstate a just balance of security in Europe and in the world on the whole, and agree with President Trump, as he has said today, that naturally, the security of Ukraine should be ensured as well. Naturally, we are prepared to work on that."
"I would like to hope that the agreement that we've reached together will help us bring closer that goal and will pave the path towards peace in Ukraine. We expect that Kyiv and European capitals will perceive that constructively and that they won't throw a wrench in the works," he said. "They will not make any attempts to use some backroom dealings to conduct provocations to torpedo the nascent progress."
So what to make of it? "While the exact results of the summit remain to be seen, Presidents Trump and Putin each gave some indication that the outline of a framework deal to end the war in Ukraine — and substantially improve US-Russia relations — was reached today," said George Beebe, director of the Quincy Institute's Grand Strategy Program. "The next step will be more consultation between the U.S., Ukraine, and Europe about this framework."
Not everyone agreed. Matt Dimmick, the former Russia director for the Office for the Secretary of Defense in the first Trump administration, told Al Jazeera that Trump’s demeanor appeared “subdued" indicating he wasn't thrilled with the outcome of the 3-on-3 meeting. Another meeting that was reportedly to include a larger group including trade representatives of both governments, never transpired.
“The fact that both of them went up, gave brief statements, talked in vague terms and had really no concrete deliverables to discuss with the press, I think, says everything about this particular sit-down,” Dimmick said, adding that Russia will no doubt report it out as a "win."
“I don’t think there’s any argument that the Russians have won just by showing up and having a red carpet rolled out for them."
Mark Episkopos, senior fellow at the Quincy Institute, disagrees that there was no progress to be seen in the entire affair.
"Contrary to those saying 'no deal,' there is cause to believe that the outlines of a framework deal to end the war in Ukraine and substantially improve US-Russia relations were reached today," Episkopos posted on X. "What remains is additional triangulation between the US and Ukr/EU."
Quincy's Anatol Lieven, director of the Eurasia Program, thought it might have been possible for the Trump administration to take home more than that. "Peace talks to end the war are badly needed, and peace talks are almost invariably a long and difficult process that has to begin somewhere," he said.
"But it was a mistake for Trump to hold a summit without 'sherpas' having reached detailed agreement in advance — that is really not how things are usually done, and for good reason, as it makes it look as if Trump has given Putin an escape from diplomatic isolation from the West without getting anything solid in return."
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Top image credit: Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev, left, and Armenia Nikol Pashinyan sign peace agreement in front of US President Donald Trump aimed at ending decades of conflict at the White House on Friday Aug 8, 2025. EYEPRESS via Reuters Connect
The recent diplomatic flurry between Armenia and Azerbaijan, culminating in an unveiling at the White House of a much-touted draft peace agreement, has been hailed as a breakthrough for peace in the South Caucasus.
But beneath the celebratory rhetoric lies a far more complicated reality — one where triumphalist narratives mask unresolved tensions and where military dominance rather than genuine compromise continues to dictate terms.
A day before hosting Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev for the August 8 summit, U.S. President Donald Trump announced on Truth Social that the leaders would convene for an "official Peace Signing Ceremony” Yet the actual event yielded only a "joint declaration" with seven points — just four of which substantively addressed the conflict, while the remainder offered generic platitudes about peace and effusive praise for Trump's mediation.
The declaration's first and most critical point revealed its provisional nature: the peace deal was merely initialed by foreign ministers, not signed by the heads of state. When the full text emerged days later, its substance proved strikingly familiar — a reheated version of the 1975 Helsinki Accords' principles (border inviolability, sovereignty, and territorial integrity) combined with nods to the 1991 Almaty Declaration that dissolved the USSR and established the Commonwealth of Independent States, which both Armenia and Azerbaijan joined. This deliberate vagueness signals that formidable obstacles remain before a final treaty can be signed by the countries’ leaders.
The draft agreement's emphasis on "non-interference in internal affairs" rings hollow against Azerbaijan's uncompromising demand that Armenia must purge its constitution of all references to Nagorno-Karabakh — the disputed territory that sparked two devastating wars (1990s, 2020) and culminated in Azerbaijan's military victory, the region's forcible reintegration, and the ethnic cleansing of over 100,000 indigenous Armenians in 2023. By omitting this existential sticking point, the document exposes the chasm between diplomatic theater and on-the-ground realities.
The demand for constitutional reform is politically fraught for Pashinyan, who already faces a fierce backlash from Armenians over what many view as a humiliating capitulation to Baku’s demands. As a deeply polarizing figure — locked in conflict with both the influential Armenian diaspora and the Armenian Apostolic Church — Pashinyan must tread carefully ahead of the 2026 parliamentary elections. Pushing through constitutional amendments before then would risk further eroding his hold on power, especially since the changes would require ratification via a contentious referendum.
Yet Azerbaijan’s Aliyev, eager to cement his military victories, may not tolerate indefinite delays.
Other unresolved hurdles loom large. While mutual recognition of territorial integrity should theoretically protect enclaves on each other’s soil, Armenia is far more vulnerable in practice. Three Azerbaijani exclaves — Kerki, Yuhary Askipara, and Sofulu — occupy strategic positions along or near critical roads within Armenia, including the vital Yerevan-Tbilisi highway. Should Baku regain control, it could jeopardize Armenia’s land link with Georgia.
Land swaps might offer a solution, but Yerevan lacks equivalent leverage: unlike Azerbaijan, it holds no strategic Armenian enclaves in Azerbaijani territory to trade. This asymmetry gives Baku little incentive to relinquish its tactical advantages, ensuring it retains territorial leverage in addition to its military superiority against future hostilities.
This reveals the fundamental flaw in the so-called “peace deal” — it reflects Azerbaijan's military triumph rather than a balanced compromise addressing both sides' core interests. With its battlefield objectives achieved, Baku feels little need to make meaningful concessions.
Yet history cautions against mistaking military victory for enduring peace. Armenia's own short-lived 1994 victory demonstrates how quickly fortunes can change. While Azerbaijan enjoys structural advantages — greater size, population, and natural resources — its current dominance isn't guaranteed. Shifting regional alliances or internal dynamics could alter the equation. The real danger lies in how this agreement institutionalizes a victor's peace, embedding unresolved grievances that may fuel future conflict rather than fostering genuine reconciliation.
These dynamics explain Aliyev's maximalist position — he seeks to leverage Azerbaijan's current dominance to eliminate any future possibility of what Baku terms "Armenian revanchism." This strategy is made clear by the peace agreement's broad clause (Article 8) mandating opposition to "separatism” in all its forms. That phrase serves dual purposes: it permanently extinguishes Armenia’s territorial claims to Karabakh while simultaneously denying the right of return to its Armenian population. The 2023 forced exodus thus represented not just a military solution, but the deliberate creation of irreversible facts on the ground.
Yet these local tensions unfold against an increasingly complex geopolitical situation, where great power rivalries threaten to exacerbate rather than resolve the region's conflicts.
Washington's mediation has undeniably weakened Russia's regional standing, but, by so doing, the U.S. has inherited the same complex balancing act between Baku and Yerevan that bedeviled Moscow for decades. The U.S. has secured Armenian and Azerbaijani agreement for the TRIPP corridor (Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity) — a U.S.-backed transit route linking Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan and Turkey through Armenia. Though billed as an economic lifeline and ostensibly subject to Armenian law, critical questions remain unanswered: who controls security? (Will U.S. or private contractors operate checkpoints?) What guarantees Armenia’s sovereignty? (Baku insists on unimpeded transit — a potential loophole for extraterritoriality).
The Kremlin's muted reaction to this U.S.-brokered deal reflects strategic calculation rather than acceptance. This stems from Moscow's desire to remain in Trump's good graces. But more significantly, it demonstrates Russia's recognition that by assuming leadership in the South Caucasus, Washington now owns both its potential rewards and risks.
It remains unclear how much Washington is truly willing to invest in stabilizing a region 6,000 miles away — and one of marginal strategic importance where regional powers like Russia, Turkey, and Iran have far more at stake.
Despite talk of withdrawal, Russia maintains deep economic and infrastructure links in Armenia and will likely seek to influence the country’s 2026 parliamentary elections to favor Moscow-friendly factions. The continued presence of Russian border guards along Armenia's frontier with Iran presents another complicating factor — the U.S.-backed TRIPP corridor will need to accommodate this enduring reality.
Among regional actors, Iran has offered the most pointed criticism of TRIPP. While President Pezeshkian struck a conciliatory tone, he explicitly warned that the U.S. presence along Iran's border would be "problematic." The Supreme Leader’s foreign policy adviser, Ali Akbar Velayati, adopted a harder line, vowing opposition to the "Trump route" regardless of Russian involvement. Against the backdrop of possible renewed Israel-Iran conflict — the last round of which featured the U.S. bombing of Iranian nuclear facilities — Tehran will likely see any American encroachment so close to its border as a serious provocation. Iran could emerge as a major spoiler.
The South Caucasus has seen many "historic" agreements unravel. For this one to endure, it must move beyond symbolism and confront the unresolved issues that still divide Armenia and Azerbaijan. Without addressing core grievances — territorial disputes, constitutional demands, and the rights of displaced populations — this deal risks becoming another fleeting truce in a conflict that has defied resolution for decades.
True peace requires more than diplomatic theater; it demands difficult compromises that have so far been absent. Until then, the promise of stability remains a mirage.
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Top photo credit: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy (2R) is welcomed by German Chancellor Friedrich Merz (R) upon arrival in the garden of the chancellery in Berlin to join a video conference of European leaders with the US President on the Ukraine war ahead of the summit between the US and Russian leaders, on August 13, 2025. JOHN MACDOUGALL/Pool via REUTERS
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky huddled with European leaders yesterday in advance of Donald Trump’s highly touted meeting with Vladimir Putin in Alaska. The call, which Trump joined as well, was viewed as Europe and Ukraine’s final chance to influence the American president’s thinking ahead of the U.S.-Russia summit in Anchorage.
With Ukraine’s position on the battlefield progressively worsening and Trump renewing his push for a ceasefire, European leaders have begun to make concessions to reality. Most strikingly, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said yesterday that the frontline should be the starting point for territorial negotiations, echoing NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte’s recent comment that there may be a need for de facto recognition of Russian occupation of Ukrainian land.
Moreover, in response to Putin’s proposal last week to agree to a ceasefire in exchange for Ukraine’s withdrawal from the rest of Donetsk region, Europe and Ukraine have insisted that any land swaps must be reciprocal. While European leaders remain firm that the norm of territorial integrity must be upheld in principle, these moves clearly embody a shift from the more uncompromising stance they embraced through the first three years of the war.
That said, some aspects of Europe’s stance remain delusional.
Prior to their meeting with Trump yesterday, Ukraine and its European partners agreed on a series of principles for negotiations with Russia. Among these remains the long outdated notion that Russia cannot have a veto over Ukraine’s NATO accession, even though the Trump administration has already ruled this prospect out. Even Trump’s much more transatlantically friendly predecessor Joe Biden was not prepared to take any tangible steps to make Ukrainian membership in NATO a reality.
In an increasingly multipolar world — one in which the United States has limited resources to respond to multiple contingencies across several theatres — Washington cannot afford to take on an additional ironclad security commitment to a country where, unlike in Western Europe, its vital interests are not at stake. Europeans advocating that the defense of Ukraine should ultimately fall on America’s shoulders is not only morally suspect but strategically unwise, as it telegraphs that Europe remains a vassal vulnerable to American shakedowns such as the recent capitulation to Trump on trade.
Even worse, Europeans risk squandering an opportunity to focus their heft on negotiating more realistic security guarantees for Ukraine. These could include pushing for Kyiv’s right to retain a peacetime military large enough to defend itself and deter Moscow, negotiating legal commitments to maintain stockpiles of specific weapons that would be automatically released to Ukraine in case Russia invades again, and pushing Moscow to accept a regulated European military presence on Ukrainian soil that is limited to activities such as training and maintenance of weapons systems.
Europe cannot claim to be a “geopolitical actor” if, on top-table matters of war and peace, it continues to fixate on presenting principles to its superpower patron rather than negotiate difficult security issues with its neighbors and adversaries. Insisting on Kyiv’s right to join NATO as a matter of principle reflects an “end of history” mentality — one that privileges lecturing over genuine diplomacy. And doing so while simultaneously claiming the mantle of “geopolitical actorness” has, ironically, only served to damage the European Union’s reputation as a sincere and consistent normative actor.
European leaders’ concessions to reality when it comes to borders mean little when one considers that the war in Ukraine is not primarily about territory. Rather, its origins lay in Russia’s perception that it has been denied a meaningful say over the contours of Europe’s post-Cold War security order, including the geopolitical alignment of states on its border.
Failure to reckon with this issue ensures that the wider European space will remain fractured, fostering a continued sense of insecurity for both Russia and the rest of Europe. The resulting increase in military budgets, coming at the expense of social spending, will in turn fuel the ongoing rise of populism across Europe. With the far right already in power or leading in the polls in the four largest European economies, this is not a prospect that liberal-minded Europeans should welcome.
Russia’s growing shift toward illiberalism at home and assertiveness abroad in the leadup to its full-scale invasion of Ukraine convinced many Europeans that Russia was “leaving” Europe. Such views confuse the European Union with Europe writ large. The fact that the return of war to the heart of the European continent has strengthened those forces that question the value of the European project shows precisely that Mikhail Gorbachev’s vision of a “common European home” remains on the historical agenda.
European leaders are naturally seeking security guarantees for Ukraine in exchange for any territory that Kyiv agrees to give up, especially since such guarantees will underwrite the stability necessary for Ukraine’s reconstruction and E.U. accession processes to move forward. At the same time, although the road ahead remains filled with obstacles, in the weeks following the Alaska meeting Putin and Trump may prove able to agree on a broad vision for conflict resolution and ceasefire implementation that Zelensky can also be persuaded to accept, since what Kyiv risks losing outright on the battlefield it may be able to concede in exchange for something at the negotiating table.
If a sense of forward momentum does emerge from the Anchorage summit, European leaders would be foolish to retain their hardline normative posture on what the continent’s security order should look like. To do so would not only sideline them in any negotiations over that order’s future, but also damage their reputation in the eyes of the world by making it seem as though they remain the only party opposed to peace after more than three years of costly war.
Because its resources must be carefully husbanded in a multipolar world, Washington needs to craft a more pragmatic relationship with Russia, while simultaneously encouraging the rest of Europe to become a more autonomous and responsible pillar of the continental security order. The former task depends on a settlement of the war in Ukraine.
The latter requires the United States to persuade its European allies to back down from an approach that risks hollowing out the E.U., fracturing European societies, and derailing a delicate diplomatic process that is now beginning in earnest in Alaska.
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