In light of the increasing speculation about whether President Biden will withdraw all U.S. troops from Afghanistan, Responsible Statecraft asked Fatemeh Aman, non-resident senior fellow at the Middle East Institute, and writer on Iranian, Afghan, and other Middle Eastern affairs for over 20 years, to answer several questions relevant to the administration's impending decisions. Her response follows:
President Joe Biden has inherited many challenges in the foreign policy field, and Afghanistan is a major one. The Afghanistan war, the longest in U.S. history, will reach its 20th anniversary later this year and there is still little prospect of a feasible solution that leads to a lasting peace.
Much of the complexity of the situation is Afghanistan results from its intricate tribal structure and rivalries in the region. Therefore, a lasting peace may not be possible without active participation of those rival neighbors. The Biden administration is pushing for a solution and its patience, apparent by U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s letter to Afghanistan’s president Ashraf Ghani, is not unlimited.
In his letter, Secretary Blinken’s tone was unmistakably firm: “We are considering the full withdrawal of our forces by May 1, as we consider other options. Even with the continuation of financial assistance from the United States to your forces after an American military withdrawal, I am concerned the security situation will worsen and that the Taliban could make rapid territorial gains.”
He stated the importance of the active involvement of Afghanistan’s neighbors, regional players, and the United Nation-sponsored meeting with foreign ministers of Pakistan, India, Iran, Russia, and China. He also called for a meeting in Turkey between the Afghan government and the Taliban. In addition, Blinken proposed a 90-day reduction-in-violence to prevent the Taliban’s annual spring offensive, and the creation of a transitional government formed by both sides.
Q) How do the government and military (if there is a divergence) in Pakistan think about the U.S. just up and leaving Afghanistan by May 1?
A) Pakistan’s foreign policies, when it comes to Afghanistan and India, have been consistent. The military and the civilian government do not differ in their approaches. Pakistan’s help was essential in bringing the Taliban to the table and signing the U.S.-Taliban “Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan” on February 29, 2020 in Doha. A government in Afghanistan that is friendly to Pakistan is a good outcome for Islamabad.
It remains to be seen, however, how things would change should India become active in the formation of the next Afghan government. Although other participants in the process, China and Turkey, could balance India’s presence,
the truth is that Pakistan’s desire is not the Taliban’s dominance in Afghanistan. A government that does not let Afghanistan become a haven for terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda is somehow a better outcome for Pakistan.
Q) There is the assumption by many Afghans that if Pakistan wanted, the Taliban would lay down their weapons or that the Taliban is Pakistan’s puppet. Is there some truth to that?
A) There are certainly strong links between the Taliban and Pakistan. However, the Taliban is not Pakistan’s puppet. They refused to recognize the Durand line [a 2,430-kilometer border drawn in 1893 by Britain that separates the two countries but cuts through Pashtun tribal and Baluch regions] as the Pakistani-Afghan border when in power in the 1990s, and this, despite multi-dimensional support that the Taliban received from Pakistan.
Also, one should not forget that ousting the Taliban from power in 2001 would have not been possible without Pakistan’s support. That said, it does not mean that Pakistan and others have not pursued the two-fold strategy of supporting some militant groups and fighting others. The countries in the region should have learned by now that extremist proxies do not stay loyal forever and they are difficult to control.
Q) If the neighbors are now reconciled to a delay, what will they want the United States to do between now and another 6 months?
A) I think by now all parties understand that there is no other alternative but to reach a deal. Formation of a new government will be extremely hard and challenging given the fact that rivals need to become partners.
Reminding Ghani’s government of the May 1 deadline was aimed at making him understand the seriousness of the issue. But the question is how to make the Taliban also understand the seriousness of the moment. The notion that the Taliban may keep promises and understand deadlines stems from the impression that the Taliban may have some respect for international law and obligations.
One of the promises the Taliban made in the agreement with Washington, was to sever ties with foreign terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda and deny them any base from which they could carry out attacks on the United States or its allies. However, according to the Department of Treasury, the Taliban and al-Qaeda have “maintained a strong relationship and continued to meet regularly.” Unfortunately, the Taliban has less to lose than the government.
I think what the neighbors desire at this point is for the United States to stay engaged but not dictate. The more participants in the talks, the better. Bringing in Turkey was a good idea since Turkey enjoys good relations with both of Afghanistan’s neighbors. The United Nations institutions could be supported and given more authority. Trying to protect some achievements of civil society in Afghanistan would be a must.
I think by now, all factions and parties in Afghanistan have understood that the United States is not taking the government away from Ghani to give to them. This is a good thing along with the fact that everybody understands that since the Biden administration is not facing challenges, such as election any time soon, its Afghanistan approach won’t be as subject to the fickle winds of domestic political opinion as might otherwise be the case.
Q) Is a situation like Najib’s outcome possible?
A) Back then the government of Muhammed Najibullah Ahmadzai held on to power (mostly in Kabul) until the spring of 1992, three years after the Soviets left. That was in major part due to financial help that his government was receiving from the Soviets. Only weeks after Najib’s government fell, a bloody civil war broke with numerous factions involved.
Today’s situation, despite similarities, is quite different from back then. Back then, almost all opponents perhaps preferred civil war over Soviet occupation. Today, neither Russia nor the United States, or any country, wants a civil war.
Q) How does Iran (and the IRGC, if there is a divergence), view the situation?
A) Iran has had a unified foreign policy with regard to South Asia as a whole and Afghanistan in particular. There is an obvious distinct approach between the Biden administration and the previous one regarding Afghanistan. Iran has noted that, and I think they would participate actively in renewed international negotiations. Things could change once a new conservative IRGC-aligned government comes to power after the June election, as seems likely. We may hear more anti-American slogans, but I don’t expect a dramatic shift in Iran’s policies toward cooperation on Afghan peace talks.
So generally, there has been a unified approach toward Afghanistan. Even after the incident of the Taliban’s attack on the Iranian consulate in Mazar-e-Sharif and killing of diplomats in 1998, when the possibility of a retaliatory raid into Afghanistan was discussed, there was a consensus between the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, reformist president Mohammad Khatami, and the IRGC to avoid a military action.
I’m also actually very cautiously optimistic that if and when Washington and Tehran return to compliance with the nuclear deal and possibly indicate a mutual willingness to engage in follow-on talks, Iran may play a more constructive role in Afghanistan. Indeed, the involvement of both Iran and the United States in these multilateral negotiations could offer a precedent for talks on other regional issues.
Q) Back to the multilateral upcoming meetings on the Afghan peace process, do you think it could be another Bonn-like conference [the Bonn Agreement in 2001 set the foundation for state-building efforts in Afghanistan]?
A) Not really. Back then there was enthusiasm to rebuild Afghanistan. The Taliban had been ousted, and a new government was being formed. There was international interest in preventing the Taliban from coming back to power. This time, it is more a desperate last resort. There is no doubt that leaving Afghanistan and letting the government deal with the Taliban, could result in the group’s return to power. The Taliban is now an important part of the game and cannot be ignored. Back then there was excitement to rebuild the country and even make it a successful model for conflict-torn places around the world. This time it is not and there is no consensus among parties. A positive factor, however, is that Iran is included in the talks, in contrast with the Trump administration’s approach of excluding Iran, and Iran has helped in the past.
Fatemeh Aman is a non-resident senior fellow at the Middle East Institute.
Afghan Nation Army soldiers assigned to 1st Kandak, 2nd Brigade, 203rd Corps, stationed at Afghan National Army Base, Khair Kut Garrison, Paktika Province, Afghanistan, move through the village of Panagir, May 22, 2013. (Photo by U.S. Army Sgt. Mark A. Moore II - 2/10 Security Forces Assistance Brigade)
Somali National Army soldiers march during the 57th Anniversary of the Somali National Army held at the Ministry of defence in Mogadishu on April 12, 2017. AMISOM Photo / Ilyas Ahmed. Original public domain image from Flickr
On February 15, the U.S. government signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the government of Somalia to construct up to five military bases for the Somali National Army in the name of bolstering the army’s capabilities in the ongoing fight against the militant group al-Shabaab.
This is a troubling development that not only risks further militarizing Somalia and perpetuating endless war, but comes with the potential of exacerbating geopolitical rivalries at the expense of the needs and interests of ordinary Somalis.
According to statements by U.S. officials, the bases are intended for the Danab (“Lightning”) Brigade, a U.S.-sponsored Special Ops Force that was established in 2014. Funding for Danab initially came from the U.S. State Department, which contracted the private security firm Bancroft Global to train and advise the unit. More recently, Danab has received funding, equipment, and training from the Department of Defense.
U.S. support is made possible by the 127e program, a U.S. budgetary authority that allows the Pentagon to bypass congressional oversight by allowing U.S. special operations forces to use foreign military units as surrogates in counterterrorism missions. The Intercept has documented similar 127e operations in multiple African countries, primarily in locations that the U.S. government does not recognize as combat zones, but in which AFRICOM troops are present on the ground.
But this MoU is about much more than the U.S. government’s proclaimed commitment to help Somalia defeat al-Shabaab. It is a clear indication of the growing geopolitical significance of the Horn of Africa, and comes at a time of mounting concerns (mostly attempts by Yemen’s Houthis to disrupt global shipping in solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza) about securing the flow of international commerce via the Red Sea. It also coincides with a growing awareness that rising tensions in the Middle East could force the U.S. out of Iraq.
The U.S. government’s plan to train Somali security forces at newly-established military bases in five different parts of the country (Baidoa, Dhusamareb, Jowhar, Kismayo, and Mogadishu) is a back-door strategy not only to expand the U.S. military’s presence in Somalia, but to position itself more assertively vis-à-vis other powers in the region. Indeed, the 127e program is not the only policy that allows for the training and equipping of foreign forces as proxies: section 1202 of the 2018 National Defense Authorization Act further expands the ability of the U.S. to wage war via surrogate forces in places where it has not formally declared war, with the broader objective of countering the influence of adversaries like China and Russia.
While much ink has been spilled attempting to analyze great power competition on the continent, we have yet to adequately scrutinize the growing influence of middle powers like Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar who are each attempting to negotiate their own sphere of influence, and whose involvement in the Horn points to uncertain, if not waning, U.S. power.
Turkey maintains its largest foreign military presence in Mogadishu, has trained Somali security forces, and more recently has worked closely with the Somali government in conducting drone strikes against Al-Shabaab. Further underlining deepening Turkish engagement in the country, Somalia and Turkey signed defense and economic agreements earlier this month. Qatar and the United Arab Emirates have trained, and continue to train, local security forces as part of a broader strategy to secure access to regional markets and to assert their control over vital shipping lanes in the Red Sea.
With the drawdown of the African Union sponsored “peacekeeping” mission — previously known as AMISOM but renamed ATMIS in 2022 — analysts have expressed apprehension about the expansive nature of foreign actor involvement in Somalia and the risk of Cold War-style competition fueling instability. Indeed, the foreign-sponsored training of multiple “elite” contingents of the Somali National Army (Danab, Waran, Gashaan) has prompted internal divisions within the security establishment in Somalia as it raises chain of command issues and questions about the loyalty of these units.
As Colin D. Robinson and Jahara Matisek, both regional and military experts, have said, “The only thing worse is that various Somali units become more loyal and dependent on their foreign patron, short-circuiting the political logic of having security forces that look more like hired proxies than locally organized for self-defense. This may contribute to the growing perception of Somalia becoming a hyper-competitive arena; a republic of militias if you will.”
Equally significant is the recently announced Memorandum of Understanding between Ethiopia and Somaliland, a separatist region in northwestern Somalia. According to the terms of this yet-to-be signed agreement, in exchange for Somaliland granting 20km of much coveted sea access for the Ethiopian Navy for a period of 50 years, Ethiopia would formally recognize the Republic of Somaliland as an independent nation. The MoU has elicited a wave of anger among Somalis who view Ethiopia as meddling in their internal affairs — and it is precisely this history of meddling that has in the past contributed to al-Shabaab’s support base as it positions itself as the defender of Somali nationalism and autonomy.
While the U.S. State Department called for respect for Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and urged dialogue in response to the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU in the name of de-escalating tensions in the region, the February 15 announcement that the U.S. intends to ramp up its involvement in Somalia is hardly an indication of a neutral stance. Rather, it is an indication of U.S. positioning in an increasingly militarized jockeying by foreign powers in this strategic but troubled country and region.
In Mogadishu, many Somalis are welcoming the U.S. announcement, perhaps in some cases hoping for job opportunities, and in others viewing the U.S. military support and presence as a potential buffer against Ethiopia. But if the past several decades of U.S. mis-adventures in Somalia are any indication, expanding U.S. involvement risks perpetuating rather than minimizing further conflict.
keep readingShow less
SOUTH CHINA SEA (Feb. 9, 2021) The Theodore Roosevelt and Nimitz Carrier Strike Groups steam in formation on scheduled deployments to the 7th Fleet area of operations. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Elliot Schaudt/Released)
The U.S. will have almost half of its aircraft carriers deployed in the Pacific in the coming weeks.
The South China Morning Post reported on February 14 that five of America’s 11 aircraft carriers would all likely soon be deployed there at the same time. Two of the carriers, the USS Carl Vinson and USS Theodore Roosevelt have been participating in a military exercise with Japan in the Philippine Sea, the USS Ronald Reagan is in port at Yokosuka, the USS Abraham Lincoln departed San Diego earlier this month, and the USS George Washington is expected to relieve the Reagan in a few weeks.
This is an unusual concentration of America’s naval power in one region at once, and it is being widely interpreted as a show of force meant for China and North Korea.
The Biden administration has made a point of making more shows of force in East Asia over the last year to reassure Asian allies that the U.S. has not forgotten about them. That isn’t surprising given the importance that the administration attaches to the “Indo-Pacific” and an active U.S. role in it, but in doing this it may also be contributing to increasing tensions with both Beijing and Pyongyang. We have already seen some of this in the back-and-forth between the U.S. and North Korea since last summer as North Korea has answered U.S. naval deployments to South Korea with additional missile tests and more bellicose rhetoric.
While these carrier deployments are presumably intended to signal American resolve and commitment to its regional allies, they could easily encourage China and North Korea to engage in their own reciprocal demonstrations of strength. They are also a reminder that the U.S. approach to East Asia is still very much a “military-first” approach that gives short shrift and devotes relatively few resources to economic statecraft and diplomacy. International relations scholar Van Jackson warned about the dangers of this approach more than two years ago, and since then the U.S. has only ramped up its military spending and deployments.
Because Washington’s attention has been focused so intently for the last four months on the war in Gaza and the other conflicts in the Middle East connected to it, it seems that the administration wants to show that it isn’t neglecting East Asia. The carrier deployments in the Pacific appear to be an attempt to “make up” for the continued massive over-investment of energy and resources in the Middle East.
The show of force may satisfy some allied governments, but it could also confirm the impression in both friendly and hostile capitals that the U.S. is overstretched and trying to take on too many tasks at the same time. The habit of reassuring allies so frequently has its own costs, including encouraging greater allied dependence, and when it is done too often it can have destabilizing effects on the wider region.
One of the principle weaknesses of U.S. foreign policy in East Asia is an overreliance on military deterrence. This tends to ratchet up tensions more than necessary and undermines credible assurances to adversaries. The U.S. excels at reassuring allies with its displays of military power, but because it often fails to strike a balance by giving adversaries assurances about its intentions, our government can feed the fears of Chinese and North Korean leaders and encourage them to assume the worst about what the U.S. is doing.
The carrier deployments suggest that the administration doesn’t understand the need for balancing deterrence and assurance. Failing to balance the two risks making conflict based on a miscalculation more likely. As the Quincy Institute’s Michael Swaine recently wrote about U.S. deterrence and Taiwan, “This balance is essential because, if the level of punishment or denial capability acquired is in fact seen as threatening the adversary’s most vital interests, the adversary, rather than being deterred from taking aggressive action, will become more inclined to undertake or threaten preemptive or punishing moves of its own in order to protect those interests, thus increasing, rather than decreasing, the chance of conflict.”
By relying so much on shows of force designed to intimidate China, the Biden administration increases the risk of a crisis.
The potential danger with North Korea is arguably even greater, since the North Korean government has a long history of responding to U.S. and allied pressure with its own provocations and threats. To the extent that Pyongyang perceives the deployment of so many carriers to the Pacific as directed even partly at North Korea, Kim Jong-un may conclude that he needs to show off his country’s own capabilities with additional missile tests and possibly even a new nuclear test.
Last year, North Korea reacted very angrily to the arrival of the USS Ronald Reagan in Busan, so it seems reasonable to expect an even harsher response if there are multiple carriers in the vicinity. Given the increasingly hostile rhetoric already coming from Pyongyang in the last few months, it would not take much for a new standoff between the U.S. and North Korea to begin.
The U.S. can ill afford a new crisis in East Asia on top of the other conflicts that it is involved in, but its overly militarized approach to the region is not the way to avoid it. If Washington wants to make conflicts in East Asia less likely, it will need to do a much better job of understanding its adversaries’ thinking and of offering them assurances that they can believe. Right now, the U.S. is doing far too little of both, and that is making the U.S. and its allies less secure than they could be.
keep readingShow less
Left-to-right: Senator-elect Ted Budd (R-N.C.); Senator Mitch McConnell (R-KY), the Senate Minority Leader; Senator-elect Katie Britt (R-AL); and Senator-elect J.D. Vance (R-OH) pose for a photo before meeting in Leader McConnell’s office, at the U.S. Capitol, in Washington, D.C., on Tuesday, November 15, 2022. (Graeme Sloan/Sipa USA)
The so-called GOP “civil war” over the role the United States should play in the world made headlines earlier this week when the Senate finally passed a national security supplemental that provides $60 billion in aid for Ukraine and $14 billion for Israel.
The legislation, which was supported by President Joe Biden and the overwhelming majority of the Senate’s Democratic caucus, proved more controversial among Republicans. Twenty-two GOP Senators voted in favor of the legislation, while 27 opposed it.
An analysis of the votes shows an interesting generational divide within the Republican caucus.
Each of the five oldest Republicans in the Senate — and nine of the ten oldest — voted in favor of the supplemental spending package. Conversely, the six youngest senators, and 12 of the 14 youngest, opposed it.
Equally striking was the breakdown of votes among Republicans based on when they assumed their current office. Of the 49 sitting GOP Senators, 30 were elected before Donald Trump first became the party’s presidential candidate in 2016. Eighteen of those 30 supported the aid legislation. Of the members who came to office in 2017 or later, only four voted to advance the bill, while 15 voted against.
The difference in votes among those elected since 2016 is likely partly attributable to Trump’s unconventional approach to foreign policy. The Republican party establishment during the Cold War and Global War on Terror is often associated with hawkishness, including towards Russia. While the party has always carried some skepticism toward foreign aid, some of the most significant spending increases have taken place during the presidencies of Republicans Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush.
Trump, however, won in 2016 in part for his open disdain for mission creep after the GWOT, what he called the failed war in Iraq, and foreign aid he believed made countries dependents rather than reciprocal partners and allies.
“[Trump] certainly created the cognitive space,” Brandan Buck, a U.S. Army veteran and historian of GOP foreign policy, tells RS. “He's more of an intuitive thinker than a person of principle, but I think him being on the scene, prying open the Overton window has allowed for a greater array of dissenting voices.”
Others have argued that the trends are perhaps also indicative of the loyalty that Republicans who assumed their offices during the Trump presidency feel toward him. Trump spoke out forcefully against the legislation in advance of the vote.
“WE SHOULD NEVER GIVE MONEY ANYMORE WITHOUT THE HOPE OF A PAYBACK, OR WITHOUT “STRINGS” ATTACHED. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA SHOULD BE “STUPID” NO LONGER!,” the former president wrote on the social media platform Truth Social the weekend before the vote.
The vote cannot only be explained by ideology, as some typically hawkish allies of Trump, like Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) ultimately voted against the package. Graham is a staunch supporter of Israel, has voted for previous Ukraine aid packages, and in the past called aid for Ukraine “a good investment” and “the best money we’ve ever spent.” By the time the vote on the most recent spending package came around, Graham was lamenting the lack of border security provisions and echoing Trump’s argument that aid to Ukraine should be a “loan.”
Meanwhile, Senators took note of the generational gap, and the debate spilled over into the public. .
“Nearly every Republican Senator under the age of 55 voted NO on this America Last bill,” wrote Sen. Eric Schmitt (R-Mo.), 48, on the social media platform X. “Things are changing just not fast enough.” Schmitt was elected in 2022.
“Youthful naivety is bliss, the wisdom of age may save the west,” retorted Sen. Kevin Cramer (R-N.D.) “Reagan may be dead, but his doctrine saved the world during less dangerous times than these. If the modern Marx (Putin for the youngsters) restores the USSR while we pretend it’s not our problem, God help us.” Cramer, 63, was sworn in in 2019, making him one of the handful of recently elected senators to support the aid legislation.
“I like Kevin, but come on, man, have some self-awareness,” Sen. J.D. Vance fired back. “This moment calls out for many things, but boomer neoconservatism is not among them.”
Vance, who at 39 is the youngest Republican member of the Senate, noted in his post that “the fruits of this generation in American leadership is: quagmire in Afghanistan, war in Iraq under false pretenses.” He said younger Americans were disillusioned with that track record.
Buck, who served several tours in the Afghanistan war, and whose research includes generational trends in U.S. foreign policy thinking, pointed out that there is strong historical precedent for believing that age and generation affect how members of Congress view America’s role in the world.
“It's certainly not unusual for there to be generational trends in foreign policy thinking, especially within the Republican Party,” Buck told RS. Following the end of World War II, he said, it took “a full churning” of the conservative movement to replace old-school non-interventionist Republicans and to get the party in line with the Cold War consensus. “I think what we're seeing now is something similar but in reverse with a generation of conservatives.”
He added that the failures of the War on Terror resulted in a deep skepticism of the national security state and the Republican party establishment. Opinion polling and trends show that the American public that grew up either during or in the shadow of the disastrous military campaigns in the Greater Middle East is generally opposed to military intervention and more questioning of American institutions.
“All the energy on FP [foreign policy] in the GOP right now is with the younger generation that wants fundamental transformation of USFP [U.S. foreign policy],” noted Justin Logan, director of defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, on X. “The self-satisfied, insular neocons who loathe their voters’ FP views are a dying breed.”