Shebaz Sharif, the younger brother of three-time prime minister Nawaz Sharif, takes over a politically divided Pakistan as terrorist attacks are rising, the economy is in crisis mode, and Shehbaz himself faces a deferred indictment for money laundering.
Sharif was elected prime minister by Pakistan’s National Assembly on Monday after Imran Khan was removed from office through a vote of no confidence last weekend.
Opposition parties saw worsening relations between Imran Khan and the military as an opportunity to strike and this catapulted Shehbaz into the prime minister’s office. He is known as a competent administrator, but not a charismatic politician like his brother. Shehbaz has pledged to heal Pakistan’s divisions and reach out to those who have been stigmatized in the political discourse. But he also faces an electrified demographic that vehemently supports Imran Khan and feels sidelined by the change in government. He will have to deliver fast on the economy or Khan’s problems will become his own.
He also assumes office at a time when U.S.-Pakistan relations are frosty at best. Pakistan doesn’t quite fit into the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy and Washington’s focus on Afghanistan and Pakistan from a security perspective is waning. President Biden never called Imran Khan as prime minister, which was a point of frustration for Khan and his advisors. It will also politicize any future communication between Biden and Sharif which will be used by Khan’s supporters as evidence of U.S. favoritism and meddling in domestic affairs.
However, U.S.-Pakistan security relations will continue to be primarily managed through Pakistan’s security establishment. These relations are more likely to be impacted by whether the army chief General Qamar Bajwa seeks an extension in November than the country’s civilian politics.
Adam Weinstein is Deputy Director of the Middle East program at the Quincy Institute, whose current research focuses on security and rule of law in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq.
Leader of the opposition Mian Muhammad Shehbaz Sherif, brother of ex-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, gestures as he speaks to the media at the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Islamabad, Pakistan April 7, 2022. REUTERS/Akhtar Soomro|
Top photo credit: The USS Carney fires an SM-2 missile during a live-fire exercise as part of Formidable Shield 19 in the Atlantic Ocean, May 17, 2019. The ship recently thwarted missiles coming allegedly from Houthi sources in Yemen headed for Israel, according to the DOD. (Navy Petty Officer 1st Class Fred Gray IV)
Namely, it hopes to boost production rates for 12 types of missiles it wants on-hand, including Patriot interceptor missiles, Standard Missile-6, THAAD interceptors, and joint air-surface standoff missiles.
Replenishing now-depleted missile stockpiles is important for U.S. military preparedness. But experts tell RS that this ambitious missile production ramp-up is a time-intensive, costly, and logistically challenging endeavor that may ultimately fail without substantive financial commitment from the DoD.
Moreover, Washington needs to assess its current foreign commitments, primarily in Ukraine and Israel, before it depletes its current stores further, requiring more money, more industry, and more time to get back up to fighting shape. In other words, say experts, put the much needed focus back on the U.S. national interest even if that means turning off the spigot for other countries.
Ramping up missile production: what does it take?
Experts told RS that ramping up missile production, in the way the Pentagon wants, could take years, and likely new weapons manufacturing facilities and infrastructure.
Ret. Col. Mark Cancian, a senior adviser with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, told RS that, if the necessary funding was available, the U.S. defense industrial base could double the production of many missiles over about two years, merely by having existing weapons factories double-up on production shifts and workers.
However, production times would vary by missile type, and higher production rates would likely require new facilities that would take time to build, Cancian noted.
Defense writer Mike Fredenburg was a bit more pessimistic. “Even with a new contract firmly in place, I could easily see it taking four years or more to double production.”
"My gut is — to try to quadruple production? [It is] not going to happen — at least not quickly,” he said.
"We do need to replenish our missiles. We burnt through them,” he explained.
Indeed, Fredenburg estimated in August that Israel’s wars on Gaza and Iran, together with the U.S. campaign on Yemen’s Houthis earlier this year, consumed 33% of the U.S. stock of Standard Missile-3 (SM-3), and 17% of the Standard Missile-6 (SM-6), since 2023. The U.S. used a quarter of its THAAD missile interceptors during the Israel-Iran war alone. And the Guardian reported in July that the U.S. only had 25% of the Patriot missile interceptors it would need for the Pentagon’s military plans — having sent many to Ukraine, which still often lacks them.
But, the current defense industrial infrastructure is not well suited to take on the rapid missile production rates the Pentagon wants to pursue.
"We have a peacetime defense industrial base, and we've had that for decades…we're not really set up to quickly produce things,” Fredenburg said. “We don’t know how much more capacity they can squeeze out of existing facilities.”
Cost is another roadblock. The “Big Beautiful Bill” passed earlier this year allocated $25 billion over the next five years toward munitions funding; the Pentagon’s new missile production targets may well cost tens of billions more.
"This is a lot of money…many tens of billions of dollars, ultimately, to get to these kinds of [missile production] numbers” the Pentagon wants, Fredenburg told RS.
To his point, the price of individual missiles can be staggering. For example, in September, the Army awarded Lockheed Martin nearly $10 billion to make nearly 2,000 PAC-3 Patriot Advanced Capability-3 missile interceptors — putting the cost of just one missile interceptor at several million dollars. The SM-6 (Standard Missile-6), which the Pentagon also wants to ramp up, costs about $4.3 million each.
And it's not just about putting the missiles together but testing them and that can take months and cost hundreds of millions.
As a point, experts say less complicated munitions production like 155 millimeter shells, have already fallen behind.
“They've been trying to build-up 155 millimeter shell production, which is…relatively simple compared to missiles. And they've been having trouble doing that,” Fredenburg said. “What makes us think that they're going to be able to ramp this production up massively for much more sophisticated, more complex, more expensive weapon systems?”
Experts say that the Pentagon’s intentions to double or quadruple missile production will likely remain aspirational — unless they are matched with substantive contracts to actually support the process.
“All we're saying so far is that we want to urge the defense industrial base to make these new capabilities, build new factories, get new weapons, equipment,” Lt. Colonel Daniel Davis said on his Deep Dive podcast. “You need a lot more than just ‘we should,’ or, we ‘urge you to,’ if you really want anything to happen.”
Jennifer Kavanagh, senior fellow and director of military analysis at Defense Priorities, told RS that while increasing missile production was important for U.S. military readiness, what the Pentagon is asking for is a “reach.”
“It is not clear that contractors can meet [the Pentagon’s] targets, especially without additional federal funding to expand production and some way to find and train more workers,” she explained.
How did we get here?
The U.S. stockpile is low because the Pentagon has burnt through many of its munitions in ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and Israel — at a rate faster than it can replace them.
“We've been involved with the Ukraine war since 2022. And we've known what kind of, and how many [American munitions] are being used over there," said Fredenburg.
Not everyone agrees that Washington was carefully balancing its missions, one of them being to maintain national readiness. Some worry that the lessons haven’t been fully learned.
“In recent years, the United States has wasted a ton of missiles and air defense interceptors on conflicts that are not in its vital interests. This includes those in the Middle East and in Ukraine,” Kavanagh told RS. “Speeding up munition production so that the United States can send those munitions abroad or expend them in conflicts that do not have implications for vital U.S. interests is a waste of resources.”
“As the U.S. supply of advanced munitions becomes larger, it will always be tempting for American leaders to squander some portion in wars of choice,” Kavanagh concluded. “This is a risk of the new effort to build missile stockpiles.”
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Top image credit: French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz meet, amid Russia's attack on Ukraine, in Kyiv, Ukraine May 10, 2025. REUTERS/Gleb Garanich
Support for mainstream political parties in Europe is crumbling against a rising tide of nationalism as voters increasingly want their governments to prioritize domestic issues.
This might not be enough to end the war in Ukraine, which will cost Europe $50 billion it can ill afford in 2026. But we may be witnessing the beginning of the end of the uniparty in Europe.
On October 6, France lost a fourth prime minister in little over a year with the unexpected resignation of Sebastien Lecornu.
The country’s problem is not new. With national debt at 114% of GDP a succession of prime ministers have fallen at the altar of trying to impose deeply unpopular budgetary cuts. One way out, which at the moment seems unlikely, is for President Macron to resign before his term expires in 2027. But polls suggest that the National Rally of Marine le Pen would stand a good chance of winning should fresh presidential elections be held.
The National Rally has seen a stunning surge in popularity over the past year — garnering 31.5% of parliamentary votes in 2024 — by focussing on local economic concerns and tapping into dissatisfaction with traditional political parties.
And there’s the rub. This pro-war internationalism of the mainstream in Europe is crumbling in the face of rising nationalism, in which citizens want their governments to focus on domestic issues, not foreign adventurism. As it stands, France will need to double its yearly defense spending to €100 billion by 2030 if it is to stay on course to hit the 5% of GDP target. It simply doesn’t have the money and any government that tries to obtain it through taxes or cuts will fall.
We are seeing the same in Britain. Given burgeoning government debt, bond yields in the UK are now consistently the highest among G7 nations. Britain seems unlikely to face a debt crisis as some fear. But as in France, the nationalist Reform Party in Britain is turning the political tide. It is now surging ahead of the incumbent Labour Party in opinion polls, with 35% share of the vote, from the eight main parties.
Mid-term elections are seldom a reliable bell-weather of electoral success. And yet, when it came to office in July 2024, the Labour Party amassed a seemingly unassailable majority of 152 seats in Parliament. Just 15 months later, it now looks beatable.
There is an increasingly widespread view that Keir Starmer’s government is not performing well on the issues that matter, on the economy, the cost of living and immigration. Yet Labour continues to pump $6 billion each year into the war effort in Ukraine and has committed, gradually, to hit 5% of GDP in defense spending by 2035. The latter would increase government spending by $80 billion per year, money which manifestly the country cannot afford without increasing taxes or cutting services to ordinary people. This continued fiscal pressure will simply funnel more votes to the Reform Party, increasing the chance that it comes to power in 2029.
While Germany does not face as severe a debt crunch as either Britain or France, it is deindustrializing in the face of high energy prices accelerated by the war in Ukraine and decisions to cut off Russian energy supplies. There, the nationalist Alternative für Deutschland is also on the rise and some fear it could compete for victory at the next Federal election in 2029.
In Czechia, the populist Andrej Babis is trying to form a coalition having won parliamentary elections with 35% of the vote. Among other things, he has vowed to scrap the Czech ammunition initiative which has supplied Ukraine with 3.5 million artillery shells since 2022 and criticized the previous centrist government for giving “Czech mothers nothing and Ukrainians everything.” That country appears to be shifting gradually towards the position of Slovakia and Hungary that want to bring the war in Ukraine to an end.
All across Europe, the mainstream appears to be falling out of favor. Part of the reason for that is a sense that all the traditional parties form a so-called uniparty in which the needs of big business and internationalism come before the needs of ordinary people. Liberals deride this notion, yet the concept appears to be gaining traction with ordinary people who increasingly want their governments to tackle issues that matter to them and to their children.
It is precisely this wave of disenfranchisement that swept Donald Trump to power in 2016 and 2024.
This shifting political arithmetic in Europe will ultimately seal the fate of the war in Ukraine, although not necessarily in the short term.
With no signs that the major powers in Europe want to get behind a negotiated end to the war, Ukraine is already signalling that it will need an additional $49 billion in Western financial support in 2026 to balance the books. With, at best, a fraction of that coming from the United States under President Trump, that leaves Europe largely on the hook for a cost that European governments can ill afford, either economically or politically.
That will weigh ever heavily on the shoulders of the mainstream across the continent who try to justify the cost of an unwinnable war to increasingly sceptical voters. France will not likely be in a position to double its financial contributions to Ukraine at a time it is trying to force through €44 billion in spending cuts. Britain is unlikely to increase its funding having already been forced to backtrack on attempts to cut welfare benefits over the past year. Where will the money come from?
The European Commission has so far been unable to extend a $140 billion credit facility to Ukraine backed by frozen Russian assets in Belgium that would allow that country in theory to continue fighting through 2027. Belgium, which houses Euroclear where the monies are held, has long opposed this move and the French, already in strife politically, are also sceptical.
Nevertheless, if Macron clings to power, and with Starmer and German Chancellor Frederich Merz relatively safe in their roles for at least another three years, it’s likely the major European powers will continue to back a continuance of war, despite its unaffordable cost, and will search for ways to make the finances work. This will have continued heartbreaking consequences for Ukraine itself.
But, it also seems obvious that the traditional parties in France, Germany and Britain will bear a painful political cost. Macron and Merz both recently decried the assault on European democracy, with the German chancellor claiming "our liberal way of life is under attack, from both outside and within."
But that is not the point. Democracy functions specifically to evict governments who aren’t delivering what their voters want. What we are starting to witness in Europe today is a natural and inevitable shift from internationalism to nationalism. Europe is simply coming to the party a few years after the United States.
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Top image credit: Brian G. Rhodes via shutterstock.com
Nearly a quarter century after the Pentagon awarded Lockheed Martin the contract to develop the Joint Strike Fighter Program into the F-35, the government finally admitted the jet will never live up to Lockheed’s ambitious promises — used to sell the $2 trillion boondoggle to nearly 20 countries around the world.
The Government Accountability Office released a report last month detailing the ongoing challenges the program faces. The first paragraph of the highlights page includes this sentence:
“The program plans to reduce the scope of Block 4 to deliver capabilities to the warfighter at a more predictable pace than in the past.”
The casual reader will be forgiven for possibly glossing over the passage because of its anodyne wording. But the statement is a profound admission that the F-35 will never meet the capability goals set for the program. “Reduce the scope of Block 4” means that program officials are forgoing planned combat capabilities for the jets.
Block 4 is the term to describe ongoing design work for the program. It began in 2019 and was termed as the program’s “modernization” phase. In reality, Block 4 is just a continuation of the program’s initial development process. Officials were unable to complete the F-35’s basic design within the program’s initial budget and schedule. Rather than making that embarrassing admission and requesting more time and money from Congress, Pentagon officials claimed the initial development process was complete (it was not) and they were moving on to “modernization.” What they really did was simply reclassify initial development work with a fancy rebrand.
So, when program officials say they plan to “reduce the scope of Block 4,” they are saying the F-35 will not have all the combat capabilities that were supposed to be a part of the original design.
This is a remarkable development. The American people have been paying a premium for more than two decades to develop and build the most sophisticated strike fighter jet in history. Pentagon officials, politicians, and defense industry executives have been saying for years that the United States needed the F-35 and all its planned capabilities to maintain a qualitive technological advantage over potential rivals. The combat capabilities at the top of the “scope” of Block 4 included some related to electronic warfare, weapons, communication, and navigation according to the GAO. These top-level capabilities were the ones for which the American people supposedly needed to pay a premium.
By admitting that the program cannot deliver the jets that were promised is really an admission that the entire project is a failure. The implications of that could be profound beyond the money that has been wasted throughout the past quarter century. There are 19 countries that either already are, or will shortly, operate F-35s after buying them from the United States. Several countries like the United Kingdom, Norway, and Italy have been a part of the program well before Lockheed Martin won the contract to develop the F-35. These countries have invested heavily in the program with the expectation that they would receive the most combat capable aircraft in history. All have seen their costs rise throughout the years and now they find out that the jets will never live up to the hype.
So, in addition to being a military disaster, the F-35 many also prove to be a foreign relations disaster as well. F-35 boosters in the United States sold the jet to the leaders of these countries with elaborate pitches of the combat capabilities they planned to deliver. There were also promises made early in the process about the program’s affordability, which seem comical today. The next time an American attempts to sell a “transformative” weapon abroad, they shouldn’t be terribly surprised if a potential customer expresses skepticism. F-35 customers have paid a fortune above the quoted price, receiving only a fraction of what was promised. The United States may find a shrinking market for weapons exports in the years ahead.
This should be a moment of deep reflection for the entire national security establishment. The F-35 was never going to live up to expectations because its very concept was deeply flawed. Trying to build one jet that could serve as a multi-role aircraft to meet the needs of just a single military branch is a highly risky proposition. When you try to build a single jet to meet the multi-role needs of at least 15 separate militaries, while also being a global jobs program and political patronage scheme, you get a $2 trillion albatross.
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