Restraint: A post-COVID-19 U.S. national security strategy
The response to the COVID-19 pandemic has weakened the U.S. economy, the foundation of its national power. This has implications for U.S. foreign policy.
Health and economic fallout from COVID-19 makes setting realistic defense priorities more urgent
The response to the coronavirus global pandemic has severely weakened the U.S. economy, the foundation of national power. This reality has vast implications for U.S. foreign policy.
Two economic factors suggest narrowing U.S. foreign policy objectives: (1) U.S. GDP and tax revenue will shrink in 2020, with no certainty about when they might recover. (2) Record deficits and debt endanger future economic growth.
Political reasons for foreign policy restraint augment those economic factors: The public increasingly perceives non-security risks are paramount, and priority will go to domestic spending that aids recovery and increases domestic institutional resilience.
Federal discretionary spending will bear a greater burden because mandatory spending programs are politically harder to cut. Since defense accounts for nearly half of discretionary spending, DoD will likely face sustained cuts.
The U.S. enjoys a favorable geostrategic position with abundant protection from rivals, so it can cut defense spending without compromising security. Indeed, ending peripheral commitments in favor of core security interests strengthens the U.S.
Ending policies bringing failure, overstretch, and drained coffers always made sense—coronavirus makes the case more urgent.
U.S. federal budget authority by category (FY 2019)
[caption id="" align="alignnone" width="2284"] Declining GDP and tax revenue and increased domestic spending post-COVID-19 will put downward pressure on DoD budgets.[/caption]
Abandon peripheral missions abroad and focus on core U.S. security and prosperity
As the pandemic demonstrates, non-military threats can be far more detrimental to Americans’ well-being than the non-state actors, rogue states, and authoritarian regimes that dominate military planning and drive DoD spending.
The decades-long pursuit of overly ambitious foreign policy goals disconnected from U.S. security contributed to the neglect of U.S. domestic institutions exposed by the coronavirus pandemic.
Recovering requires investment at home: education, health care, infrastructure, research and development, and policies that promote innovation and job creation.
For the past 20 years, the U.S. spent roughly $1 trillion annually on defense-related objectives (DoD, veteran’s care, homeland security, nuclear weapons, diplomacy) while domestic infrastructure in critical industries went under-resourced.
Rebalancing defense priorities to focus more on economic prosperity and public health will enhance U.S. power in the long term.
Middle East: Reduce overinvestment and military presence, which has backfired and weakened the U.S.
Core Middle East interests are (1) preventing significant disruptions to global oil supply and (2) defending against anti-U.S. terror threats. The former requires minimal U.S. effort; the latter requires intelligence, cooperation, and limited strikes, not occupations.
The Middle East accounts for just 4 percent of global GDP, yet for decades, the U.S. has attempted to reshape the region through military force, disrupting the regional balance of power, exacerbating political instability, and allowing terrorist groups to flourish.
Today, the U.S. has 62,000 troops in the region, many of them vulnerable to attacks by local militias. The U.S. is also fighting wars in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, largely based on exaggerated fears of Iran, a middling power contained by its local rivals.
The U.S. will be able to fund part of its coronavirus recovery by ending its participation in conflicts in the Middle East and nearby areas, such as Afghanistan and Somalia. This would free up tens of billions of dollars annually for higher priorities.
Additional savings can be had by focusing the Pentagon on its core warfighting missions and right-sizing force structure—reducing ground forces in particular, which have been swollen by these commitments.
The U.S., Europe, and Asia account for 81 percent of global GDP
[caption id="" align="alignnone" width="2280"] The U.S., Europe, and East Asia are the hubs of the global economy, making them more important to U.S. security and prosperity than the Middle East.[/caption]
Europe: Shift security burdens to wealthy allies
The U.S. has strong economic and diplomatic interests in Europe, but the continent faces limited direct military threats. Despite the fall of the USSR, the U.S. maintains a heavy military footprint in Europe in the name of securing wealthy, relatively safe allies.
This arrangement served U.S. interests when a big U.S. military presence in Europe balanced the USSR’s military might while enabling allies to recover economically and unify.
As allies grew rich and the USSR collapsed, a sensible balancing policy became a subsidy that let wealthy allies “cheap ride” on U.S. taxpayers, driving excess DoD spending while subsidizing lavish social welfare programs for European nations.
Russia is a declining power (with a large nuclear arsenal). The EU dominates Russia in important metrics of national power: 3½:1 population, 11:1 GDP, and 5:1 military spending. European economies are also more dynamic than Russia’s.
Instead of jawboning allies for shirking their obligations, U.S. policy should shift the security burden onto them by (1) ending the European Defense Initiative and (2) implementing a responsible draw down of U.S. ground and nuclear forces on the continent.
This would not only free up finite U.S. resources for higher priorities at home or in Asia, but also encourage European allies to revitalize their militaries: increasing spending, prioritizing modernization, or increasing military cooperation with each other.
Asia: Fortify Asian allies with A2/AD capabilities to deter Chinese aggression at less risk
U.S. policy toward China—the only conceivable strategic competitor—balances several key interests: deterring Chinese territorial expansion against Asian allies, avoiding war, and ensuring a fair and beneficial trading relationship.
Efforts to balance against China should therefore be based on core U.S. interests and carefully designed and planned to reduce cost, minimize escalation risks, and protect trade.
U.S. goals in Asia are inherently defensive (to preserve the territorial status quo) and are best served by a military approach of “defensive defense”: an operational concept that limits U.S. costs by encouraging allies to develop their defensive capabilities.
By improving anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities—a network of sensors and missiles—U.S. allies can deter Chinese attacks more effectively and cheaply than via investment in aircraft and surface ships that mimic U.S. capabilities.
Allied defensive capability is less threatening to China than U.S. offensive capability. Reducing the perceived threat of direct attacks, A2/AD is less prone to spark costly, counterproductive arms racing.
Pressing allies to adopt this approach will allow the U.S. to jettison escalatory plans to defend them by attacking the Chinese mainland, lowering tensions and risks of a broader war with China and allowing for cost saving on U.S. forces in Asia.
U.S. force structure: Constrained DoD budgets means more tradeoffs and rebalancing among the services
With the world’s most sophisticated nuclear arsenal, large oceans separating it from rivals, and weak neighbors, the U.S. has a unique advantage over every other nation—security is abundant and cheap.
The U.S. accounts for 40 percent of global military spending—treaty allies account for 22 percent; Russia and China account for 17 percent. The 2020 DoD budget ($757 billion) exceeds Cold War highs in real terms, reflecting a false sense of insecurity.
Reduced DoD budgets can force debate and prioritization among programs and services—between what contributes to U.S. security and what is peripheral or even counterproductive—that large spending authorizations prevent.
Geography makes the U.S. a natural naval power and trading nation. Distance from other major states means the U.S. is perceived as less threatening—unlike China, which borders other Eurasia powers.
The Navy is the key service for projecting U.S. power globally and defending commerce if necessary while avoiding costly occupations. The Navy should command a larger portion of DoD’s reduced budget.
With no nation building and a large reservist pool, the U.S. can reduce Army, Marines, and special operations forces end strength.
Mission-driven reductions to force structure generate savings on personnel and procurement, enabling savings on operational costs, administrative overhead, basing, and other support functions.
U.S. military spending compared to allies and competitors
[caption id="" align="alignnone" width="2284"] Total U.S. military spending vs. the rest of the world[/caption]
No major or regional powers are unscathed by the pandemic—strategic thinking will determine who comes out stronger
The pandemic has hit all major powers hard, including U.S. adversaries; the economic pain is well distributed.
China announced its GDP contracted at 6.8 percent in the first quarter of 2020, the first decline since 1976. The CCP relies on steady economic growth for legitimacy, and in a nation with almost no social safety net, job losses could breed discontent.
While earning some goodwill, China’s efforts to help afflicted nations are an attempt to mitigate the reputational damage from its early obfuscation of the outbreak, which led to the global pandemic. Businesses are also taking steps to limit their China exposure.
Record low oil prices could see Russia’s GDP fall by as much as 15 percent this year, resulting in more pressure to limit its military spending and interventions in places such as Ukraine and Syria.
Iran has been crippled by the virus. Infection has killed several of its senior leaders, and the collapse in oil prices has damaged its already shrinking economy, making this middling power even weaker.
Strong fundamentals undergird U.S. power: favorable geography; a technologically advanced society with a skilled, innovative workforce; and abundant natural resources. Post-COVID rebuilding will require focusing on these strengths to restart the economy.
The U.S. grew to become the global superpower by virtue of its productive economy; advanced technology, including nuclear weapons; and skillful diplomacy.
The pursuit of liberal hegemony—militarized democracy spreading fueled by threat exaggeration and hubris—has resulted in strategic failure, military overstretch, and a hollowing out of U.S. internal strength.
The coronavirus pandemic has exposed the extent to which U.S. power has been squandered. To recover its strength, U.S. should focus on the core elements of national power while avoiding excessive military projects and the overspending that entails.
The budgetary demands to recover from this pandemic will be enormous, but the fundamental sources of U.S. security are robust—and insensitive to mild deviations in military activities and spending.
Coronavirus is a terrible tragedy but nonetheless an opportunity to shed illusions and rebuild the real pillars of national strength for the long haul.
As long as U.S. focuses on its prosperity—rather than peripheral distractions—it will grow stronger at home and retain the ability to marshal the resources necessary for competition with any adversary.
This article has been republished with permission from Defense Priorities.
Benjamin H. Friedman is Policy Director at Defense Priorities and an adjunct lecturer at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs. Previously, he served as Research Fellow in Defense and Homeland Security Studies at the Cato Institute.
Laura Loomer has never been subtle about her support for Israel. Just a few months ago, she described the diminutive state as a “wall protecting the U.S. from mass Islamic invasion.” So it came as something of a surprise last week when, seemingly out of nowhere, Loomer called for the U.S. to end all aid to Israel.
But her logic is fairly straightforward. “Cut the US aid, and Israel becomes fully sovereign,” she wrote on X. In Loomer’s view, the financial support amounts to “golden handcuffs” — a needless restriction on Israeli actions that also acts as a “constant source of agitation” in the U.S. “America First means liberation from being a global baby sitter,” she argued. “Once the aid to Israel ends, the Pentagon’s leash comes off.”
A few days later, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu hinted that he agreed with Loomer’s assessment. Asked if he would support an end to aid, Netanyahu argued that “it’s time to assure that Israel is independent.”
“I want to make our arms industry independent, totally as independent as possible,” he said. “My direction is greater independence, and I'll have something to say about that very soon.”
The shift in language among some Israeli officials and their allies comes at a potential turning point in U.S.-Israel relations. The American public has in recent years grown far more skeptical of U.S. aid to Israel, which currently amounts to $3.8 billion annually, in addition to roughly $9 billion in emergency funding since Oct. 7. In fact, a plurality of Americans now say it’s time to turn off the spigot. Some oppose the aid on humanitarian grounds, while others argue that it clashes with the America First ethos now dominant on the right. These voices are rapidly becoming too loud for political elites to ignore.
To better understand these changes, RS spoke to a range of experts on the U.S.-Israel relationship. All agreed that there are significant obstacles to cutting off U.S. aid to Israel. But they also agreed that an eventual end to the aid has become inevitable. The question remaining is when, exactly, that moment will come.
Adding to the urgency of this discussion is the fact that the U.S. and Israel are now in talks about a new long-term military aid package, with the previous one set to expire in 2028. Scattered reports indicate that Netanyahu, despite all his talk about independence, may try to use the opportunity to lock in American aid for another 20 years. But there is also a real possibility that such a deal could be the final U.S. commitment to funding Israel’s military.
Netanyahu and his allies “understand that this is an issue for the political class in the U.S.,” said Khaled Elgindy, a former adviser to the Palestinian Authority and a senior fellow at the Quincy Institute, which publishes RS. “Maybe they see the writing on the wall and they say, ‘We got to get out ahead of this, and we'll do it on our terms. We'll phase it out.’”
Slouching toward a ‘clean break’
It’s probably safe to say that, these days, most advocates of cutting off aid to Israel are motivated by anger at Israeli policies in Gaza. But skepticism toward aid has never been limited to Israel’s critics.
Back in 1996, a now-defunct Israeli think tank with close ties to pro-Israel analysts in the United States carried out a study group to provide advice to Netanyahu, then serving in his first stint as prime minister. The resulting policy paper argued that Israel must make a “clean break” from the past and reorient its relationship with the U.S. toward “self-reliance, maturity and mutuality.” Like Loomer today, the study group argued that this shift would “grant Israel greater freedom of action and remove a significant lever of pressure used against it in the past.”
The report recommended an end to U.S. economic aid to Israel, though it stopped short of suggesting an end to military aid. And Netanyahu largely took this advice. Just a month after the paper was written, Netanyahu told Congress that Israel would “begin the long-term process of gradually reducing the level of your generous economic assistance to Israel” — a process that was complete by 2007.
Military aid has always been more sensitive given Israel’s intense sense of threat. But that taboo has broken down in recent years as tensions have grown in the U.S.-Israel relationship. And this process began even before Oct. 7.
Back in mid-2023, a wide range of pro-Israel writers and politicians debated the future of aid in a special collection for Tablet Magazine, a right-wing American outlet that has often expressed support for Netanyahu and his Likud Party. The primary argument for getting rid of aid boiled down to one phrase: freedom of action.
In the view of many pro-Israel analysts, the aid provided an excuse for the U.S. to interfere in Israeli decision-making and relegated Israel to a sort of junior partner status. While politicians like Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Texas) and Rep. Ritchie Torres (D-N.Y.) balked at the idea of ending the aid, some analysts argued that the change would also redound to the benefit of the U.S.
One such analyst was Raphael BenLevi, a senior fellow at the Misgav Institute for National Security in Jerusalem. Citing the work of Elbridge Colby, who now holds an influential position at the Pentagon, BenLevi wrote that “it is increasingly difficult for Washington to justify spending a disproportionate share of military aid and political capital in the Middle East when its greatest security challenges are elsewhere.”
BenLevi believes that arguments for ending aid have only gotten stronger in the past two years. “Israel has done a lot to improve its security environment,” he told RS. It will be easier for Israel to consolidate its victories against Hezbollah and Iran, BenLevi argued, if it has more freedom to act against them. (In this sense, removing the aid could wind up hurting Israel’s critics rather than helping their cause, especially given that the U.S. would almost certainly continue selling weapons to Israel.)
Support for ending aid has even gained currency among long-time practitioners in Washington. Aaron David Miller, who spent 15 years working on Israeli-Palestinian issues at the State Department, argued that an end to aid should not be viewed in “punitive terms.” There’s “a compelling case to be made, both from the U.S. and Israeli point of view, that reducing Israel's dependence on the United States, by and large, is healthy and would strengthen, not weaken, the relationship,” Miller told RS.
Of course, obstacles to ending the aid remain formidable. While presidents get to negotiate the exact terms of the aid, Congress is still responsible for appropriating the funds to make it happen. So if you get rid of the aid, then you also eliminate the single most important way for pro-Israel lawmakers to show their support. “All of the other aspects of the relationship are kind of invisible,” Elgindy said. “Taking Israel out of congressional politics is not something I think folks will welcome on the Hill.”
As Elgindy explained, an end to aid would also remove a cornerstone issue for powerful pro-Israel groups like AIPAC. “Is there a need for AIPAC if there's no military aid package?” he asked. “It is the lightning rod issue that they lobby on and that Congress members fundraise off of.” But, setting aside the issue of AIPAC in particular, some Israeli analysts view sidelining Congress as a win on balance. Ending aid would be “important in making Israel less of a hot-button political issue in the United States and in Congress specifically,” BenLevi said.
Another possible barrier to ending aid is Trump himself. As Jon Hoffman of the Cato Institute noted, Trump is by all accounts a pro-Israel president, and he has shown no willingness to restructure America’s relationship with the country. But Trump may try to get creative in order to get the MAGA movement off his back on this issue.
This creativity could take several forms. “I could see a scenario in which maybe they cut the aid in half and try to present that as a win to the wing of the party that's becoming more critical [of Israel], while also telling Israel everything will continue, business as usual,” Hoffman said. Or, as Miller told RS, the Trump administration could start the process of developing a new set of bilateral agreements that would “cement the relationship” by creating new partnerships even as direct financial aid is phased out.
The Heritage Foundation drew sharp criticism earlier this year when it made a proposal to cut off aid to Israel by 2047 in an unpublished report. Rep. Brian Mast (R-Fla.) and Israel’s ambassador to the U.S., who were scheduled to speak at a launch event for the project, pulled out after learning about details of the proposal. But some Israeli officials have apparently started to come around to the idea. “Definitely on the political echelon, and also within the defense establishment and bureaucracy, everyone is much more open to going in this direction” than they were even a few years ago, BenLevi said.
Indeed, proposals have already started to circulate in Israeli media about how this could unfold. A source told Israel Hayom, a right-wing Israeli newspaper, that Israel’s leaders are open to “thinking outside the box” and moving from an aid-based model to one focused on bilateral cooperation. “It may be time to move from an aid model to something different,” an unnamed senior Israeli official told the outlet.
These leaks provide an early taste of the PR battle that will accompany the debate over phasing out aid. Pro-Israel voices will likely argue that this represents a maturing of the U.S.-Israel relationship — one that will put both countries on a more even footing and do away with the idea of a patron-client relationship.
But Israel’s critics will make the case that an end to aid reflects a new reality in which the U.S.-Israel relationship is “not so ironclad” anymore, Elgindy said. “It's not guaranteed anymore to be this unshakable,” he told RS. “It certainly won't be unconditional the way it has been over the past 10 to 15 years.”
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Top photo credit: Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelensky (paparazzza/shutterstock)
The $100 million corruption scandal around Ukraine’s energy system that broke this past week is critical to ordinary Ukrainians for its timing. Russia has been bombarding the country’s energy infrastructure on a daily basis to deny ordinary citizens heat and electricity during the cold and dark winter months.
In November 2024, a separate scandal broke that $1.6 billion set aside to build protective bunkers around electricity sub-stations had not led to any being built.
With this in mind, many have responded that the highly publicized nature of this latest scandal, which resulted in the resignations of both the energy and justice ministers, offers visible proof that progress is being made in tackling corruption in Ukraine. The National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) of Ukraine, which is often at the spearhead of such investigations, was first established by Presidential Decree in April 2015. That it continues to function is indeed a positive sign.
It's not possible, however, to claim that corruption has emerged as a specifically wartime phenomena. This energy scandal is hardly a one-off. In September 2021, with Zelensky having already been in power for two and a half years, the European Court of Auditors reported that state corruption and capture were still widespread in Ukraine. It pointed out that “tens of billions of Euros are lost annually as a result of corruption,” and that EU support delivered over 20 years had not delivered the desired results.
Since Russia invaded in 2022, Ukraine has been flooded with hundreds of billions of dollars of aid, of a much greater value than its yearly economic output. The United States has been unable to accurately account for the billions it has sent there. No country at this point would be able to assure itself that its funds have been spent well.
The scale of each new corruption scandal has seemingly grown over time. In August 2023, Zelensky sacked all the heads of the regional military recruitment offices following widespread complaints about kick-backs, often bribes to let potential recruits escape military service. In September 2023, Ukraine’s Defense Minister, Oleksii Reznikov, resigned following a procurement scandal related to the marking up the cost of purchased body armour and helmets by 4-5 times. In January 2024, Ukrainian defense officials were arrested over the theft of $40 million, related to an order for 100,000 artillery shells that were never delivered.
To date, President Volodymyr Zelensky has been able to keep Western donors off his back through a sacking here or a prosecution there. What has changed this year is that the erstwhile NABU investigators have been gradually nudging closer to his inner circle.
In July of this year, as the noose was closing around his close ally former Deputy Prime Minister Oleksiy Chernyshov because of a large-scale property fraud, Zelensky made a failed attempt to hobble NABU and bring it under his personal control. As it turns out, Chernyshov has also been implicated in the current $100m energy scandal, with NABU detectives documenting the transfer of an estimated $1.3 million in cash to him and an associate. On 14 November, NABU sought an order for pre-trial detention of Chernyshov.
Timur Mindich, the man at the centre of the current scandal, is a close ally of Zelensky and co-founded the TV company ‘Kvartal 95’ with him. He was allowed to flee the country before the NABU raids, which discovered duffel bags stuffed with cash and a golden toilet. It hasn’t been lost on some commentators that, in 2014, the ousted President Yanukovych was also alleged to have possessed a toilet made of gold.
Which provides another reminder that, stepping back from the canvas, not much has really changed in Ukraine over the past decade. I first met an anti-corruption activist in Kyiv in late 2015, at the foot of the postcard perfect Andriivsky descent in the quaint Lviv Handmade Chocolate Café. Approaching two years after the ouster of Yanukovych, she was visibly distressed that little progress had been made in tackling corruption. Within weeks, the government of Arseny Yatseniuk faced a no-confidence vote over a slew of corruption scandals involving figures close to him that led, ultimately, to his resignation in February 2016.
In the midst of that scandal, Vice President Joe Biden visited Kyiv in a bid to shore up the government, anxious that Ukraine might not be able to form a better coalition than the one in power. “Corruption siphons away resources from the people. It blunts economic growth, and it affronts human dignity. We know that. You know that. The Ukrainian people know that,” Biden said.
For many ordinary Ukrainians, who protested peacefully in the Maidan in late 2013, rooting out corruption was at the core of the so-called “revolution of dignity.” Biden’s 2015 visit was an attempt to paper over the cracks, and close down moves to unsettle the pro-western government. Yet the endemic corruption carried on.
When it released its recent report on EU accession states, the European Commission noted Ukraine’s remarkable commitment to its EU path. However, it downgraded its assessment to B grade, expressing concern about progress in tackling corruption. As with the 2015 Biden visit it was, I fear, another example of papering over the cracks of a much bigger problem.
The vertical of power in Ukraine, in which a small number of oligarchs possess outsized power in all spheres of business and politics, remains largely unchanged to this day. Zelensky has emerged as a creature of that system, having both clashed and aligned himself with different oligarchs at different times. With presidential elections paused, there are fewer constitutional checks and balances on his power than before the war. And for all its excellent work, NABU is not yet powerful enough to break the system.
There is a persuasive case to make that ending the war and turning off the gravy train would make it easier for Ukraine’s future leaders to refocus on the path to European membership. This would require real and measurable reform. It’s possibly for this reason that public support for an end to the war continues to grow along with outrage at every new case of graft by cronies close to Zelensky. But it may also help to explain why he is in no hurry to see the war end.
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Top image credit: President Donald Trump participates in a coffee ceremony with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman Al Saud at the Royal Court Palace in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Tuesday, May 13, 2025. (Official White House Photo by Daniel Torok)
As Washington prepares for a visit this week to the White House by Saudi Arabia’s de facto leader, Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman (MBS), reports indicate that it could be the occasion for the announcement of a U.S.-Saudi security pact, along the lines of a recent security commitment announced by President Trump for Saudi Arabia’s one-time regional rival, Qatar.
The Qatar agreement commits the United States to take “all lawful and appropriate measures — including diplomatic, economic, and, if necessary, military — to defend the interests of the United States and of the State of Qatar and to restore peace and stability.”
Although this kind of deal would not be the Senate-confirmed legally binding treaty that MBS had previously wanted, if extended to Saudi Arabia, it would still be a uniquely bad idea. Given MBS’s history of reckless behavior — for example violations of the laws of war and systematic human rights abuses — a pact committing Washington to come to Riyadh’s defense would be bad for U.S. interests, regional security, and the people of Saudi Arabia.
From his leadership of Saudi Arabia’s brutal intervention in Yemen, which left nearly 400,000 people dead through direct and indirect means, to his kidnapping of the prime minister of Lebanon, his years-long blockade of Qatar, and his directing the murder of U.S.-resident and Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi, MBS has been a force for instability and rights abuses, and will not be a reliable partner.
Although Saudi Arabia is not currently engaged in an active conflict outside of its borders, thanks in large part to U.S. pressure, that may be temporary. In fact, providing such a security guarantee risks emboldening MBS to resume his foreign policy recklessness, just as former President Biden’s visit to Saudi Arabia in 2022 emboldened MBS’s resurgent domestic repression.
Following Biden’s visit, MBS’s regime went on an unprecedented campaign of handing down decades-long sentences to Saudis merely for expressing their views, including a woman who was sentenced to 45-years in prison and a subsequent 45-year travel ban.
Saudi security forces have also carried out mass killings of migrants at its southern border. And for the second straight year, the Saudi government has executed more than 300 people and is on pace to break the record number of executions it set last year. These include journalist Turki al-Jasser, two individuals convicted of crimes committed when they were children, nearly half convicted of non-violent drug offenses, and 56% who are foreigners.
In his first term, Donald Trump chose to make his first official visit to Saudi Arabia, where he announced an enormous $110 billion arms sales package. The size of the deal was inflated for publicity purposes, but it served its purpose, allowing Trump to tout his skills as a master deal maker. Similarly, his first trip abroad in his second term was to Saudi Arabia, and the administration claimed to secure $600 billion in investment commitments from the Kingdom, including $142 billion in undisclosed arms sales. Recent reporting indicates that the F-35 combat aircraft may be a part of this deal. So far F-35s have not been sold to any country in the region other than Israel.
Trump protected MBS for his role in Khashoggi’s murder during his first term, including refusing to release a congressionally mandated intelligence report assessing the crown prince’s responsibility, stating that he didn’t want to lose business for “our great defense contractors.” This narrow definition of U.S. interests is precisely the kind of logic that has tied the United States to repressive regimes that entangle Washington in unnecessary wars.
The economic ties between Trump’s family and the Saudi regime raise even more questions about Trump’s potential decision to extend a security pact to Saudi Arabia. The crown prince’s sovereign wealth fund provided $2 billion for Trump son-in-law Jared Kushner’s investment firm at the end of the first term, over the objections of the fund’s board members. And other deals are in the works, including possibly a Trump Tower and a golf course in Saudi Arabia, LIV Golf tournaments at Trump properties, and a partnership for the largest buyout ever of EA Sports for $55 billion.
Instead of tying the United States to the fate of the current Saudi government, President Trump should press MBS to release all political prisoners and make the necessary rights reforms that help Americans, including reuniting American families with their loved ones wrongfully detained in Saudi Arabia, such as Saad Almadi, Abdulrahman al-Sadhan, Salman al-Odah, and Sarah and Omar al-Jabri.
The last thing the United States needs is another commitment that could lead to the U.S. being dragged into yet another war in the Middle East. Doing business with Saudi Arabia is one thing. Committing to defend it is another. It’s time for Congress to speak out against a possible new security pact with Saudi Arabia, and to scrutinize any proposed arms sales to Riyadh.
Uncritically continuing to uplift MBS will only embolden the crown prince’s recklessness and repression and risk perpetuating conflict in the region instead of bringing the peace Trump claims to want. It’s the wrong deal at the wrong time.
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Declining GDP and tax revenue and increased domestic spending post-COVID-19 will put downward pressure on DoD budgets.[/caption]
Declining GDP and tax revenue and increased domestic spending post-COVID-19 will put downward pressure on DoD budgets.[/caption]
The U.S., Europe, and East Asia are the hubs of the global economy, making them more important to U.S. security and prosperity than the Middle East.[/caption]
The U.S., Europe, and East Asia are the hubs of the global economy, making them more important to U.S. security and prosperity than the Middle East.[/caption]
Total U.S. military spending vs. the rest of the world[/caption]
Total U.S. military spending vs. the rest of the world[/caption]
