Revenues at the world’s top 100 global arms and military services producing companies totaled $632 billion in 2023, a 4.2% increase over the prior year, according to new data released by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).
The largest increases were tied to ongoing conflicts, including a 40% increase in revenues for Russian companies involved in supplying Moscow’s war on Ukraine and record sales for Israeli firms producing weapons used in that nation’s brutal war on Gaza. Revenues for Turkey’s top arms producing companies also rose sharply — by 24% — on the strength of increased domestic defense spending plus exports tied to the war in Ukraine.
The United States remains the world’s dominant arms producing nation, with $318 billion in revenues flowing to American firms in the world’s top 100 for 2023, more than half of the global total. And the five highest revenue earners globally were all based in the United States — Lockheed Martin, Raytheon (now RTX), Northrop Grumman, Boeing, and General Dynamics.
China ranked second to the United States in arms industry revenues, with nine firms accounting for 16% of the revenue received by companies in the global top 100. Two of the fastest growing countries in terms of revenue growth for top companies were also in Asia, South Korea (plus 39%) and Japan (plus 35%). South Korea’s increase was tied to major export deals with Poland and Australia, while Japan’s was driven by its largest military buildup since World War II.
SIPRI’s analysis takes a “just the facts” approach, tracking sales numbers and correlating them with increases in domestic and export spending tied to specific events. It does not address the dire humanitarian circumstances that underlie the growing revenues of top arms companies, most notably Israel’s unconscionable attacks on Gaza, which have killed over 40,000 people directly and many more through indirect causes, including over 62,000 who have died from starvation. The companies and countries fueling this mass slaughter — including U.S. firms that have supplied a substantial share of the bombs, missiles, and aircraft used in Gaza — should be held to account for their actions, even as they halt the supply of weapons and services that the Israeli government is using to commit ongoing war crimes.
Another major impact of the revenue surge for top arms makers is the diversion of funding and talent from addressing urgent global problems, from climate change to poverty to outbreaks of disease. And the more companies and countries become dependent on the profits of war, the harder it will be to shift funding towards other urgent priorities. The continuing militarization of the global economy has a double cost — lives lost in conflict and devastating problems left unsolved. The situation needs to be treated as far more than a grim parade of statistics about who benefits from a world at war. It should be treated as an urgent call to action for a change in global priorities.
William D. Hartung is a senior research fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. His work focuses on the arms industry and U.S. military budget.
Top image credit: Andrew Angelov via shutterstock.com
Top photo credit: President Donald Trump signs two executive orders in the Oval Office of the White House in Washington, DC on Thursday, January 30, 2025. The first order formally commissioned Christopher Rocheleau as deputy administrator of the FAA. The second ordered an immediate assessment of aviation safety. Photo by Bonnie Cash/Pool/Sipa USA
It’s a time for choosing in the Russia-Ukraine war.
President Donald Trump’s decision to considerably shorten his 50-day deadline for Russia to agree to an unconditional ceasefire with Ukraine reflects his mounting frustration with what has proven to be a difficult peace process.
The President acknowledged on Monday this move is unlikely to shift Russia's position. “If you know what the answer is going to be, why wait?” he said.
As the White House ponders next steps, it’s worth reflecting on the geopolitical moment President Trump finds himself in. It was only eight months ago that any talk of a viable diplomatic settlement was traduced by the previous administration as a naive, shortsighted capitulation to autocracy.
The Trump administration deserves no shortage of credit for lifting the three-year blockade on dialogue with Russia, a grave mistake by Western leaders that has exacerbated the diplomatic logjam Ukraine is now in.
Direct high-level channels between Russia and the U.S. were restored almost immediately upon Trump’s assumption of the presidency. Months of dialogue between Trump and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, as well as the relentless diplomatic efforts of special envoy Steve Witkoff, have de-escalated bilateral U.S.-Russia tensions and generated a clearer, even if ungenerous, picture of Russia’s framework for a peace settlement.
Most importantly, President Trump has conclusively refuted the strategic bankruptcy and political nihilism of the “as long as it takes” mantra that has colored the Western approach to Ukraine under the previous administration. There is now widespread agreement, spearheaded by the White House, that the war must end through substantive diplomacy.
But the administration is now faced with a dilemma that, if left unresolved, threatens to undo the real diplomatic progress that has been made since January. This is a bilateral conflict between Russia and Ukraine, but there is also a level on which it is a confrontation between Russia and the West that is unfolding on Ukrainian soil. Both of these prongs must be addressed as part of any sustainable settlement.
Prioritizing the former and largely ignoring the latter by treating this war as a narrow deconfliction/delimitation problem is a recipe for failure.
To be sure, Trump is fully justified in taking the view that this crisis was compounded and badly mishandled by actors he has nothing to do with, including, as it were, some of the loudest promoters of the false Russiagate narratives that derailed his first term and left a malign imprint on U.S. national security discourse.
Many of these same actors are now urging Trump to abandon the sound judgement behind his pledge to keep America out of endless military entanglements and to instead adopt a lightly repackaged version of the failed Biden-era policies that he rightly denounced.
This crisis was foisted on Trump by forces outside his control, but it is nevertheless his to resolve, and the choices made by the White House in coming weeks will augur fateful results not just for the Ukraine peace process but for the administration’s ability to deliver on its larger foreign policy vision. There cannot be a sustainable reprioritization of U.S. resources away from Europe to the Indo-Pacific while this war roils on, nor if it ends with a volatile Europe teetering on the brink of direct confrontation with Russia.
There is no “walking away” from this, except in the purely tactical sense of leveraging U.S. aid to smooth the way to a viable peace deal. Nor is it technically possible or the slightest bit desirable to revert to the Biden-era malaise of aiding Ukraine from one aid package to the next with no endgame in sight. U.S. security assistance and sanctions can impose costs on Russia in a way that prolongs the conflict, but these tools were never enough to put Ukraine on the winning side of what has been a grinding attrition war against a vastly larger enemy.
It should be recognized as part of any diplomatic point of departure that Russia will never agree to an unconditional 30-day ceasefire. Imposing deadlines in service of this goal, regardless of length, does nothing to assuage the underlying logic that Russia will never surrender its principal source of leverage – namely, its military advantage and escalation dominance over Ukraine – without substantial concessions from Kyiv and the West. There is little the U.S. can offer, in terms of affecting the bilateral military dynamics between Russia and Ukraine, that Russia cannot take by force if the war continues into 2026.
The only way out is through sustained, creative diplomacy that takes into account the full scope of challenges and opportunities in U.S.-Russia relations. The stakes extend well beyond Ukraine; President Trump has a window to not just put an end to the carnage and tragedy wrought by this war, but to do so while advancing American strategic interests in a way not seen since Richard Nixon’s opening to China. But to seize this opportunity, the White House must treat the Ukraine war as the complex, multilayered problem that it is.
The question of Ukraine’s postwar orientation must be at the core of any roadmap to a ceasefire and durable peace. Here, the starting point for negotiations should be guarantees that Ukraine will not join NATO and that no NATO troops will be stationed on Ukrainian soil, in exchange for Moscow’s reaffirmation that it has no objection to Ukraine’s pursuit of European Union membership.
The Trump administration should outline concrete steps to restore U.S.-Russia commercial ties and reintegrate Russia into Western-led financial institutions as part of a package deal premised on Russia’s willingness to soften its territorial claims. The White House should likewise make clear that a negotiated settlement in Ukraine would generate the goodwill and confidence-building mechanisms necessary for constructive dialogue on arms control and NATO’s force posture in Eastern Europe, both questions of acute concern to the Kremlin.
Creative solutions will have to be developed to address Ukraine’s postwar security needs in a way that doesn’t feed into future escalatory spirals between Russia and its neighbors; my proposal for an off-site stockpiles aims to accomplish just that.
In short, the key to a successful negotiating posture on Ukraine is to refocus the talks away from immediate deconfliction to underlying strategic issues that both Moscow and Washington have vested interests in addressing. This can only be accomplished by accepting and consistently acting on the reality that the main sources of American leverage are to be found off the battlefield. No one said this would be easy, but the costs of inaction – both for Ukraine and U.S. global interests – are far higher.
Peace through strength has always meant more than maintaining military readiness, important as that is. The true measure of strength is being able to tap all the tools at your disposal in pursuit of concrete national interests, and nowhere is this sense of hard-nosed pragmatism more urgently required than the Ukraine crisis. President Trump’s instincts as a dealmaker have gotten him this far – now is the time to bring it home.
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Top photo credit: Times of India/You Tube/Screengrab: US contractors deployed in Gaza in February 2025.
Americans working for a little known U.S.-based private military contractor have begun to come forward to media and members of Congress with charges that their work has involved using live ammunition for crowd control and other abusive measures against unarmed civilians seeking food at controversial food distribution sites run by the Global Humanitarian Fund (GHF) in Gaza.
UG Solutions was hired by the GHF to secure and deliver food into Gaza. The GHF, with the help of the PMCs claims to have provided nearly 100 million meals to Gaza. Israel put GHF in control of what used to be the UN-led aid mission.
UG Solutions is one of two American contracting outfits working at the food centers. Both have vehemently denied the contractors’ claims, as has the IDF. The GHF has also put out extensive responses calling the charges categorically false.
Needless to say this raises a ton of questions about the use of American contractors in this particular conflict zone, but also about who they are. From all available information about UG Solutions, they are not operating under the banner, nor protection, of a U.S. agency contract, but of a foreign entity. This expansion of scope, I contend, makes UG Solutions a full-fledged mercenary organization and takes the industry down a very dark path.
What is a mercenary?
The use of Private Military Contractors (PMCs) in Iraq created a gray area between war fighters and private civilians filling combat roles in a war zone. The U.S., not wanting to be seen as occupiers, handed over the governance of Iraq in 2004. In theory, this meant the military mission ended, and the diplomatic mission began.
In practicality, the war raged on and diplomats needed to be protected by non-military members. Civilians working for companies like Dyncorp and Blackwater protected the people tasked with helping the nascent government of Iraq rebuild. Were they mercenaries? The short answer is: Sort of.
Is specially recruited to fight in an armed conflict
Directly participates in the hostilities
Is primarily motivated by private gain (promised significant compensation)
Is not a national of a party to the conflict
Is not a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict
Has not been sent by a state on official duty
Lawyers can haggle over the legal definition of each criterion but, by my count, and having worked for Blackwater in 2004-2005, PMC’s meet four of the six criteria (1, 2, 3, and 5).
Is UG Solutions the next Blackwater?
No. But they share similarities. Blackwater gained notoriety protecting diplomats in Iraq in 2003. The contract to protect the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, Paul Bremer, led to contracts under the U.S. Department of State (DoS) protecting the diplomats, Other Government Agencies ( CIA, FBI, etc.), U.S. Senators, and anyone else who wanted to check on the progress being made in Iraq.
Ours was primarily a defensive operation where we protected people and places but had to move around the country to do so. This is also a gray area we had to move around the country with, and without, the people we protected. This meant clearing traffic using the same weapons issued to the U.S. military. Some could argue this was still defensive but the videos of us on YouTube look a lot like offensive operations.
These contracts were issued by DoS to Blackwater who then hired independent contractors (me) to work for them in Iraq. With multiple layers of separation between the grantor of the contract (DoS) and the men doing the work on the ground, it’s been said that Blackwater wasn’t a mercenary group but it hired them.
Going back to the UN definition of mercenary, I contend, this meets four of the six criteria: We were recruited to fight, participated in hostilities, were motivated by private gain, and were not members of the armed forces in the conflict.
Leaking into the gray area created by hiring PMC’s I could make an argument we were also not a national of a party to a conflict as the war was now a “diplomatic” mission between the U.S. and Iraq where Iraq requested U.S. military assistance so we weren’t technically “at war” with Iraq any longer. But hey, I got a diplomatic passport and was told by Blackwater we had diplomatic immunity so I was definitely sent by the state on official duty.
Is UG Solutions the next Wagner Group?
No. Honestly, they don’t share any similarities. Wagner is commonly referred to as a mercenary group but, by the UN definition, they are not. They are an extension of the Russian military. Granted, they recruited from prisons and have committed war crimes, but they aren’t mercenaries. Of the three companies, they are the one which can claim they are not mercenaries.
The primary difference between Wagner and Blackwater is Wagner is a military unit. They conduct offensive operations, take and hold land, and are sent to places where Russia wants to exert influence. It wasn’t until 2023 that Vladimir Putin confessed Wagner was funded by the government. They also have a rank structure and code of conduct similar to the U.S. military. Granted, they don’t seem to abide by it in the same manner as U.S. service members are regulated by the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), but it exists. That’s more than Blackwater had.
Based on this, they aren’t any more a “mercenary army” than the U.S. military. I know this is going to ruffle some feathers but I didn’t create the criteria so don’t get mad at me.
Is UG Solutions a new kind of mercenary?
Yes. UG Solutions is a mercenary group. They meet every criterion. They are not a party to the conflict in Gaza, were recruited to participate in hostilities, were not sent by the U.S. government, are not a national of a party in the conflict, are not part of a military, and are there for personal gain. I want to make a distinction that UG Solutions, as a company, is a mercenary group. The men working for them are also mercenaries.
Similar to Blackwater, they are primarily doing defensive operations and the U.S. State Department has helped fund the GHF but they are headquartered in the U.S. working for a foreign entity, in a combat zone, for money. It’s time to call it like it is – U.S. companies are directly involved in mercenary work and trying to shield themselves under the guise of being a Private Military Contractor.
So what does this mean?
UG Solutions took the PMC model and moved it forward by contracting with a foreign entity. There is no connection to the U.S. government. No way for them to shield themselves under the American flag. Granted, their mission is ostensibly humanitarian — pointing out that the UN uses contractors for similar operations. They have a point, albeit, a flimsy one. Whistleblowers have come forward to say that they have been engaging in aggressive offensive tactics against an unarmed population of Gazans coming to the GHF sites for food.
The use of PMC’s here has evolved to the point where there is little space between contracting and mercenary work. UG Solutions has moved the line of what is appropriate for U.S. based PMCs both ethically and legally by throwing morality to the wind and working for an organization unaffiliated with the U.S. government. Politicians sit silently as sea change happens refusing to acknowledge, let alone regulate, the private companies working as military proxies. Sadly, this will continue until an incident like the ambush of four Blackwater contractors in Fallujah, Iraq, 2004 happens again.
It's time to call this out for what is: mercenary work. If we refuse to define it, we’ll never have the conversation of whether or not we should continue to use PMCs as a proxy for U.S. military and foreign policy. We owe it to ourselves to address this scope creep before it leads to the more U.S. civilians in a combat zone.
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Top photo credit: Lai Ching-te (William Lai), the President of Taiwan pose with soldier during his inspection of the Navy's Taiwan-built Xu Jiang stealth missile corvettes in Keelung, Taiwan, in July 13, 2024. (JamesonWu1972/Shutterstock)
Earlier this week, the Financial Times reported that the Trump administration denied permission for Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te to transit the U.S. en route to his diplomatic trip to Latin America. The U.S. decision eventually led Lai to cancel his trip, according to the report.
The Trump administration’s blocking of Lai’s stopover has drawn criticism across Washington’s foreign policy establishment, including from think tank experts and former officials. Some critics stress the moral inadequacy of the decision, arguing that the U.S. should not be turning its back on Taiwan, a longtime democratic friend, particularly when the island is subject to increasing diplomatic and military pressure from China. Others point to the danger of eroding deterrence; that is, how Washington’s decision might signal weakness and embolden Beijing at a critical moment.
Such criticisms reflect valid concerns. However, the administration’s decision to avoid high-profile interactions with Lai this time around makes sense given its diplomatic focus on ongoing tariff and related negotiations with China. Moreover, there was considerable risk that Beijing would use Lai’s visit as a justification for intensifying its already escalating saber-rattling against Taiwan, consequently making the state of deterrence more fragile.
Lai’s trip, initially scheduled for early August, would have coincided with Washington and Beijing's active negotiations to reach a trade deal, which is a high priority for Trump’s foreign and domestic agenda. Just this Monday and Tuesday, senior American and Chinese officials were meeting in Stockholm, and talks are expected to resume throughout the coming weeks. Allowing Lai’s stay in the U.S. for a series of high-profile activities, reportedly including an event in New York with a major U.S. think tank, could jeopardize the trade talks.
Historically, China has opposed high-profile political interactions between Taipei and Washington, including Taiwanese presidents visiting the U.S., viewing them as a tool for Taiwan to promote its “independence” and Washington’s implicit endorsement. To be sure, Chinese reactions have varied depending on the geopolitical climate and the perceived political significance. When Taiwan-China relations and U.S.-China relations were relatively stable, and the scope of interactions was kept fairly limited in terms of formality and visibility, Beijing’s responses to Taiwanese presidential stopovers in the U.S. tended to be more tolerant, often not going beyond ritualistic rhetorical objections. But when Taiwan-China relations and U.S.-China relations were tense, and the interactions were seen as politically symbolic, Beijing’s reactions tended to be more belligerent and escalatory.
For example, in 1995, with the approval of the Bill Clinton administration, then-Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui — a strongly nationalist figure (or pro-independence from China’s viewpoint) who had a conflictual relationship with Beijing — visited New York and delivered a major speech on Taiwan’s transformation from authoritarianism to democracy at Cornell University. Lee’s visit provoked Beijing to recall its ambassador from Washington and ramp up its military threats against Taiwan, which ended up triggering what is known as the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis between the U.S. and China.
A more recent case took place when Lai’s predecessor, Tsai Ing-wen — who had a tense relationship with Beijing due to her firm stance on the issue of sovereignty and independence — visited the U.S. in 2023 and participated in various high-profile activities, including meetings with senior U.S. politicians and a think tank event. Beijing responded by conducting large-scale military drills encircling Taiwan for three days.
In today’s context, tensions in Taiwan-China relations and U.S.-China relations are worryingly high. Beijing is deeply pessimistic about Lai — known for his pro-independence credentials — and has been hostile toward his government. As with his predecessor Tsai, Lai has also remained hardline toward Beijing regarding Taiwan’s sovereignty, if not tougher in rhetoric. Add to this, mutual suspicions between the U.S. and China about their intentions continue to deepen as “great power competition” overshadows their relationship.
Given the fraught dynamics in the U.S.-Taiwan-China triangular relationship, it was likely that Lai’s visit would prompt an aggressive Chinese response that would risk derailing, at least temporarily, the trade talks. Perhaps recognizing the volatility of the situation amid high-stakes negotiations with China, Washington appears to have chosen to avoid provoking Beijing.
Essentially, the Trump administration’s decision to veto Lai’s stopover has no real impact on the concrete cooperation between the U.S. and Taiwan. Nor does it suggest the administration will not allow future transits. Behind the optics, the structure of cooperation remains business as usual, as evidenced by the administration’s recent pitch to Congress to expand military aid to Taiwan.
The takeaway here is not that high-profile political engagement with Taiwan has no value, but to think more carefully about the benefits and costs of such symbolic interactions. Taiwanese presidential transits to the U.S. or visits to Taiwan by high-level American officials can be meaningful in terms of demonstrating mutual friendship. But ultimately, practical cooperation, not symbolic visits, will be the decisive factor in U.S.-Taiwan ties and the state of deterrence vis-à-vis China more broadly.
Furthermore, limiting high-profile symbolic interactions with Taipei could better position Washington to practice both deterrence and reassurance vis-à-vis Beijing. By doing so, Washington could avoid creating unnecessary pretexts for Chinese saber-rattling, thereby reducing a potential source of escalation, while continuing to support Taiwan's defense efforts. Simultaneously, Washington’s restrained approach to political engagement with Taipei could help reassure Beijing about the continued U.S. adherence to the One China policy — that it seeks to promote a peaceful resolution of cross-strait differences, not Taiwan’s independence.
All that said, there are legitimate concerns to be raised about how the U.S. blocking of Lai’s transit can give the impression that Washington is willing to compromise U.S. security interests regarding Taiwan for a trade deal with Beijing. Such an impression could mislead Beijing into believing that it can leverage trade talks to extract security concessions regarding Taiwan, such as loosening or cutting U.S. military support for the island.
The revelation from yesterday’s report that the Taiwanese defense minister’s scheduled visit to Washington in June was cancelled after a call between Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping further highlights the risk of Beijing’s possible overreach in negotiations.
To ensure negotiations are grounded on realistic expectations, U.S. officials should make it clear to their Chinese counterparts that security and trade issues are to be kept separate, and also advise Trump that it is necessary to avoid such entanglement.
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