Those who say that Taiwan is a vital U.S. interest often cite the island’s strategic location, the U.S.’ moral obligation to defend it as a long-time ally, and the need for the U.S. to maintain credibility as a partner that will come to the defense of its allies.
But as Michael Swaine says in a new Quincy Institute video below, the U.S. has no formal security treaty agreements with Taiwan, whereas it does with Japan and South Korea — countries that do not want the U.S. to go to war with China. And, Swaine adds, these arguments are inadequate when weighed against what a conflict with China over Taiwan would actually look like.
War with China would be a “really major destructive war, a magnitude of destruction in life and property and a disruption of the international system that goes beyond anything that we've really seen since World War Two,” Swaine says. “Up to $10 trillion — 10% of global GDP — could be wiped away. You could have deaths in the many thousands on both sides.”
“If you're going to go to war with the Chinese over this issue, it had better be a vital interest of the United States. It's an important interest. It’s not a vital interest.”
Video produced by Khody Akhavi, senior video producer at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Top image credit: Jeremy Corbyn, ex-Leader of the Labour Party seen protesting the starving of Gaza outside Downing Street. July 2025 (Lab Mo / SOPA Images via Reuters Connect)
The rise of public support for the populist right, and in some cases also the populist left, has remodeled political competition in France, Germany, Italy, and Poland.
British politics is increasingly following this trend, although a general election is not due until 2029. The right populist Reform UK party, led by veteran Brexiteer Nigel Farage, has been leading in opinion polls since April, clearly sapping the remaining strength of Britain’s venerable Conservative (Tory) Party. The unpopular Labour administration of Prime Minister Keir Starmer now faces a left populist challenge from a new party led by the former Labour leader, Jeremy Corbyn.
Farage’s Reform party has surged to first place in opinion polls with 31%, well ahead of the governing Labour Party at 21%. The Conservative Party, which ruled continuously from 2010 to 2024, trails at a miserable 17% voter support. Both establishment parties have been on a downward trajectory since the 2024 elections. Corbyn’s party is in its early phase of organization, with a founding conference planned for later this year.
As in the other cases in Europe where populist parties are on the rise, defense policy and coolness toward unconditional support for Ukraine are not the main drivers of Reform’s success nor of Corbyn’s aspirations. Reform UK wins support by decrying irregular migration, while the Corbyn left emphasizes inequality, inadequate social services, and a weak economy. Polls show “immigration and asylum” as leading public concerns, while defense and security hardly register by comparison.
The populists’ dissent from the mainstream on the war in Ukraine and on foreign policy more generally would presumably matter if and when these parties win a share of power.
Why the populist challenge matters for war and peace
Both populist right and populist left across Europe tend to prioritize domestic social and economic issues, but they differ radically on irregular immigration and on the impacts of ethnic and linguistic diversity. Both tend to be Euro-skeptic.
The avowedly nationalist Reform UK depicts the EU as encroaching on the prerogatives of democratically elected national leadership, while the left wing of the Labour Party has also been wary of the EU, which is seen as too wedded to neo-liberal economics. These attitudes helped produce the victory for the “leave” option in the 2016 Brexit referendum. One of the leading advocates of Brexit, Nigel Farage, poses a formidable challenge to the Conservative Party from the right.
The party program of Reform UK does not address foreign policy at all. However, Farage is close to the Trump administration and has said that NATO expansion contributed importantly to Russia’s decision to invade Ukraine. Returning from a visit to Mar-a-Lago after Trump’s election last November, Farage called for “concessions on both sides” to end the war in Ukraine.
On July 24, Corbyn and disaffected Labour MP Zarah Sultana announced plans to launch a new left-wing party, with the tentative name YourParty. This excited a surprising level of interest, garnering 600,000 registrations on social media. Initial polls indicate its support could range from 10% to 15% of the electorate.
Corbyn has mobilized protests against Israel’s war in Gaza and advocates a diplomatic solution in Ukraine. He has been closely associated with antiwar causes throughout his career and is a co-founder and leader of the activist network Stop the War, first formed in September 2001 to oppose the looming invasion of Afghanistan, and now very much absorbed in public protests against British support for Israel’s operations in Gaza. Banished by Starmer from Labour, Corbyn is an independent MP.
Corbyn’s party project draws on and courts support from younger voters, as well as from communities of color in Britain. This has close parallels with Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s party La France Insoumise (France Unbowed), as Mélenchon himself has acknowledged.
Can populists affect foreign and defense policy?
Neither Farage nor Corbyn nor their supporters share the dislike and dread of Russia promoted by Britain’s mainstream parties and much of the media. This could be significant if Reform UK and/or Corbyn’s party attract substantial support from the Conservatives and Labour, respectively. A steadily decreasing majority of the population (now only about 53%) supports continuing to arm and finance Ukraine.
Because any success of Corbyn’s party harms Labour, it could inadvertently help Reform UK win the next election, because of the “first past the post” electoral rule. Corbyn insists his party would present stronger opposition to Farage’s party than is being offered by Starmer’s government.
In general, trends point to polarization and the “Europeanization” of Britain’s politics — a splintering of the party system as the center ceases to hold — and more zero-sum contestation in the country’s politics.
The ideal of a united Europe — including the UK — providing support to Ukraine for the indefinite future is very unlikely to be achieved in a more fractured political system in which the anti-establishment right and left exert greater influence.
In 2016, the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) published what the organization called their “working definition” of antisemitism.
According to its lead writer, “It was created primarily so that European data collectors (of antisemitic incidents) could know what to include and exclude. That way antisemitism could be monitored better over time and across borders.”
She added, “It was never intended to be a campus hate speech code, but that’s what Donald Trump’s executive order accomplished this week.”
These words were written by the American Jewish Committee’s antisemitism expert Kate Aronoff, in 2019. She, as the author, was condemning the application of the definition by the Trump administration, which signed an executive order in December of that year that made Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act apply to antisemitic acts defined under the IHRA.
Many worried that this order, which was signed nearly four years before the October 7, 2023 terrorist attack on Israel by Hamas — and the mass killing, devastation and starvation of civilians in Gaza that has followed — would serve to stifle critics of the Israeli government. In many ways, as international students in the U.S. have been arrested and threatened with deportation for expressing pro-Palestinian political views, and schools have cracked down on student protesters for fear of getting federal funding yanked, it has.
Today, the IHRA claims its definition has been adopted by nearly 1,300 entities, including 45 countries, the United States Executive Branch among them, as well as 37 U.S. state governments and 96 U.S. city and county governments.
So what is the definition?
“Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may (emphasis) be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.” It might not be limited to that. Is anti-Zionism, antisemitism? IHRA’s website attempts to explain: “Manifestations might include the targeting of the state of Israel, conceived as a Jewish collectivity. However, criticism of Israel similar to that leveled against any other country cannot be regarded as antisemitic.” That language seems ambiguous too.
The text goes on to cite examples of antisemitism including, “Accusing Jews as a people of being responsible for real or imagined wrongdoing committed by a single Jewish person or group, or even for acts committed by non-Jews.” Does criticizing Israel’s government qualify as this? Or this other IHRA antisemitism bullet point: “Accusing Jewish citizens of being more loyal to Israel, or to the alleged priorities of Jews worldwide, than to the interests of their own nations.”
The definition’s language does not read like law, because, according to Aronoff, it was never intended to be law. However, critics say IHRA and supporters of Israel are using it to chill and quash criticism of Israel’s government policies, and most recently, military operations in Gaza and the West Bank here in the U.S.
Aviva Chomsky spelled out what’s happening in an essay at The Nation last week: “Creating legal avenues to suppress what would otherwise be protected political speech about Israel is a major reason that the IHRA and its allies have felt the need to turn their definition into law. And advocates for the legal adoption of that definition claim that it’s necessary because antisemitism is on the rise in this country.”
The proliferation of these laws came within months, if not weeks after the Oct. 7 attacks, when over 10,000 Gazans had already been killed, mostly civilians, in IDF operations in the Strip. Protests were ramping up in American streets and especially college campuses as Americans began questioning U.S. military aid to Israel. Government officials, including the FBI, were warning that incidents of antisemitism were already climbing to "historic levels" across the country.
On his November 2023 bill to require the Department of Education “to adopt the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance’s (IHRA) definition of antisemitism for use in enforcing federal anti-discrimination laws,” Rep. Mike Lawler (R-NY) said outright, “we have seen a rapid rise in antisemitism on these college campuses, and we need to crack down on it.”
The U.S. House eventually passed a pro-IHRA definition bill, 320-91, in May 2024. The Senate, so far, has failed to do the same.
In the meantime, the crackdown on speech has been in full force, often justified by some variation of IHRA-defined prohibitions on antisemitism.
Palestinian activist and Columbia University graduate student Mahmoud Khalil was arrested in March “in support of President Trump’s executive orders prohibiting antisemitism.”
After last year's protests over the war in Gaza, the Trump administration said it expanded on its 2019 order and would take “forceful and unprecedented steps to marshal all Federal resources to combat the explosion of anti-Semitism on our campuses and in our streets since October 7, 2023.”
In late July, The Times of Israel reported that at Columbia University alone “nearly 80 students were suspended or expelled” as the school came under pressure to crack down on alleged antisemitism or lose federal funding. Columbia is by no means an outlier.
When Republican Ohio State Senator Terry Johnson proposed a bill in November — that passed — to define antisemitism under state law to determine whether an individual has committed “ethnic intimidation,” he said that “demonstrations related to pro-Gaza protests on college campuses have been marked by disturbing displayed aggression and intolerance.”
“Many of these protests cross the line into antisemitism by targeting Jewish students and expressing hateful rhetoric,” Johnson added, not issuing any specific examples for the record.
His efforts had critics. “By tying the IHRA definition to legal and administrative decisions, this bill risks confusing legitimate criticism of Israel’s policies or the political ideology of Zionism with antisemitism,” said Ann Ghazy, who joined others at the state capitol ahead of the December 2024 vote that nonetheless overwhelmingly passed Johnson’s bill. “Such conflation undermines valid discussions about human rights and self-determination and threatens to stifle debates necessary for a healthy democracy.”
Kenneth Stern is the director of the Center for the Study of Hate at Bard College who authored the IHRA’s original definition of antisemitism in 2006. Stern said that weaponizing the definition through law, or executive order, "puts pro-Israel Jewish students in a situation where they may be seen as trying to suppress speech rather than answer it.”
Stern, who says there is real antisemitism in America, including on college campuses, nonetheless charges that the definition he helped to craft is being distorted and misused to silence anti-Israel critics, and that could make the situation worse.
Critics contend that merely using this definition to enforce new laws or de facto speech codes could lead to other abuses. This is already happening. As independent journalist Glenn Greenwald noted on X on Sunday: “A Jewish professor of Holocaust Studies may leave Columbia because the texts she always used include the Jewish philosopher Hannah Arendt, who compared Zionists to Nazis and said Zionism is racist: now banned ideas under the IHRA hate speech code Trump forced on universities.”
Greenwald was referring to the Trump administration’s funding cuts to schools that the White House feels are not properly investigating for antisemitism offenses as defined by the IHRA.
As Columbia professor Marianne Hirsch, a prominent genocide scholar, told the Associated Press, “A university that treats criticism of Israel as antisemitic and threatens sanctions for those who disobey is no longer a place of open inquiry. I just don’t see how I can teach about genocide in that environment.”
Hirsch has been using the same curriculum for years but suddenly it’s an offense. It shouldn’t be, nor should speaking against Israel’s government, or any other government, and especially one’s own.
As Aronoff put it, “If you think this isn’t about suppressing political speech, contemplate a parallel. There’s no definition of anti-black racism that has the force of law when evaluating a Title VI case.” She added, “If you were to craft one, would you include opposition to affirmative action? Opposing removal of Confederate statues?”
Good questions, messy and unanswered, and likely unanswerable, because few would even think to go there legally, due to the First Amendment.
Whether or not something is considered “hateful rhetoric" — does waving a Palestinian flag, or calling what is happening in Gaza a genocide qualify? — this display of speech is something most Americans for the last half century understood was protected under the First Amendment, a precedent set by the Supreme Court in 1978 in a case brought by the ACLU in defense of neo-Nazi speech.
The Ohio state senator mentioned above insists that his “legislation should not be construed to diminish or infringe on any right protected by the First Amendment.” This addendum is what most government leaders have said to brush off Constitutional concerns over their antisemitism speech bills. And they are wrong — just because they say it passes Constitutional muster doesn’t make it so.
Courts are already considering whether using the IHRA definition of antisemitism to forge policies and law is unconstitutional.
In October 2024, the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas found in Students for Justice in Palestine v. Abbott that an executive order directing all Texas higher education institutions to use the IHRA definition of antisemitism to create and enforce speech codes likely violates the First Amendment and that affected student groups can proceed with lawsuits against the governor.
There has been much racial and religious upheaval throughout the history of the United States and an often bruised and battered First Amendment has, thankfully, survived it all.
Is this now but a memory? And for what cause — another country’s government?
As Glenn Greenwald posits, “There's no Israel exception to the First Amendment of the US Constitution.”
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Top photo credit: Russian President Vladimir Putin Alexandros Michailidis/Shutterstock
Russia’s economy is at a critical juncture. It is not an understatement to say that Moscow needs these Alaska peace talks with the Trump administration on Friday to end the Ukraine war as much as Kyiv does.
Mixed indicators in June signal that the overall economy seems relatively stable for the near term, but recession may be on the horizon. It may be trying to hide it, but Moscow can no longer obscure the true costs of the war, which are in part to blame for current conditions.
After the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Kremlin initially used budget spending, counter-sanctions measures, and credit growth to boost investment, which were largely successful as the economy grew near 4 percent in 2023 and 2024. However, in late 2024, the measures used to secure a war economy led to economic overheating, wage growth, and rampant inflation.
Now the economy is experiencing decline after more than two years of solid growth. Contraction has been driven by falling activity in mining, trade, real estate, and leisure — which parallel growth in agriculture, manufacturing, and public administration were not able to offset. As a result, the Russian Central Bank is predicting annual growth in 2025 between 1 and 2% and growth near 1% in 2026.
Despite the Central Bank’s optimism, the IMF recently cut its own 2025 projection for Russian GDP growth to 0.9% and 1% in 2026.
Russia’s current economic slowdown may be viewed as an opportunity for policy makers in the United States and Europe to escalate pressure on Russia. However, it is important to note that these same policymakers have overestimated Russia’s economic weakness since 2022 with negligible results on Russia’s management of the war in Ukraine.
Therefore, a policy of economic restraint, as opposed to economic warfare, would still appear the best approach to ending the war in Ukraine. Additional sanctions on Russia and countries who trade with Russia, as President Trump has threatened, may impact the global economy more severely than Russia.
Trump’s call for secondary sanctions has only served to bring the BRICS closer together and reinforce anti-American distrust in the Global South. Brazil's President, Lula da Silva, has revealed plans to call the leaders of India and China to discuss a joint BRICS response to tariffs and secondary sanctions imposed by President Donald Trump.
"What President Trump is doing is tacit — he wants to dismantle multilateralism, where agreements are made collectively within institutions, and replace it with unilateralism, where he negotiates one-on-one with other countries," Lula said.
Meanwhile, increased geopolitical instability or even escalation in current hotspots such as Israel, Iran, or the Caucasus, particularly Armenia, could cause fluctuations in oil prices and require Russia to divert resources it does not have, impacting Russia’s budget in unexpected ways.
The continuing slowdown during the first half of 2025 has contributed to a widening budget shortfall that has left the country with less to spend on infrastructure and public services. Apparently, the Kremlin has started to reallocate funds from vital investment projects in road, rail, and utilities to military budget items, but this is difficult to decipher given publicly available statistics.
The Moscow Times speculates that the data “blackout” is the latest in a broader trend that began after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. A recent article cites a report by Promsvyazbank (PSB) which suggests Russian authorities are increasingly limiting public access to core economic statistics as concerns grow over a potential economic slowdown, The PSB report notes that RosStat, the state statistics service, has not published several key macroeconomic figures for June and the first half of 2025.
For example, the PSB report notes inflation-adjusted retail and wholesale trade data were missing in the latest figures. RosStat reported a nominal 12.2% year-on-year rise in retail turnover for June but omitted the real, inflation-adjusted number. PSB analysts estimate real turnover growth may be closer to 2-3%.
The recent absence of key data follows Russian President Vladimir Putin's sharp remarks regarding a possible economic slowdown at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum in June. During the Forum, Economic Development Minister Maxim Reshetnikov warned that Russia’s economy is “on the brink of a recession.”
In later remarks, Putin commented that “several specialists have pointed out that there are risks for stagnation and even a recession. This will absolutely under no circumstances be allowed.”
Despite the Kremlin’s assertions, the S&P Global Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) survey for Russia showed the manufacturing sector dropped to 47.5 from 50.2 in May, signaling a sharp contraction. “Falling output, dwindling new orders, and job cuts are driving the manufacturing slump and mark a severe challenge for an economy heavily reliant on industrial production.”
The survey also showed that job losses accelerated at the fastest pace since April 2022. The survey predicts Russia’s unemployment rate of 2.9% in 2024 could increase to 3.5% in 2025. The country lacked around 2.6 million workers at the end of 2024, according to Russia’s Higher School of Economics, largely due to men going to war or fleeing abroad to avoid it.
The employment news is slightly concerning because record employment was one of the significant achievements of the war economy along with higher wages. Data for June confirmed that wage growth still increased by 12%, but the figure marked a drop from 19% in the same period in 2024.
In an effort to address the severe inflation and investment issues resulting from overheating, the Russian Central Bank lowered the key rate from 20% to 18% in July. Russian business viewed the measure as a positive sign in the battle to lower crushing inflation that has restricted borrowing costs and investment into the economy.
After the Central Bank lowered the rate from 21% to 20% in June inflation had dropped to 9.2% in July from 9.4%. The Central Bank predicts inflation will reach 6 to 7% by the end of 2025 with a target of 4% by the end of 2026.
Lower inflation will help lessen the ruble’s strength, which had been hampering trade. The Russian ruble's 45% rise against the U.S. dollar since the start of the year had made it one of the world's best performing currencies. However, the strong ruble also resulted in higher prices for Russian merchandise exports, which decreased 6% year on year as of June.
Another downside of the strong ruble is that dollar-denominated energy revenues generate fewer rubles for the Russian budget. As a result, Russia's oil and gas revenues have fallen due to sanctions and weaker pricing and were down by 27% year-on-year in July. Oil prices averaged $59.8 for Brent crude in June of 2025 versus nearly $70 in June 2024.
Although the projected economic stagnation is not something the Kremlin likes to discuss, measures to reduce inflation and stimulate greater business investment should boost the flagging economy enough to give Moscow the economic stability necessary to continue pursuing its aims in Ukraine through at least 2026 — if it has to.
Beyond 2026, the question would be whether Russia’s economy can recover in a way to force a peace in Ukraine and still achieve its full list of objectives.
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