US Central Command announced that it sent a Ohio-class guided missile submarine to the Middle East Sunday and accompanied this social media post with pictures already showing the sub in the Suez Canal.
This sends "a message of deterrence clearly directed at regional adversaries as the Biden administration tries to avoid a broader conflict amid the Israel-Hamas war," according to CNN's reporting.
According to CNN, this is one of the Ohio-class subs that were built for ballistic missiles but had been converted to carry a payload of up to 154 Tomahawk conventional cruise missiles instead, each with the capacity to carry a 1,000-pound warhead.
If this indeed is the mission, the submarine joins a host of U.S. military assets in the region, including, according to Cato's John Hoffman in RS today: "two aircraft carrier strike groups, with roughly 7,500 personnel on each, two guided-missile destroyers, and nine air squadrons to the Eastern Mediterranean and Red Sea region. Washington also deployed an additional 4,000 troops to the region, with another 2,000 on standby, adding to the roughly 30,000 troops already in the region.
Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin announced on Oct. 26 that nearly 1,000 of those standby troops have already been activated and sent to the Middle East. “Approximately 900 troops have … deployed or are in the process of deploying,” said Air Force Brig. Gen Pat Ryder, the Pentagon’s top spokesman to reporters. “These include forces that have been on prepare-to-deploy orders and which are deploying from the continental United States.”
In the meantime, the Pentagon has acknowledged there are U.S. special forces commandos in Israel helping to find American and Israeli hostages held by Hamas. According to the New York Times, defense officials have confirmed there are "several dozen" commandos in the country but would not say exactly where they are, and they had joined a small team that was already there.
“Barbarism is on the ballot,” columnist George Will declared this week, noting that if the next president doesn’t transform the current policy on Ukraine, which is “so timid, tentative and subject to minute presidential calibrations,” then Russia’s Vladimir Putin’s war could end up being a “great rehearsal” for World War Three.
Meanwhile, the New York Times has said that “two different futures loom” for Ukraine depending on the outcome of Tuesday’s election, Kamala Harris or Donald Trump.
Much of this is based on the candidates’ rhetoric, and, in the case of Harris, the Biden Administration’s current policy of supporting Ukraine with weapons and aid for “as long as it takes” to defeat Russia. Harris has suggested she would continue this policy, to “stand strong with Ukraine and our NATO allies,” if elected. She has also accused Donald Trump of being too cozy with Putin and said she would not talk to the Russian president.
For his part, Trump has said he would bring all sides to the table and end the war in a day, and he has been critical of continued U.S aid to Ukraine, which has totaled some $175 billion ($106 billion of which has gone directly to the Ukraine government) since 2022. He has offered no details for how he would end the war or bring the parties together.
But does it matter? In some ways, yes, foreign policy experts tell RS. One side wants to assure that U.S. strategy won’t change, the other advocates for a bold if not abrupt shift that involves a step back from the narrative George Will evinces, that Putin is a barbarian that can only be stopped with more war.
Those same experts say Ukraine is losing, and more weapons and more fighting cannot help. They also point out that official Washington is beginning to realize this too, as is Europe, and a shift toward diplomacy will likely happen no matter who is in the White House come January 2025.
“Ultimately the war in Ukraine will be determined by the balance of power on the ground. This very basic fact often gets lost in conversations about the war. Regardless of whether Kamala Harris or Donald Trump wins tomorrow, the Ukrainians are facing an extremely dire situation at the front, with the Russian offensive continuing to chip away at Ukraine’s defensive lines in Donetsk and its manpower shortages becoming more of a problem every day the war goes by,” says Daniel DePetris, foreign policy analyst and regular Chicago Tribune columnist.
“I don't think the outcome of the election will have a decisive impact on the Ukraine war. Ukraine is losing territory at the fastest rate since the war began, and its main problem is manpower, not lack of weapons,” offers Jennifer Kavanagh, director of military analysis for Defense Priorities.
"After the election, Kyiv will have to shift its strategy regardless of who wins because its current approach is not sustainable,” she adds.
“Regardless of who wins, the next American president will face harsh realities in Ukraine that will demand a change from Biden’s present policies. Russians vastly outnumber Ukrainians and produce far more military materiel than both Ukraine and its Western backers,” points out George Beebe, the director of the Quincy Institute’s Grand Strategy program.
“As a result, Ukraine cannot win a war of attrition with Russia, and is headed, sooner or later, toward a general collapse absent either a diplomatic deal to end the war or a U.S. decision to go to war with Russia.”
Meanwhile, as supportive as the European leadership has been, elections across the region, particularly in Germany — Ukraine’s second biggest weapons supplier — have reflected public exhaustion with the war due in major part to its visible economic impacts. Sanctions on Russia have not “crushed” Moscow’s economy or war effort, but have had negative effects on European energy prices.
“Staying the present course would be a formula for Ukraine’s becoming a failed state, with Europe thrown into growing disarray as a consequence,” notes Beebe.
“The war is coming at a high price for all involved,” offers John Gay, director of the John Quincy Adams Society, noting that whoever wins on Tuesday, Europe has to start making major decisions for itself — in part how much it can do for its own security if and when U.S. support begins to recede.
“Europe needs to be able to deter Russia and defeat a Russian invasion with little direct U.S. support,” he says. “Is the current NATO target of 2 percent of GDP for defense adequate for that?”
So what are some of the differences each candidate may bring to the Oval Office in January?
“I am not convinced that Harris will buck the national security establishment, her advisors, and Democratic leaders in Congress by suddenly pushing for an end to the war in Ukraine. I expect more of the same if she wins,” charges former CIA analyst Michael DiMino.
“A Trump Administration will probably have a much bigger impact on the future trajectory of the conflict. But as I always say: personnel is policy,” he adds.
"If Trump wins, there will be an early push for a peace settlement. He will not meet all Russia's demands, but Russia may still provisionally accept, in the hope that Ukraine (and Poland) will reject them, and Trump will then abandon Ukraine,” says Anatol Lieven, head of the Quincy Institute’s Eurasia program.
“We will then have to see whether Trump and his administration have the skill and stamina to conduct a complicated and fraught negotiating process.”
“If Harris wins,” Lieven adds, “she will also aim for peace, but the process will be much slower and more hesitant, the terms offered Russia will be much worse, and Russia will go on wearing down the Ukrainians in the hope of a crushing military victory.
“In this case, everything will depend on the progress of the war on the ground, and whether in order to try to ward off a Ukrainian collapse, Harris would be willing to escalate drastically,” says Lieven.
“Anybody who says he knows what Donald Trump would do about Ukraine is lying or delusional. Trump himself doesn’t know,” says Justin Logan, director of Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute.
“Kamala Harris would be led by her advisers, who will likely come from the Brookings (Institute) cafeteria school of foreign policy,” he adds. “Trump would be heavily influenced by his own advisers. The question is who those advisers will be.”
At the very least, Trump and Harris should be sufficiently allergic to policies that could escalate the war in ways that would make peace impossible.
“No U.S. president, Republican or Democrat, should be eager to shovel tens of billions of dollars a year, forever, into the Ukrainian furnace,” says Gay. “Both sides are escalating the conflict in new ways — bringing in North Korea, seeking looser targeting rules, and more. No U.S. president should be eager to see how far escalation can go before the conflict spreads beyond Ukraine.”
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Top photo credit: U.S. President Joe Biden meets with Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the G20 leaders' summit in Bali, Indonesia, November 14, 2022. REUTERS/Kevin Lamarque/File Photo
Sparked by a Foreign Affairs essay proposing a “theory of victory” toward China, many prominent American analysts have joined the debate on whether the United States needs a “theory of victory” in its competition with China.
A recent report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) frames the debate in terms of “end state” vs. “steady state” in U.S.-China policy. The report presents a diversity of views from American observers as well as analysts from select countries in Asia and Europe. Collectively, these views reveal the central parameters of the current debate on U.S.-China competition.
Wide-ranging though it is, this debate is lacking in one crucial aspect: an interrogation of the concept of competition itself. This neglect is problematic because different conceptions of competition tend to shape different strategies of competition.
The Trump administration’s conception of “strategic competition” led to confrontational policies toward China. The Biden administration’s proposal of “managed competition” produced a more stable yet still tense relationship. As strategy is inherently interactive, Washington’s competitive strategy will also affect Chinese perceptions and responses.
For its part, Beijing is averse to using the term “competition” to characterize the relationship. Chinese officials have tried to modify it by adding adjectives such as “positive” or “healthy.” But they have yet to offer a theory — let alone concrete policy proposals — on “positive competition.”
Imagine Confucius, the ancient Chinese philosopher, joining the debate. He would have significantly expanded it by offering a radically different conception of competition. This would be the idea of “exemplary competition” (junzi zhi zheng) — and one that could transform U.S.-China rivalry into a force for mutual growth and global stability.
Consider ancient Chinese archery, which Confucius saw as a model of exemplary competition. Archers pursued excellence not by obstructing their opponents, but by perfecting their own skill and character. They engaged in parallel competition, each aiming at their own target, while adhering to elaborate rituals that fostered mutual respect and self-improvement.
The Confucian concept of “exemplary competition” presents an illuminating contrast to the U.S. approach to great power competition. At the heart of the contrast lie two different intellectual traditions: the individualist tradition that underlies Western — particularly American — thought, and the relational tradition central to Confucian philosophy. The individualist tradition, shaped by Enlightenment ideas and American history, sees individuals and nations as separate entities with their own interests and rights. In this view, competition is about different parties pursuing their own goals, often measuring success by how much they gain compared to others.
The Biden administration’s China strategy reflects this individualist pursuit of relative advantage. It encompasses a broad spectrum of policies designed to maintain American technological and economic preeminence, strengthen alliances to counterbalance Chinese influence, and frame the competition as a clash of value systems. The strategy’s ambitious scope, aiming at achieving superiority across technological, economic, political, military, intelligence, and global governance domains, reveals an underlying preoccupation with maintaining global primacy.
In contrast, the Confucian relational tradition sees people and nations not as isolated entities, but as deeply interconnected. Competition is not about pursuing relative advantage; it is a process of mutual elevation occurring within a web of relationships. The long-term health of the relationship takes precedence over short-term, narrowly self-interested gains. As exemplified in ancient Chinese archery, the goal was not merely to win, but to improve oneself and one’s competitors, thereby strengthening the social fabric.
This concept of exemplary competition casts light on the inadequacies of the current debate on U.S.-China competition. A central divide in the debate is between hawks, who want to equate “winning” with regime change inside China, and moderates, who seek to manage competitive coexistence and avoid inadvertent conflict.
The hawks, represented by former Trump administration national security official Matt Pottinger and former Rep. Mike Gallagher (R-Wis.), focus solely on maximizing U.S. interests. They assume that a U.S. “victory” necessitates China’s defeat. The moderates highlight the risks of unchecked confrontation such an approach would bring about. They emphasize the importance of stabilizing the relationship and cooperating on key issues of mutual concern.
From a Confucian perspective, the framing of this debate is misguided. Confucius would likely urge a fundamentally different conception of “winning” or “success.” Victory in an exemplary competition between the United States and China would involve both nations improving themselves and excelling in their respective strengths while maintaining a peaceful and cooperative relationship. Washington and Beijing would each strive to enhance their own capacities and address their internal challenges, rather than focusing on obstructing or undermining the other.
The goal would not be to “defeat” the other side or force a change in its political system, but to achieve the best possible version of oneself.
This conception of success presents a different set of policy imperatives for both countries. For the United States, it would emphasize reinvigorating democratic institutions, strengthening educational systems, modernizing infrastructure, catalyzing innovation, and addressing systemic social inequalities. For China, the focus would shift toward enhancing democratic governance, confronting environmental challenges, and achieving sustainable development. Both nations would be “winning” by becoming better versions of themselves, not by diminishing the other.
The foreign policy implications of this approach are equally significant. Exemplary competition does not dismiss the genuine differences and tensions between the United States and China; rather, it provides a framework for channeling competitive impulses constructively. It acknowledges the importance of safeguarding legitimate interests and encourages the fostering of enlightened, rather than narrow, self-interest.
Moreover, it would compel Washington and Beijing to assume collaborative leadership in addressing humanity’s most pressing challenges — particularly climate change, pandemics, and artificial intelligence governance.
Although the idea of exemplary competition has distinctive Confucian roots, its relational foundation is not entirely foreign to American thought and practice. The various European-descended subcultures of American society have historically valued family harmony and community cooperation.
Indeed, elements of exemplary competition are discernible in the Biden administration’s China policy, particularly in its emphasis on domestic renewal. These promising developments are nevertheless overshadowed by a threat-based competitive strategy oriented toward zero-sum outcomes.
American analysts have demonstrated a keen awareness of the importance of exemplary competition, albeit without explicitly framing their ideas in these terms. In the CSIS report mentioned earlier, various experts propose innovative approaches centered on domestic renewal.
This common ground, though modest, suggests that exemplary competition between the United States and China remains possible. At a minimum, it indicates that the U.S. policy community should expand its conception of competition.
The same imperative applies to China. Despite being the birthplace of Confucianism, China has not explored the implications of Confucian exemplary competition for contemporary U.S.-China relations. Furthermore, current Chinese foreign policy often fails to meet Confucian standards. As the wellspring of Confucian thought, China bears a particular responsibility to embody exemplary competition in its U.S. policy.
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Top photo credit: Page 17, Department of Defense (DoD) Inspector General: Audit of C-17 Spare Parts Pricing (10/25/24).
Time is running out for Congress to pass the annual defense policy bill. After the election, lawmakers must reconcile the differences between their versions of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and set the topline for Pentagon spending in fiscal year 2025. When they do, they must strip two measures that will make it easier for contractors to engage in price gouging.
While the House abided by the spending caps Congress established in last year’s debt deal, the Senate added about $25 billion to the president’s budget request for the Pentagon — bringing the department’s topline to a whopping $912 billion. This is excessive, and the increase will not make Americans any safer. Lawmakers should communicate that to those negotiating the final NDAA.
Members of Congress cannot, however, overlook two seemingly benign provisions in the House version of the bill. If retained, Sections 811 and 812 of the House-passed NDAA would bolster contractors’ ability to price gouge the Pentagon — already a significant issue for the military. Just this week the Department of Defense (DOD) Inspector General found that Boeing overcharged the Air Force by nearly a million dollars on various products for the C-17 military transport aircraft. In one case, Boeing overcharged the military for a soap dispenser by nearly 8,000%, more than 80 times the commercial price.
A million dollars is a drop in the bucket when it comes to overall Pentagon spending. But this isn’t the first time Boeing has price gouged the department, and the practice is rampant throughout the arms industry. Two weeks ago, the Department of Justice (DOJ) announced that Raytheon will pay nearly a billion dollars to resolve a government investigation that exposed the company for overcharging on government contracts. Whistleblowers exposed both Boeing and Raytheon for price gouging. Without them, the agencies may have never discovered that the contractors overcharged taxpayers.
Unfortunately, the true scale of military price gouging is unknown. The Pentagon obligated $431 billion for military contracts in fiscal year 2023, nearly half of its total base budget. So, the government often relies on whistleblowers to alert it to potential price gouging by military contractors. Lawmakers can also request inspectors general to conduct investigations into potential misconduct. Several members are dedicated to this effort and to preventing contractors from overcharging the government in the future. Congress overall, however, has played an integral role in expanding the opportunities for price gouging.
Sections 811 and 812 of the House NDAA are part of a decades-long effort to legalize price gouging. Congress has achieved this goal, in part, by broadening the array of products and services considered to be commercial by the Pentagon. According to the Federal Acquisition Regulation, contractors are not required to submit to the Pentagon certified cost and pricing data for commercial products and services. These data include the cost of labor and the price of materials; they must be current, complete, and accurate.
More often than not, the Pentagon needs certified cost and pricing data to negotiate fair prices with military contractors. Certified data is particularly critical when the department is negotiating prices for products or services that may not be available in the civilian marketplace, or for which there is a sole source. In these cases, Pentagon officials have few other tools to ensure they are making fair deals with military contractors.
In theory, it would be easier for the Pentagon to negotiate reasonable prices for commercial products and services. Commerciality implies some level of price competition. But Congress has broadened the definition of commercial products and services to the degree that the designation has become virtually meaningless. There is no requirement, for example, that commercial products are sold to the public.
Section 811 would further expand what products and services are considered commercial, exempting an even greater portion of military contractors from certified cost and pricing data requirements. This would further erode the Pentagon’s bargaining power in negotiations with military contractors.
While Section 811 broadens the pool of so-called commercial products, Section 812 provides the Pentagon the green light to rely on uncertified cost and pricing data in certain cases. Uncertified data can be incomplete, dated, or inaccurate. Contractors can legally omit any information that may indicate to the Pentagon that they are charging 80 times the fair and reasonable price — as did Boeing for a soap dispenser.
Even the White House “strongly opposes” Section 812, asserting that it would disincentivize contractors from keeping costs under control, “creating unnecessary risk for taxpayers.” The provision would hamper some prime contractors’ ability to obtain certified cost and pricing data from subcontractors, increasing the likelihood that the prime contractors overcharge the government, which ultimately pays the bills.
The Pentagon is most capable of spending taxpayer dollars wisely when it obtains certified cost and pricing data. It helps the department assess a contractor’s costs, and thus, what its profit margins may be. Sections 811 and 812 of the House NDAA only hurt the Pentagon’s ability to negotiate fair prices on military contracts. By retaining them in the final NDAA, Congress would be acting against the best interests of both their constituents and the Pentagon.
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