Those who say that Taiwan is a vital U.S. interest often cite the island’s strategic location, the U.S.’ moral obligation to defend it as a long-time ally, and the need for the U.S. to maintain credibility as a partner that will come to the defense of its allies.
But as Michael Swaine says in a new Quincy Institute video below, the U.S. has no formal security treaty agreements with Taiwan, whereas it does with Japan and South Korea — countries that do not want the U.S. to go to war with China. And, Swaine adds, these arguments are inadequate when weighed against what a conflict with China over Taiwan would actually look like.
War with China would be a “really major destructive war, a magnitude of destruction in life and property and a disruption of the international system that goes beyond anything that we've really seen since World War Two,” Swaine says. “Up to $10 trillion — 10% of global GDP — could be wiped away. You could have deaths in the many thousands on both sides.”
“If you're going to go to war with the Chinese over this issue, it had better be a vital interest of the United States. It's an important interest. It’s not a vital interest.”
Video produced by Khody Akhavi, senior video producer at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Top photo credit: Beijing, China.- In the photos, Chinese President Xi Jinping (right) and his Ecuadorian counterpart, Daniel Noboa (left), during a meeting in the Great Hall of the People, the venue for the main protocol events of the Chinese government on June 26, 2025 (Isaac Castillo/Pool / Latin America News Agency via Reuters Connect)
Marco Rubio is visiting Mexico and Ecuador this week, his third visit as Secretary of State to Latin America.
While his sojourn in Mexico is likely to grab the most headlines given all the attention the Trump administration has devoted to immigration and Mexican drug cartels, the one to Ecuador is primarily designed to “counter malign extra continental actors,” according to a State Department press release.The reference appears to be China, an increasingly important trading and investment partner for Ecuador.
Washington undoubtedly noticed that the first visit abroad undertaken by conservative Ecuadorian president Daniel Noboa after being reelected for a second term earlier this year was to China. Ecuador has a significant foreign debt that it needs to service. It thus depends heavily on export markets to generate the hard currency to repay its creditors. The last thing the country needs at this point is to be pressured by Washington to do less business with China.
Such pressure would only add to the travails of a country that has been beset by enough trouble in the recent past. This includes the devastating impact of the pandemic (during which the death toll in Guayaquil, Ecuador’s main port and largest city, was such that bodies were piled up on the street, as the mortuaries were packed), skyrocketing gang violence, and the growing presence of organized crime.
Yet, for several years now, Washington has pressed Ecuador to minimize its economic links with China, while doing little to help it overcome the serious challenges it faces. Over the years, for a variety of reasons related to the fluctuations in the price of oil, its main export commodity, and other factors, Ecuador racked up a significant foreign debt, to China, to the International Monetary Fund, and to other creditors.
After Ecuador partially defaulted on its foreign debt in 2008 and was largely excluded from international credit markets, China came through with several loans. These loans allowed Ecuador to build up its infrastructure, show one of the highest investment rates in the region through 2013 ( gross capital formation went up from 20.25 per cent in 2009 to 23.77 per cent in 2013) and improve its economic performance.
In fact from 2006 to 2016 Ecuador’s average annual per capita economic growth was 1.5 percent, versus 0.6 in the previous 26 years. At some point, however, those credits and those of the IMF package that followed them came due, and by 2020 Ecuador was caught in a foreign exchange squeeze.
In January 2021 — that is, in the last days of the first Trump administration — Washington’s newly created International Development Finance Corporation extended one of its first major loans in South America to Ecuador, for 3.5 billion dollars, ostensibly to help Quito repay part of its debt.
The conditions attached to the loan, however, were unprecedented. Among other things, they required that Ecuador’s telecommunications grid be free of any Chinese technology (from Huawei, ZTE or any other Chinese company), which at the time happened to be the most advanced and cost-effective available, thus adding a significant cost to the country’s efforts to improve its connectivity and digitize its economy.
Another condition required that Ecuador privatize the equivalent of $3.5 billion dollars in public assets. Moreover, the determination of which assets to be sold off to private interests would not be left to the Ecuadorian government alone, but would rather be jointly decided by Washington and Quito. This led to many questions about the transparency of such decisions and the associated effects of “crony capitalism” at its worst. (It’s notable that, while former President Joe Biden could have changed these terms, he failed to do so during his term.)
With the IDFC loan providing only partial debt relief, then-President Guillermo Lasso, a wealthy conservative businessman from Guayaquil travelled to Washington to explore the possibility of negotiating a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) similar to those from which Ecuador’s neighbors — Colombia, Peru and Chile — had already been benefiting. In his view, preferential access to the U.S. market would go a long way towards increasing Ecuadorian exports, and thus earning hard currency that could be used to service the debt.
Biden rejected the demarche and stated in no uncertain terms that Washington was no longer in the business of signing FTAs.
Without missing a beat, Lasso then flew to Beijing, where his proposal for a China-Ecuador FTA was well received. The agreement was negotiated, signed and ratified quickly and came into effect in May 2024 .
China today provides a growing market not just for Ecuadorian oil, but also for its prized shrimp, and the fresh fruits and vegetables. Chinese companies, which have established a strong presence in Ecuador over the years, are thriving there.
The decision not to open its market to Ecuador via an FTA is obviously a legitimate and sovereign U.S. choice. What is questionable, however, is the attempt to pressure Quito to reduce its economic links with Beijing, which opened its market and provided preferential access to Ecuadorian exports. This is what Secretary Rubio’s mission to Ecuador is apparently intent on doing, as per the State Department’s release.
The issue, however, goes beyond Ecuador. For much of the past decade, U.S. policy towards Latin America has focused on excluding China from the region. Much pressure was exercised on Chile, Panama , Brazil, and other countries to cancel China-related projects and to exclude Chinese companies from doing business there.
Unsurprisingly, this approach has mostly backfired. In 2024, China-Latin America trade reached a record $518 billion (up from $12 billion in 2000, a more than 40-fold increase). For South America, China has become its number one trading partner. Chinese investment in the region is estimated at $200 billion, still much less than that of the U.S., but growing fast, especially in cutting-edge sectors like e-mobility and the green economy.
Exhibit A for this trend are the openings this year of Chinese e-vehicle factories in Brazil — by BYD in the state of Bahia at an industrial park once owned by the Ford Motor Company, and by Great Wall Motors in the state of Sao Paulo, in a locale that once produced cars for Mercedes-Benz.
As political scientist Francisco Urdinez shows in a forthcoming book, Economic Displacement and the End of US Primacy in Latin America, one key reason Chinese companies have moved into Latin America is because U.S. business has been moving out. The policy of attempting to exclude China from Latin America has failed and is bound to continue to fail, because the region badly needs more foreign trade and investment, not less. The United States should compete with China in the Americas, proving that it can build a better mousetrap, not by banning rival producers of mice-catching devices.
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Top image credit: Lucky-photographer via shutterstock.com
As Congress returns from its summer recess, Washington’s attention is turning towards a possible government shutdown.
While much of the focus will be on a showdown between Senate Democrats and Donald Trump, a subplot is brewing as the House and Senate, led by Republicans but supported by far too many Democrats, fight over how big the Pentagon’s budget should be. The House voted to give Trump his requested trillion dollar budget, while the Senate is demanding $22 billion more.
To justify this historic largesse, both Trump and Congress give the same reason: peace through strength. Harkening back to Ronald Reagan’s Cold War military spending spree, today its invocation often boils down to one simple idea: give the Pentagon more money. But, since Reagan’s famed buildup actually cost much less, it's worth asking if the problem really is a lack of funds
Four decades ago, the newest aircraft carrier in the fleet was the USS Theodore Roosevelt. It was a remarkable acquisition project coming in a full 16 months early and more than $80 million under budget. Today, the latest carrier, the USS Gerald Ford, was billions of dollars over budget and years behind schedule. And even after adjusting for inflation, the Ford class carriers are also much more expensive than the Nimitz class they are replacing, and costs may keep going up. And those costs come before even asking if the ships are actually matched to the military’s current needs, let alone for the decades ahead they’ll be in use.
Sadly, this cost explosion and questionable alignment with modern warfare are far from unique to carriers. A quick google search for the F-35, Littoral Combat Ship, Sentinel ICBM or any number of otherrecentboondoggles tells the same story. Today, nearly every Pentagon acquisition program is a mess, coming in late, over budget, and significantly more expensive than the weapons and platforms being replaced.
This collapse into dysfunction of the Pentagon’s procurement system cannot be ascribed to a lack of funding. Despite a genuine drop in spending following the end of the Cold War, the Pentagon is now nearly two and a half decades into an unprecedented era of massive budgets. More money hasn’t solved this problem, and there’s zero reason to think even more will do anything but make it worse.
Before going further, it’s worth examining two of the most common justifications for why costs have skyrocketed: technology and personnel.
There’s a decent chance you’re reading this on a smartphone like the iPhone, a remarkable encapsulation of just how dramatically technology has increased in power and decreased in costs over the past 40 years. In 1985, the CRAY-2 was the world’s most powerful super computer. It cost between $35-50 million (adjusted for inflation) and weighed nearly 3 tons. Instead, that iPhone in your hand weighs a few ounces, costs around $1,000, and is thousands of times more powerful. Oh, and it also makes phone calls, plays music, takes photos and videos, lets you surf the internet, and much more.
Put another way, you have far more computing power in your pocket than the entire U.S. military did four decades ago, and you didn’t even need a multi-billion-dollar spending spree to get it. Yet somehow, every time someone tries to explain why the Pentagon needs a trillion dollars today, the inevitable answer is the role of advanced technology in today’s military. Is technology more ubiquitous and more complex? Unquestionably. It is also outrageously more powerful and cheaper today than it was 40 years ago. Reagan’s military wasn’t sailing tall ships and using an abacus. They bought most of those supercomputers and utilized some of the most sophisticated technology of the time.
Yet somehow, while the rest of us have cheap supercomputers in our pocket, the Pentagon’s spending more than ever.
Of course, the Pentagon doesn’t just buy things; it is the largest employer in the United States, and, so the justification for more money goes, those people cost more today than they used to. Let’s start with acknowledging two facts: military personnel have seen real and meaningful increases in their pay and benefits over the past 40 years; and also their compensation, particularly among the lower ranks, remains woefully low and should be raised further.
But what’s also true is that the size of the armed forces under Trump is significantly smaller than those under Reagan. In 1985, there were 2.15 million active-duty personnel with another 1.1 million civilians supporting them. Today, those numbers are more than one third smaller. So, while one can justify some budget pressure by the increasing costs per person due to better pay and benefits, any honest math would have to also account for significant cost savings of a smaller workforce both in and out of uniform. Today, we’re simply paying more for a far smaller military and civilian workforce than 40 years ago. Since in Washington, “more” is never enough, we’re left to wonder what happened to the savings of a smaller workforce utilizing ever cheaper technology?
It’s worth adding into the equation what the military is actually doing. There is no doubt that a wartime military costs more than one at peace. At the center of today’s calls for a larger budget is thus, the so-called “return of great power competition,” with the U.S.-China rivalry at its core. Add in a resurgent and aggressive Russia, ongoing crises in the Middle East, and other challenges like North Korea, and the Pentagon’s boosters say the threat environment is simply far more complex and involved than 40 years ago.
Accepting that logic, however, requires one to dramatically downplay the complexity of the Cold War, which of course was only “cold” if you leave out conflicts like Afghanistan, Central America, and the Iraq-Iran War. There was also U.S. support for brutal dictators like Mobutu, Pinochet, and Suharto and their armed forces. Today’s threat environment is no doubt complex, but Reagan hardly oversaw a time of cheap, global peace.
Trump’s trillion-dollar budget is also coming in far larger than those of the recent past when the U.S. was actively fighting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, with as many as 200,000 uniformed personnel deployed in theater simultaneously. While the U.S. undoubtedly maintains a not-insignificant operational tempo across the Middle East and North Africa today, it is a far cry from those peak war years.
One has to wonder how on Earth the Pentagon needs more money to not fight wars than it did to fight two of them at the same time.
When you put it all together, Washington has some tough questions to ask about the Pentagon’s budget, and one of those questions should not be, “can we add $22 billion more?” How will more money fix a completely broken acquisition process? What happened to savings from cheaper technology and a smaller military? And why exactly are the military’s missions of the future so much more expensive than the past? Ultimately, if we want our nation to experience either peace or strength, it's going to take answering those, and other, questions, not just an ever larger fortune for the Pentagon.
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Top image credit: Funeral in Sana a for senior Houthi officials killed in Israeli strikes Honor guard hold up a portraits of Houthi government s the Prime Minister Ahmed al-Rahawi and other officials killed in Israeli airstrikes on Thursday, during a funeral ceremony at the Shaab Mosque in Sanaa, Yemen, 01 September 2025. IMAGO/ via REUTERS
“The war has entered a new phase,” declared Mohammed al-Bukhaiti, a senior official in Yemen’s Ansar Allah movement, after Israeli jets streaked across the Arabian Peninsula to kill the group’s prime minister and a swathe of his cabinet in Yemen’s capital, Sana’a.
The senior official from Ansar Allah, the movement commonly known as the Houthis, was not wrong. The strike, which Israel’s Defense Minister Israel Katz promised was “just the beginning,” signaled a fundamental shift in the cartography of a two-year war of attrition between the region’s most technologically advanced military and its most resilient guerrilla force.
The retaliation was swift, if militarily ineffective: missiles launched towards Israel disintegrated over Saudi Arabia. Internally, a paranoid crackdown ensued on perceived spies. Houthi security forces stormed the offices of the World Food Programme and UNICEF, detaining at least 11 U.N. personnel in a sweep immediately condemned by the U.N. Secretary General.
The catalyst for this confrontation was the war in Gaza, unleashed by Hamas’s October 7 attacks on Israel, which provided the Houthis with the ideological fuel and political opportunity to transform themselves. Seizing the mantle of Palestinian solidarity — a cause their leader, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, frames as a “sacrifice in the cause of God Almighty ” — they graduated from a menacing regional actor into a global disruptor, launching missiles toward Israel just weeks after Hamas’s attacks and holding one of the world’s most vital shipping lanes hostage.
The chessboard was dangerously rearranged in May, when the Trump administration, eager for an off-ramp from a costly and ineffective air campaign, brokered a surprise truce with the Houthis. Mediated by Oman, the deal was simple: the U.S. would stop bombing Houthi targets, and the Houthis would stop attacking American ships. President Trump, in his characteristic style, claimed the Houthis had “capitulated” while also praising their “bravery.”
The deal was, in reality, a propaganda victory for the Houthis, allowing them to claim they had faced down a superpower and emerged unshaken. For the U.S., it was a transactional exit that prioritized halting expenditure over achieving the previously stated goal of “annihilating” the group. Crucially, the deal was cut without consulting Israel or the internationally recognized Yemeni government, leaving both parties exposed.
For Israel, the unilateral American move meant that it was left to face the Houthi threat alone. For Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), the fractured entity that constitutes the internationally recognized government, it was a devastating blow. Yemeni Vice Foreign Minister Mustapha Noman captured the government's surprise and despair, telling PBS he came to Washington in May with questions and was "leaving with more of them.”
The American withdrawal from direct conflict did not bring peace by any measure. Instead, it created a permissive environment for escalation between the Houthis and Israel, transforming a distant problem for Washington into an open-ended strategic challenge for its closest regional ally.
The strike on the Houthi cabinet meeting in late August was a demonstration of Israel’s formidable intelligence reach, but the significance of the targets is a matter of debate. The slain prime minister, Ahmed al-Rahawi, was largely a political figurehead — the Houthi government’s civilian "décor," as one analyst termed it — and not a member of the secretive ideological and military command that constitutes the movement's true center of gravity.
Nonetheless, the assassinations represent a serious escalation, one that not only sees Israeli strikes systematically target the country’s already crippled infrastructure — from ports to power stations, deepening the humanitarian crisis with every salvo — but also one that forces Israel to contend with a distant, resilient foe that has a high tolerance for casualties and a proven ability to adapt. Unlike the contained battlefields of Gaza or southern Lebanon, Yemen is a vast, mountainous country where the Houthis have perfected the art of concealment and asymmetric warfare.
An air campaign alone is unlikely to defeat them, a lesson etched in the wreckage of a seven-year Saudi-led intervention. Launched in 2015 to reverse the Houthi takeover of Sana’a, the capital, and restore Yemen's internationally recognized government, the coalition's campaign devolved into a brutal war of attrition. It failed to achieve its strategic objectives and ended with a Saudi-led and UAE-supported truce with the Houthis in 2022.
Washington was merely the latest to relearn this lesson during its own brief and ultimately futile aerial war. With air power proven futile and a ground invasion logistically and politically unthinkable, Israel is left with no viable military path to victory.
Furthermore, engaging the Houthis directly drains resources and focus from Israel’s primary obsessions: Hamas in Gaza as well as Iran and its nuclear program. The Houthis understand this; they are waging a war of economic and psychological attrition, knowing that even symbolic strikes, like the missile that reached the outskirts of Ben Gurion Airport close to Tel Aviv, have negligible military effects but deliver immense political dividends. It allows them to unite Yemenis under a popular cause, project an image of heroic resistance to the wider Arab audience, and crucially, distract from their own governance failures.
For Israel's current leadership, this is no longer a war of containment but a grander crusade, a mission to dismantle “the axis [of resistance] brick by brick” as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu put it. The strategy behind Israel's intensification of its war with the Houthis was made explicit when, just a day after killing the Houthi prime minister in Sana’a, an Israeli airstrike in Gaza City killed Abu Obeida, the masked spokesman for Hamas.
For Israeli policymakers, the back-to-back assassinations were a demonstration of a long-held strategic conviction that they are fighting on multiple fronts, but the same enemy. This view was articulated by Netanyahu as far back as 2014, when he warned of "militant Islamists" driven by a "master faith" vying for regional supremacy. After two years of war in Gaza and a direct 12-day clash with Tehran, the Houthi front is becoming an increasingly integral part of this existential, multi-front campaign.
But the consequences of this strategy are profound and are already shattering Yemen's fragile political landscape. The direct entry of Israel into the conflict has rendered the official Yemeni peace process effectively obsolete. The U.N.-backed roadmap, a framework designed to coax Ansar Allah into a nationwide ceasefire and an “inclusive political process” with other Yemeni factions was already on life support. It is now a historical document, its terms irrelevant to the post-October 7 reality of a fully regionalized war.
The Yemeni civil war’s center of gravity is no longer the internal power struggle but the growing showdown between the Houthis and Israel. This shift has been catastrophic for the anti-Houthi coalition. Indeed, the PLC, established in Riyadh in 2022 to unify disparate factions and serve as the executive leadership of the internationally recognized government, is collapsing under the weight of its own contradictions.
Recent months have seen public spats and demands for a rotating presidency, reflecting a deep power struggle between its Saudi-backed chairman, Rashad al-Alimi, and a UAE-backed bloc that includes the secessionist Southern Transitional Council leader Aidarous al-Zubaidi and military commander Tareq Saleh. This paralysis prevents any coherent political or military strategy against the Houthis, leaving them unchallenged as the de facto authority in northern Yemen.
The result is a strategic dead end from which there is no clear exit. With the political path rendered irrelevant and the military path foreclosed by the anti-Houthi coalition’s own fractures, the internal logic of the Yemeni conflict has become fully subsumed by regional animosities.
In this vacuum, Israel finds itself tied to a conflict it cannot win, the U.S. has carved for itself a narrow peace at the cost of broader instability, and the factions of Yemen’s shattered state are left to fight over the scraps. The escalating confrontation with Israel has only served to entrench the dominance of Ansar Allah, the sole beneficiary of this new, chaotic order.
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