UPDATE 10/28: According to the New York Times Saturday morning, U.S. air defenses shot down a drone new the Al Asad Air Base in western Iraq on Friday, shortly after the U.S. launched retaliatory attacks against Iranian targets in Syria.
There were no injuries or damage on the ground, U.S. officials said on Friday. Pentagon officials also said that rockets were also fired into northern Syria on Friday but landed far from American troops.
The Pentagon announced it conducted F-16 fighter aircraft strikes against Iranian Revolutionary Guard targets in Syria early on Friday.
The targets — military supply depots that an official said were run by the IRGC — were located near Boukamal in the eastern part of the country. The official said the ammo and weapons there were the same used in a string of recent attacks against U.S. troops on bases in Iraq and Syria.
According to the Associated Press: "there had been Iranian-aligned militia and IRGC personnel on the base and no civilians, but the U.S. does not have any information yet on casualties or an assessment of damage. The official would not say how many munitions were launched by the F-16s."
U.S. personnel had come under fire for several days starting Oct. 19 and through last weekend. At least 24 troops sustained minor injuries, including 19 who suffered mild traumatic brain injuries from the blasts. The Biden administration has blamed Iranian backed militias for the attack and it appears now that they believe Iran's elite guards are supplying those fighters. Of course there are concerns that the war in Gaza will spill over into the region and one way it could do that is if U.S. military in Iraq and Syria are triggered into a fight.
In a statement, Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III said that the airstrikes were “narrowly tailored strikes in self-defense,” and “do not constitute a shift in our approach to the Israel-Hamas conflict.”
Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s recently unveiled his “victory plan,” which is meant to give Western leaders a strategy for how Ukraine can defeat Russia and defend against Moscow moving forward.
While U.S. officials were reportedly “unimpressed” with the proposal when Zelenskyy presented it to the Biden administration last month, the Ukrainian president presented details publicly for the first time on Thursday at an EU summit in Brussels. At the top of Zelenskyy’s plan is an unconditional invitation to join NATO.
“It is important for us that we are strengthened, and the first step should be an invitation,” Zelenskyy said. Zelenskyy’s plan also calls for Western assistance to strengthen Ukrainian defenses, including the allowance for Ukraine to use Western-supplied long-range missiles deep into Russian territory. The missile-use request is not new, and the United States and United Kingdom have been previously reluctant to provide this permission.
Zelenskyy is also asking the EU and the U.S. to protect Ukraine’s natural resources and to position Ukrainian troops in Europe, with the goal of replacing the presence of some U.S. troops on the continent, which have been there since the end of World War II.
Zelenskyy didn’t offer much by way of pathways to peace or ceasefire and even said the plan could go into place without Russian cooperation at all. And it has so far had a lukewarm reception from Western leadership. “We are not at the point right now where the alliance is talking about issuing an invitation in the short term,” said U.S. Ambassador to NATO Jullianne Smith, referring to formally inviting Ukraine to join the alliance. She added however that, “as always, we will continue conversations with our friends in Ukraine to talk to them about ways in which they can continue to move closer to this Alliance.” NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte did not outright accept the plan either, saying that he would welcome the day that Ukraine joins the alliance, but that “doesn’t mean that I here can say I support the whole plan.”
Meanwhile, President Biden took what’s been billed as a “farewell trip” to Berlin on Thursday to make up, in part, for the Ramstein meeting that was canceled due to last week’s hurricane in Florida. Despite the meeting’s cancellation, Biden still pledged an additional $425 million in defense aid to Kyiv as support for a continued war is shifting both among Western leaders, and members of the Ukrainian military and public.
“Biden’s trip to Germany represents a last-ditch effort to corral flagging trans-Atlantic support for Ukraine,” said Mark Episkopos, Eurasia research fellow at the Quincy Institute. “But there is every indication that European partners will continue slowly peeling away in the absence of a viable strategy, articulated and pursued by the White House, for bringing the war to a close on the best possible terms for Ukraine and the West.”
Other Ukraine war news this week:
Nearly half of the land taken by Ukraine in the Kursk region of Russia has been retaken, according to The Telegraph. Two months ago Ukraine captured the lightly guarded territory just over the border and Putin has vowed to retake all of it.
Reuters is reporting that Zelenskyy has called on his Western allies to further sanction North Korea following reports of Pyongyang’s direct involvement in the war. According to Ukrainian intelligence, the Kremlin is preparing to receive 10,000 soldiers from North Korea, lining up with earlier reports of North Korea assisting Moscow both with soldiers and advisers, as well as with weapons.
Levadne, in the southern Zaporizhzhya region of Ukraine, has been taken by Russian troops. The Associated Pressreports that the city was retaken on Monday, which adds to the increasing number of cities which Russia has taken or retaken in recent months.
State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller was asked about reports that North Korean troops were assisting Russia with its war against Ukraine. Miller said that if the reports were true, “it would also indicate a new level of desperation by Russia, as it continues to suffer significant casualties on the battlefield.”
When asked about a senior Russian official’s claim that the U.S. would face a “head-on collision with a nuclear power” if American weapons are used deep into Russian territory, Miller said, “I think it’s inappropriate for Russia to continue to make these kinds of statements, as we’ve said for some time.”
Asked about Zelensky’s victory plan, Miller said, “I’m not going to get into the various details other than to say that we continue to engage with the government of Ukraine about that plan.”
Miller also said he was confident France and Germany would continue military support for Ukraine when asked about reports that they would scale down.
When asked again about the cooperation between Russia and North Korea, he said that the administration “continues to have great concerns about the growing security relationship between Russia and North Korea.”
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Top photo credit: Hamas leader Yehya Al-Sinwar looks on as Palestinian Hamas supporters take part in an anti-Israel rally over tension in Jerusalem's Al-Aqsa mosque, in Gaza City October 1, 2022. REUTERS/Mohammed Salem
Yahya Sinwar’s death, which was confirmed by Israeli authorities Thursday, was long anticipated. Within Gaza, he was one of three key targets; the other two, Mohammad Deif and Marwan Issa were killed months ago.
Sinwar will be remembered by some as an inspired, defiant champion of Palestinian rights, by others as a false prophet and by still others as a bloodstained villain. The one aspect of his role in the 100-year war over Palestine, to paraphrase Rashid Khalidi’s book title, that most will agree upon, is that he failed to understand not only his adversary, but also his friends. He believed, among other things, that his October 7 attack would precipitate Israel’s collapse and that others in the Axis of Resistance would coordinate serious attacks against Israel with his own.
He timed his “big project,” as its planners called it, to exploit civil discord in Israel over Benjamin Netanyahu’s effort to hamstring the country’s Supreme Court and subordinate it to the will of the right-wing legislature. Netanyahu’s gambit spurred massive demonstrations against the government and led some in the reserves, including pilots, to declare that they would not serve until the court reform measure was shelved.
Sinwar interpreted this unrest as cracks in the foundation of the Israeli state. In the very long run he might well prove to have been right. But he was very wrong to think that these cracks could be widened by the big project. Indeed, Sinwar’s assault on Israel and the taking of hostages, was not the wedge he thought it would be, but rather the cement that instantaneously sealed the fault lines.
Sinwar united a factionalized society, reminded them of the rationale for their state and the dark history preceding it.
The result was an all-out war on Hamas. Traumatized Israelis, humiliated and scandalized by an historic intelligence failure, quickly coalesced in favor of a scorched-earth response and Netanyahu’s aim of total victory. And it was understood that as of October 7, Sinwar was dead, if unburied. Sinwar’s hubris triggered a massive assault that eviscerated Gaza’s civilian population and was — is — apparently replete with war crimes related to Israel’s failure to protect Gaza’s civilian population from attack, the targeting of humanitarian agencies, and the failure to ensure that Palestinian noncombatants had adequate access to food, water, and medical care.
Sinwar’s colossal misperception also led to Hezbollah's involvement, which to the grief of both Gazans and Lebanese, was too trivial to fulfill Sinwar’s expectations, but too much for Israel to ignore, as it emptied northern Israel of its inhabitants. This in turn brought Israel and Iran into direct conflict and threatened the escalation of a regional war. And it is undeniably regional — as Houthis increasingly target U.S. vessels in the Red Sea, the U.S. deploys B-2 bombers from Missouri to drop bunker busters on deeply buried installations in Yemen, and the Israelis bomb Yemen’s only port for the transfer of humanitarian assistance.
Sinwar understood well enough that many ordinary Gazans would die in furtherance of his vision of victory. In this, he evidently confused himself with Vo Nguyen Giap, who likewise understood that many Vietnamese would die, particularly in vast U.S. air raids on the North, but was correct in assessing that this would weaken the U.S. internationally, legitimize his campaign to destroy South Vietnam, and unify the country under Hanoi’s rule.
But North Vietnam had a powerful ally, a population many times the size of Gaza’s, a much larger land area, and a highly mobilized society and powerful army. And his adversary to the south was, unlike Israel, fatally divided against itself.
The question for both the Palestinians and Israelis is what happens next. If the two are smart, Sinwar’s successors will offer to release all the remaining hostages, dead and alive, in exchange for an immediate ceasefire and a massive influx of humanitarian aid. The Israelis would be well-advised to declare victory and accept such an arrangement.
The Biden administration, and presumably Vice President Harris, have signaled that Netanyahu’s government is skating on thin ice. The prime minister might calculate that he need only wait a few weeks for a president-elect Donald Trump and therefore pocket Sinwar’s death and carry on with business as usual. This might be a good bet.
But hedging might be a better bet, and that would mean using Sinwar’s death as a face-saving way to manage White House pressure.
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Top photo credit: The Terracotta Army Sculpture in XIAN, CHINA (Shutterstock)
In recent years, discussions about China’s grand strategy have dominated international security journals, think tanks, and policy discussions across the globe. As China continues its meteoric rise, scholars and policymakers have been asking: Is China pursuing a strategy of global primacy, or is it more focused on balancing the international system?
These questions reflect not only concerns about China’s growing power but also its future trajectory. Will China remain an ambitious yet cautious player in world affairs, or will it pursue outright dominance, fundamentally reshaping global governance?
China’s grand strategy is undoubtedly shaped by history, geography, systemic pressures, and its relative power, often quantified as “comprehensive national power” or CNP. To understand whether China is moving toward a strategy of primacy or balancing, we must explore these factors through a classical realist lens that accounts for both systemic constraints and domestic considerations.
The evolving nature of China's strategy can be framed in several key phases: survival (Mao and Deng), rejuvenation (Deng and Jiang), maximization (Hu and Xi), and balance (potentially in the future).
Historical Foundations of China’s Strategy
China’s grand strategy has always been closely tied to its historical circumstances and strategic culture.
Under Mao Zedong, China's strategy was one of survival. Mao's focus was on consolidating internal power, fending off external threats, and establishing China as a sovereign state unimpeded by external forces. Deng Xiaoping, who led China after Mao, moved toward a strategy of rejuvenation, prioritizing economic modernization while maintaining a low profile in global affairs. Deng’s famous dictum to “hide your strength, bide your time” encapsulated this approach.
The strategic environment of the Cold War and China’s relatively weak international position necessitated caution.
However, the end of the Cold War and China’s economic boom shifted the equation. Under Jiang Zemin, and later Hu Jintao, China’s strategy became more assertive, moving from rejuvenation toward maximization. China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO), the modernization of its military, and its increasingly proactive diplomacy signaled this shift. Hu's “Peaceful Rise” narrative tried to balance China’s growing power with reassurances to the international community.
Nevertheless, China’s material capabilities had grown significantly, and its foreign policy became more confident and wide-ranging.
Xi Jinping and the China Dream: A Strategy of Maximization?
Xi Jinping’s era has ushered in an even more ambitious phase of China’s grand strategy. Xi’s articulation of the “China Dream” embodies a vision of national rejuvenation that encompasses not just economic strength but also global leadership. Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), growing military assertiveness in the South China Sea, and his efforts to reform global institutions to better reflect China’s interests signal a strategy of maximization.
This strategy does not suggest outright global hegemony, but it points toward an effort to maximize China’s influence within a multipolar international system. Xi’s China is no longer content with simply rising peacefully; it seeks to actively shape the global order in its favor.
Avery Goldstein, in his 2020 analysis “China's Grand Strategy under Xi Jinping: Reassurance, Reform, and Resistance,” highlights three core elements of Xi’s strategy. China reassures neighbors of its peaceful intentions, seeks to reform global governance structures (e.g., the United Nations, IMF, and World Bank), and resists efforts by other powers — especially the United States — to constrain its rise. This multifaceted approach reflects a delicate balancing act between maximizing China's power and avoiding direct confrontation with established powers, particularly the U.S.
Balancing: A New Strategy?
While Xi’s strategy seems focused on maximization, there is growing speculation that China may eventually shift toward a more explicit strategy of balancing. In international relations theory, balancing refers to efforts by a state to prevent any one power from becoming dominant, either by building up its own power (internal balancing) or by aligning with other states (external balancing).
China’s current strategy, though ambitious, does not appear to seek global hegemony in the way that the United States did after World War II. Instead, China’s actions may suggest a form of balancing. For instance, China has been careful to forge closer ties with Russia, establish regional economic institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and create a vast network of partnerships through the BRI.
These actions can be seen as a form of offshore balancing, where China strengthens its regional influence while preventing the U.S. from becoming too dominant in the Asia-Pacific.
As China faces headwinds — an aging population, slowing economic growth, environmental challenges, and potential internal political unrest — it may find that a strategy of balancing is more sustainable than one of outright maximization. Indeed, there is evidence that China’s grand strategy has always adapted to the state of its economy and external environment.
As China’s rise peaks and the limitations of its domestic growth model become clearer, its strategy will likely shift once again, this time toward balancing the competing pressures of maintaining economic growth, preserving political stability, and navigating an increasingly hostile international environment.
Is China’s Grand Strategy in Flux?
At present, China’s grand strategy appears to be in a period of strategic flux. On one hand, Xi’s China has become more assertive, seeking to maximize its influence in various spheres. On the other hand, China is acutely aware of the systemic pressures it faces, especially the strategic competition with the United States. This competition could push China toward a more defensive or balancing strategy in the future.
Elbridge Colby’s notion of the “best strategy” may offer insights into China’s next steps. Colby, a prominent advocate of realist balancing within U.S. strategy circles, argues that states must often choose strategies that best align with their material capabilities and the geopolitical environment. Applying this framework to China, one could argue that Beijing’s best strategy in the coming decades might be one of offshore balancing with Chinese characteristics — a strategy that seeks to maintain a stable regional environment while avoiding overextension and direct confrontation with the U.S.
As China faces both internal and external challenges, it may indeed settle into a strategy of balancing, recognizing that it has peaked and must now manage its power carefully. Some scholars, such as Joshua Shifrinson, have suggested that China’s grand strategy has always been more about balancing than achieving outright primacy, especially given the constraints posed by U.S. dominance and China’s economic vulnerabilities.
A Future of Balance
The debate over China’s grand strategy remains open, with competing visions of its future direction. While Xi’s strategy appears focused on maximization, systemic pressures, economic realities, and domestic challenges may force a shift toward balancing in the near future. Whether this is a de facto strategy or a deliberate shift will depend on how China navigates its ongoing rise and the international community’s response to it.
As China continues to rise, debates akin to those that took place in the U.S. in the 1940s may emerge within China’s strategic circles. Just as the U.S. grappled with the question of whether to pursue primacy or balance after World War II, China’s leaders may soon face a similar dilemma. For now, the signs point toward an evolving grand strategy — one that may well transition into a new phase of balancing as China reaches the limits of its rise.
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