Follow us on social

google cta
Shutterstock_2127053996-scaled

Ukraine and the power of nationalism

Zelensky is bringing his country together in unified resistance to Russian aggression. Can it remain that way beyond the invasion?

Analysis | Europe
google cta
google cta

Ukrainians’ inspired defense of their country against Russian aggression is one of the most vivid displays in recent times of strong nationalism. That defense and the sentiments and loyalty that have sustained it have demolished Vladimir Putin’s assertion that Ukraine is not a real nation but only a Soviet-manufactured entity.

What the Ukrainians are demonstrating can be viewed in the context of a larger pattern of nationalism shaping internal as well as international politics across much of the globe. The roots of nationalism are very old and include the consolidation of the European nation-state in the 17th century and the concept of mass commitment to the nation-state that came out of the French Revolution. Nationalism emerged more recently and clearly as a dominant way of people thinking about their identities and loyalties once the obscuring effects of supranational empires (of which the Soviet Union was one of the last) and the supranational conflict known as the Cold War went away.

Nationalism in other nations has important implications for the United States, but it is important to distinguish two different types of ideologies that have borne labels that include the word nationalism.

One type is often called ethno-nationalism or some other name that incorporates an ethnic, racial, or religious identity that is the focus of the ideology. This type is not based on the nation-state or patriotic adherence to a nation-state. It instead typically asserts a superior position for a demographic group within a nation-state. In that respect it is exclusive rather than inclusive. Sometimes its adherents reach beyond international borders to make common cause with those having comparable ideas about exclusion, which is true of some nativists today.

Examples of this type include the “Hindu nationalism” of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party in India, the Israeli ideology that claims a superior position for a specific ethnic and religious group, various far-right political parties in today’s Europe, and ethnically-based extremism in the United States that sometimes claims the title “nationalist.”

Ethno-nationalism poses numerous problems, including to peace and security.

Internationally, it has underlain wars where ethnic and religious patterns of habitation do not correspond with state boundaries, as in the Balkans and Caucasus. Internally, it leads to such violence as between Hindus and Muslims in India, between Jews and Arabs in Palestine, and individual carnage at the hands of white supremacists in the United States.

Although ethno-nationalism is no stranger to Ukraine, the nationalism that Ukrainians are displaying today in resisting Russian aggression is a much different type. It is loyalty to the entire nation-state rather than any one demographic group within it. It is inclusive rather than exclusive. In Ukraine, it is proving more powerful than what could have been a more exclusive variety based on language or ethnicity. In disproving one of the mistaken assumptions Putin evidently made before launching the war, even most Russian-speaking Ukrainians in the eastern part of the country have rallied to the Ukrainian national cause.

The type of nationalism that Ukrainians are displaying need not be a problem for peace and security. Strong pride in, and attachment to, a nation-state is consistent with preservation of an international order based on the nation-state and respect for territorial integrity. Nationalist-minded Ukrainians may be stubborn enough about restoring their own territorial integrity to make a peace settlement more elusive than it might otherwise be, but their nationalism does not motivate them to invade another country. The alternative to nationalism based on the nation-state is empire, which is what Putin is trying to recreate.

In shaping its foreign policy, the United States needs to respect nationalism — genuine, Ukrainian-style nationalism based on the nation-state. When the United States in the past has failed to show that kind of respect and understanding, it has gotten in trouble, as in Vietnam and Iraq.

A restrained foreign policy that incorporates such respect can avoid such trouble. The performance in the current war of Ukrainian forces, highly motivated to defend their country, against a numerically superior Russian military ought to be taken as revalidation of this lesson.

It would be nice if the more inclusive variety of nationalism could everywhere displace destabilizing ethno-nationalism and its variants, but that is too much to hope for. Even in Ukraine, which has long been troubled by linguistic and other internal divisions that at times has given its external policies a split personality, it took a brutal foreign invasion to inspire the degree of national unity and patriotism it displays today. The curse of ethno-nationalism is not about to go away in most of the world. The United States should criticize it as appropriate and certainly not actively support it.


ODESSA, UKRAINE - 20 FEB 2022: Unity march in Odessa against Russian invasion. (Photo: Olga Evans via shutterstock.com)
google cta
Analysis | Europe
Dan Caine
Top photo credit: Secretary of War Pete Hegseth and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff U.S. Air Force Gen. Dan Caine conduct a press briefing on Operation Epic Fury at the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., March 4, 2026. (DoW photo by U.S. Navy Petty Officer 1st Class Alexander Kubitza)

Did Caine just announce the Morgenthau option for Iran?

QiOSK

Gen. Dan Caine’s formulation of American war aims in Iran is remarkable not because it is bellicose, but because it is strategically incoherent.

In a press conference Tuesday morning, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not describe a limited campaign to suppress missile fire, blunt Iran’s naval threat, or even impose a severe but bounded setback on Tehran’s coercive instruments. He described a campaign against Iran’s “military and industrial base” designed to prevent the regime from attacking Americans, U.S. interests, and regional partners “for years to come.” In an earlier briefing he put the objective similarly: to prevent Iran from projecting power outside its borders. Rather than the language of a discrete coercive operation, this describes a war against a state’s capacity to regenerate power.

keep readingShow less
Mbs-mbz-scaled
UAE President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan receives Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman at the Presidential Airport in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates November 27, 2019. WAM/Handout via REUTERS

Is the US goading Arab states to join war against Iran?

QiOSK

On Sunday, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Mike Waltz told ABC News that Arab Gulf states may soon step up their involvement in the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran. “I expect that you'll see additional diplomatic and possibly military action from them in the coming days and weeks,” Waltz said.

Then, on Monday morning, Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) slammed Saudi Arabia for staying out of the war even as “Americans are dying and the U.S. is spending billions” of dollars to conduct regime change in Iran. “If you are not willing to use your military now, when are you willing to use it?” Graham asked. “Hopefully this changes soon. If not, consequences will follow.”

keep readingShow less
Why Tehran may have time on its side
Top image credit: Iranian army military personnel stand at attention under a banner featuring an image of an Iranian-made unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) during a military parade commemorating the anniversary of Army Day outside the Shrine of Iran's late leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in the south of Tehran, Iran, on April 18, 2025. (Photo by Morteza Nikoubazl/NurPhoto)

Why Tehran may have time on its side

QiOSK

A provocative calculus by Anusar Farrouqui (“policytensor”) has been circulating on X and in more exhaustive form on the author’s Substack. It purports to demonstrate a sobering reality: in a high-intensity U.S.-Iran conflict, the United States may be unable to suppress Iranian drone production quickly enough to prevent a strategically consequential period of regional devastation.

The argument is framed through a quantitative lens, carrying the seductive appeal of mathematical precision. It arranges variables—such as U.S. sortie rates and degradation efficiency against Iranian repair cycles and rebuild speeds—to suggest a "sustainable firing rate." The implication is that Iran could maintain a persistent strike capability long enough to exhaust American political patience, forcing Washington toward a premature declaration of success or an unfavorable ceasefire.

keep readingShow less
google cta
Want more of our stories on Google?
Click here to make us a Preferred Source.

LATEST

QIOSK

Newsletter

Subscribe now to our weekly round-up and don't miss a beat with your favorite RS contributors and reporters, as well as staff analysis, opinion, and news promoting a positive, non-partisan vision of U.S. foreign policy.