Revenues at the world’s top 100 global arms and military services producing companies totaled $632 billion in 2023, a 4.2% increase over the prior year, according to new data released by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).
The largest increases were tied to ongoing conflicts, including a 40% increase in revenues for Russian companies involved in supplying Moscow’s war on Ukraine and record sales for Israeli firms producing weapons used in that nation’s brutal war on Gaza. Revenues for Turkey’s top arms producing companies also rose sharply — by 24% — on the strength of increased domestic defense spending plus exports tied to the war in Ukraine.
The United States remains the world’s dominant arms producing nation, with $318 billion in revenues flowing to American firms in the world’s top 100 for 2023, more than half of the global total. And the five highest revenue earners globally were all based in the United States — Lockheed Martin, Raytheon (now RTX), Northrop Grumman, Boeing, and General Dynamics.
China ranked second to the United States in arms industry revenues, with nine firms accounting for 16% of the revenue received by companies in the global top 100. Two of the fastest growing countries in terms of revenue growth for top companies were also in Asia, South Korea (plus 39%) and Japan (plus 35%). South Korea’s increase was tied to major export deals with Poland and Australia, while Japan’s was driven by its largest military buildup since World War II.
SIPRI’s analysis takes a “just the facts” approach, tracking sales numbers and correlating them with increases in domestic and export spending tied to specific events. It does not address the dire humanitarian circumstances that underlie the growing revenues of top arms companies, most notably Israel’s unconscionable attacks on Gaza, which have killed over 40,000 people directly and many more through indirect causes, including over 62,000 who have died from starvation. The companies and countries fueling this mass slaughter — including U.S. firms that have supplied a substantial share of the bombs, missiles, and aircraft used in Gaza — should be held to account for their actions, even as they halt the supply of weapons and services that the Israeli government is using to commit ongoing war crimes.
Another major impact of the revenue surge for top arms makers is the diversion of funding and talent from addressing urgent global problems, from climate change to poverty to outbreaks of disease. And the more companies and countries become dependent on the profits of war, the harder it will be to shift funding towards other urgent priorities. The continuing militarization of the global economy has a double cost — lives lost in conflict and devastating problems left unsolved. The situation needs to be treated as far more than a grim parade of statistics about who benefits from a world at war. It should be treated as an urgent call to action for a change in global priorities.
William D. Hartung is a senior research fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. His work focuses on the arms industry and U.S. military budget.
Top image credit: Andrew Angelov via shutterstock.com
One of the more surprising developments of President Trump’s tenure in office thus far has been the relatively calm U.S. relationship with Mexico, despite expectations that his longstanding views on trade, immigration, and narcotics would lead to a dramatic deterioration.
Of course, Mexico has not escaped the administration’s tariff onslaught and there have been occasional diplomatic setbacks, but the tenor of ties between Trump and President Claudia Sheinbaum has been less fraught than many had anticipated. However, that thaw could be tested soon by economic disagreements as negotiations open on a scheduled review of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada trade agreement (USMCA).
State of play
Both the U.S. and Mexico appear to have found a way to cooperate on the key bilateral security issues — like immigration and organized crime — allowing them to compartmentalize these subjects from negotiations over the future of the economic relationship. But the upcoming USMCA review could still be complicated by broader foreign policy questions about supply-chain security, American economic diplomacy in the hemisphere, and the tradeoffs involved in granting market access to the U.S.
When Secretary of State Marco Rubio visited Mexico last week, the U.S. attacked a boat in international waters that was allegedly transporting narcotics for a Venezuelan cartel. In his press conference, Rubio had warnings for Caracas, but was complimentary about his host country, noting that the U.S. has “had a great relationship with the Government of Mexico” adding that “it is the closest security cooperation we have ever had, maybe with any country but certainly in the history of U.S.-Mexico relations.”
The stabilization of ties is in good part a reflection of Sheinbaum’s success in balancing a steadfast insistence on her country’s sovereignty with her ability to deliver on key American demands — such as the extradition of more than 50 alleged drug traffickers to the U.S. in August.
Sheinbaum’s strategy has helped Mexico’s position — for example, the 30% retaliatory tariffs announced on the country in late July have been suspended for 90 days. No such relief was granted to Canada, which got hit right away with 35% tariffs. Similarly, Mexico is doing significantly better than Brazil, where political and foreign policy differences have led to Trump hitting the South American giant with a 50% tariff.
Beyond Sheinbaum’s deft handling of the relationship, there are other factors in play. One is probably the sheer lack of bandwidth as the Trump administration has embarked on a range of tariff, trade, and “deal” initiatives spurred by economic, ideological, and geopolitical motives, such as the recent imposition of a 50% tariff on India. All this frenzied activity has meant that America’s largest trading partner (Mexico accounted for $840 billion of trade in 2024) kept getting pushed to the back of the line for a scarce commodity in Washington — attention.
The sheer volume of bilateral trade points to another factor that might have kept things from spiraling out of control. Mexico plays a critical role in U.S. industrial supply chains, particularly in the automotive sector, where parts and completed vehicles can cross national borders inside USMCA multiple times during the production process. Fear of the ensuing disruptions has likely helped to at least dampen some of the White House’s enthusiasm for tariffs as a method to deliver quick results.
Where does the USMCA review come in?
But that period of calm could end soon with a long-scheduled review of USMCA (which was itself the result of a 2019 renegotiation under Trump of the original 1992 North American Free Trade Agreement). This will set in train a period of contentious talks as the parties review (and effectively renegotiate yet again) a treaty that the U.S. is already ignoring in many respects. The deadline for renegotiation is Oct. 4. Tariffs on items that do not comply with USMCA rules have jumped to 25% (versus 2.5% earlier), and a complicated mechanism for tariff rebates on auto parts imported from Mexico has a two-year sunset clause, hinting strongly at a desire to force that industry to return to the U.S.
Amid all the trade turmoil emanating from Washington, Mexico’s Economy Secretary Marcelo Ebrard has been arguing that, as long as tariffs on his country are lower than those imposed on others, Mexico will still come out ahead. However, even that is now in doubt. The White House’s quest for investment deals with wealthy, industrialized countries could lead to lower tariffs on those countries’ exports to the U.S. than apply to those from Mexico.
For example, the deals with the EU, Japan, and South Korea contain provisions that could lower tariffs on their automobile exports to the U.S. to 15%. Such a step would hurt not just Mexico, but also U.S. automobile manufacturers who have large operations in that country. Ford CEO Jim Farley pointed this out, saying that these deals would give Japanese automakers a big cost advantage over American automakers who have integrated supply chains across all three USMCA members.
Similarly, lower tariffs on imports from outside the USMCA would reduce the incentive for European and Asian auto and parts manufacturers to locate more of their plants in Mexico. This paradoxically puts Mexico in a position where it could become the strongest proponent of what originated as an American idea — the importance of reducing the U.S.’s supply-chain geographic and security vulnerabilities by “nearshoring;” that is, locating a larger portion of the production facilities servicing American markets within USMCA.
Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent invoked a “Fortress North America” in February when he asked Canada to join Mexico in matching U.S. tariffs on China. And Rubio’s first official trip to Bogotá saw him give an address entitled “An Americas First Policy” where he said “relocating our critical supply chains to the Western Hemisphere would clear a path for our neighbors’ economic growth and safeguard Americans’ own economic security.”
Both statements are in line with Mexico’s preferences, as suggested by the recent move to impose 50% tariffs on Chinese automobiles, but could run into two separate obstacles at the upcoming review. The first is that influential constituencies like the autoworkers' union want to push for higher purely American content, i.e., reshoring industry within the borders of the U.S. alone rather than just nearshoring to USMCA countries.
In a brief published in July, I suggested that it might be possible to reconcile the “nearshoring” and “reshoring” agendas by raising the percentage of automobile content required to be manufactured in the U.S., while simultaneously requiring significantly higher USMCA content in electronics and telecommunications. The latter would benefit Mexican manufacturing because the country functions largely as a final assembly point for those industries. And combining an element of automotive reshoring with nearshoring in other critical industries would assuage American concerns about both jobs and supply chain security.
However, this would depend on Washington taking the idea of a deeper North American market that confers both security and regional developmental benefits more seriously instead of treating access to American consumers as a reward for investing in the U.S.
So even if calm continues to prevail on the non-trade issues that precipitated the first round of U.S. tariffs on Mexico in February, other issues arising from different understandings of economics-security linkages could still complicate the USMCA review.
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Top image credit: US Secretary of State Marco Rubio (right) is seen in the Oval Office with US President Donald Trump (left) during a meeting with the King of Jordan, Abdullah II Ibn Al-Hussein in the Oval Office the White House in Washington DC on Tuesday, February 11, 2025. Credit: Aaron Schwartz / Pool/Sipa USA via REUTERS
The US-Colombia drug war alliance is at a breaking point
It appears increasingly likely that the Trump administration will move to "decertify" Colombia as a partner in its fight against global drug trafficking for the first time in 30 years.
The upcoming determination, due September 15, could trigger cuts to hundreds of millions of dollars in bilateral assistance, visa restrictions on Colombian officials, and sanctions on the country's financial system under current U.S. law. Decertification would strike a major blow to what has been Washington’s top security partner in the region as it struggles with surging coca production and expanding criminal and insurgent violence.
A recent U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime report found that coca cultivation in Colombia had increased 53% in 2023, with the country now responsible for 67% of global production. An internal security report shared with Reuters revealed that the number of combatants in the country's armed groups — mostly financed through drug trafficking and illegal mining — increased by 7% in the past year and 45% since President Gustavo Petro took office in mid-2022.
Colombian security forces have been reeling after dissident members of the demobilized FARC guerilla group shot down a police helicopter during a coca eradication operation last month, killing 12 police officers. On the same day, a truck bomb on a major thoroughfare near a military aviation school in Cali exploded, killing six civilians.
While Petro's government has sought to break with the country's militarized counternarcotics strategy through peace talks with armed actors, crop substitution programs, interdictions at more profitable nodes of the supply chain, and global initiatives to decriminalize and reduce the demand for drugs, it has been forced to revive elements of the U.S.-backed war on drugs, including manual eradication, aerial bombardments, and bounties on the heads of crime bosses.
Under the framework of Plan Colombia, Colombia has been the largest recipient of U.S. foreign assistance in the Western Hemisphere, averaging $700 million annually in security aid, development assistance, economic support, counternarcotics funding and foreign military financing through the Departments of Defense and State and the now-defunct USAID — for a total of nearly $15 billion since 2000.
The threat of decertification, which puts much of that aid at risk, comes amid a rapid deterioration in relations with the historic U.S. ally since President Trump took office. A Petro-Trump social media spat in January over conditions of deportation flights led to threats of 50% tariffs, visa revocations, and economic sanctions.
Insinuations by Secretary of State Marco Rubio that Petro was responsible for the political violence that culminated in the assassination of Senator Miguel Uribe Turbay in June, followed by a diplomatic crisis over unfounded allegations that Rubio was involved in a coup plot against Petro, have eroded once-solid ties. A proposed 50% reduction in non-military assistance to Colombia in the 2026 U.S. federal budget and the administration’s unhappiness with the conviction for witness tampering and bribery of the former rightwing president, Álvaro Uribe, have further strained bilateral ties.
Tariffs on Colombia's U.S.-bound exports and demands to extradite guerrilla leaders involved in peace negotiations have led Colombia to seek new trade and security agreements with China and the European Union, a trend that decertification could accelerate.
To mitigate some of these concerns, Colombia in August hosted a bipartisan delegation of two freshman Colombian-American senators, Ruben Gallego (D-Ariz.) and Bernie Moreno (R-Ohio), who told the AP before arriving that “the purpose of the trip is to understand all the dynamics before any decision is made.” After meetings with top Colombian officials, Gallego said in a statement: "Colombia will suffer more if we take away its certification because there will be more unemployed people, and then drug traffickers and criminals will have more people who want to work for them."
In July, the Colombian government tapped a former Trump aide to "[advocate] for Colombia’s position in anticipation of the forthcoming determination by the U.S. administration," documents filed with the Justice Department’s Foreign Agent Registration Unit reveal.
The one-year, $720,000 contract with DGA Government Relations is being overseen by Nicole Frazier, who served as a special assistant to the president in the last two years of Trump’s first term. She has been tasked with giving "special emphasis" to ensuring Colombia is not decertified.
For the past six months, Colombia has waged a diplomatic offensive against the pending blacklisting, with numerous high-level visits by top police and counternarcotics officials, meetings with key GOP lawmakers and Trump administration officials, and repeatedwarnings from Colombia’s defense minister that decertification would run counter to making the U.S. “safer, stronger and more prosperous,” echoing Rubio’s words from January.
“It’s a political decision,” Colombia’s foreign minister Rosa Villavicencio said this week, but “if you look at certification objectively, in terms of the social costs we’ve paid, lives lost and servicemembers killed, the just thing to do would be to maintain our certification, and we hope that it’s looked at objectively.”
After the State Department sends its recommendation to the president based on Colombia’s interdiction results, hectare reduction figures, and anti-drug policies over the past year, Rubio will send his own recommendation to Trump, who makes the final decision, which is then submitted to Congress for feedback, though typically the presidential determination stands.
Security analysts and former U.S. officials have urged the U.S. to issue national security waivers allowing certain bilateral cooperation to continue even if Colombia is formally decertified. The last time Colombia was decertified, insurgent and paramilitary violence surged.
Without these waivers, transnational criminal groups could seize the opportunity to ramp up operations across the region and narcotics flows to the U.S. may increase, according to these experts. U.S.-bound migration from Colombia could also resume and foreign investment in the country continue to wane.
Gimena Sanchez-Garzoli, a Colombia expert at the Washington Office on Latin America, says that waivers could include foreign military financing and international narcotics and law enforcement programs, as well as funds approved in the FY26 National Defense Authorization Act.
“Cooperation with the U.S. is so embedded that decertification would seriously affect all operations, including in air, maritime, intelligence and other capacities,” a Colombian defense official told the International Crisis Group. “The main beneficiaries of decertification would be criminal groups, [who] are regional, not just local, so [this] would endanger security across the hemisphere.”
Decertification could also inadvertently boost Petro’s party in the lead-up to next year's elections — contrary to the Trump administration's preference — and prove difficult to reverse if the Trump-aligned opposition wins the presidency in August.
This could be why business leaders, opposition mayors and former President Uribe’s party are, like the Petro government, warning U.S. lawmakers and the administration about the risks of decertifying the country. This week, the mayors of Colombia’s second and third largest cities visited Washington to advocate against decertification.
“It would be the U.S. shooting itself in the foot,” Sanchez-Garzoli said, because “by isolating Colombia, the U.S. would not get the intelligence it needs, which is vital for counternarcotics efforts and strategies in the region. This would have a boomerang effect and would be bad for drug policy in the region, which is why in the past Colombia has always ended up being certified.”
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Top image credit: President Donald Trump meets with Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Vice President JD Vance before a call with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Monday, August 18, 2025, in the Oval Office. (Official White House Photo by Daniel Torok)
The U.S. military recently launched a plainly illegal strike on a small civilian Venezuelan boat that President Trump claims was a successful hit on “narcoterrorists.” Vice President JD Vance responded to allegations that the strike was a war crime by saying, “I don’t give a shit what you call it,” insisting this was the “highest and best use of the military.”
This is only the latest troubling development in the Trump administration’s attempt to repurpose “War on Terror” mechanisms to use the military against cartels and to expedite his much vaunted mass deportation campaign, which he says is necessary because of an "invasion" at the border.
Unfortunately, more than two decades of widely-accepted, bipartisan laws and norms first laid the groundwork for this to occur.
After 9/11, the Bush administration created the Specially Designated Global Terrorists list, and Congress expanded the pre-existing Foreign Terrorist Organization list. These lists allow the executive branch, at its sole discretion, to add and remove individuals and groups to standing lists of “terrorists,” a term that is defined broadly.
The Trump administration has exercised this authority to formally designate transnational cartels as “terrorists” due in part to their role in the flow of people and drugs across the southern border into the United States. They have leveraged this designation to justify a range of actions, including deploying troops to Los Angeles and deporting immigrants to a brutal Salvadorean prison without due process.
Another post-9/11 legal invention that paved the way to what the Trump administration is doing today was the USA PATRIOT Act’s updates to immigration law that allowed deportation of not just those involved in actual violent acts of terrorism, but also those loosely associated with designated “terrorist groups,” even if those associations were peaceful and law-abiding or involuntary and a result of duress. People who have previously been excluded from the United States by these provisions include Iraqi interpreters for U.S. troops, victims of forced labor by violent armed groups in El Salvador, and even Nelson Mandela. These provisions mean that not just alleged members of cartels, but also cartel victims could be denied entry into the United States or deported if already here.
These same post-9/11 immigration law amendments also allow for revoking or denying immigration benefits to foreign nationals who “endorse or espouse” “terrorist activity,” defined broadly. The Trump administration has already revoked the visas of several immigrant students and scholars solely for their nonviolent activities criticizing the U.S.-Israel genocide in Gaza, as part of what they call a “zero-tolerance” policy for terrorism. The administration has primarily leaned on an older and more obscure provision of immigration law to carry out these attacks on immigrants’ free speech rights. But if current efforts are blocked by courts, or they wish to go further, post-9/11 immigration law may give them the tools to justify doing so.
The original decision to treat the 9/11 attacks not as crime but as warfare, and to launch a literal “war on terror” in response, remains the primary post-9/11 legal innovation on which so many abuses are made possible. Under this global war paradigm, the Obama administration carried out ruthless drone killings, including one that targeted a U.S. citizen, and justified the strikes with a mish-mash of legal standards that applied rules of war outside of actual war zones, and expansively interpreted what constitutes an “imminent threat” and resulting “self-defense” powers.
Every post-9/11 president has claimed wide authority to use military force so long as it serves a vague “national interest.” We can see echoes of this in the Trump administration’s insistence that the small Venezuelan boat blown up by the U.S. military posed an “immediate threat to the United States,” that the strike complied with the laws of war, and was “in defense of vital U.S. national interests.”
Commentators are entirely correct to denounce these assertions of legal authority. But policymakers have spent more than two decades accepting a war paradigm against whomever presidents determine to be “terrorist,” making it politically and legally all the more difficult to push back against what the Trump administration is doing now.
It is also worth recalling that dragnet detentions and deportations of immigrants under the auspices of the “War on Terror” are not entirely unique to the Trump era. In the Bush administration, then-FBI Director Robert Mueller leaned on civil immigration enforcement authorities to round up more than 1,000 Arab, Muslim and South Asian immigrants without due process for secret detention until they were “cleared” of terrorism.
A year later, the National Security Entry and Exit Registration System, which some have called the original “Muslim registry,” was launched, imposing onerous registration and surveillance requirements on lawful noncitizen immigrants suspected of no wrongdoing, almost entirely from Muslim-majority countries, with a stated justification of countering terrorism. This program wasn’t fully dismantled until well into the Obama administration, and produced no convictions for acts of terrorism. It did result in the deportation of more than 13,000 people, mostly over minor immigration process violations.
There are more powers that post-9/11 legal infrastructure affords that this administration has not pursued. It is not impossible to imagine terrorism prosecutions against low-level drug purchasers at home, new hot wars across Latin America, and more dragnet deportations of immigrants, justified by a melding of the laws of war, counterterrorism law, and immigration enforcement. This is because, on a bipartisan basis, our lawmakers have built and strengthened a post-9/11 package of powers that gets handed to each successive president, ripe for potential new weaponization and abuse. The targeting of immigrants and cartels as “terrorists,” including with the tools of warfare, is not a sharp deviation from our recent history — it is its logical conclusion.
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