Calling Donald Trump the "best friend Israel ever had in the White House" the Israel parliament welcomed the American president hours after the remaining 20 living hostages were released to Israel as part of last week's brokered ceasefire deal. As Trump prepared to speak before the Knesset, 2,000 Palestinian prisoners held by Israel were being readied for their own release.
In the lead up to his remarks, Knesset Speaker Amir Ohana thanked Trump for recognizing the capital of Israel as Jerusalem and for preventing Iran from being a nuclear power. He was then applauded for the day's hostage release. "You stand before the people of Israel, not as another American president, but as a giant of Jewish history, one for whom we must look back two and a half millennia into the mists of time to find a parallel. Cyrus the Great. Donald J Trump, you are a colossus who will join the pantheon of history."
"There is no single person on the planet who did more to pursue peace... in less than nine months you became one of the most consequential presidents in history," said Ohana, who said he and House Speaker Mike Johnson will be submitting a nomination for Trump to receive next year's Nobel Peace Prize. The 2025 recognition was bestowed on Venezuelan opposition leader Maria Machado last week.
Benjamin Netanyahu received a thunderous applause and a standing ovation when acknowledged in the Knesset audience, as did Israeli Ambassador to the U.S. Rob Dermer and Secretary of State Marco Rubio. "Secretary of War" Pete Hegseth was also recognized, as was Steve Witkoff — who got an added chant: "Witkoff, Witkoff" — Jared Kushner and "absolute rock star" Mike Huckabee.
In his own remarks before Trump's speech, Netanyahu again ran down the litany of Trump's deeds for Israel, including recognizing the Golan Heights as Israeli, getting out of the Iran nuclear deal, the Abraham Accords, and bombing Iran in June. "Donald Trump is the greatest friend the state of Israel has ever had in the White House," he repeated, to chants of "Trump, Trump, Trump" in the audience.
Story is developing and will be updated with Trump's remarks.
Donald Trump has long been a fan of using the U.S. military to wage a more vigorous war against drug cartels in Latin America. He also shows signs of using that justification as a pretext to oust regimes considered hostile to other U.S. interests.
The most recent incident in the administration’s escalating antidrug campaign took place on October 3 when “Secretary of War” Mike Hegseth announced that U.S. naval forces had sunk yet another small boat off of the coast of Venezuela. It was one of four destroyed vessels and a total of 21 people killed since late September. The administration claims they were all trying to ship illegal drugs to the United States.
Colombian president Gustavo Petro said publicly Wednesday that one of the vessels was carrying Columbian citizens and that they were killed. Two administration officials confirmed to the New York Times that Colombians were on one of the boats blown out of the water. The White House called Petro’s claims “baseless” and “reprehensible.”
However, Trump’s enthusiasm for the military option in the war on drugs long predates this episode. Mike Esper, who served as secretary of defense during the final stages of Trump’s first term, relayed in his memoirs that the president had seriously explored the option of conducting missile strikes against suspected traffickers in Mexico. Esper recalled that his boss asked him at least twice in 2020 about the feasibility of launching missiles into Mexico to “destroy the drug labs” and wipe out the cartels.
The president considered such a drastic step to be justified because Mexican leaders were “not in charge of their own country.”
Esper’s account is not the only evidence of Trump’s enthusiasm for the military option. After a 2019 incident in which cartel gunmen massacred a family of American Mormon ex-pats in northwest Mexico, Trump reacted with a tweet insisting that “this is the time for Mexico, with the help of the United States, to wage WAR (sic) on the drug cartels and wipe them off the face of the earth. We merely await a call from your great new president!” He added: “If Mexico needs or requests help in cleaning out these monsters, the United States stands ready, willing & able to get involved and do the job quickly and effectively.”
Just weeks after entering the White House for his first term, Trump adopted a similar stance in a session with then‐Mexican president Enrique Pena Nieto — and did so in even less cordial terms. “We are willing to help you,” Trump stated. “But they [the cartels] have to be knocked out, and you have not done a good job of knocking them out.” The U.S. president assured his counterpart that he preferred to assist the Mexican military rather than take direct action, but it was clear that the more menacing alternative existed.
The option of using the U.S. military against drug traffickers in Latin America became a prominent theme of not only Trump but other Republican political leaders in 2023 and 2024. Not surprisingly, Trump quickly joined the lobbying campaign to attack the cartels. He explicitly embraced the proliferation of proposals from GOP members of Congress at that time to pass an Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF).
Other prominent Republicans, including former Attorney General William Barr and former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nicki Haley (briefly a challenger to Trump for the GOP presidential nomination in 2024), embraced the idea of using U.S. military, even special forces, to go after the traffickers.
However, Trump no longer considers an AUMF even remotely necessary. He implicitly believes that the Executive may do virtually anything he deems necessary to defend the United States. Both undocumented immigrants and suspected drug runners fall into the category of being a national security threat in his opinion.
President Trump and his aides have shifted their primary focus from Mexico to Venezuela, however. Indeed, Trump seems reasonably content with Mexico City’s current level of cooperation with U.S. anti-drug efforts, despite his frequently inflammatory rhetoric on the topic during the 2024 election campaign. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Mexico’s president, Claudia Scheinbaum, concluded a new agreement to pursue the cartels more vigorously — consistent with respect for the sovereignty of both nations.
The Trump administrationin turn has agreed to take steps to stem the flow of guns from the United States to the drug gangs based in Mexico. Given these developments, Washington’s pressure on Mexico has eased for the moment regarding the drug issue. The massive trade flow between the two nations may have something to do with the White House leaning more into diplomatic solutions here.
Venezuela, on the other hand, is now in Trump’s gunsights. Administration leaders have made it clear that they consider suspected traffickers to be the equivalent of terrorists and are therefore not entitled to meaningful due process protections. By adopting that view, they are building on ugly precedents set during the administrations of George W. Bush and Barack Obama in which mere accusations of terrorist activity became the equivalent of definitive evidence.
There are growing indications that Trump may use the war on drugs and the war on terror as pretexts to have U.S. military forces overthrow the extreme left-wing government of Venezuela’s autocratic leader, Nicolas Maduro. The existence of that regime has been a great annoyance to conservatives in the United States for years, and even moderate liberals are unenthusiastic about excusing, much less defending, Maduro’s corrupt, authoritarian rule.
The current U.S. administration likely is tempted to transform an ostensible anti-drug and anti-terrorist mission into a regime change crusade. In recent weeks, the United States reportedly has deployed a naval task force to the Caribbean that includes 4,500 Marines and sailors, several destroyers, an attack submarine, and 10 F-35 stealth fighters. Such a buildup of U.S. military firepower off of Venezuela’s shores is more than a little ominous.
Pursuing a regime change war using the façade of an anti-drug offensive would be unwise and potentially a disastrous blunder. Donald Trump has owed much of his political success to his promotion of an “America First” foreign policy. His rhetoric in support of such a policy always has exceeded the substance by a very wide margin, as his willingness to have the United States continue fueling the war in Ukraine clearly demonstrates.
However, one consistent central feature of Trump’s alleged America First policy has been condemnation of regime change wars and nation building crusades. A military intervention in Venezuela would entail both elements.
Granted, a U.S. effort to oust Maduro might succeed. An estimated 7.7 million people have fled Venezuela since the leftist revolutionaries led by Maduro’s predecessor, Hugo Chavez, came to power. Venezuela is an economic dumpster fire, a situation not helped by Washington’s myopic policy of imposing sanctions on the beleaguered country. Maduro has endured primarily because of rigged elections and the support of well-armed partisan militias.
However, defeating those militias might not be all that easy. Even more limited options such as seizing selected ports and airfields could prove to be a difficult and bloody venture. A full-fledged regime change war could easily become another Third World fiasco for the United States on the scale of Afghanistan or Iraq.
When Richard Nixon coined the term “War on Drugs,” he apparently meant it as a metaphor. Trump seems to take the term quite literally, and that mentality poses a great danger to the United States.
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Top photo credit: United States and Israel flags are projected on the walls of the Old city of Jerusalem in celebration after Israel and Hamas agreed to the first phase of U.S. President Donald Trump's plan to end the war in Gaza, October 9, 2025. REUTERS/Sinan Abu Mayzer
Two years into the Gaza conflict and perhaps on the cusp of a successful phased ceasefire, what can we say?
On the basis of media reporting about Yahya Sinwar’s strategic rationale for attacking Israel on October 7, 2023, it seems that he believed Israel was on the brink of civil war and that the impact of a large-scale assault would severely erode its political stability. He believed that Hamas’s erstwhile allies, especially Hizballah and Iran, would open offensives against Israel, which, in combination with Hamas’s invasion, would stretch the nation’s military capabilities to the breaking point.
Years in an Israeli prison evidently led Sinwar to think that he understood Israel and what made it tick. There was something Dunning Kruger-esque about his self-confidence.
In the event, his attack unified a divided Israeli society and focused most of its electorate on the task of wiping out Hamas. Incidentally, we learned that hostage-taking works against the interests of the hostage-taker when it motivates the adversary to prioritize absolute victory even at the expense of the hostages’ lives. This was another factor that he did not anticipate. His misunderstanding, however, might be excused given the previous successes Hamas enjoyed by seizing hostages. But these very successes buttressed the refusal of Israel to add another ransom arrangement to the list.
On the Israeli side, there was an analogous story of self-deception. Reporting has focused on two elements. The first was Israel’s conviction before Oct. 7, 2023 that it had found the route to least cost stability on the Gaza front. The linchpin of this strategy was a tacit agreement with Qatar to pump cash into the Gazan economy and therefore into Hamas’s pockets. The premise was an assessment that Hamas had made its own strategic pivot toward governance and away from armed resistance. This strategy would also keep an opponent of Fatah in play, thus hamstringing the Palestinian Authority and dividing the national movement.
This approach seemed to secure quiet in the decade leading up to October 7. When a strategy seems to be working, there is generally little appetite within governments to consider alternative scenarios and hedging stratagems; if it ain’t broke don’t fix it becomes the guide to policy.
The second element was the “Konzeptzia,” the mindset that discounted both Hamas capability and motivation to challenge Israel on the battlefield. This caused Israeli military and intelligence leaders to downplay the risk of Hamas aggression. It also caused the political leadership to think that diverting troops from Southern Command to the West Bank to deal with Palestinian violence triggered by empowered settlers would be cost free.
In the end game, it was not lack of tactical warning, but rather a refusal to take it seriously because it ran against the grain of the Konzeptzia. Once it dawned on senior officers that the game was afoot, all the obstacles to swift preemption and mitigation described by Richard Betts in his work on surprise attack made disaster a certainty.
We know, too, that Hamas’s allies read the security environment very differently. It was clear from the outset that deterrence, which had been holding up relatively well between Hizballah and Israel since their brief war in 2006 and Israel and Iran since the 2015 JCPOA, was still preferred to armed conflict. Both Hizballah and Iran sought to preserve it. This necessarily meant leaving Hamas to twist in the wind. But the need to do something symbolic in lieu of something that could spin out of control, Hizballah initiated fire on Israeli assets in the northern part of the country. But the dynamic could not be fine tuned.
Before long the territory on both sides of the Blue Line had been savaged by artillery and rocket exchanges and, on the Lebanese side, Israeli airstrikes. The depopulation of Israel’s northern towns brought political pressure on the government that compounded strategic incentives to raise the stakes.
Israel had been preparing for a showdown with Hizballah since 2006, but had refrained from going to war. Hizballah’s measured – in its view — support for Hamas, which had just attacked Israeli civilians with sadistic glee, was enough to tip the balance. Iran settled for tough talk until Israel struck one of its installations in Damascus, killing senior IRGC officers. This led to missile attacks against Israel that coincided with the Gaza fighting but were not really organic to it.
We know now that the Israeli public supported Netanyahu’s focus on “absolute victory.” There were differences of opinion within the body politic and to some extent within the government over the place of hostages in this framework. But most Israelis seemed to accept the urgent priority of destroying Hamas. Indeed most Israelis were willing to accept serious tradeoffs in pursuit of this goal. Some sectors of the economy suffered, reservists were exhausted, casualties were high and Israel became increasingly isolated on the world stage.
We know, however, that diplomatic isolation is not an effective deterrent to the policies that invite it. In this instance, when Israeli society experienced October 7 in ways that many foreigners found difficult to fathom, growing isolation was not only a small price to pay but also an affirmation of right wing claims that Hamas was just the tip of an eternal antisemitic spear. We also know there was actually sufficient ambivalence in Europe and the Middle East regarding Israel’s brutal response to October 7 to ensure that isolation never evolved into punishment.
Even after a consensus regarding genocide crystallized in many capitals, punishment came only in the form of empty gestures toward Palestinian self-determination.
In part this was due to the awkward fact of Hamas’s role as the aggressor, in part to avoid clashes with the Trump administration when it was in its anti-NATO, pro-Russia phase, and in part because condemning Israel might come back to haunt them if they ever faced a similar attack. The fact that only Turkey, Bolivia, Nicaragua and Belize severed diplomatic relations with Israel over the course of the war should be the subject of careful study in the months and years ahead.
If we had not already known, we are now aware of American lack of leverage over Israel. The U.S. has been pleading for a ceasefire for at least a year while proffering arms and money in support of Israeli operations. Until now, Netanyahu has defied these pleas. The proposition that the U.S. has no usable leverage is now being debated by the Washington commentariat. Those who believe that the U.S. could control Israeli actions through threats of retaliation or imposed distance, have pointed to Donald Trump’s bluster as evidence that there was indeed a reservoir of leverage from which a right minded president could draw and that Israel’s leadership would respect. Headlines and editorials reflect the pull of this narrative.
What do we know that might clarify things? First, we know that Israel had largely achieved its explicit and implicit war aims by decimating Hamas, transferring the casualty risks of urban combat to Gazans, using hunger as a tool to use against Hamas, and demonstrating to Palestinians that Israel held the power of life and death over them. The war therefore had reached a point of sharply diminishing returns to scale.
Second, that the terms devised by the White House largely mapped onto conditions that Netanyahu had long insisted upon.
Third, Israeli overreach complicated Netanyahu’s options going forward. The attack on Qatar was pivotal in this respect. If Israel had restrained itself Netanyahu would not have faced the pressure he did from the Gulf and Washington. And there was a former British prime minister, Tony Blair, waiting in the wings with a fully fleshed out day after plan that had been coordinated with Israel, Washington and key Gulf states and geared to Trump’s 20 points.
Lastly, it is crucial to remember that Trump was not operating in a domestic political setting that his predecessors ever experienced. The combination of an utter absence of domestic constraints and an impulsive personality helped produce a good outcome for Israel and perhaps for the Palestinians. Also relevant is the interest of both Netanyahu and the Trump administration to cast Trump’s intervention in such epic terms. For Netanyahu, this provides a degree of political immunity for doing politically tricky things he wanted to do anyway; he can tell his partners on the right that he had no choice —“Trump made me do it."
And Trump, as he has said himself, wants a Nobel peace Prize. Given this context, attributions of a decisive role to Trump in bringing a war that was virtually over to provisional conclusion need to be taken with a grain of salt.
Attitudinal shifts are clearest in younger age cohorts and have therefore not reshaped party politics yet at the national level. But they will and historians will identify the Gaza war as a turning point.
Finally what do we know about how the ceasefire arrangements will play out? Based on the past two years, It is likely that phase one will conclude successfully. The 20 living hostages will be returned and an Israeli military presence in about half of Gaza’s territory will have an international imprimatur. And Israeli attacks against Palestinians will stop, or at least slow down. One thing we know from Israeli operations in Lebanon is that from Israel’s perspective, airstrikes and other operations are compatible with a ceasefire.
What we do not know is whether phase two will eventuate. The provisions are still being discussed at the technical level. And the grandiose bits — Donald Trump as head of a “peace board,” the consolidation of a technocratic government, the deployment of a rapid reaction force largely manned by Arab soldiers — these must remain for the moment in the category of unknown.
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Top photo credit: A man, wearing shirt in the colours of the U.S. flag, and a woman, wearing an Israeli flag across her shoulders, celebrate after U.S. President Donald Trump announced that Israel and Hamas agreed on the first phase of a Gaza ceasefire, at the "Hostages square", in Tel Aviv, Israel, October 9, 2025. REUTERS/Ronen Zvulun TPX IMAGES OF THE DAY
Reports today indicate that both the Israelis and Hamas have agreed on a deal that would call for an immediate cessation of fighting and return of hostages and prisoners on both sides in a first phase.
Both parties are expected to sign the agreement and the Israeli cabinet will vote to approve it afterwards. The deal would supposedly see a partial withdrawal of Israeli forces from the ground in order for the hostage-prisoner swaps to proceed, but the thornier issues of Hamas disarmament, governance, full Israeli withdrawal and a complete end to the war have been left to hammer out in later phases.
It remains to be seen if this is fully implemented and successful, but if it will secure an ultimate end of the genocide and the release of the hostages, then that is a crucial achievement.
There is a risk that the deal repeats Trump's previous phased agreement that ended up only becoming a prisoner exchange rather than an end to the slaughter. At the time, in March 2025, Israel had already killed some 48,000 Palestinians in Gaza; today, 67,000 and likely many more are dead.
Israel decided to break that first agreement and resumed the war, and as a result, Phase II of the previous agreement was never reached.
Some commentators in Israel are already declaring that there is no intent on the Israeli side to reach Phase II and end the genocide. Rather, this is just a “hostage deal, and a ceasefire while talks continue in good faith.” That is, a tactical pause before Israel restarts the slaughter.
On the positive side, the fact that Trump is making this such a personal success for himself may imply that he will be far less forgiving if Israel sabotages the deal once again. This, it seems, is what the Palestinians and the Arab states are counting on.
Bottom line is that Trump must retain pressure on all parties — particularly Israel — to ensure that the prisoner exchange is followed up with a full end to the war.
The fact that Trump and his team could step in aggressively to get a deal done this week shows that the war could have ended much earlier had the U.S. pressured the Netanyahu government appropriately earlier. The key reason Trump moved forward with pressure on Israel at this point is because of Israel's overreach by bombing Qatar in September.
It made the White House recognize that Israel's recklessness was increasingly becoming an American problem.
Add to this another key factor: Israel was increasingly becoming a political burden for Trump. Israel’s popularity has been tanking among Trump’s America First constituency. The sheer amount of Trump’s time Israel was demanding - from Gaza to Lebanon to Iran - was seen as undermining Trump’s domestic political priorities while dragging the US once again into unnecessary Middle East conflicts.
Trump has himself pointed to this, saying that his voters have turned against Israel. “My people are starting to hate Israel,” Trump told a donor already in July. Major voices in MAGA, such as Tucker Carlson, Steve Bannon, Candace Owens, and, privately before he was assassinated, Charlie Kirk, view blind support for Israel as incompatible with the America First approach.
Israel‘s international isolation also imposed a cost on the US since it is Washington that is constantly tasked to defend Israel and insulate it from international pressure. Trump reportedly told Netanyahu that Israel cannot fight the entire world. The implicit message was that the US can no longer spend its political capital defending a reckless and recalcitrant Israel.
Trump, of course, is eyeing a Nobel Peace Prize. But ceasefires do not warrant such prizes. Much more must be achieved. If Trump keeps up the pressure on Israel, peace can be secured. And so can the coveted peace prize.
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