Restraint: A post-COVID-19 U.S. national security strategy
The response to the COVID-19 pandemic has weakened the U.S. economy, the foundation of its national power. This has implications for U.S. foreign policy.
Health and economic fallout from COVID-19 makes setting realistic defense priorities more urgent
The response to the coronavirus global pandemic has severely weakened the U.S. economy, the foundation of national power. This reality has vast implications for U.S. foreign policy.
Two economic factors suggest narrowing U.S. foreign policy objectives: (1) U.S. GDP and tax revenue will shrink in 2020, with no certainty about when they might recover. (2) Record deficits and debt endanger future economic growth.
Political reasons for foreign policy restraint augment those economic factors: The public increasingly perceives non-security risks are paramount, and priority will go to domestic spending that aids recovery and increases domestic institutional resilience.
Federal discretionary spending will bear a greater burden because mandatory spending programs are politically harder to cut. Since defense accounts for nearly half of discretionary spending, DoD will likely face sustained cuts.
The U.S. enjoys a favorable geostrategic position with abundant protection from rivals, so it can cut defense spending without compromising security. Indeed, ending peripheral commitments in favor of core security interests strengthens the U.S.
Ending policies bringing failure, overstretch, and drained coffers always made sense—coronavirus makes the case more urgent.
U.S. federal budget authority by category (FY 2019)
[caption id="" align="alignnone" width="2284"] Declining GDP and tax revenue and increased domestic spending post-COVID-19 will put downward pressure on DoD budgets.[/caption]
Abandon peripheral missions abroad and focus on core U.S. security and prosperity
As the pandemic demonstrates, non-military threats can be far more detrimental to Americans’ well-being than the non-state actors, rogue states, and authoritarian regimes that dominate military planning and drive DoD spending.
The decades-long pursuit of overly ambitious foreign policy goals disconnected from U.S. security contributed to the neglect of U.S. domestic institutions exposed by the coronavirus pandemic.
Recovering requires investment at home: education, health care, infrastructure, research and development, and policies that promote innovation and job creation.
For the past 20 years, the U.S. spent roughly $1 trillion annually on defense-related objectives (DoD, veteran’s care, homeland security, nuclear weapons, diplomacy) while domestic infrastructure in critical industries went under-resourced.
Rebalancing defense priorities to focus more on economic prosperity and public health will enhance U.S. power in the long term.
Middle East: Reduce overinvestment and military presence, which has backfired and weakened the U.S.
Core Middle East interests are (1) preventing significant disruptions to global oil supply and (2) defending against anti-U.S. terror threats. The former requires minimal U.S. effort; the latter requires intelligence, cooperation, and limited strikes, not occupations.
The Middle East accounts for just 4 percent of global GDP, yet for decades, the U.S. has attempted to reshape the region through military force, disrupting the regional balance of power, exacerbating political instability, and allowing terrorist groups to flourish.
Today, the U.S. has 62,000 troops in the region, many of them vulnerable to attacks by local militias. The U.S. is also fighting wars in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, largely based on exaggerated fears of Iran, a middling power contained by its local rivals.
The U.S. will be able to fund part of its coronavirus recovery by ending its participation in conflicts in the Middle East and nearby areas, such as Afghanistan and Somalia. This would free up tens of billions of dollars annually for higher priorities.
Additional savings can be had by focusing the Pentagon on its core warfighting missions and right-sizing force structure—reducing ground forces in particular, which have been swollen by these commitments.
The U.S., Europe, and Asia account for 81 percent of global GDP
[caption id="" align="alignnone" width="2280"] The U.S., Europe, and East Asia are the hubs of the global economy, making them more important to U.S. security and prosperity than the Middle East.[/caption]
Europe: Shift security burdens to wealthy allies
The U.S. has strong economic and diplomatic interests in Europe, but the continent faces limited direct military threats. Despite the fall of the USSR, the U.S. maintains a heavy military footprint in Europe in the name of securing wealthy, relatively safe allies.
This arrangement served U.S. interests when a big U.S. military presence in Europe balanced the USSR’s military might while enabling allies to recover economically and unify.
As allies grew rich and the USSR collapsed, a sensible balancing policy became a subsidy that let wealthy allies “cheap ride” on U.S. taxpayers, driving excess DoD spending while subsidizing lavish social welfare programs for European nations.
Russia is a declining power (with a large nuclear arsenal). The EU dominates Russia in important metrics of national power: 3½:1 population, 11:1 GDP, and 5:1 military spending. European economies are also more dynamic than Russia’s.
Instead of jawboning allies for shirking their obligations, U.S. policy should shift the security burden onto them by (1) ending the European Defense Initiative and (2) implementing a responsible draw down of U.S. ground and nuclear forces on the continent.
This would not only free up finite U.S. resources for higher priorities at home or in Asia, but also encourage European allies to revitalize their militaries: increasing spending, prioritizing modernization, or increasing military cooperation with each other.
Asia: Fortify Asian allies with A2/AD capabilities to deter Chinese aggression at less risk
U.S. policy toward China—the only conceivable strategic competitor—balances several key interests: deterring Chinese territorial expansion against Asian allies, avoiding war, and ensuring a fair and beneficial trading relationship.
Efforts to balance against China should therefore be based on core U.S. interests and carefully designed and planned to reduce cost, minimize escalation risks, and protect trade.
U.S. goals in Asia are inherently defensive (to preserve the territorial status quo) and are best served by a military approach of “defensive defense”: an operational concept that limits U.S. costs by encouraging allies to develop their defensive capabilities.
By improving anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities—a network of sensors and missiles—U.S. allies can deter Chinese attacks more effectively and cheaply than via investment in aircraft and surface ships that mimic U.S. capabilities.
Allied defensive capability is less threatening to China than U.S. offensive capability. Reducing the perceived threat of direct attacks, A2/AD is less prone to spark costly, counterproductive arms racing.
Pressing allies to adopt this approach will allow the U.S. to jettison escalatory plans to defend them by attacking the Chinese mainland, lowering tensions and risks of a broader war with China and allowing for cost saving on U.S. forces in Asia.
U.S. force structure: Constrained DoD budgets means more tradeoffs and rebalancing among the services
With the world’s most sophisticated nuclear arsenal, large oceans separating it from rivals, and weak neighbors, the U.S. has a unique advantage over every other nation—security is abundant and cheap.
The U.S. accounts for 40 percent of global military spending—treaty allies account for 22 percent; Russia and China account for 17 percent. The 2020 DoD budget ($757 billion) exceeds Cold War highs in real terms, reflecting a false sense of insecurity.
Reduced DoD budgets can force debate and prioritization among programs and services—between what contributes to U.S. security and what is peripheral or even counterproductive—that large spending authorizations prevent.
Geography makes the U.S. a natural naval power and trading nation. Distance from other major states means the U.S. is perceived as less threatening—unlike China, which borders other Eurasia powers.
The Navy is the key service for projecting U.S. power globally and defending commerce if necessary while avoiding costly occupations. The Navy should command a larger portion of DoD’s reduced budget.
With no nation building and a large reservist pool, the U.S. can reduce Army, Marines, and special operations forces end strength.
Mission-driven reductions to force structure generate savings on personnel and procurement, enabling savings on operational costs, administrative overhead, basing, and other support functions.
U.S. military spending compared to allies and competitors
[caption id="" align="alignnone" width="2284"] Total U.S. military spending vs. the rest of the world[/caption]
No major or regional powers are unscathed by the pandemic—strategic thinking will determine who comes out stronger
The pandemic has hit all major powers hard, including U.S. adversaries; the economic pain is well distributed.
China announced its GDP contracted at 6.8 percent in the first quarter of 2020, the first decline since 1976. The CCP relies on steady economic growth for legitimacy, and in a nation with almost no social safety net, job losses could breed discontent.
While earning some goodwill, China’s efforts to help afflicted nations are an attempt to mitigate the reputational damage from its early obfuscation of the outbreak, which led to the global pandemic. Businesses are also taking steps to limit their China exposure.
Record low oil prices could see Russia’s GDP fall by as much as 15 percent this year, resulting in more pressure to limit its military spending and interventions in places such as Ukraine and Syria.
Iran has been crippled by the virus. Infection has killed several of its senior leaders, and the collapse in oil prices has damaged its already shrinking economy, making this middling power even weaker.
Strong fundamentals undergird U.S. power: favorable geography; a technologically advanced society with a skilled, innovative workforce; and abundant natural resources. Post-COVID rebuilding will require focusing on these strengths to restart the economy.
The U.S. grew to become the global superpower by virtue of its productive economy; advanced technology, including nuclear weapons; and skillful diplomacy.
The pursuit of liberal hegemony—militarized democracy spreading fueled by threat exaggeration and hubris—has resulted in strategic failure, military overstretch, and a hollowing out of U.S. internal strength.
The coronavirus pandemic has exposed the extent to which U.S. power has been squandered. To recover its strength, U.S. should focus on the core elements of national power while avoiding excessive military projects and the overspending that entails.
The budgetary demands to recover from this pandemic will be enormous, but the fundamental sources of U.S. security are robust—and insensitive to mild deviations in military activities and spending.
Coronavirus is a terrible tragedy but nonetheless an opportunity to shed illusions and rebuild the real pillars of national strength for the long haul.
As long as U.S. focuses on its prosperity—rather than peripheral distractions—it will grow stronger at home and retain the ability to marshal the resources necessary for competition with any adversary.
This article has been republished with permission from Defense Priorities.
Benjamin H. Friedman is Policy Director at Defense Priorities and an adjunct lecturer at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs. Previously, he served as Research Fellow in Defense and Homeland Security Studies at the Cato Institute.
European leaders met this week at the behest of French President Emmanuel Macron, who wants to solidify a plan to send troops to Ukraine as a security package. However, the meetings emerged, according to the Wall Street Journal, “without a public commitment from other European countries to send troops.”
France and the United Kingdom have been pushing for troops on the ground in Ukraine, and other countries, like Sweden, Denmark, and Australia, have indicated a willingness to do so as well. The main hurdle appears to be that most are apparently unwilling to send their armed forces to Ukraine without the protection of the United States.
“My wish is that the Americans are engaged at our side, but we have to be prepared for a situation in which they maybe don’t join in,” Macron said.
Another European diplomat said, "when Ukraine was in a better position, the idea of sending troops appealed. But now, with the situation on the ground and the U.S administration as it is, it's not very sexy.”
European countries did agree this week to provide more aid and training for Ukraine. France, Germany, and the United Kingdom also agreed to send a team to Ukraine to analyze how many troops would be needed for a hypothetical European force.
Meanwhile, after negotiations earlier in the week, U.S. and Russian leaders agreed on an expanded ceasefire deal focused on the Black Sea. The Kremlin clarified that accepting an agreement would hinge on the relaxation of sanctions on the agricultural bank, Rosselkhozbank.
The U.S. did not explicitly promise to lift sanctions but that it would “help restore Russia’s access to the world market for agricultural and fertilizer exports, lower maritime insurance costs, and enhance access to ports and payment systems for such transactions.”
European leaders balked at the idea of lifting sanctions. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz said doing so would be “a serious mistake.” Additionally, U.K. Prime Minister Kier Starmer said, “now is not the time for lifting sanctions.”
“Moscow has shown every indication of driving a hard bargain in the talks conducted thus far, not to mention that much of the subject matter is innately technical and simply does not lend itself to swift resolution,” said the Quincy Institute’s Mark Episkopos. “There have been signs in prior weeks of a slow convergence between U.S. and Russian positions… However, Kyiv, flanked by some of its European partners, has voiced deep-seated reservations about possible concessions and other terms of a potential peace settlement.”
Episkopos added, “these concerns and the way they’re being raised speak to a larger lack of buy-in that, if left unsquared, will complicate efforts to get a peace deal past the finish line.”
On Wednesday, the Wall Street Journalreported that President Trump said that the Kremlin may be “dragging its feet” on the Black Sea ceasefire deal. “I’ve done it over the years. You know, I don’t want to sign a contract. I want to sort of stay in the game, but maybe I don’t want to do it quite—I’m not sure,” he said, referring to his previous experience in real estate.
Russia’s mission to the United Nations accused Ukraine of sabotage. In a statement to the Security Council, UN Representative Dmitry Polyanskiy said, “Kiev continues to plan and carry out strikes against Russia's energy infrastructure, thus trying to hoodwink both us and the United States.”
According to CNN, South Korean officials claim that North Korea sent an additional 3,000 soldiers to Russia in January and February. Pyongyang also sent “220 pieces of 170-millimeter self-propelled howitzers and 240-millimeter multiple rocket launchers,” and that further aid was likely to increase depending on the situation.
The European Commission advised EU citizens to have at least 72 hours of food and supplies in reserve. CNN outlined the new document released on Wednesday, which cited Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, geopolitical tensions, and other concerns.
U.S. State Department news:
During a State Department briefing this week, a reporter asked spokesperson Tammy Bruce if the Trump administration agreed that Putin had legitimate claims to Crimea or other regions annexed by Russia, referencing comments made by envoy Steve Witkoff. Bruce said she did not want to speculate on the topic but promised that the president was “singularly focused” on bringing peace to the conflict.
Another reporter asked how the administration was planning on ensuring trust between the United States and Ukraine. Bruce replied, "this isn’t about trust or if—who you’re dealing with and whether or not you like them or you don’t or what that dynamic is.”
keep readingShow less
Top image credit: Andrew Harnik / Shutterstock.com
In recent weeks, many of the same neoconservative voices who pushed the U.S. into Iraq are calling for strikes on Iran. Groups like the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Washington Institute for Near East Policy are once again promoting confrontation, claiming there may never be a better time to act. But this is a dangerous illusion that risks derailing what Donald Trump himself says he wants: a deal, not another disastrous war in the Middle East.
A war with Iran wouldn’t just risk another endless conflict. It would blow up Trump’s broader agenda at home and abroad.
A major conflict would drain U.S. resources and attention, distracting from domestic priorities and weakening America’s leverage on every front: China, Russia, Europe, and trade. Europe could seize the moment to prolong support for the war in Ukraine and resist Trump’s push to reset transatlantic ties. Trade partners like Mexico, Canada, India, and others could take advantage of America’s preoccupation to extract lop-sided concessions. And a unilateral strike would likely fracture the international community.
Russia and China, despite their own misgivings about Iran’s nuclear ambitions, would point to U.S. aggression as the real threat, undermining American credibility at the United Nations and beyond.
And the most dangerous consequence? A strike could backfire and push Iran to do exactly what Trump says he wants to prevent: build a bomb. Iran is already enriching uranium near weapons-grade. If it withdraws from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the last threads of international oversight would disappear. An attack would likely galvanize even more hardline elements in Iran and provide the political justification to sprint for a nuclear weapon.
Trump could go down in history, not as the president who solved the Iran crisis, but as the one under whose watch Iran finally became a nuclear weapons state. That’s not the legacy he wants, or one the country can afford.
Raising alarms, Trump recently declared, “Something will happen to Iran soon.” But he also made clear, “Hopefully, we can have a peace deal. I’m not speaking out of strength or weakness, I’m just saying I’d rather see a peace deal than the other.” These are not the words of a warmonger. They are the words of a negotiator, someone who still sees the value in diplomacy.
Trump is not alone. In a recent interview with Tucker Carlson, his foreign policy envoy Steven Witkoff offered a notably more restrained perspective on Iran than is typical from the foreign policy establishment. Witkoff emphasized pragmatism, verification, mutual respect, and, most importantly, avoiding conflict. His remarks reflected a grounded approach rooted in a clear understanding of both American interests and the region’s complex dynamics.
The problem is that many of the loudest voices shaping Iran policy — inside and outside the government — are actively working to sabotage any realistic path to diplomacy. They talk about wanting a “deal,” but what they’re actually demanding is Iran’s surrender: zero uranium enrichment, dismantling its nuclear program, cutting ties with all its regional allies, and fundamentally changing its foreign policy. No Iranian government — pragmatist or hardliner — could accept such terms. Even Masoud Pezeshkian, Iran’s newly elected president who ran on a platform of diplomacy and engagement, would have no political space to agree to that kind of ultimatum.
Let’s be clear: if you’re pushing for such maximalist demands under the guise of wanting a deal, you’re not working for peace. You’re laying the groundwork for war.
Iran is a complicated actor with a complicated history. But the lessons of the past decade are clear: when the U.S. engages Iran through diplomacy, it gets results. When it relies solely on pressure, it inches closer to conflict.
The point of pressure has always been to create leverage, not to impose costs for their own sake. That leverage now exists. The question is what to do with it.
The 2015 nuclear deal was far from perfect for any side, but it did succeed in placing tight constraints on Iran’s nuclear program and subjected it to unprecedented international inspections. The aim of withdrawing from that deal was to compel Iran to accept stronger terms. That hasn’t happened.
Instead, the result has been several years of Iranian nuclear expansion, regional instability, and growing alignment between Tehran, Moscow, and Beijing. Iran is now enriching uranium to 60% — dangerously close to weapons-grade — and stockpiling far more than before. Meanwhile, the international consensus that once backed U.S. efforts has frayed.
Now is the time to cash in on current U.S. pressure. Not by continuing on an escalatory path that leads to war, but by using the leverage that’s been built to strike a better deal — one that delivers strong constraints, more transparency, and greater long-term security for the United States.
Against this backdrop, hawkish voices are once again pushing the illusion that striking Iran would be quick and effective. A recentreport from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) claims Israel’s alleged deep intelligence reach and risk tolerance make a “preventive strike” against Iran potentially “much more successful” than past American efforts, like when the U.S. attacked nuclear targets in Iraq in 1991 and 1993. But this dangerously downplays the risks. Even Trump’s allies are urging caution.
Vice President J.D. Vance, for example, rightly cautioned last October that “America’s interest is sometimes going to be distinct” from Israel’s — and made clear that avoiding war with Iran is in the U.S. interest. He warned such a conflict would be “massively expensive” and a “huge distraction of resources.” The reality is that a strike might at best delay Iran’s program while likely sparking a regional war, endangering U.S. troops, and pushing Iran to weaponize.
Indeed, even the same WINEP report that touts the feasibility of a strike quietly acknowledges the scale of what it would entail: “an open-ended, multiyear campaign to degrade Iran’s nuclear capabilities, influence its nuclear proliferation calculus, and shape its political and military responses.” In other words, this wouldn’t be a quick, surgical strike; it would be the beginning of another endless war in the Middle East.
Such a conflict would also carry steep economic costs, from skyrocketing oil prices to instability across the Middle East. And it would almost certainly backfire politically: Americans are war-weary, and polls show overwhelming support for diplomacy over conflict.
What’s needed now is a pragmatic strategy to de-escalate and reengage — one that offers Iran credible incentives in exchange for verifiable nuclear limits but doesn’t require dismantling its entire program.
The Iranian leadership has shown a consistent pattern in its dealings with the United States: pressure is met with pressure, while concessions are met with reciprocal steps. History has made clear that what moves the needle is not ultimatums, but a formula grounded in mutual respect, trust-building, and incremental, verifiable actions. Witkoff’s recent interview signaled a welcome openness to serious diplomacy, but rhetoric alone is not enough. To resonate in Tehran, it must be paired with credible, calibrated actions.
Modest, realistic steps — such as allowing a limited release of Iran’s frozen assets for humanitarian purposes or reviving President Emmanuel Macron’s 2019proposal for a credit line backed by future oil revenues — would not require lifting core U.S. sanctions. Yet they could offer enough tangible benefit to bring Iran to the table. These measures should be linked to parallel Iranian concessions, such as slowing the accumulation of highly enriched uranium and enhancing IAEA access.
Another option is a negotiated “pause:” a fixed-duration agreement where the U.S. freezes further escalation of sanctions and refrains from imposing new pressure, while Iran halts key elements of its nuclear expansion. This mutual freeze could serve as a time-bound window for more comprehensive talks — buying time, lowering tensions, and creating space for diplomacy to succeed.
Critics will claim this approach "rewards bad behavior." But the real question isn't about rewarding anyone, it's about results. What actually reduces the risk of Iran getting a nuclear weapon or dragging the U.S. into another endless war? The record speaks for itself: pressure detached from feasible diplomatic outcomes hasn’t delivered results. In fact, pressure for its own sake has backfired — driving Iran’s nuclear program forward and repeatedly bringing the U.S. to the brink of conflict.
Some will say Iran cannot be trusted. That’s precisely why inspections and verification are essential. When a deal was in place, international inspectors had access to Iran’s nuclear facilities, and the program was significantly constrained. Military strikes, by contrast, would likely end all transparency and push Iran to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, eliminating the last tools for monitoring and oversight.
There’s no perfect deal. But the smart play is a deal that contains Iran’s nuclear program, avoids a war, and keeps the U.S. in the driver’s seat. That should be the goal of any serious policy, not wishful thinking or ideological crusades.
President Trump has always seen himself as a dealmaker. Now’s the moment to make one that matters. He should empower voices in his camp — like Steven Witkoff — who understand that diplomacy isn’t weakness, it’s strategy. Rejecting the tired playbook of regime change and endless escalation would show real leadership.
keep readingShow less
Top Image Credit: Israel's Iron Dome anti-missile system intercepts rockets after Iran fired a salvo of ballistic missiles, as seen from Ashkelon, Israel, October 1, 2024 REUTERS/Amir Cohen TPX
As the Trump administrationproceeds full speed ahead on its Golden Dome missile defense project, U.S. officials and engineering experts alike suggest it's a next to impossible undertaking.
Gen. Michael Guetlein, Space Force vice chief, likened Golden Dome to the WWII-era Manhattan project, which created the atom bomb. Acting DoD official Steven J. Morani called it a “monster systems engineering problem.” Trump himself compared it to President Ronald Reagan’s 1983 Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), or “Star Wars,” a space-based defense system that never made it past the drawing board.
Previously called “Iron Dome for America,” the Pentagon describes Golden Dome as a missile defense system similar to Israel’s “Iron Dome," which intercepts incoming projectiles with missiles, scaled up to protect the entirety of the United States from aerial threats. The project was made official with a January 27 executive order.
Advocates emphasize Golden Dome’s significance — describing it as critical for the defense of the U.S. amid increasingly perilous geopolitical conditions. But the project’s questionable feasibility — and likely exorbitant price tag — leaves observers skeptical that the project amounts to little more than a contract generator, all while harming prospects for peace.
The weapons industry goes to bat for Golden Dome
For its part, the U.S. has put nearly $3 billion toward Israel’s Iron Dome’s production, equipment, and maintenance since 2011. Understanding that the American version won’t likely operate quite the same way due to our continent’s sheer size, the Defense Department has requested industry input.
Contractors have sent the Pentagon over 360 company concept papers for consideration. They’re also publicly gunning for a role — weapons industry mainstay Lockheed Martin, for example, has published a web page and even a teaser trailer boasting of its capacities.
“We’re a major partner in Israel’s Iron Dome today,” RTX (formerly Raytheon) Chief Executive Chris Calio likewise pointed out in late January, upon Trump’s executive order for Golden Dome. “It's the bedrock of Raytheon…we view [America’s Golden Dome project] as a significant opportunity for us, something right in our wheelhouse.”
Execs from defense tech startup L3Harris, likewise, expressed their ability and eagerness to assist in an op-ed for Breaking Defense. “With a portfolio of proven capabilities in countering air and missile threats, we’re ready to assist [Trump’s] administration in achieving this goal,” Ken Bedingfield and Ed Zoiss wrote. The Pentagon is also reviewing a proposal for a similar defense system sporting tech from Anduril, Palantir, and SpaceX.
And counter-drone systems producer BlueHalo’s CEO, Jonathan Moneymaker, even pushed for scope creep in an interview with Business Insider, suggesting that — by bringing on state-of-the-art defense and AI-backed tech — the Golden Dome project could become a more holistic threat response system, rather than one more narrowly focused on projectiles. Naturally, the move would require "the full might of the Defense Industrial Base."
But the industry’s Golden Dome fervor should, considering its track record, be taken with a grain of salt.
“It is interesting to see how quickly defense contractors have allied themselves with President Trump’s call for a Golden Dome missile shield,” Project on Government Oversight national-security analyst and Bunker columnist Mark Thompson told RS. “Contractors’ statements about how well they can build a missile shield would carry more weight if they reflected the reality of the weapons they are currently producing.”
Thompson added, “While Lockheed talks about the need for such a Golden Dome, its F-35 fighter currently is ready for action only about 50% of the time.”
Is Golden Dome even possible?
Other feasibility issues chip away at Golden Dome’s viability. For example, Israel’s Iron Dome can intercept shorter-range projectiles deployed by regional neighbors. But if the U.S. were to be hit, it may well be targeted with intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) — something Iron Dome can’t currently counter.
“The system [Golden Dome] borrows part of its name from — Israel's Iron Dome system — is only designed to defend against short to medium-range missiles. It would be of no use against an incoming intercontinental ballistic missile,” said William Hartung, a Senior Research Fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft.
While the Pentagon can try to develop a system prepared for ICBMs, previous attempts haven’t been successful. “Long-range interceptors have failed many tests, and those tests were considerably less rigorous than an actual attack would be…that a new initiative would do better is both unproven and unlikely,” Hartung explained.
To defense contractors, this ICBM problem simply presents itself as another challenge, where they say some of Golden Dome’s work, complete with space-based lasers and radars, could take place beyond the atmosphere. "If [long-range] weapons maneuver around [our current defense] systems, that means our current architecture can't provide fire control ordnance,” L3Harris’ Zoiss told Fox News. “And, therefore, it has to be moved to space.”
In contrast, Pentagon insiders don’t even seem to know how Golden Dome would work in practice. “Right now, Golden Dome is, it’s really an idea,” a source familiar with internal discussions surrounding the project told CNN, emphasizing the project’s conceptual nature.
Meanwhile, the likelihood of long-range attacks Golden Dome would theoretically protect against is questionable. “It is not in the interests of either China or Russia to launch kinetic strikes to damage the U.S. homeland early in a crisis as this would likely draw the United States deeper into a conflict,” Xiaodon Liang, senior policy analyst at the Arms Control Association, wrote.
What is clear is the project’s likely-hefty price tag, even as the DoD moves (at least nominally) to cut costs. Former Pentagon comptroller Dov Zakheim supposed that Golden Dome could cost $100 billion per year through 2030. Going further, Ret. Air Force Lt. General Richard Newton told NewsNation that the Golden Dome system could cost $2.5 trillion.
“I’m not opposed to the idea of having a system like [Golden Dome] but it’s not just, the idea pops into one guy’s head and we should just suddenly spend hundreds of billions of dollars on it,” Sen. Mark Kelly (D-Ariz.) mused at a March 13 Punchbowl News event on space policy.
And experts fear that Golden Dome will inflame already existing geopolitical tensions, or even encourage an arms race — where nuclear warheads, which can be attached to ICBMs — could be involved.
“Even if the United States were to sink hundreds of billions, or even trillions…into an exquisite new national missile defense program, how much return would we get on such a program if it would only encourage adversaries to build more cheap missiles?” Geoff Wilson, Distinguished Fellow and Strategic Advisor for the National Security Reform Program at the Stimson Center, asked of the project. “Such actions would do little to further American security and likely would only waste taxpayer dollars on an impossible Oval Office talking point while further inflaming a new global nuclear arms race that is putting every man, woman and child in this nation and around the globe at risk.”
“The only reliable defense against nuclear-armed missiles is to reduce the chances that they will be launched in the first place, which calls for a revival of arms control talks between the U.S. and Russia, and a dialogue on future nuclear developments with China,” Hartung said.
Subscribe now to our weekly round-up and don't miss a beat with your favorite RS contributors and reporters, as well as staff analysis, opinion, and news promoting a positive, non-partisan vision of U.S. foreign policy.
Declining GDP and tax revenue and increased domestic spending post-COVID-19 will put downward pressure on DoD budgets.[/caption]
Declining GDP and tax revenue and increased domestic spending post-COVID-19 will put downward pressure on DoD budgets.[/caption]
The U.S., Europe, and East Asia are the hubs of the global economy, making them more important to U.S. security and prosperity than the Middle East.[/caption]
The U.S., Europe, and East Asia are the hubs of the global economy, making them more important to U.S. security and prosperity than the Middle East.[/caption]
Total U.S. military spending vs. the rest of the world[/caption]
Total U.S. military spending vs. the rest of the world[/caption]
