Why is the US removing its Patriot missile systems from Saudi Arabia?
While the military characterized the move as part of a planned withdrawal that reflects the view that Iran now poses less of a threat, the news has prompted debate over the timing of the decision.
The U.S. is removing Patriot anti-missile systems from Saudi Arabia as part of a broader drawdown of its military capacity placed there to counter Iran. While the military characterized the move as part of a planned withdrawal that reflects the view that Iran now poses less of a threat, the news has prompted debate over the timing of the decision.
In general, the Trump administration and especially Secretary of State Mike Pompeo have repeatedly emphasized the danger to regional security posed by Iran. To suddenly acknowledge that the Islamic Republic is less of a threat than it was previously portrayed to be appears to undermine the case that hawks like Pompeo and Special Representative for Iran Brian Hook have made, that the U.S. needs to maintain a posture of heightened vigilance and even pre-emptive aggression in order to deter military actions by Iran. Tensions between Iran and the U.S. remain high, which was why the reduction of U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia prompted speculation among observers. Given Trump’s transactional approach to policymaking and his tendency for showmanship, the assertion that the decision merely reflects the need for maintenance of the Patriot system seems incomplete.
One interpretation reads that the Trump administration feels that Saudi Arabia needs to be reminded that its enjoyment of U.S.-guaranteed security is predicated on its adherence to America's oil price preferences. Reuters revealed that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman agreed to cut Saudi oil production after Trump called to say that he would otherwise be unable to prevent a bill sanctioning Saudi Arabia from being introduced by representatives of oil producing states, most of whom are Republicans. Although MBS did agree to cut production, Trump may have felt that the Crown Prince would benefit from a reminder of his kingdom’s dependence on the U.S. military umbrella.
Alternatively, Trump just issued the seventh veto of his presidency in order to defeat a bi-partisan bill that would have required him to gain Congressional approval before launching military action against Iran. Although Trump was unwilling to acknowledge any limit to his executive authority, the drawdown of the U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia may serve to reassure members of Congress, especially Trump’s GOP allies, that they need not fear his belligerence against Iran.
One final interpretation of the decision to reduce U.S. military capacity in Saudi Arabia takes the opposite view: that it could be intended to tempt the Iranians into a military action that would justify a more robust response from the United States. As explained by officials quoted in the Wall Street Journal article, the build-up of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia was undertaken in response to attacks on Saudi oil facilities in September 2019 that Riyadh and Washington blamed on Iran. However, Iran has generally avoided escalation, even following the killing of Qassem Soleimani in early January, the “unprofessionalism” of Iranian boat captains notwithstanding. Hawks within the Trump White House have maintained that they view the Iranian regime as weak and near collapse and may hope that reducing U.S. forces could tempt Tehran into more aggressive moves that would justify an intimidating U.S. military response.
The drawdown of U.S. military presence in the Middle East, and especially from Saudi Arabia, is a welcome development. However, given this administration’s track record of belligerence towards Iran and its transaction approach towards even its closest security partners, it is hardly surprising that the timing of the move is provoking considerable speculation.
Annelle Sheline, PhD, is a Research Fellow in the Middle East program at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. She previously served as a Foreign Affairs Officer at the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor’s Office of Near Eastern Affairs (DRL/NEA), before resigning in March 2024 in protest over the Biden administration’s unconditional support for Israeli military operations in Gaza.
A Patriot missile battery sits on an overlook at a Turkish army base in Gaziantep, Turkey, Feb. 4, 2013. (DoD photo by Glenn Fawcett/Released)
Top image credit: US President Joe Biden delivers his farewell address to the nation from the Oval Office of the White House in Washington, DC, on January 15, 2025. Photo by Mandel NGAN/Pool/ABACAPRESS.COM via REUTERS
Joe Biden's presidency will end at noon on Monday and so will, by many accounts, his disastrous foreign policy. Or was it? Much ink has been spilled about how President Biden handled the wars in Ukraine and Gaza and while we know how many of his decisions played out almost in real time, in some respects, the true outcomes of other choices he made in those conflicts won't be known for some time.
Biden's foreign policy wasn't all bad though. And a lot happened in the world during the last 4 years beyond the aforementioned conflicts. So we asked nearly two dozen experts a question: "Outside of Gaza and Ukraine, name one consequential U.S. foreign policy decision, good or bad, that Joe Biden made as president." See their answers below.
Brandan Buck, Research Fellow, Cato Institute: The most consequential and best foreign policy decision President Joe Biden made during his presidency was to maintain his predecessor's determination to withdraw American troops from Afghanistan. While there was clearly a failure to foresee and, therefore, prepare for the implosion of the Kabul government, Biden's decision to follow through on withdrawal was a needed, if inglorious, and tragic ending to a 20-year war. Had Biden wanted to reverse course, he would have enjoyed some institutional support. Instead, he stuck with the bipartisan and popular position and endured opprobrium when it all went sideways. That took courage and is commendable.
Dan DePetris, Fellow at Defense Priorities and columnist at the Chicago Tribune: One of President Biden’s most confusing (and useless) diplomatic initiatives was the Summit for Democracy. While this grand project was designed to be an outgrowth of the administration’s wider “democracy vs autocracy” foreign policy framework, it failed to produce anything of substance and turned out to be a counterproductive demonstration of just how hypocritical Washington is on these matters overall. The summits never really had clear goals and quickly descended into talk-a-thons that were preaching to the converted.
On a practical level, it was hard to see why the project was needed in the first place; the U.S., after all, retains fairly strong diplomatic and security relationships with some highly repressive countries (Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Rwanda to name a few), so if Biden hoped to sing the wonders of political pluralism, the words likely went in one year and out the other. The fact that the same South Korean president who eagerly hosted the 2024 summit is now arrested and charged with insurrection is a fitting end to a meaningless act of diplomatic showmanship.
Ben Friedman, Policy Director at Defense Priorities: President Biden insisted that the United States was leading a global struggle of democracies against autocracies. Layered with standard presidential talk about a liberal international order and human rights, this piffle became especially hypocritical when the administration began enthusiastically funding Israel's war in Gaza. But the trouble was worse than hypocrisy. The administration seemed to believe its own hyperbole. By juicing military competition with China, serially expanding support for Ukraine, and leaving relations with Iran in a post-Iran Deal straits, it seemed to be trying to maximize antagonists and to unify them against the United States.
Julia Gledhill, Research Associate, Stimson Center: President Biden failed miserably to advance a so-called foreign policy for the middle class. Much like the liberal hawks before him, Biden instead wasted precious national resources on the war industry. Indeed, his requests for national security spending increased by 19% during his four years in office. The Biden administration also proudly introduced the first ever “National Defense Industrial Strategy” designed to invest generations of Americans in weapon production only to further enrich an industry in which executive compensation exceeds $20 million annually.
Yet in his farewell address, Biden cautioned against the “dangerous consequences” of an oligarchy “taking shape in America.” His warning rings empty after four years of unfettered military spending, which has strengthened oligarchs’ death grip on U.S. foreign policy. As a result, Biden has exacerbated security dilemmas, increasing the risk of great power conflict and threatening prospects of peace. The world will suffer the consequences long after Biden departs from the White House.
Dan Grazier, Senior Fellow, Stimson Center: Joe Biden’s presidency will be remembered as a tumultuous era characterized by a chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan and wars in Ukraine and the Middle East. One spot on the globe remained largely quiet, however. For years, the American people have heard almost daily warnings of the existential military threat posed by China. The specter of an invasion of Taiwan has become the main justification for the largest peacetime defense budgets in American history. Record spending has been squandered on a slew of failing weapons programs like the Littoral Combat Ship, the F-35, the Sentinel Program, and several others.
The Biden administration did little to calm the rhetoric despite a growing body of evidence that China is no longer the growing colossus official Washington claims it is. According to the World Bank, China’s economy has slowed significantly from its peak and the country’s population is in decline. Those factors combined with a brewing debt crisis will further disincentivize China’s leaders from launching a costly military adventure. The Biden administration should have adjusted its China strategy in light of these developments, but it persisted as only a bloated national security establishment can.
Jennifer Kavanagh, Senior Fellow and Director of Military Analysis at Defense Priorities: As president, Joe Biden eroded the “strategic ambiguity” that the United States has traditionally maintained toward Taiwan by declaring four times that he would send troops to defend the island if China were to attack. This repeated commitment pushed Taiwan to the center of U.S. military strategy in Asia and raised tensions with China, which ratcheted up its military activity nearby.
Worse, Biden’s assurances over-valued the island’s strategic and economic importance to the United States while under-estimating the devastating costs such a conflict would bring — even if the United States emerged as the winner, an outcome that is far from guaranteed. He leaves with the risk of war in the Taiwan Strait higher and U.S. position in the region more tenuous than when he arrived.
Charles Kupchan, Professor of International Affairs, Georgetown University: Biden came into office well aware that strength abroad requires strength at home; good policy requires good politics. He pursued a “foreign policy for the middle class” that entailed a combination of strategic retrenchment and domestic investment aimed at getting working Americans back up on their feet and fueling economic competitiveness. Rebuilding the nation’s political center is the starting point for anchoring a steady and purposeful statecraft. Regrettably, Biden fell short of finishing the job, one of the reasons that Trump is returning to office.
Lora Lumpe, CEO, Quincy Institute: President Biden's decision in April 2021 to end the U.S. war in Afghanistan was the pinnacle of his administration’s foreign policy. It took a good deal of bravery to buck the conventional wisdom in Washington that the war could and should continue at its current levels.
He understood that if his administration didn't take the off ramp the Trump administration had negotiated, however imperfectly, the Taliban would start shooting at U.S. soldiers and contractors again after May 1, and once one of of the 2,000 soldiers or thousands of contractors was killed, the U.S. would be boxed into sending more troops, and we'd be mired in an unwinnable war for possibly another 10 or 20 years.
In announcing his decision, he said: "I’m now the fourth United States president to preside over American troop presence in Afghanistan: two Republicans, two Democrats. I will not pass this responsibility on to a fifth." He seemed at that moment to understand that it was much easier to start a war than to end one.
Sumantra Maitra, the American Conservative: President Biden's singularly good foreign policy decision was to follow through with the withdrawal deal in Afghanistan. He deserves credit for that. Politicians will do politics, but the responsibility for the disaster of the withdrawal falls neither on Trump's negotiation team, nor Biden himself, as it was the responsibility of the military brass, who had ample notice of over three years, but slow-rolled the process with the hope that the decision would be eventually reversed.
Biden also had the basic cold-war equilibrium instinct intact about avoiding a direct conflict with a nuclear peer power (Russia), unfortunately, he had no control over his hawkish cabinet and his military leadership. It could have been much worse under a President Clinton or Harris. His faults, however, are too numerous to elaborate, including devastation in Gaza and giving in to European free-riding on Ukraine at the cost of domestic politics.
Eldar Mamedov, Brussels-based foreign policy expert: Withdrawing U.S. troops from Afghanistan was one consequential foreign policy decision that the Biden administration got right. While the implementation of the decision was far from flawless, the decision itself was strategically sound. Twenty years of American military presence and $2.3 trillion spent in operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan since 2001 failed to fundamentally transform the society along the liberal, pro-Western lines. The Taliban, however deplorable their practices, proved to have staying power, while the pro-Western government in Kabul was often incompetent and corrupt. In that context, continued U.S. commitment became a strategic liability. The main U.S. interest in Afghanistan is to prevent its relapse to a terrorist base threatening the U.S. However, today the main terrorist threat stemming from Afghanistan is not the Taliban, but the Islamic State, which the Taliban is committed to fighting.
A.J. Manuzzi, Program Assistant, John Quincy Adams Society: President Biden removing Cuba from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list to facilitate release of 553 political prisoners is a positive development, albeit too little, too late. Six decades of economic war failed to bring democracy to Cuba while making life for everyday Cubans harder and shorter. While the administration’s determination that Havana does not sponsor international terrorism is correct, it should face criticism for delaying that review for several years. With the incoming administration set on re-listing and the broader embargo intact, banks are unlikely to change their Cuba sanctions guidance, rendering the decision moot and on death row.
Rajan Menon, Spitzer Professor Emeritus, City College of New York/CUNY: Leave aside President Biden’s unqualified support for Israel Gaza War, a grossly disproportionate response to Hamas’ October 7, 2023, attack. He has also stood by while Israel has been evicting thousands of West Bank Palestinians from their lands, effectively killing the two-state solution that has already been on life support, thus supporting Israel’s dead-end strategy of “mowing the lawn,” a futile effort to side step the fundamental source of conflict between Israel and the Palestinians: the occupation.
Arta Moeini, Managing Director, Institute for Peace and Diplomacy: The Biden administration's failure to grasp the evolving security dynamics in West Asia and anticipate the new balance of power in that region represents a critical strategic error. The rise of an emboldened, neo-Ottoman Turkey, coupled with Washington’s inability to leverage the emerging Iran-Saudi éntente, has left key opportunities for a stable Middle Eastern security architecture unexploited. While a potential cold war between Israel and Turkey looms, Ankara’s assertiveness and backing for Muslim Brotherhood-type Islamist groups has also alarmed Tehran and Riyadh, yet Washington has not capitalized on this shared concern to forge a stabilizing framework that could bring together the region's key players. Such a short-sighted decision not only puts U.S. forces in harm's way, but it also promises to leave Washington enmeshed in new Middle Eastern quagmires peripheral to America's interests.
In light of this, Biden's confounding decision to keep U.S. troops in Syria and Iraq over his tenure leaves them vulnerable in a region that is certain to experience more violence and instability at least over the near to medium term. Such a short-sighted decision not only puts U.S. forces in harm's way, but it also promises to leave Washington enmeshed in new Middle Eastern quagmires peripheral to America's interests.
Negar Mortazavi, Senior Fellow, Center for International Policy: Despite the major failure of his wider Middle East policy, there was one catastrophe that Joe Biden prevented and that was a full-scale war with Iran. In the course of the expanding war in the region, Israel and Iran had two direct confrontations, first in April 2024 and then in October 2024, which were the first instances in which the two states directly attacked each other in dangerous gambles that brought them to the brink of an all-out war. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and his war cabinet tried to pull the United States into Israel’s direct conflict with Iran to expand the war to a new front.
But the Biden administration was able to draw a red line on war with Iran and avoid getting pulled into what would be another dangerous and endless war in the Middle East. U.S. officials made it clear, behind the scenes and in public, that they would support Israel in defense but not in offense against Iran. That was the one successful strategy the administration implemented despite its many other bad policies toward the Middle East.
Chris Preble, Senior Fellow, Stimson Center: Ending the U.S. war in Afghanistan. For all of the focus on the aftermath of President Biden’s decision, including the swift collapse of the Ghani government and the Taliban’s return to power, no one has made a convincing case that an open-ended mission served U.S. interests. Withdrawing troops was an essential first step to testing the claims that the United States had put in place a government in Kabul that could stand on its own. Those claims have been proven false; those who made them have yet to be held accountable. But now they can and should be.
Ian Proud, former British diplomat: ''A foreign policy for the middle class," summarises why, in my opinion, Biden failed so spectacularly on the world stage. Supercilious, beltway-focused and disinterested in the — as we now know, potentially devastating — impact of foreign policy choices on ordinary people either in the U.S. or overseas. The initial Carnegie report said, "there is no evidence America’s middle class will rally behind efforts aimed at restoring U.S. primacy in a unipolar world, escalating a new Cold War with China, or waging a cosmic struggle between the world’s democracies and authoritarian governments." And yet, Biden had a go at all three.
Sam Ratner, Policy Director, Win Without War: An aspect of Biden’s policy that didn’t get the coverage it deserved, but that will reverberate negatively for years to come, is the president’s terrible record on nuclear arms control. Arms control advocates were optimistic in 2020, expecting that Biden would live up to his pledges to take common-sense steps like re-entering the Iran Nuclear Deal and killing off the SLCM-N program, a pointless and escalatory submarine-launched nuclear cruise missile. They also hoped that he would take seriously the vital challenge of building a nuclear arms control relationship between the U.S. and China. Instead, Biden completely flipped on the Iran Deal and SLCM-N, among other programs, failing to resurrect the deal and ultimately endorsing yet more SLCM-N spending. On China, his administration began outreach to the Chinese government on arms control and then, at the first sign that achieving a deal would be a challenge, pivoted to threatening an expansion of the U.S. nuclear arsenal if the Chinese government continues its nuclear buildup. Nuclear arms racing with China is both dangerous and self-defeating, but Biden leaves office without his team having proposed any serious alternative.
Mark Reading-Smith, Executive Director, ReThinkMedia: While the core negotiations that defined the terms for the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan were made before President Biden's arrival, the exit in August 2021 was bungled from start to finish. The decision to be out before the 20th anniversary of 9/11 carried the conviction of a president who clearly understood that it was imperative to initiate the long-overdue removal of U.S. troops from a lost “forever war.” However, the dire and deadly scenes from Kabul in the final days made it easy for opponents to call his administration’s competence into question.
The chaotic exit also left many of Afghanistan’s most vulnerable without any path to safety, and when the final wheels went up, the Biden administration left religious minorities in the hands of the Taliban, knowing the potential genocidal consequences. While promises were made by President Biden to help, those promises were largely unkept and forgotten. Those who have found a way to leave have done so through private evacuation efforts and other nations providing refuge, although many of these religious minorities remain in direct harm’s way or permanent limbo. This outcome was a sad early reminder of the lack of importance human rights ultimately were to the Biden administration agenda.
Annelle Sheline, Senior Fellow, Quincy Institute: Biden lifting Trump's eleventh hour designation of the Houthis as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) was significant in helping to prevent an even worse humanitarian crisis in Yemen. Unfortunately, the Biden administration maintained the Obama and Trump-era policies of supporting Saudi Arabia’s brutal campaign of bombing and starving the Houthi-controlled portion of Yemeni territory, where 80 percent of the population live. It was only after the Houthis demonstrated their missiles could threaten MBS’ economic ambitions in early 2022 that the Crown Prince finally agreed to a truce, which has largely held for almost three years.
Ironically, after the Houthis initiated their blockade of Israel’s port of Eilat, the U.S. suddenly found their actions intolerable, much to the schadenfreude of the Saudis and Emiratis, who declined to join the U.S.-led Operation Prosperity Guardian. Biden named the Houthis as a “specially designated global terrorist group” in January 2024. Ahead of Trump’s inauguration, 15 Republican Senators introduced legislation to reapply the FTO designation, which humanitarian groups fear would do little to deter the group but would impair humanitarian assistance to Yemen.
Sarang Shidore, Director of Quincy Institute’s Global South program: Through the U.S. deepening military ties with the Philippines and expanding American military sites in the archipelagic nation (partly provoked by Chinese intrusive activities in the South China Sea), Biden played a part in expanding the great power competition to the vital and dynamic region of Southeast Asia.
Sina Toossi, Senior Non-Resident Fellow, Center for International Policy: One of President Biden’s most significant foreign policy failures has been his approach to Iran. Despite campaigning on returning to the Iran nuclear deal, his administration sent the wrong signals upon taking office. Instead of a straightforward “compliance for compliance” approach, Biden’s team pushed for additional Iranian concessions, eroding trust and stalling progress. This miscalculation was compounded by the administration’s failure to deter Israeli sabotage of Iran’s nuclear facilities in 2021, which further derailed diplomacy. As a result, negotiations got nowhere by the time moderate Iranian President Hassan Rouhani left office, ushering in hardliner Ebrahim Raisi.
Over the next three years, Biden continued Trump’s “maximum pressure” sanctions, failing to de-escalate tensions. Iran’s nuclear program expanded dramatically, with its breakout time to a bomb dropping to just one week. Meanwhile, Tehran doubled down on support for regional allies like Hamas and Hezbollah, deepening instability.
By neglecting diplomacy and enabling Israeli impunity, his administration leaves the region and U.S. interests vulnerable, draining U.S. resources from urgent priorities at home and elsewhere abroad.
Michael Swaine, Senior Fellow, Quincy Institute East Asia program: The Biden administration has certainly eroded the One China policy and sent mixed messages regarding the U.S. stance towards the defense of Taiwan. Biden has stated on several occasions that the United States would militarily intervene to defend Taiwan if it were attacked by China, a stance that is not part of U.S. policy. In addition, the Biden administration has allowed a senior U.S. Defense Department official to state more than once that Taiwan is a critical strategic location for the U.S. defense posture in Asia, again a position that is not congruent with long-standing U.S. policy.
Beyond this, U.S. officials have stopped making statements regarding U.S. support for any outcome in the China-Taiwan standoff as long as it is arrived at peacefully and without coercion and with the consent of the people of Taiwan. That stance, again a long-standing position, clearly implied that Washington would no longer support peaceful unification.
Jake Werner, Director of the Quincy Institute’s East Asia program: On Sep 16, 2022, national security adviser Jake Sullivan proclaimed that U.S. control over “computing-related technologies, biotech, and clean tech...is a national security imperative.” The U.S. would not just aim for a relative advantage in those fields, but would actively undermine the efforts of “competitors” (i.e., China) to advance in them. Less than a month later, the Biden administration announced a fateful transformation in the practice of U.S. economic coercion, establishing a blockade against all Chinese companies on advanced semiconductors and the equipment and know-how required to produce them — effective immediately without notice or comment.
At a stroke, the new approach declared open season on technologies foundational to any advanced economy whose applications are overwhelmingly commercial rather than military, and it specifically targeted China. The administration thereby defined China’s entire development strategy and its aim of improving the lives of the Chinese people as a national security threat and began building the state capacity necessary to suppress that threat.
Sarah Leah Whitson, Executive Director, DAWN: Biden missed an important opportunity to reform long-failed U.S. policies in the Middle East that have entangled us in endless wars and human rights abuses in the region, to the detriment of the peoples of the Middle East and the U.S. alike. Had he stayed true to his promise to end support for abusive regimes and withdraw U.S. forces from the region instead of capitulating to the likes of Saudi’s murderous Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman and Egypt’s dictator Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, he could have heralded a true shift in U.S. policies, normalizing America’s abnormal role in the region and prioritizing economic and cultural development for the benefit of all.
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Top photo credit: Miami, Florida. JULY 11, 2021: Cuban exiles rally at Versailles Restaurant in Miami's Little Havana in support of protesters in Cuba. (Shutterstock/FErnando Medina)
President Joe Biden’s January 14 removal of sanctions imposed on Cuba during the first Trump administration could have been a major step toward restarting Barack Obama’s policy of engagement if Biden had done it in his first week as president instead of his last.
But done at the last minute, they are unlikely to have much impact. Two of the three will not even take effect until after Trump’s inauguration.
Senior members of Trump’s incoming foreign policy team, including Secretary of State Marco Rubio, National Security Adviser Mike Waltz, and Special Envoy for Latin AmericaMaurico Claver-Carone, have criticized Biden’s actions, noting that they can be quickly and easily reversed by the incoming administration.
“No one should be under any illusion in terms of a change in Cuba policy," Waltz said.
Nevertheless, within hours of the White House’s announcement, the Cuban government announced that, in response to appeals from the Vatican, it would gradually release 553 prisoners, many of whom were involved in the nationwide protests on July 11, 2021. The deal was the culmination of three years of Vatican shuttle diplomacy.
Biden’s package includes three measures: (1) It rescinded Trump's National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM) 5, of June 16, 2017, the basic framework for Trump’s policy of regime change; (2) It suspends Title III of the 1996 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, which gives U.S. citizens, including naturalized Cuban Americans, whose property was nationalized by Cuba’s revolutionary government the right to sue in U.S. Federal Court anyone making beneficial use of that property; and (3) It initiated removal of Cuba from the State Department’s list of State Sponsors of International Terrorism.
Trump’s 2017 NSPM included several sanctions limiting travel to Cuba and, most importantly, prohibiting doing business with Cuban companies managed by the armed forces, including many of the hotels where U.S. visitors typically stayed. However, Biden’s recission of NSPM-5 does not reopen those hotels to U.S. visitors because another, separate, sanction imposed by Trump in 2020 prohibits U.S. visitors from staying in any hotel owned by the Cuban government. That prohibition remains in place.
A suspension of Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act only takes effect 15 days after the president notifies Congress of his intention to suspend it, in this case, on January 29. President Trump could either lift the suspension, like he did in 2019, or simply wait six months at which time the suspension will expire automatically unless renewed.
In Congressional testimony on May 22, 2024, Secretary of State Tony Blinken admitted that there was no factual basis for Cuba being designated a state sponsor of terrorism, and that the reasons cited in the State Department’s annual report on terrorism were no longer valid. When the administration finally undertook a formal review of Cuba’s designation, it concluded— predictably—that Cuba should be removed from the list.
But Cuba’s removal does not take effect for 45 days, giving Congress and the Trump administration plenty of time to block it. The Republican majority in Congress can vote to nullify Biden’s action or Trump can simply put Cuba back on the list at his discretion — just as he did in January 2021.
Moreover, even if Biden’s measures survive long enough to take effect, no company, U.S. or foreign, is going to invest the time and resources necessary to take advantage of reduced sanctions when there is a better than even chance that President Trump will reverse them sooner or later, just as he reversed Obama’s in 2017.
So why would the Biden administration bother to take such ineffectual and probably ephemeral steps to reduce sanctions, and why would the Cuban government release more than five hundred prisoners in response?
Winning freedom for the prisoners was obviously the main motivation for Biden, but for years the administration was loathe to engage Cuba in negotiations to free them. However, after Bob Menendez’s departure from the Senate, the Democrats’ loss in November, and the ruby red hue of Florida politics, Biden no longer had any reason to subordinate Cuba policy to domestic politics.
Perhaps entreaties from both Congressional Democrats and the Vatican that Biden do something to alleviate the deepening humanitarian crisis on the island finally broke through. Or perhaps there was some guilty pleasure in complicating Trump’s forthcoming Cuba policy — poetic justice for Trump putting Cuba on the terrorism list as a parting shot just days before Biden’s inauguration in 2020.
Cuban officials were equally resistant to freeing the protestors, whose tough prison sentences served as a warning and deterrent against future protests. Yet they agreed, despite there being slim chance that Cuba will gain any economic relief from Biden’s measures. But even in the worst case — that Trump scuttles all of Biden’s measures immediately — Cuba would still reap some political benefit. By releasing so many political prisoners — the most since the 1970s — Havana addresses a major point of friction in its relations with the European Union, an important source of desperately needed humanitarian assistance.
Havana’s prisoner release demonstrates to the international community at large its willingness to compromise and desire to reduce conflict with Washington. It puts the United States government on record acknowledging that Cuba is not a state sponsor of terrorism. And it puts the Trump administration in the awkward position of having to choose between leaving the new measures in place or reneging on an agreement to release 553 people from jail.
President Biden’s four years in the White House were a colossal missed opportunity in U.S.-Cuban relations — four years in which domestic political aspirations overrode foreign policy interests, advancing neither. And the Cuban people paid the price as Washington stood idly by while their standard of living plummeted, partly as a result of sanctions Trump imposed and Biden left in place.
Barack Obama took bold action to normalize relations with Cuba. Donald Trump took bold action to destabilize it. Nothing about Joe Biden’s Cuba policy was bold, and it accomplished nothing. Cuba is poorer and less open today than it was four years ago, China’s and Russia’s influence there is greater, a million more Cuban migrants have fled to the United States, and Democrats are less politically popular than ever in Florida.
As Joe Biden leaves the White House, there are many accomplishments he can be proud of. Cuba is not one of them.
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Top photo credit: U.S. President Joe Biden walks accompanied by U.S. first lady Jill Biden after delivering remarks on what he calls the "continued battle for the Soul of the Nation" in front of Independence Hall at Independence National Historical Park, Philadelphia, U.S., September 1, 2022. REUTERS/Jonathan Ernst
Joe Biden’s place in history is as the man under whom the liberal international order unraveled.
America has suffered bouts of inflation before, and while Biden’s domestic failures will be remembered, they will not stand out as singular. In foreign policy, however, Biden has written the end of a chapter not only in America’s story but in the world’s as well.
Far from representing “hope and change,” the slogan on which he and Barack Obama were elected in 2008, Biden has personified the hopelessness and stagnation of the West’s post-Cold War foreign policy.
In 2008 voters demanded something new and trusted Obama’s ticket to deliver it. The regime-change projects of the “Global War on Terror” under George W. Bush had been sold to the public as a “cakewalk” and a liberation of foreign populations who would greet our soldiers with flowers. Seven years into the Afghan War and after five in Iraq, it was clear that Bush and those who followed him had no way out of these conflicts, which were being fought not in order to be won — since victory could hardly even be defined — but simply to postpone defeat.
These were open-ended “forever wars.” Obama, with Biden by his side, was handed a mandate to end them and chart a different course. They failed to do so and instead maintained the disastrous direction that had been set in the early 1990s.
The failure of the post-Cold War presidents
George H.W. Bush had never really been able to end the 1991 Gulf War, which continued under Bill Clinton with the enforcement of no-fly zones and sanctions, as Washington entertained a series of neoconservative dreams and schemes for regime change in Iraq.
The 2003 invasion of Iraq, then, was a drastic escalation of a war that had already been underway. Yet once Saddam Hussein was overthrown, the war still didn’t end. Washington’s aims of nation-building, regional transformation, and promoting democracy and liberalism were so ill-defined and unrealistic that even a supposedly successful war could only be a prelude to further conflict.
Iraq was a clear symbol of how far American policy had gone awry, but the same mentality of doubling-down on misjudged commitments was to be seen on a grander scale, too. After each wave of NATO expansion, for example, Russia became more rather than less threatening. If the purpose of NATO expansion was to make Europe more secure, the contrast between the security environment of 1992 and that of 2025 delivers a damning verdict — all the more so when contrasted with the success a more limited NATO enjoyed in checking the Soviet Union until its demise.
As if on autopilot, and heedless of results, America’s post-Cold War presidents and the Washington foreign-policy “Blob” pursued a comprehensive neoliberal (and neoconservative) agenda, which included expanding international institutions, promoting global economic integration, castigating nationalist movements of all sorts, deploying U.S. military forces as police and social workers in trouble spots anywhere and everywhere, and fostering regime change by any means necessary in certain targeted countries. All this required not only the continuation but the amplification of America’s Cold War intelligence and surveillance apparatus.
As a senator, Biden marched in step with Washington’s consensus, with a few exceptions that put his capacity for independent thought to the test. He voted against authorizing the 1991 Gulf War, for example, but enthusiastically supported the invasion of Iraq in the policy debates of 2002 and 2003. He then voiced opposition in 2006 to the “surge” of additional troops into Iraq.
The most straightforward explanation for these swerves is that Biden was merely playing politics: he’d first run for president in 1988, after all, and opposing Bush in 1991 may have seemed like a smart move ahead of a future bid for the White House; in contrast, opposing the second Bush’s plans for a new war in the years right after 9/11 would have been politically costly. By 2006, the political logic had changed again, and a would-be contender for the 2008 Democratic nomination — which Biden did indeed try for — would have been wise to position himself as relatively anti-war.
That was, of course, the cycle when Obama, who did not support the Iraq War, defeated the hawkish Hillary Clinton (and the “triangulating” Biden) for the Democratic nomination. Biden was then seen by the political establishment as a vice presidential pick who would balance the ticket — giving the inexperienced, seemingly idealist Obama a long-serving figure as a running mate, one trusted by Washington’s foreign-policy elites in a way the newcomer from Illinois was not.
They need not have worried: Obama did withdraw troops from Iraq, but in many other respects he maintained the direction of U.S. foreign policy that had been set in the early 1990s. He kept the system in place, even as he opened relations with Iran and Cuba.
Just how little Obama changed his party — let alone Washington — was showcased by the fact that his successor as the Democratic Party’s presidential nominee was the very Iraq War supporter he had beaten in 2008. Hillary Clinton, not hope or change, was Barack Obama’s legacy.
The beginning of the end of (this) history
After Clinton lost in 2016 to a Republican outsider, Donald Trump, the Democratic Party and Washington’s foreign-policy elites had only one place left to turn. Joe Biden was a symbol of politics past, but that’s exactly what Washington wanted: a return to what had been considered normal since the 1990s. Biden and Obama have together played a role as America’s Gorbachev — leaders that insiders hoped would allow just enough change to keep the status quo standing.
But like Gorbachev, Biden instead presided over its collapse.
Biden withdrew from Afghanistan, then pursued the same strategic vision that had failed there in Ukraine. There was never a realistic definition of victory in Afghanistan, and Biden had none for Ukraine. Instead of an obtainable goal, in both conflicts Washington elites promoted idealistic dreams: a democratic and liberal Afghanistan, a Ukraine with Crimea restored and NATO membership, Russia too weak and frightened to cause trouble for anyone.
Biden involved America in a new open-ended war, and his policies were perverse even on their own terms. If American support was meant to win the war for Ukraine, or at least provide maximum leverage, then providing the utmost aid up front would have been the logical thing to do.
Instead, Biden followed a pattern of incremental escalation, giving Ukraine more powerful arms and more leeway to use them only as Ukraine weakened — as if the administration’s conscious aim was to protract the war as long as possible, no matter the cost in Ukrainian lives or the danger of the conflict taking a nuclear turn.
And while Biden was prolonging one war, another erupted in the Middle East, with Hamas’s savage attack on Israel and Israel’s relentless, far-ranging response. In this conflict too, Biden’s administration was at war with itself, lecturing Israel while also arming Israel and exerting no effective influence. A deployment of American forces to a “pier” in Gaza for humanitarian purposes — soldiers as social workers again — was predictably useless but thankfully brief, ending before Americans in uniform could die in a warzone doing everything but fighting.
Biden himself is senescent, but so, more importantly, is the worldview he represents. From the George H.W. Bush and Clinton years through the George W. Bush and Obama administrations, and then again with Biden in the White House, Washington has had one way of operating, attempting to engineer a universal system and preferring to prolong conflicts indefinitely rather than admit idealistic aims cannot be realized.
When Donald Trump attempted to shift away from a liberal ideological foreign policy toward a more realistic and negotiation-ready one, the media and official Washington went to extraordinary lengths to stop him. In his first term, Trump’s foreign policy was frustrated from within his administration by unelected officials, and even presidential appointees, who sought to prevent any deviation from “the Blob’s” prescribed path.
But last November’s election gave America’s voters a simple choice, pitting Trump and his foreign policy against a unified establishment, with Kamala Harris having the support not only of liberal Democrats but also neoconservative Republicans like Liz Cheney. Americans chose Trump in greater numbers than ever before, handing him a victory in every swing state.
Both at the ballot box and in the disastrous record of the Biden administration, the old order was put to its final tests and failed. Biden is the epitaph to the epoch of neoconservatism and neoliberalism that defined American policy for decades and that lost the peace after the Cold War.
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