In response to a question about foreign reports that he is ordering U.S. troops out of Syria, Trump said Thursday that he did not know where that came from, however, he added, "we're not involved in Syria. Syria is in its own mess. They've got enough messes over there. They don't need us involved."
Earlier this week, Israeli official broadcasting channel Kan reported that “senior White House officials conveyed a message to their Israeli counterparts indicating that President Trump intends to pull thousands of US troops from Syria.” The news was picked up by a number of foreign news outlets, but was ignored here in the U.S.
During a Q&A with reporters after an Executive Order signing session (about 13:19 in the video) at the Oval Office Thursday, Trump was asked about the report. He did not seem surprised, but was curt in his answer nonetheless. “I don’t know who said that, but we’ll make a determination on that."
The United States reportedly has some 2,000 troops in Syria, which is reeling from the December fall of Bashar al-Assad's government and the takeover of former Al-Qaeda linked militants HTS. The U.S. has been manning outposts in the northeastern part of the country throughout the Syria civil war, ostensibly to fight ISIS and provide assistance to the Kurdish-led Syrian Defense Forces, which are in charge of detention camps housing ISIS fighters. The U.S. has been conducting numerous airstrikes and raids against ISIS targets there, including the reported killing of "Muhammad Salah al-Za'bir, a senior operative in the terrorist organization Hurras al-Din (HaD), an Al-Qaeda affiliate" in a "precision airstrike in Northwest Syria" as reported by Central Command on Thursday.
But critics are hoping that Trump will "determine" that the troops on the ground are if anything in harm's way and need to come home, as he did in 2018 when he was last president and was thwarted by his own Pentagon. Since then the landscape has become more murky and volatile and critics are concerned that Washington will see the turnover in power in Syria as justification to stay longer.
“Arguing for an indefinite U.S. troop presence in Syria both overstates U.S. influence and ties troops to uncontrollable conditions,” said Quincy Institute Middle East Fellow Adam Weinstein, who is also a Marine Corps veteran of the Afghanistan War.
“Syrians have taken back their country and Washington should respond with diplomacy and sanctions relief rather than indefinite troop deployments," he added. “ISIS is largely degraded, Assad’s regime is gone, diplomatic outreach to the new leadership in Damascus is underway, and Iran’s proxy forces have taken a severe beating. There’s little reason why U.S. troops should remain in Syria.”
Kelley Beaucar Vlahos is the Editorial Director of Responsible Statecraft.
Top photo credit: President Donald Trump signs two executive orders in the Oval Office of the White House in Washington, DC on Thursday, January 30, 2025. The first order formally commissioned Christopher Rocheleau as deputy administrator of the FAA. The second ordered an immediate assessment of aviation safety. Photo by Bonnie Cash/Pool/Sipa USA
President Trump finds himself in a rerun of his first term on Ukraine policy. Declawed by lawmakers in D.C. and forced to push policies that worsen the U.S. relationship with Russia.
He is expected today to announce that the U.S. will be sending more advanced patriot missile batteries to Ukraine — via NATO member countries, which will be paying for it.
It’s not clear whether this is the “big announcement” he told reporters he’d be making on Ukraine on Monday or whether that could include tough new sanctions on Russia. The sanctions, which would impose enormous tariffs of 500% on countries that buy Russian energy, are being pushed by Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) and Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.) in a Senate bill that now has some 85 co-sponsors.
Trump has not endorsed it yet but has made suggestions he would support it.
Pumping more weapons into the war won’t help Ukraine win; backing secondary sanctions will kill prospects for peace. He should press for compromise from all sides in the conflict.
There is a depressing sense of Groundhog Day to the situation President Trump finds himself in again today. Having said that “sanctions cost us a lot of money” at the recent G7 Summit in Canada, signing this latest act into law will simply confirm that he is no longer in control of U.S. policy towards Russia, as he wasn’t during his first term.
Indeed, the proposed legislation would have a much worse effect on U.S.-Russia relations than the Countering American Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of 2017, which was also pushed by Senator Graham.
When President Trump signed CAATSA into law, he included a statement expressing displeasure at its flawed nature and how it would limit his executive authority in foreign affairs.
CAATSA has been used for example to sanction Turkey in December 2020 over the purchase of Russian S-400 air defence and in March 2021 for the poisoning and imprisonment of the late political dissident, Aleksey Navalny. The difference with this latest sanctions bill is that, in addition to killing prospects of peace in Ukraine, it will cause self-harm to the U.S. economy — the tariffs would affect trade with a number of major U.S. partners including the EU, Taiwan, and China — and to America’s increasingly tarnished world standing.
Attempting to undermine Russia by pushing vast tariffs against its main trading partners simply will not work. Anyone who believes that China will suddenly stop importing Russian oil against the threat of U.S. sanctions is a fool or deliberately disingenuous.As it did earlier this year, China will simply respond with tit for tat tariffs against Washington.
While a much feared spike in inflation has not materialized yet, many American economists predict prices to rise over the summer. The rate of U.S. growth appears set to slow, according to the OECD. And that is on the basis of tariffs that President Trump threatened to impose. From ramping up China tariffs to 145% the average U.S. tariff on China is now around 51%. America’s effective tariff rate with the whole world stands at around 14.1% today.
At no point since 2014 has it appeared remotely likely that sanctions would change President Putin’s stance towards Ukraine.
As far back as February 2022, the day after the war in Ukraine started, Tulsi Gabbard, now U.S. Director of National Intelligence, was quoted as saying, “sanctions don’t work… What we do know is that they will increase suffering and hardship for the American people. And this is (the) whole problem with the Biden administration: They are so focused on how do we punish Putin that they don’t care and are not focused on what is actually in the best interests of the American people.”
Meanwhile, Russia will continue to prosecute its grinding war against Ukraine with devastating consequences for that country.
Now President Trump has struck a deal to send Patriot missiles to Ukraine via NATO (NATO countries will be paying for them), putting the financial burden on Europe as foreshadowed in my previous article.
In widely reported comments, President Trump accused President Putin of throwing a lot of “bull****” about peace talks. But the core of his comments were about the capabilities of U.S. military equipment, how Washington has given Ukraine three times as much as Europe and how that balance should be “equalized.” He also refers to the “brilliant” U.S. defense contractors and urges Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth to “step them up” so that they can produce equipment more quickly.
My take is that, with a 5% NATO spending commitment pocketed, an increasingly frustrated President Trump increasingly looks upon the war as a business opportunity.
This follows approval of a one-time spending splurge of an additional $150 billion for the Department of Defense — more than twice Britain’s yearly military spending and the reversal of a decision to temporarily pause weapons shipments to Ukraine.
Trump says a major driver of this decision was the increase in Russian drone and missile strikes on Ukrainian cities including Kyiv. Ukraine undoubtedly needs weapons to defend itself.
The rate at which Ukraine is losing territory on the battlefield has accelerated significantly in recent weeks. However, daily territorial gains remain objectively small, albeit at a punishing human cost in death and injury. But providing more “defensive” weapons won’t help Ukraine win, though it may arrest the speed of defeat. Not providing weapons won’t help Russia secure a spectacular breakthrough either.
Russia has, arguably since the collapse of the first Istanbul talks in April 2022, focused on the attritional nature of the war, bleeding Ukraine and its Western sponsors dry of the economic means to fight. This lurch back to arming Ukraine to the teeth won’t change that.
Longer term, the new NATO commitment to 5% defense spending will gradually shift the balance of military power in Europe, such that European NATO members could stand on their own two feet against Russia. But it won’t happen soon enough to help Ukraine snatch victory from the jaws of defeat.
Further talks between Secretary of State Marco Rubio and his Russia counterpart Sergei Lavrov took place on July 10 in Kuala Lumpur. But the Russian Foreign Ministry statement on the talks was bland.
Beyond a brief reference to the search for peaceful solutions to conflict, it focused more on the reestablishment of “unhindered ties between their countries’ societies,” including through direct flights. A strategic reset of U.S.-Russia relations undoubtedly remains a big priority for the Kremlin. But right now, they appear in no hurry to settle. They, too, are consumed by a sense of déjà vu.
Going right back to the failed Minsk peace agreements of 2014 and 2015, peace efforts have always come to nought because of a desire by Western powers to force Russia to concede without imposing obligations on Ukraine to make concessions.
President Trump now needs to step back and look at the canvas.
While the texture of a future peace deal provides considerable scope for compromise on both sides, including on the issue of how the territorial status quo is described, one Russian demand will not change: NATO membership. Unless President Trump can broker Ukrainian acceptance that it will not join NATO, amidst resistance to any compromise from European allies, he will not bring peace to Ukraine, though he might dent the American economy.
Time to rip off that band-aid.
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Top image credit: Inspired By Maps / Shutterstock.com
Rather than helping to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, the Israeli-initiated 12-day war on Iran damaged the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
In response to the attacks on its nuclear facilities, on July 2, Iran suspended cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, whose responsibilities include verifying NPT state parties’ compliance with their nonproliferation commitments. At the same time, these illegal attacks, which the U.S. joined, have created the conditions for the kind of endless war that President Trump allegedly wants to avoid. While the prospects for Iranian-U.S. diplomacy in this context look bleak, there might still be a way out through regional non-proliferation cooperation.
The end of nuclear transparency in Iran
Iran’s suspension of cooperation with the IAEA marks the end of nuclear transparency provided by agency inspections in the country since 1974. Thanks to this transparency, we knew, prior to June 13, the exact amount and locations of Iran’s fissile material stockpiles — which could not have been diverted to military uses without being noticed by the IAEA. Now, due the Israeli and U.S. attacks, this knowledge has been lost.
Israel — whose goal appears to be to weaken and remove the Iranian government, rather than just its nuclear program — is likely to push for additional military actions. That Iran’s nuclear capabilities were, predictably, not all destroyed by the military strikes, makes it difficult for Washington to restrain Israel even if it wishes to do so. This points to the open-ended aggression that experts have long warned would result from attacks against Iran’s nuclear facilities.
Apart from its perception that the IAEA is politically biased in favor of Israel and Western countries, Iran’s decision to suspend cooperation with the agency arguably reflects a concern that nuclear transparency might undermine its interests. By indicating the location of nuclear materials and facilities that survived the war, IAEA findings could be used to facilitate future Israeli and U.S. military targeting.
Demonstrating the flawed logic of aggressive counterproliferation, the war on Iran could be seen as a perfect argument for Tehran to leave the NPT and develop a nuclear deterrent. After all, the use of force against its territorial integrity can constitute a circumstance in which “extraordinary events have jeopardized [its] supreme interests,” the legal basis for withdrawal under the NPT’s Article X.
Prospects for bilateral Iranian-US nuclear diplomacy
Yet, Iran has neither withdrawn from the NPT nor closed the door to diplomacy. Iran is currently reviewing a U.S. proposal for resuming bilateral talks. As Iran’s foreign minister Abbas Araghchi said, "Iran needs guarantees it won’t be attacked again if the talks don’t succeed."
The trust required for bilateral diplomacy, let alone for credible security guarantees, has been severely undermined by the war — which took place while the last round of Oman-mediated Iranian-U.S. talks was still ongoing. According to Araghchi, this constituted a ”betrayal of diplomacy.”
A nuclear deal would also require a compromise on the key issue of uranium enrichment. A compromise was already reached in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action when Iran agreed to verifiably limit enrichment activities in exchange for sanctions relief. The obstacle here has been President Trump’s self-inflicted difficulty in accepting anything resembling the JCPOA — from which he withdrew in 2018, thus renewing a nuclear crisis with Iran.
President Trump has insisted that Iran should not be allowed to enrich any uranium, assuming that the country can be coerced to accept his terms through maximum pressure. But Iran has consistently rejected this demand. If his approach now rests on the assumption that Iran will finally give in as a result of the war, efforts at bilateral diplomacy are likely doomed.
On the other hand, the Trump administration has demonstrated ambiguity on the enrichment issue. Together with the president’s aversion to endless wars, this might still allow for a compromise solution.
Possibilities for diplomacy
One of the most promising avenues in the Iranian-U.S. talks since April was a regional nuclear consortium involving Iran and other Gulf states. The main sticking point seemed to be the location of joint uranium enrichment facilities: while Iran viewed the enhanced nuclear transparency provided by the consortium as a way to build international confidence in its enrichment activities, Washington saw it a means to end enrichment on Iranian soil.
This plan could still be feasible if the U.S. were to accept limited enrichment on Iranian soil as part of the consortium. This would serve the objective of nonproliferation and still might look different enough from the JCPOA for President Trump to claim victory.
The previous idea of U.S. investment in the consortium nevertheless seems unlikely after Washington’s involvement in Israel’s military operation that also included the assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists. However, other extra-regional powers such as China or Russia could be invited to join the venture, thus enabling a de facto security guarantee to Iran. Notably, the Bushehr nuclear power plant was Iran’s only nuclear facility that was spared in the June attacks — partly due to the presence of Russian staff there.
As an alternative to a nuclear consortium, Gulf states could jointly agree to cap uranium enrichment levels and fissile material stockpiles in the region. While such restrictions would initially mainly affect Iran’s program, over time they would also build confidence in Saudi Arabia’s nuclear ambitions, which also include plans for uranium enrichment.
To verify these restrictions, the Gulf states states could establish a regional nuclear verification mechanism modeled on the Brazilian–Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC). This could complement IAEA safeguards and, in the case of Iran, substitute for them as long as the country’s cooperation with the agency remains suspended.
Although Iran cannot be expected to implement restrictions on its nuclear activities without sanctions relief by the U.S., it could nevertheless commit to doing so pending such relief. This could allow an informal Iranian-U.S. compromise even without a bilateral nuclear agreement.
At minimum, a conditional agreement on regional nuclear restraint would increase political pressure on Washington to lift sanctions on Iran, while a regional verification mechanism would provide an argument against further military action.
By way of comparison, the additional confidence created by ABACC apparently explains why Brazil is allowed to enrich uranium without international objection — despite the lack of public reporting on related details and the country’s refusal to sign the Additional Protocol with the IAEA.
Choice between diplomacy and endless war
The 12-day war represented the culmination of the disastrous U.S. maximum pressure policy, which since 2018 has undermined nonproliferation for the sake of scoring domestic political points and fostering Washington’s special relationship with Israel. Continuing on this path now risks leading to an endless war in the Middle East.
A diplomatic off-ramp still exists but it would require a U.S. policy shift from coercion to compromise. The political costs of such a shift for President Trump could be reduced through linking the compromise to a regional nuclear arrangement. While extending the non-proliferation benefits beyond Iran, the involvement of multiple stakeholders committed to its success could also make such an arrangement more sustainable than the JCPOA.
The Bunker appears originally at the Project on Government Oversight and is republished here with permission.
A pair of stories with contrasting narratives
Amid the roar of B-2 bombers and other warplanes bizarrely flying over the White House on the 4th of July, President Donald Trump signed his “Big, Beautiful Bill” increasing defense spending by $150 billion and the national debt by $3 trillion. The military hardware was a bow to the U.S. military’s successful June 21 strike on Iran’s nuclear program. Nonetheless, it was a strange way to celebrate the nation’s 249th birthday. Only in today’s Washington could one celebrate dive-bombing the national debt ever closer to $40 trillion.
About $113 billion of that $150 billion is slated for the Pentagon’s 2026 coffers (the rest would be spent later). That has allowed the Pentagon to send Congress a base budget for next year that totals $848 billion, which is actually less than this year’s $831 billion, when inflation is taken into account. But adding the base budget request to the one-time bonus, and other national-security spending, pushes proposed defense spending to roughly $1 trillion in 2026. Where such future $100+ billion annual add-ons will come from remains a mystery.
News outlets that focus on economics wasted no time citing one of the bonus bill’s big winners. “The Pentagon will budget about $150 billion over five years on big-ticket projects such as ships, munitions production and missile-defense systems, including a roughly $25 billion down payment on the planned Golden Dome antimissile shield,” the Wall Street Journalnoted. Echoed Bloomberg News: “The package boosts defense spending by $150 billion, with much of the funding going to new weapons systems made by major contractors.”
The troops will get July 4th picnic-table scraps. Only 6% of the $150 billion is earmarked for improving the quality of life for troops and their families. On July 3, Stars and Stripesreported that the Army will save nearly $5 million a year by shutting down a program that for decades has provided mental-health services for children of U.S. troops based overseas. That’s happening despite a May report that said such Pentagon-run schools are overwhelmed by kids with mental health problems.
Army officials said they are eliminating the program because “similar services exist.” Funny how such logic never applies to the redundancy of the Pentagon’s nuclear triad of bombers, ICBMs, and submarines, which cost about $5 million every half hour.
Why wonky weapons-buying changes won’t work
A defense reform bill now slinking its way through Congress is simply the latest in military camouflage, disguising future taxpayer rip-offs as the latest and greatest good-government bromide. This new wolf-in-sheep’s-clothing is the Streamlining Procurement for Effective Execution and Delivery Act — the SPEED Act(PDF), in Capitol Hill lingo. “With the SPEED Act, Congress and industry are yet again setting the stage for another round of decimating changes that will have disastrous results,” Scott Amey here at the Project On Government Oversight said in his July 1 analysis of the proposed legislation.
Amey, a recognized expert in the admittedly wonky arena of government procurement law, warns that the bill:
Prioritizes speed above the cost to the taxpayer.
Prioritizes “best value” of rushed requirements above cost efficiency, and risks steering contracts to well-connected or undeserving companies.
Promotes buying so-called “commercial” products and services, and the general principles of “offered for sale” and “similar,” all of which are misleading and result in overcharges for defense-only solutions because they are exempt from providing certified cost or pricing data that would ensure the federal government gets a fair deal.
The SPEED Act, Amey argues, “will take us back 60 years, to a time when companies blatantly took advantage of the federal government … which will lead to new $436 hammers and $10,000 toilet seat covers.”
Excellent! The Bunker is always on the prowl for new material.
It’s too easy to ignore troop deaths in peacetime
Battlefields and blood are first cousins in combat. The Bunker has done many deep dives over the years into those who voluntarily went into harm’s way in the nation’s uniform, and didn’t get to come home. There’s generally a patriotic predisposition to want to know about these heroes, waging war in our name.
But the deaths of U.S. troops in peacetime is a murkier realm. The U.S. military trains like it fights, which means that over the past decade more troops have died while training for combat than in combat itself. Yet too little attention is paid to their sacrifice. They’re not battling a foe other than inadequate training, or a moment’s inattention that could have saved a life.
The Pentagon noted the deaths of three U.S. troops recently. Their sacrifice should not pass unnoted:
— On July 3, Task & Purposereported on the July 1 death of Navy Special Warfare Boat Operator 2nd Class Noah Tobin after an unexplained malfunction during a California parachute jump.
— On June 27, Air & Space Forces Magazinedetailed how Air Force Captain John Robertson died at a Texas base in 2024 after he failed to fully engage a safety pin on the ejection seat of his T-6 trainer after landing, sending him 100 feet into the air without a parachute.
— On July 1, Task & Purposereported on the death of Army Specialist Matthew Perez, 20, who died in 2024 after a string of snafus beginning with “an incorrectly tied knot” doomed him while parachuting at a Louisiana post.
Despite critics who argue that the U.S. Navy’s huge aircraft carriers would be sitting Peking ducks in a war with China, Commander Joshua M. M. Portzer maintained in the July issue of Proceedings that each of them is “a queen on the Pacific chess board.”
The Navy’s newest aircraft carrier faces a 20-month delivery delay because of problems with elevators designed to move munitions around the vessel, Tony Capaccio of Bloomberg News reported July 7.
The Pentagon Pizza Report, operated by an anonymous computer geek, tracks Google data flowing from pizzerias near the headquarters of the Defense Department to telegraph when the U.S. military might be preparing to strike, the Washington Post reported July 1.
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