Follow us on social

google cta
Shutterstock_1764276692-scaled

How the UAE has used the 'war on terror' to crack down on its people for nine years

The Emirates have managed to frame suppression of domestic dissent as counterterrorism, and the U.S. says nothing.

Analysis | Middle East
google cta
google cta

As democratic uprisings spread like wildfire across the Middle East in 2011 and 2012, the United Arab Emirates experienced its own milder form of the Arab Spring.

Secular intellectuals and Islamist groups joined together in March 2011 to craft a petition for greater political representation in Emirati politics. After witnessing the fall of regimes across the region, Abu Dhabi responded by conducting the largest crackdown in Emirati history — arresting, jailing, banning, and exiling practically all involved parties. After the crackdown, the monarchical regime  framed the incident as a state initiative to quell violent extremism and to prevent terrorism from infiltrating its borders. 

The episode illustrates how the UAE has managed to frame its suppression of domestic dissent and its interventionist military campaigns as counterterrorism initiatives, feeding the international community a distorted  image of its participation in the so-called “ war on terror.” 

Washington  is eating it up. Despite Abu Dhabi’s increasingly politically repressive behavior, the United States continues to provide a broad range of security and political support to the UAE, demonstrating an  inherent support of its actions. As the Trump administration moves closer towards selling 50 F-35 fighter jets to the UAE following its cooperation in the Abraham Accords, U.S. regulators should be cognizant of Abu Dhabi’s motivations and role in regional security.

The UAE’s  perception of political dissent as a threat to the regime strongly influences its national security agenda. Criticism of the regime stems from a range of domestic democratic voices and academics, and human rights advocates around the world.. In particular, this stream of dissent is popular with marginalized Emiratis due to its emphasis on faith and criticism of Gulf social policies.

In 2011, the opposition, which was composed of both religious and secular academic leaders, signaled to the regime that the threat of democratic forces was growing too strong, and Abu Dhabi was losing its grip over the national consensus. In the government’s eyes, if left unchecked, political dissent could unravel the very fabric of the regime.

The United States’ emphasis on the “war on terror” enabled a convenient justification for Abu Dhabi to pursue domestic political repression. Citizens have privately accused the government of monitoring private communications and organizations under the guise of state protection from terrorism. International human rights defenders have documented unethical detention and corrupt court practices, some of which have landed political figures in prison for decades. Yet, there has been little outrage from the United States because the UAE claims to abide by the U.S. national security priority of “defeating” violent extremism..

The UAE also aligns its interventionist campaigns with U.S. counterterrorism initiatives in the region, which has enabled it to pursue its authoritarian policies on a regional scale. Abu Dhabi has supported military campaigns in favor of like-minded regimes in Yemen, Somalia, and Libya, in efforts to curb the development of political groups that reflect the views of anti-government entities within the Emirates. Critics have noted that Emirati military campaigns to ostensibly counter extremist groups have resulted in serious human rights violations and war crimes. But yet again, as long as Abu Dhabi cites counterterrorism as its objective, they can indiscriminately conduct warfare with little U.S. objection.

As the Emirates  progressively become more involved in regional and global initiatives, it reinforces its security alliance with Washington. In a sense, the U.S. does not contest Abu Dhabi’s agenda because it mirrors its own indiscriminate militarism in the region, as critiqued through this Center for International Policy report of U.S. arms sales. 

The nature of Washington’s security relationship with the UAE should come under even greater scrutiny as the Trump administration draws even closer to Abu Dhabi in the wake of the UAE’s unprecedented diplomatic agreement with Israel. While discussing the newly formalized diplomatic relations, President Trump has praised Abu Dhabi’s deepened involvement in the region as a pivotal moment for peace and stability in the Middle East. But at what cost? The agreement risks cementing  America’s  security relationship with Abu Dhabi without addressing its efforts to preserve the regional status quo.

U.S. lawmakers and officials should reflect on the monarchy’s political repression in the context of U.S. policy in the Middle East, to ensure that the U.S. does not also misconduct counterterrorism and execute terror instead.

Sydney Boer is a Researcher at the Center for International Policy’s (CIP) Security Assistance Monitor.


(Jeff Kingma/Shutterstock)
google cta
Analysis | Middle East
Trump corollory
Top image credit: President Donald Trump holds a cabinet meeting, Tuesday, December 2, 2025, in the Cabinet Room of the White House. (Official White House Photo by Daniel Torok)

Trump's 'Monroe Doctrine 2.0' completely misreads Latin America

Latin America

The “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, “a common-sense and potent restoration of American power and priorities, consistent with American security interests,” stating that “the American people—not foreign nations nor globalist institutions—will always control their own destiny in our hemisphere,” is a key component of the National Security Strategy 2025 released last week by the Trump administration.

Putting the Western Hemisphere front and center as a U.S. foreign policy priority marks a significant shift from the “pivot to Asia” launched in President Obama’s first term.

keep readingShow less
'In Trump we trust': Arab states frustrated with stalled Gaza plan
Top image credit: (L to R) Comfort Ero, CEO & President of the International Crisis Group, Moderator, Jose Manuel Albares, Minister of Foreign Affairs, European Union, and Cooperation of Spain, Badr Abdelatty, Foreign Minister of Egypt, Espen Barth Eide, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Norway, and Manal Radwan, Minister Plenipotentiary, Cabinet of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia, take part in a panel discussion during the 23rd edition of the Doha Forum 2025 at the Sheraton Grand Doha Resort & Convention Hotel in Doha, Qatar, on December 6, 2025. (Photo by Noushad Thekkayil/NurPhoto via REUTERS CONNECT

'In Trump we trust': Arab states frustrated with stalled Gaza plan

Middle East

Hamas and Israel are reportedly moving toward negotiating a "phase two" of the U.S.-lead ceasefire but it is clear that so many obstacles are in the way, particularly the news that Israel is already calling the "yellow line" used during the ceasefire to demarcate its remaining military occupation of the Gaza Strip the "new border."

“We have operational control over extensive parts of the Gaza Strip, and we will remain on those defence lines,” said Israeli military chief Lieutenant General Eyal Zamir on Sunday. “The yellow line is a new border line, serving as a forward defensive line for our communities and a line of operational activity.”

keep readingShow less
‘This ain’t gonna work’: How Russia pulled the plug on Assad
Top Image Credit: Syrian President Bashar al-Assad (Harold Escalona / Shutterstock.com)

‘This ain’t gonna work’: How Russia pulled the plug on Assad

Middle East

In early November of last year, the Assad regime had a lot to look forward to. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad had just joined fellow Middle Eastern leaders at a pan-Islamic summit in Saudi Arabia, marking a major step in his return to the international fold. After the event, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who had spent years trying to oust Assad, told reporters that he hoped to meet with the Syrian leader and “put Turkish-Syrian relations back on track.”

Less than a month later, Assad fled the country in a Russian plane as Turkish-backed opposition forces began their final approach to Damascus. Most observers were taken aback by this development. But long-time Middle East analyst Neil Partrick was less surprised. As Partrick details in his new book, “State Failure in the Middle East,” the seemingly resurgent Assad regime had by that point been reduced to a hollowed-out state apparatus, propped up by foreign backers. When those backers pulled out, Assad was left with little choice but to flee.

keep readingShow less
google cta
Want more of our stories on Google?
Click here to make us a Preferred Source.

LATEST

QIOSK

Newsletter

Subscribe now to our weekly round-up and don't miss a beat with your favorite RS contributors and reporters, as well as staff analysis, opinion, and news promoting a positive, non-partisan vision of U.S. foreign policy.