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Why bombing Iran is (still) a bad idea

With JCPOA talks not looking promising, Israel is pressuring Biden to turn to a military option that will only make things worse.

Analysis | Middle East

Israeli officials in Washington on Thursday reportedly urged the United States to launch strikes against Iranian targets, in what would be an unprecedented escalation of hostilities. Defense Minister Benny Gantz and Mossad chief David Barnea pushed the Biden administration to engage in military action in order to get Iran to “soften its position at the negotiating table.” 

While the talks in Vienna have yielded little progress, this appeal marks just the latest example of the failed paradigm with which both the United States and Israel have approached Iran: the belief that greater pressure and more aggression will force Tehran to capitulate, when the likelier outcome would be to provoke a similarly militant response.

Israel says it is under an increasingly dire threat, prompting President Herzog to assert, “If the international community does not take a vigorous stance on this issue, Israel will do so. Israel will protect itself.” Yet neither Israel nor the United States would be in this position if Trump had stayed in the deal, or if Biden had swiftly rejoined it upon taking office.

Retired Israeli General Isaac Ben Israel told Bloomberg that “Netanyahu’s efforts to persuade the Trump administration to quit the nuclear agreement have turned out to be the worst strategic mistake in Israel’s history.” With this statement, Ben Israel admitted that not only did Israel undermine its own security by pushing for Trump to renege on the JCPOA, but also that Israel undermined America’s security, as both countries share an interest in preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. Such behavior is unacceptable from a partner. Unfortunately, Israel’s current Prime Minister Naftali Bennett is adopting much the same posture on Iran as his political rival and predecessor, Benjamin Netanyahu.

If the Biden administration takes Israel’s advice, or, perhaps more likely, if Israel launches attacks that provoke an Iranian response and Washington gets dragged into the conflict, what would happen?

An Israeli strike on Iran will likely start a conflict that pulls in neighboring countries on both sides. Hezbollah will launch thousands of rockets, missiles, and drones at Haifa, Tel Aviv, and other targets. Hamas might also join the conflict. Iran or its Iraqi and Yemeni partners could strike Saudi Arabia as they have in the past; they might also expand attacks to include Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, given their now publicly normalized ties with Israel. Oman, Kuwait, and Qatar, which have tended to maintain relations with both Iran as well as the rest of the GCC and the United States, will be pressed to choose a side, a decision that will subject them to attack from their new adversaries. Jordan would be in a bind, given the enormous popular pressure to break the peace treaty with Israel. Oil prices would skyrocket.

If the war escalated, the United States might feel compelled to invade and try to hold Iranian territory. But as regional expert Kenneth Pollack once quipped, “If you liked the Iraq War, you’ll love the Iran War.” Indeed, Iran’s population is three times larger than Iraq’s was in 2003. Iran’s terrain is more mountainous and therefore challenging for an occupying force to control. Iranian nationalism is grounded in millennia of Persian civilization, so the splintering of national identity observed in Iraq is unlikely. While some might mistakenly imagine Iranians welcoming the fall of their authoritarian government, experiences in Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Vietnam, etc. should remind us that foreign invaders are rarely welcomed. Iran lost a half million lives fighting Iraq in the 1980s, in what Iranians believe was an American-inspired war to destroy their revolution, which only rallied citizens behind the regime.

Iran has already withstood decades of U.S. sanctions, including the past three years of “maximum pressure”: instead of fomenting a popular uprising against the government, as some American Iran hawks persist in believing, that strategy has empowered hardliners who now control all of the regime’s major institutions. This is due in major part to the widespread perception that then-President Rouhani’s willingness to trust that the Americans would uphold their commitments under the 2015 nuclear deal was naive. Indeed, even before Trump pulled out of the deal, Iranians’ hopes for a post-sanctions economic boom were disappointed, as many sanctions remained in place and more were added. 

This is not the first time Israel has expressed panic about Iran, nor is it the first time tensions have run high. Yet at some point, through arrogance or error, military confrontation is more likely than not. Israel is not at existential risk from Iran. Tehran is well aware that Israel has its own nuclear arsenal with the capability to deliver weapons by American-built aircraft, French-inspired missiles, and German-built submarines.

In their recent expressions of regret that Netanyahu exhorted then-President Trump to withdraw from the 2015 nuclear deal, other senior Israeli national security officials — most of whom are no longer in office — have suggested the need for a different approach. Although they may have felt dissatisfied with the deal at the time, they now say the JCPOA was the only measure that ever successfully checked Iran’s nuclear program. Director of Central Intelligence William Burns says there is no evidence that Iran has embarked on weaponizing its nuclear program, and an effort to do so would take one to two years. 

American officials need to avoid talking themselves into a dead-end where the only two choices are doing nothing or going to war. U.S. interests would be better served by engaging in a rational discussion of the issues that divide us from Iran than issuing threats that if Tehran does not comply with a deal we violated there will be heavy consequences. Washington should also be clear with Tel Aviv that an Israeli attack on Iran or Iranian targets would have serious negative implications for the U.S.-Israel relationship. 

The Trump administration — egged on by Netanyahu — made an enormous mistake by violating the JCPOA. It destroyed an emergent American dialogue with Iran that offered to de-escalate tensions in the region and gave Iran an excuse to restart parts of its nuclear program that the JCPOA had boxed in. It also rightly raised concerns about the integrity of American commitments. The consequences of this violation are now coming home to haunt us. It is time for honest and thoughtful discussions with ourselves and our partners, not full-throated threats that will have their own dangerous results.


Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken meets with Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz at the U.S. Department of State in Washington, D.C. on December 9, 2021. [State Department photo by Freddie Everett]
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Donald Trump’s recent outburst against Vladimir Putin — accusing the Russian leader of "throwing a pile of bullsh*t at us" and threatening devastating new sanctions — might be just another Trumpian tantrum.

The president is known for abrupt reversals. Or it could be a bargaining tactic ahead of potential Ukraine peace talks. But there’s a third, more troubling possibility: establishment Republican hawks and neoconservatives, who have been maneuvering to hijack Trump’s “America First” agenda since his return to office, may be exploiting his frustration with Putin to push for a prolonged confrontation with Russia.

Trump’s irritation is understandable. Ukraine has accepted his proposed ceasefire, but Putin has refused, making him, in Trump’s eyes, the main obstacle to ending the war.

Putin’s calculus is clear. As Ted Snider notes in the American Conservative, Russia is winning on the battlefield. In June, it captured more Ukrainian territory and now threatens critical Kyiv’s supply lines. Moscow also seized a key lithium deposit critical to securing Trump’s support for Ukraine. Meanwhile, Russian missile and drone strikes have intensified.

Putin seems convinced his key demands — Ukraine’s neutrality, territorial concessions in the Donbas and Crimea, and a downsized Ukrainian military — are more achievable through war than diplomacy.

Yet his strategy empowers the transatlantic “forever war” faction: leaders in Britain, France, Germany, and the EU, along with hawks in both main U.S. parties. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz claims that diplomacy with Russia is “exhausted.” Europe’s war party, convinced a Russian victory would inevitably lead to an attack on NATO (a suicidal prospect for Moscow), is willing to fight “to the last Ukrainian.” Meanwhile, U.S. hawks, including liberal interventionist Democrats, stoke Trump’s ego, framing failure to stand up to Putin’s defiance as a sign of weakness or appeasement.

Trump long resisted this pressure. Pragmatism told him Ukraine couldn’t win, and calling it “Biden’s war” was his way of distancing himself, seeking a quick exit to refocus on China, which he has depicted as Washington’s greater foreign threat. At least as important, U.S. involvement in the war in Ukraine has been unpopular with his MAGA base.

But his June strikes on Iran may signal a hawkish shift. By touting them as a decisive blow to Iran’s nuclear program (despite Tehran’s refusal so far to abandon uranium enrichment), Trump may be embracing a new approach to dealing with recalcitrant foreign powers: offer a deal, set a deadline, then unleash overwhelming force if rejected. The optics of “success” could tempt him to try something similar with Russia.

This pivot coincides with a media campaign against restraint advocates within the administration like Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon policy chief who has prioritized China over Ukraine and also provoked the opposition of pro-Israel neoconservatives by warning against war with Iran. POLITICO quoted unnamed officials attacking Colby for wanting the U.S. to “do less in the world.” Meanwhile, the conventional Republican hawk Marco Rubio’s influence grows as he combines the jobs of both secretary of state and national security adviser.

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Nuclear deterrence rules out direct military action — even Biden, far more invested in Ukraine than Trump, avoided that risk. Instead, Trump ally Sen.Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), another establishment Republican hawk, is pushing a 500% tariff on nations buying Russian hydrocarbons, aiming to sever Moscow from the global economy. Trump seems supportive, although the move’s feasibility and impact are doubtful.

China and India are key buyers of Russian oil. China alone imports 12.5 million barrels daily. Russia exports seven million barrels daily. China could absorb Russia’s entire output. Beijing has bluntly stated it “cannot afford” a Russian defeat, ensuring Moscow’s economic lifeline remains open.

The U.S., meanwhile, is ill-prepared for a tariff war with China. When Trump imposed 145% tariffs, Beijing retaliated by cutting off rare earth metals exports, vital to U.S. industry and defense. Trump backed down.

At the G-7 summit in Canada last month, the EU proposed lowering price caps on Russian oil from $60 a barrel to $45 a barrel as part of its 18th sanctions package against Russia. Trump rejected the proposal at the time but may be tempted to reconsider, given his suggestion that more sanctions may be needed. Even if Washington backs the measure now, however, it is unlikely to cripple Russia’s war machine.

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Central Asia itself is itself emerging as a new battleground. In May 2025, the EU has celebrated its first summit with Central Asian nations in Uzbekistan, with a heavy focus on developing the Middle Corridor, a route for transportation of energy and critical raw materials that would bypass Russia. In that context, the EU has committed €10 billion in support of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route.

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