Follow us on social

160307-f-fn000-092-scaled

What we think of Biden's first 100 days in office

On China, Afghanistan, defense budget, climate crisis and the Middle East — a bit of a mixed bag, say Quincy experts.

Analysis | Washington Politics

Could 100 days have possibly gone by so fast? In a blink of an eye President Biden has attempted to address a large swath of foreign policy promises he made on the campaign trail, including ending forever wars, confronting climate change, and prioritizing human rights in our relationships with friends, frenemies, and rivals abroad. 

So how did he do? As Biden prepares to address Congress in a Joint Session on Capitol Hill Wednesday, Quincy Institute experts are weighing in on whether the president makes the grade or has fallen short of expectations. The responses are decidedly mixed:

Andrew Bacevich, Quincy Institute President

Upon becoming president, Joe Biden wasted no time in reaching an agreement with Russian President Vladimir Putin to extend the life of the New Start nuclear nonproliferation treaty, and that’s a good thing.  

But candidate Biden had responded to a query by the Council for a Livable World by declaring that, "the United States does not need new nuclear weapons." Then why has his administration made no attempt to reassess the massive modernization of the U.S. nuclear strike force — projected price tag $1.2 trillion — now underway?  Given the actually existing and emerging security challenges facing the United States, do we really need new land-based missiles, long-range bombers, missile-firing submarines, and a new family of "more flexible" warheads?  The answer is no.  

Lora Lumpe, Quincy Institute CEO

What President Biden has done right: declare climate change an existential threat and announce that it will be at the center of national security and foreign policy. 

What he has done wrong: Other than holding a global zoom call, he does not appear seriously committed to this declaration. His team is doubling down on containing China’s economic, technological, and diplomatic rise through a militarized approach that will ensure that the United States continues to burn a lot more oil and money for war preparations than is advisable. Their approach will exacerbate the threat rather than ameliorate it.

Trita Parsi, Executive Vice President 

What a difference a few weeks make! Biden started off slow on foreign policy, signaling that his priorities were all domestic — the pandemic, the economy — and that he would not allow foreign policy issues to consume the political capital he needed for domestic reform. On Iran, his non-movement left many with the impression that his position differed little from that of Donald Trump. On Afghanistan, a withdrawal did not seem to be in the cards. But two months into his presidency, something changed. He ordered the full withdrawal from Afghanistan while sowing the seeds of a broader military disengagement from the Middle East. Iran diplomacy has kicked into full gear and a return to the JCPOA seems within reach. 

Stephen Wertheim, Director of Grand Strategy

“America is back” was the story Joe Biden told to begin his presidency. It appeared to augur the restoration of pre-Trump defaults, in which the United States divided the world into subordinate allies and actual or potential adversaries, and attempted to shoulder the military burdens toward both. But Biden’s decision to withdraw from Afghanistan suggests something else is afoot, even if very partially. The president argued that open-ended deployments are unacceptable and inhibit rather than enable productive forms of engagement. Apply this principle rigorously and he — or his successors — would transform America’s role in the world for the better.

Michael Swaine, Director of QI’s East Asia program 

The Biden administration should be commended for eliminating the counter-productive containment rhetoric and overt hostility toward China and the CCP favored by the Trump administration. Yet it has thus far failed to present a realistic strategy toward Beijing that reflects a recognition of the urgent need to stress shared leadership and military restraint over primacy and zero-sum rivalry, temper deterrence with credible reassurance signals on key issues such as Taiwan, and prize constructive over zero-sum economic and technological competition. This might be good for domestic politics, but it will not reassure U.S. friends and allies nor move China in desired directions.

Jessica Lee, Senior Research Fellow, East Asia program 

President Biden has stated that North Korea is U.S.'s top foreign policy challenge and authorized a policy review. Ideally, the new policy would broaden the scope beyond Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program to include the overall bilateral relationship, which is stuck in Korean War-era. A phased approach that pursues both peace and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula has never been seriously tested. The well-worn path of “maximum pressure” will only inflict harm on ordinary North Koreans while encouraging the regime to build more nuclear weapons as a security guarantee against its number one enemy: the United States.  

Anatol Lieven, Senior Research Fellow, Russia and Europe

It is good that Biden has prioritized climate change  and also that the United States has rejoined the Paris Agreement and the World Health Organization. The announced withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Afghanistan is excellent. Biden has rightly resumed talks with Iran on a nuclear agreement, but wrongly attached new conditions to this.

However, while Biden has sought to diminish tensions with China he has also cast them as a Cold War-style foe. He is not trying to reduce military spending. The administration continues vastly to exaggerate the threat from Russia. 

Rachel Esplin Odell, Research Fellow, East Asia

Among the most disappointing aspects of Biden’s China policy thus far is his failure to take swift actions to revitalize the people-to-people exchanges with China that were gutted in the final year of the Trump administration. These exchanges are essential for enhancing mutual understanding and preventing conflict. The Biden administration should have restored the Peace Corps presence in China, renewed the China Fulbright program, reinstated five other cancelled U.S.-China cultural exchange programs, removed the extreme visa restrictions on all Chinese Communist Party members and their families, and adopted a more targeted approach to reviewing visas for students from universities affiliated with China’s military. The Biden administration also needs to take steps toward reopening the Houston consulate and loosening restrictions on Chinese journalists in exchange for reciprocal measures from China. 

Mark Perry, Senior Analyst, Grand Strategy

Progressives and conservatives alike believed that Joe Biden would cut the defense budget, soften the previous administration's needlessly harsh rhetoric on Russia and China, and more substantively reverse America's approach to Iran. He did none of these things, disappointing his supporters and raising questions about his dedication to his articulated ideals. On the defense budget, in particular, Biden retreated when no retreat was necessary. But for many, Biden can be excused for a simple and singular reason: he has reversed the tone set by the previous administration — which makes change on the other issues suddenly possible. Joe Biden isn't Franklin Roosevelt, but he's not Donald Trump either. 

Annelle Sheline, Research Fellow, Middle East

The Biden administration’s early actions on Yemen — ending support for “offensive” Saudi military actions and pausing “relevant” arms sales — were welcome. Yet the administration has failed to clarify U.S. military involvement in Yemen, despite requests from Congress. Biden must pressure Saudi Arabia to lift the blockade, as the use of starvation as a weapon of war is both morally reprehensible and constitutes a war crime, thereby undermining Biden's stated commitment to the international order and rule of law. The status quo in Yemen continues to incentivize violence: to shift these dynamics, Biden should push the U.N. Security Council to revise Resolution 2216 and to bring non-armed groups to the negotiating table, especially women and youth. 

Adam Weinstein, Research Fellow, Middle East

The decision to withdraw all U.S. troops from Afghanistan was the right one. President Biden resisted pressure to transition from one flawed strategy that seeks to defeat the Taliban militarily to another one that attempts to dictate a negotiated settlement using U.S. troops as leverage. There is a distinction between short-term leverage and leverage that can actually produce lasting results. President Biden correctly recognized that U.S. troops could never provide the latter. The Biden administration was also right to encourage robust diplomacy between Afghans. But it fell short by trying to rush fragile negotiations in the hopes that Afghans could reach a peace deal prior to a U.S. withdrawal. Both the Trump and Biden administrations learned that convincing adversaries to talk and walking away with a deal are two very different things.

****

Watch Stephen Wertheim discuss Biden’s first 100 days, in conversation with the New Yorker’s Susan Glasser and FT columnist Gideon Rachman:


Vice President Joe Biden speaks with U.S. and coalition personnel during a visit to an undisclosed location in Southwest Asia, March 7, 2016. Biden’s visit is part of his tour of the Middle East, which began March 7, 2016. (U.S. Air Force photo/Staff Sgt. Kentavist P. Brackin)
Analysis | Washington Politics
POGO The Bunker
Top image credit: Project on Government Oversight

Bombers astray! Washington's priorities go off course

Military Industrial Complex

The Bunker appears originally at the Project on Government Oversight and is republished here with permission.


keep readingShow less
Trump Zelensky
Top photo credit: Joshua Sukoff / Shutterstock.com

Blob exploiting Trump's anger with Putin, risking return to Biden's war

Europe

Donald Trump’s recent outburst against Vladimir Putin — accusing the Russian leader of "throwing a pile of bullsh*t at us" and threatening devastating new sanctions — might be just another Trumpian tantrum.

The president is known for abrupt reversals. Or it could be a bargaining tactic ahead of potential Ukraine peace talks. But there’s a third, more troubling possibility: establishment Republican hawks and neoconservatives, who have been maneuvering to hijack Trump’s “America First” agenda since his return to office, may be exploiting his frustration with Putin to push for a prolonged confrontation with Russia.

Trump’s irritation is understandable. Ukraine has accepted his proposed ceasefire, but Putin has refused, making him, in Trump’s eyes, the main obstacle to ending the war.

Putin’s calculus is clear. As Ted Snider notes in the American Conservative, Russia is winning on the battlefield. In June, it captured more Ukrainian territory and now threatens critical Kyiv’s supply lines. Moscow also seized a key lithium deposit critical to securing Trump’s support for Ukraine. Meanwhile, Russian missile and drone strikes have intensified.

Putin seems convinced his key demands — Ukraine’s neutrality, territorial concessions in the Donbas and Crimea, and a downsized Ukrainian military — are more achievable through war than diplomacy.

Yet his strategy empowers the transatlantic “forever war” faction: leaders in Britain, France, Germany, and the EU, along with hawks in both main U.S. parties. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz claims that diplomacy with Russia is “exhausted.” Europe’s war party, convinced a Russian victory would inevitably lead to an attack on NATO (a suicidal prospect for Moscow), is willing to fight “to the last Ukrainian.” Meanwhile, U.S. hawks, including liberal interventionist Democrats, stoke Trump’s ego, framing failure to stand up to Putin’s defiance as a sign of weakness or appeasement.

Trump long resisted this pressure. Pragmatism told him Ukraine couldn’t win, and calling it “Biden’s war” was his way of distancing himself, seeking a quick exit to refocus on China, which he has depicted as Washington’s greater foreign threat. At least as important, U.S. involvement in the war in Ukraine has been unpopular with his MAGA base.

But his June strikes on Iran may signal a hawkish shift. By touting them as a decisive blow to Iran’s nuclear program (despite Tehran’s refusal so far to abandon uranium enrichment), Trump may be embracing a new approach to dealing with recalcitrant foreign powers: offer a deal, set a deadline, then unleash overwhelming force if rejected. The optics of “success” could tempt him to try something similar with Russia.

This pivot coincides with a media campaign against restraint advocates within the administration like Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon policy chief who has prioritized China over Ukraine and also provoked the opposition of pro-Israel neoconservatives by warning against war with Iran. POLITICO quoted unnamed officials attacking Colby for wanting the U.S. to “do less in the world.” Meanwhile, the conventional Republican hawk Marco Rubio’s influence grows as he combines the jobs of both secretary of state and national security adviser.

What Can Trump Actually Do to Russia?
 

Nuclear deterrence rules out direct military action — even Biden, far more invested in Ukraine than Trump, avoided that risk. Instead, Trump ally Sen.Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), another establishment Republican hawk, is pushing a 500% tariff on nations buying Russian hydrocarbons, aiming to sever Moscow from the global economy. Trump seems supportive, although the move’s feasibility and impact are doubtful.

China and India are key buyers of Russian oil. China alone imports 12.5 million barrels daily. Russia exports seven million barrels daily. China could absorb Russia’s entire output. Beijing has bluntly stated it “cannot afford” a Russian defeat, ensuring Moscow’s economic lifeline remains open.

The U.S., meanwhile, is ill-prepared for a tariff war with China. When Trump imposed 145% tariffs, Beijing retaliated by cutting off rare earth metals exports, vital to U.S. industry and defense. Trump backed down.

At the G-7 summit in Canada last month, the EU proposed lowering price caps on Russian oil from $60 a barrel to $45 a barrel as part of its 18th sanctions package against Russia. Trump rejected the proposal at the time but may be tempted to reconsider, given his suggestion that more sanctions may be needed. Even if Washington backs the measure now, however, it is unlikely to cripple Russia’s war machine.

Another strategy may involve isolating Russia by peeling away Moscow’s traditionally friendly neighbors. Here, Western mediation between Armenia and Azerbaijan isn’t about peace — if it were, pressure would target Baku, which has stalled agreements and threatened renewed war against Armenia. The real goal is to eject Russia from the South Caucasus and create a NATO-aligned energy corridor linking Turkey to Central Asia, bypassing both Russia and Iran to their detriment.

Central Asia itself is itself emerging as a new battleground. In May 2025, the EU has celebrated its first summit with Central Asian nations in Uzbekistan, with a heavy focus on developing the Middle Corridor, a route for transportation of energy and critical raw materials that would bypass Russia. In that context, the EU has committed €10 billion in support of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route.

keep readingShow less
Syria sanctions
Top image credit: People line up to buy bread, after Syria's Bashar al-Assad was ousted, in Douma, on the outskirts of Damascus, Syria December 23, 2024. REUTERS/Zohra Bensemra

Lifting sanctions on Syria exposes their cruel intent

Middle East

On June 30, President Trump signed an executive order terminating the majority of U.S. sanctions on Syria. The move, which would have been unthinkable mere months ago, fulfilled a promise he made at an investment forum in Riyadh in May.“The sanctions were brutal and crippling,” he had declared to an audience of primarily Saudi businessmen. Lifting them, he said, will “give Syria a chance at greatness.”

The significance of this statement lies not solely in the relief that it will bring to the Syrian people. His remarks revealed an implicit but rarely admitted truth: sanctions — often presented as a peaceful alternative to war — have been harming the Syrian people all along.

keep readingShow less

LATEST

QIOSK

Newsletter

Subscribe now to our weekly round-up and don't miss a beat with your favorite RS contributors and reporters, as well as staff analysis, opinion, and news promoting a positive, non-partisan vision of U.S. foreign policy.