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2022-07-15t161833z_263984144_rc2gcv9a9tiq_rtrmadp_3_usa-saudi

Amid Gaza war, a beefed up Saudi nuke program is still on the table

Biden said recently that the Israeli normalization deal with the Gulf kingdom is still alive, and along with it will come serious proliferation risks.

Middle East

Speaking at a campaign event on October 20, President Biden clearly linked Hamas’s brutal surprise attack on Israel to the highly publicized normalization talks with Saudi Arabia, explaining, “One of the reasons Hamas moved on Israel … they knew that I was about to sit down with the Saudis.”

While the talks have since paused, the incentives for rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Israel still remain, assuming a wider war does not confound the present calculus.

Saudi Arabia reportedly stands to benefit from U.S. nuclear assistance and a potential defense pact if the deal goes through, which would represent a galactic shift in the U.S.-Saudi relationship. Normalization was already a prized goal for Israel, but it is now highly incentivized to isolate Hamas from the Arab world by normalizing relations with Saudi Arabia and building on the Abraham Accords. And President Biden may view a breakthrough as his legacy achievement in the Middle East, given that the Iran nuclear deal is hanging by a thread.

As presently envisioned, the tripartite deal relies on the United States to grease the wheels for there to be any breakthrough in normalization talks. But it is some expensive grease. The United States and Saudi Arabia have spent a decade negotiating the limits of a nuclear power program to no avail, and Saudi leaders routinely threaten to acquire nuclear weapons if Iran does.

Acceding to Saudi demands on this issue would represent a stark break in U.S. nonproliferation policy, but the transfer of enrichment technology is highly unlikely. Instead, the United States’ pursuit of influence over the program might result in concessions, allowing Riyadh access to enrichment capabilities without exerting control over them, unlike the situation with Iran. The measure of policy success should be the extent of knowledge and technology retained by Riyadh in the event of U.S. withdrawal.

Saudi Arabia’s Nuclear Quest

Since its inception, the Saudi nuclear program has never been fully isolated from regional security dynamics. Saudi Arabia announced its nuclear ambitions in 2006 along with the heads of the other Gulf Cooperation Council members at a time when Washington was warming up to the idea of negotiating with Iran over its by-then halted military nuclear program. While the Saudis have played up the energy security angle, the initially quiet, and eventually explicit, message was that if Iran was allowed to maintain its nuclear program, then the Saudis must follow along in stride.

The U.S. and Saudi Arabia have tried to negotiate a nuclear cooperation agreement (NCA) since 2012. An NCA would provide assurances for the peaceful use of nuclear technology, and the key point of contentions has been over access to enrichment and reprocessing technology. If a state develops a latent nuclear capacity with ostensibly peaceful nuclear technology, the threat of proliferation can hang over all security interactions. Specifically, a state’s possession of uranium enrichment or spent fuel reprocessing technologies determines its latent capacity to produce the fissile material for the core of a nuclear weapon, which is the challenge presently posed by Iran.

The Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations all eventually settled on requiring Saudi Arabia to forgo enrichment and reprocessing technology — also known as the “gold standard” which the UAE and Taiwan have adhered to — and to implement an Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) — the U.N.’s nuclear watchdog. The exact conditions are uncertain, but reports suggest that building an enrichment plant with Saudi investment, either in the U.S. or, as suggested by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace nuclear expert Mark Hibbs, a black-box centrifuge enrichment plant in Saudi Arabia but under complete U.S. control, is under discussion today.

Regarding safeguards, Saudi Arabia is finally in negotiations with the IAEA to grant nuclear inspectors access to sites where nuclear material may be present. For almost two decades, the country maintained minimal safeguards for its growing nuclear program. While it was not an imperative for Saudi Arabia to negotiate an Additional Protocol with the IAEA until it was prepared to handle large quantities of nuclear material, addressing these concerns earlier would have alleviated proliferation fears. Not doing so raised more questions about Riyadh’s intentions.

The Slippery Slope and the Role of Congress

Saudi Arabia views the Iran nuclear deal as the regional standard and argues that if Iran can maintain its enrichment program — even though the country suffers from crippling economic sanctions — then Riyadh should similarly be allowed access to the full nuclear fuel cycle. If the United States deviates from its long-standing nonproliferation policy and enables a path to Saudi enrichment, then the UAE will likely renegotiate the terms of its NCA, Turkey and Egypt may turn to Russia and China for enrichment plants, and the region may slide into a nuclear race.

However, Congress has a significant oversight role to play. It should sound strange that Congress gets the ultimate say in whether there is a normalization deal between two countries on the other side of the world, but Riyadh’s conditions of U.S. nuclear assistance will require congressional approval and a defense pact might require congressional approval. While any NCA would require congressional review, a defense pact, on the other hand, could come in many different forms.

For example, a NATO-style Article 5 commitment that an attack on one ally is considered an attack on all would require congressional ratification while a Bahrain-style Comprehensive Security Integration and Prosperity Agreement (C-SIPA) is an internationally binding agreement that does not require congressional ratification. The political lift and the role of Congress depends on the final shape of each condition. However, it is prudent to prepare for the scenario that U.S.-Saudi relations deteriorate; an imaginable scenario as U.S. lawmakers have called to withdraw troops over oil disputes as recently as last year, and presidential candidate Joe Biden said he would make them “pay the price, and make them in fact the pariah that they are.”

In an October 24 readout from the White House, President Biden and Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman “affirmed the importance of working towards a sustainable peace between Israelis and Palestinians as soon as the crisis subsides, building on the work that was already underway between Saudi Arabia and the United States over recent months.” Normalization talks may resume at some point, but it is crucial for the U.S. inter-agency process and Congress to prioritize long-term nonproliferation threats over meeting Riyadh’s immediate demands.


Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman fist bumps U.S. President Joe Biden upon his arrival at Al Salman Palace, in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, July 15, 2022. Bandar Algaloud/Courtesy of Saudi Royal Court/Handout via REUTERS ATTENTION EDITORS - THIS PICTURE WAS PROVIDED BY A THIRD PARTY TPX IMAGES OF THE DAY
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The Bunker appears originally at the Project on Government Oversight and is republished here with permission.


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Blob exploiting Trump's anger with Putin, risking return to Biden's war

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Donald Trump’s recent outburst against Vladimir Putin — accusing the Russian leader of "throwing a pile of bullsh*t at us" and threatening devastating new sanctions — might be just another Trumpian tantrum.

The president is known for abrupt reversals. Or it could be a bargaining tactic ahead of potential Ukraine peace talks. But there’s a third, more troubling possibility: establishment Republican hawks and neoconservatives, who have been maneuvering to hijack Trump’s “America First” agenda since his return to office, may be exploiting his frustration with Putin to push for a prolonged confrontation with Russia.

Trump’s irritation is understandable. Ukraine has accepted his proposed ceasefire, but Putin has refused, making him, in Trump’s eyes, the main obstacle to ending the war.

Putin’s calculus is clear. As Ted Snider notes in the American Conservative, Russia is winning on the battlefield. In June, it captured more Ukrainian territory and now threatens critical Kyiv’s supply lines. Moscow also seized a key lithium deposit critical to securing Trump’s support for Ukraine. Meanwhile, Russian missile and drone strikes have intensified.

Putin seems convinced his key demands — Ukraine’s neutrality, territorial concessions in the Donbas and Crimea, and a downsized Ukrainian military — are more achievable through war than diplomacy.

Yet his strategy empowers the transatlantic “forever war” faction: leaders in Britain, France, Germany, and the EU, along with hawks in both main U.S. parties. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz claims that diplomacy with Russia is “exhausted.” Europe’s war party, convinced a Russian victory would inevitably lead to an attack on NATO (a suicidal prospect for Moscow), is willing to fight “to the last Ukrainian.” Meanwhile, U.S. hawks, including liberal interventionist Democrats, stoke Trump’s ego, framing failure to stand up to Putin’s defiance as a sign of weakness or appeasement.

Trump long resisted this pressure. Pragmatism told him Ukraine couldn’t win, and calling it “Biden’s war” was his way of distancing himself, seeking a quick exit to refocus on China, which he has depicted as Washington’s greater foreign threat. At least as important, U.S. involvement in the war in Ukraine has been unpopular with his MAGA base.

But his June strikes on Iran may signal a hawkish shift. By touting them as a decisive blow to Iran’s nuclear program (despite Tehran’s refusal so far to abandon uranium enrichment), Trump may be embracing a new approach to dealing with recalcitrant foreign powers: offer a deal, set a deadline, then unleash overwhelming force if rejected. The optics of “success” could tempt him to try something similar with Russia.

This pivot coincides with a media campaign against restraint advocates within the administration like Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon policy chief who has prioritized China over Ukraine and also provoked the opposition of pro-Israel neoconservatives by warning against war with Iran. POLITICO quoted unnamed officials attacking Colby for wanting the U.S. to “do less in the world.” Meanwhile, the conventional Republican hawk Marco Rubio’s influence grows as he combines the jobs of both secretary of state and national security adviser.

What Can Trump Actually Do to Russia?
 

Nuclear deterrence rules out direct military action — even Biden, far more invested in Ukraine than Trump, avoided that risk. Instead, Trump ally Sen.Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), another establishment Republican hawk, is pushing a 500% tariff on nations buying Russian hydrocarbons, aiming to sever Moscow from the global economy. Trump seems supportive, although the move’s feasibility and impact are doubtful.

China and India are key buyers of Russian oil. China alone imports 12.5 million barrels daily. Russia exports seven million barrels daily. China could absorb Russia’s entire output. Beijing has bluntly stated it “cannot afford” a Russian defeat, ensuring Moscow’s economic lifeline remains open.

The U.S., meanwhile, is ill-prepared for a tariff war with China. When Trump imposed 145% tariffs, Beijing retaliated by cutting off rare earth metals exports, vital to U.S. industry and defense. Trump backed down.

At the G-7 summit in Canada last month, the EU proposed lowering price caps on Russian oil from $60 a barrel to $45 a barrel as part of its 18th sanctions package against Russia. Trump rejected the proposal at the time but may be tempted to reconsider, given his suggestion that more sanctions may be needed. Even if Washington backs the measure now, however, it is unlikely to cripple Russia’s war machine.

Another strategy may involve isolating Russia by peeling away Moscow’s traditionally friendly neighbors. Here, Western mediation between Armenia and Azerbaijan isn’t about peace — if it were, pressure would target Baku, which has stalled agreements and threatened renewed war against Armenia. The real goal is to eject Russia from the South Caucasus and create a NATO-aligned energy corridor linking Turkey to Central Asia, bypassing both Russia and Iran to their detriment.

Central Asia itself is itself emerging as a new battleground. In May 2025, the EU has celebrated its first summit with Central Asian nations in Uzbekistan, with a heavy focus on developing the Middle Corridor, a route for transportation of energy and critical raw materials that would bypass Russia. In that context, the EU has committed €10 billion in support of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route.

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On June 30, President Trump signed an executive order terminating the majority of U.S. sanctions on Syria. The move, which would have been unthinkable mere months ago, fulfilled a promise he made at an investment forum in Riyadh in May.“The sanctions were brutal and crippling,” he had declared to an audience of primarily Saudi businessmen. Lifting them, he said, will “give Syria a chance at greatness.”

The significance of this statement lies not solely in the relief that it will bring to the Syrian people. His remarks revealed an implicit but rarely admitted truth: sanctions — often presented as a peaceful alternative to war — have been harming the Syrian people all along.

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