Another round of constructive nuclear talks has been held with the help of the Omani mediators and Italian hosts. Though it is too early for a breakthrough, the momentum remains positive and is growing.
As a critical sign of strong political will on both sides for a deal, the pace of the talks is increasing, with technical talks being held in four days and another round of political discussions in seven days, according to officials.
While success is far from guaranteed, a pathway to success is starting to emerge. Still, hard issues remain unresolved, such as Tehran's demands for airtight guarantees that the US will stick to the deal.
But Trump has a chance to score a better deal than the 2015 agreement due to a willingness to put primary sanctions relief on the table. The opening of the Iranian market to American companies is a win-win. Iran's economy is in dire need of relief, and American companies would benefit greatly from access to this major, largely untapped market. The presence of American companies in the Iranian market may also be the most efficient political guarantee that the US will stick to the agreement.
Oman's constructive role continues to impress. Some countries help America find peace. And then there are countries trying to drag America into war. America is very fortunate to have Oman as a friend.
Trita Parsi is the co-founder and Executive Vice president of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft.
People and police members stand at one of the entrances of the Omani embassy, where the second round of US-Iran talks is taking place, in Rome, Italy, April 19, 2025. REUTERS/Vincenzo Livieri
Since inauguration day, the Trump White House has routinely evoked a deep-rooted Cold War framework for expressing America’s relationship with war. This framing sits at odds with the president’s inaugural address in which Mr. Trump, conjuring Richard Nixon, argued that his “proudest legacy will be that of a peacemaker and unifier.”
From January 2025 on, the administration has instead engaged in a steady drumbeat of aggressive militaristic taunting, threatening real and perceived enemies, foreign and domestic alike. From ordering 1,500 active-duty troops to assist with border patrolling and deportation missions, to the secretary of defense censuring the nation’s armed forces for not focusing enough on “lethality,” the Trump administration is reviving a decades-long trend within an increasingly militarized U.S. foreign policy — a faith in and fear of war and its consequences.
Since the end of World War II, Americans crafted and then embraced a rather disjointed relationship with war, exhilarated by its possibilities to transform the world and make them safe, while also fearing wars they could not prevent or, perhaps worse, win. This tension between faith and fear has haunted Americans and led to a persistent failure to align ends and means in carrying out US foreign relations.
Of course, ideals, interests, and power matter when it comes to foreign policy. Cold War commentators insisted that international politics was a “struggle for power.” True, some critics worried about the consequences of using “raw power” to achieve global dominance while overestimating threats. They fretted that wielding power might actually produce foreign policy crises rather than solve them.
But in the decades following the Second World War, many Americans feared that if the United States “lost” the burgeoning Cold War, their nation might not even survive. It was a tense time. World War II gave Americans the world…and the faith necessary to rule it. But seemingly new evils emerged that gave pause to policymakers and the general public alike.
Here were inklings of a relationship between faith and fear that would inform U.S. foreign policy ever since. I talk about this in my new book, "Faith and Fear: America's Relationship with War since 1945." A secular faith in war to solve any foreign policy problem, coupled with fears of America’s enemies bringing destruction to the nation’s shores, indelibly shaped policy choices when it came to containing communism around the globe.
In short, Americans largely held faith that war would always be utilitarian, a “rational means” for attaining their desired ends.
In such a cognitive framing, war might bring chaos in the dangerous world of which realists warned, but it also lured with the promise of influence, even dominance, the chance to reshape or control whole swaths of the globe.
Now by faith, I’m not talking about religious determinants in U.S. foreign policy. For sure, church leaders used their pulpits in service to both God and the anticommunist cause. Instead, I’m expressing faith as an anecdote for policymakers’ unwavering trust and confidence in war, as a vital tool for achieving policy objectives.
Civilian and military leaders held faith in nuclear arsenals deterring communists’ pursuit of “world domination.” They assumed covert paramilitary operations would stabilize nations in Latin America and the Middle East enduring nationalist struggles in the postcolonial era. And they faithfully believed that war would aid in modernization efforts aimed at transforming societies abroad, similar to later 21st century counterinsurgency theorists and regime change advocates seeking to bring liberal democracy and freedom to parts of the world supposedly still living in darkness.
Military force thus became an integral component of how policymakers and citizens alike related with the outside world. After World War II, war occupied a place in America it never relinquished.
Not everyone believed this was healthy for America. Dissenters have long worried about a garrison state emanating from this process of militarizing our foreign policy, but too often their voices were drowned out. The United States had to generate power, so the argument went, and then use that power to advance its political aims against an unyielding, atheistic enemy.
But faith also partnered well with domestic politics. Eager politicians extolled the nation’s military capabilities, diminishing the costs of war while worshipping its benefits. Rarely did they consider the possibility that military intervention might make matters worse, exacerbating local problems instead of solving them.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, those who didn’t accept this compulsory faith were branded as unpatriotic heretics. A false faith in war, taken to its extreme, bred not just hyper-patriotism, but xenophobia and nativism. In the process, dissent was driven to the political periphery. It seemed far easier, and far more patriotic, to embrace false promises of easy, if not eventual victory when the nation committed itself to war.
Aside this essentialist faith in war sat a fear that nearly all national security threats, both foreign and domestic, were existential ones. Americans bounded their faith in war to a kind of Hobbesian, primal fear of the unknown.
So, what were Americans afraid of? What left them in a near constant state of Cold War paranoia? Well, everything. They feared atomic war and “unconventional” war. They feared an anarchic international system seemingly under threat by godless communist forces. They feared arms races and missile gaps, threats abroad and threats at home. They feared depressions and recessions, the future and the past. They feared Soviet spies and Cuban “revolutionaries,” and, perhaps worst of all, they feared each other.
Americans displayed a kind of “neurotic anxiety” born of perpetually exaggerated fear. The parallels to today are striking. Had not the 9/11 attacks, as just one example, also revived long-simmering, stereotypical fears that Muslim extremists, in literary critic Edward Said’s words, might “take over the world”?
And, not surprisingly, as the Cold War persisted, opportunistic politicians and big business realized that existential fear could be a useful tool for persuasion, propaganda, and profit. Taken to its politicized extreme, fear could breed a form of militarized consensus.
In fact, the insidious relationships between legislators and lobbyists became a hallmark of Cold War politics as major defense firms were rewarded for the nation’s increased military posture. As one journalist noted in 1961, the purposes of the military-industrial complex fit “neatly in the atmosphere of crisis…as the United States continued to be held in the grip of wartime thinking.”
These tensions between faith and fear matter because they endure. For Cold War Americans, not unlike today, war was immensely relevant. As George Kennan, the father of “containment,” saw it in 1951, “many people in this country are coming to believe that war is not only unavoidable but imminent.”
Ultimately, these interactions between faith and fear have the potential to culminate into a spiraling, never-ending militarization of American foreign policy that leaves us far less safe in an uncertain world.
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Top image credit: Lev Radin, Maxim Elramsisy via shutterstock.com
Rightwing pundit Tucker Carlson recently made Ted Cruz look like a buffoon.
Cruz said during their interview in June, “I was taught from the Bible, those who bless Israel will be blessed, and those who curse Israel will be cursed. And from my perspective, I want to be on the blessing side of things.”
Carlson looked puzzled. He asked the Republican senator what part of the Bible said this. Cruz didn’t know.
Carlson told Cruz he was citing Genesis, whether he realized it or not, but also wondered how the senator could believe such a thing but not even be able to pinpoint the scripture (Cruz, the Texan, was seemingly appealing to evangelical Christian Zionists whose dispensationalist theology, heavily concentrated in the Southeast United States, dictates that they must unequivocally support the state of Israel formed in 1948).
“So you’re quoting a Bible phrase, you don’t have context for it,” Carlson asked. “You don’t know where in the Bible it is, but that’s your theology? I’m confused. What does that even mean?”
Carlson pushed Cruz to define what he meant by “Israel.” Did he mean the state’s current borders? It’s current government? A “political entity?” It’s biblical meaning?
Cruz settled on the term “nation.”
Not letting up, Carlson asked, “Is the nation God is referring to in Genesis, is that the same as the country run by Benjamin Netanyahu right now?”
On Thursday, Cruz seemed to attempt to win back points against Carlson by sharing a video on X, showing Carlson and a number of his recent guests mentioning “Israel” a lot.
Cruz wrote, “Wow. Why does (Tucker Carlson) seem to care more about Israel than any other country on earth? Since our interview, he & his show have referenced Israel 14.82 times EVERY SINGLE DAY.”
The senator asked, “Is there something particular about Israel that he really, really dislikes?”
Let’s face it, he seems to be suggesting that Tucker might be antisemitic.
The day before Cruz’s tweet, GOP Senator Lindsey Graham told a Republican audience, seemingly appealing to evangelical Christians in his party’s base, “If America pulls the plug on Israel, God will pull the plug on us.”
“I’m not going to let that happen,” Graham vowed.
What does this mean? Israel should be able to do whatever it wants, no matter what that might be, and on the U.S.’s dime? “Israel First?” In fact, Sen. Graham talks about Israel a lot. Does Cruz detect something sinister about his language? Of course not.
More importantly, given how deeply, financially, and morally the United States is involved in the ongoing conflict between Israel and Gaza, shouldn’t American journalists be talking about the carnage and mentioning the parties involved, as Cruz has accused Carlson and his guests of doing in a supposedly terrible way?
Even more important, given the intimacy of the U.S.-Israeli relationship and the widespread death and starvation happening in Gaza, shouldn’t American reporters and opinion makers be challenging the governments of the United States and Israel? Asking as many questions as possible? Interviewing experts and giving some context to these life-and-death global events?
If you’re Ted Cruz, that answer appears to be “no.” He appears to believe that if you talk about Israel too much, it might mean you’re antisemitic.
It seems Cruz is relying on his followers being stupid.
The charge of “antisemitism” for merely questioning anything the government of Israel does is a tired neoconservative trope, deployed for years by bullies like talk show host Mark Levin to shut down criticism and keep the right in line. As MAGA “America First” populism now includesyounger Southern evangelicals who are less dispensationalist when it comes to Israel in their theology, this trick just doesn’t resonate the way it used to.
But it's all Cruz seems to have. After his embarrassing drubbing by Carlson, it’s an attempt to save face — to whatever effect and to whomever on the right still believes this propaganda.
I suppose you can’t blame him for trying. In the meantime, Tucker Carlson’s interview with Ted Cruz has surged, and he is roasted all over again.
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Top photo credit: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy speaks during a meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump, French President Emmanuel Macron, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, and Finland's President Alexander Stubb amid negotiations to end the Russian war in Ukraine, at the White House in Washington, D.C., U.S., August 18, 2025. REUTERS/Al Drago
President Donald Trump met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and a host of European leaders in the White House Monday to discuss a framework for a deal to end the war. The big takeaway: that all parties appear to agree that the U.S. and Europe would provide some sort of postwar security guarantees to deter another Russian invasion.
What that might look like is still undefined. Trump also suggested an agreement would require “possible exchanges of territory” and consider the “war lines” between Ukraine and Russia, though this issue did not appear to take center stage Monday. Furthermore, Trump said there could be a future “trilateral” meeting set for the leaders of the U.S., Ukraine, and Russia, and reportedly interrupted the afternoon meeting with the European leaders to speak with Russian President Vladimir Putin on the phone.
The Trump administration’s approach to negotiations aimed at ending the war in Ukraine has been unorthodox and at times wrongheaded. But its commitment to pursuing diplomacy in the face of an obstacle-ridden path has nonetheless been commendable.
Sadly, for much of the past three and a half years, it has been difficult to say the same of Europe. Today’s meeting evinced a more constructive tone, along with a clear desire to carry forward the positive momentum from Trump’s summit with Putin in Alaska.
Yet some of the positions that European leaders were advocating for heading into the Monday meetings leave much to be desired.
For one, NATO membership for Ukraine remains unrealistic. There is a lot of talk suggesting the U.S. and European will extend some non-NATO “Article 5” guarantees but NATO’s Article 5 relies on credibility to be an effective deterrent — and any American promise to fight for Ukraine would not be credible, given that two consecutive U.S. administrations have made clear since Russia’s invasion that they will not send troops to defend Ukraine.
If Europe were a serious “geopolitical actor,” it would have recognized this fact long ago and sought more realistic security guarantees for Ukraine, rather than continue down the dead end of continually advocating for Kyiv’s right to pursue NATO membership — something its leaders were still doing as recently as this weekend.
History and geography ensure that Ukraine will always matter more to Russia than it does to the United States. If Kyiv were offered NATO membership, Russia would very likely test the West’s commitment to Ukraine’s security in short order. NATO members could then either choose not to retaliate, thereby severely undermining the credibility of Article 5 more generally, or they could respond militarily and risk a tit-for-tat escalation that could culminate in a nuclear exchange.
European Atlanticists, who presumably care deeply about the security of NATO members, should have concluded long ago that Ukraine cannot be one such member. While NATO expansion was certainly not the only cause of Russia’s invasion, it was strategic folly to insist repeatedly that Moscow could have no say over the security orientation of a large state on its border — even worse, to have done so in part because, as a matter of principle, Russia as a non-NATO member could not be seen to retain a veto over NATO decision making.
Europe’s position that a ceasefire should precede any discussion of substantive issues — reiterated by French President Macron and German Chancellor Merz in their meeting with Trump today — is also bound to go nowhere. European leaders were only belatedly brought around to the idea that there should be a ceasefire at all, preferring up until Trump’s inauguration to support Ukraine’s failing war effort for as long as it takes.
Trump has focused on reaching a ceasefire for the past several months likely due to his desire to notch a quick win. But he has correctly come around to the conclusion that a comprehensive settlement offers the only viable path forward. European leaders, for their part, only backed Trump’s calls for a ceasefire to keep him onside and, by doing so, delay having to make difficult political compromises with Moscow.
Putin launched this war of aggression to achieve certain political aims, including settling the question of Ukraine’s military alignment and creating a European security order in which Russia’s interests are treated seriously. His main leverage to get the West to entertain these goals is to press on with a military campaign that he appears to be winning. Simply put, Putin is not going to agree to an unconditional ceasefire in exchange for nothing.
It is particularly shocking that EU leaders — who are meant to be the embodiment par excellence of a peace project — have pushed for an unstable ceasefire rather than a comprehensive peace deal. Far too many characterize a peace deal as a “win” for Putin when in fact it is in the interest of allparties.
A comprehensive settlement that provides long-term stability offers the best chance at securing the private-sector investment necessary to rebuild Ukraine’s economy. It can also strengthen the country’s demographic base, which has shrunk nearly by half since the collapse of the Soviet Union, by encouraging the return of Ukrainians who have fled the country. Without the reconstruction that a settlement can facilitate, Ukraine has little chance of ever joining the EU. And the U.S. cannot responsibly draw down its forces in Europe and adjust its grand strategy to the realities of a multipolar world if it continues to be dragged back into a region beset by the threat of recurring conflict.
Can we trust Putin not to invade Ukraine again, even after a peace deal? The question is moot, since there has not been much trust between Russia and the West for years. The United States has also been prone to withdrawing from agreements that previous administrations had signed onto, including the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (under George W. Bush) and the Iran nuclear deal (under Trump).
There is no guarantee of perpetual peace in this world. Getting all sides to stick to their end of the bargain will require a mixture of inducements and penalties, deterrence and reassurance. It will require ending Ukraine’s position as a “grayzone” state whose security status is unclear and providing it with sufficient guarantees of its future security that all sides can live with.
Above all, it will require an ongoing commitment to robust diplomatic dialogue and a concerted effort to craft a more inclusive continental security order, without which neither Russia, Ukraine nor the West will enjoy any security.
For Europeans who have long sung from the hymnbook of peacebuilding and “political solutions” when other countries’ conflicts are concerned, only to insist that the “war will be won on the battlefield” when their own interests are at stake, a long period of reflection is warranted.
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