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How to turn recognition of Palestine into more than just symbolism

France and Saudi Arabia's initiative at the UN carries some promise, but it requires strong follow-up

Analysis | QiOSK

The decision by France, the UK, Australia, Portugal, and several other countries to recognize Palestine has been hailed by many as a watershed moment — a symbolic reversal of decades of ambivalence — and lambasted by its critics for being a hollow, theatrical flourish set against the backdrop of complicity in the genocide in Gaza.

Indeed, Western complicity— through arms sales, diplomatic cover, intelligence sharing, and the failure to enforce international law — casts a long shadow over the moral claims of state recognition. Symbolism alone cannot stem the tide of genocide.

Nevertheless, this moment can yield more than virtue signaling. The recognition lends force to the Saudi-French initiative at the United Nations for the establishment of a Palestinian state, adopted by 142 states on September 12

This initiative can help shift the grammar of the conflict away from endless negotiation toward irreversible implementation: one grounded in time-bound, tangible steps toward statehood.

With the right follow-up, it can terminate the Oslo-process fallacy — whereby the roadmap never ends, and the outcome remains deferred.

The New York Declaration calls not just for recognition but for “tangible, time-bound, irreversible steps” toward implementing a two-state solution. It also calls for a temporary international stabilization mission under U.N. Security Council mandate, and commits to support for a Palestinian state based on 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital, pending agreed land swaps.

Reaffirming this is crucial at a time when Israel is explicitly seeking to destroy any prospects for a Palestinian state.

But this reaffirmation is far from enough; the Saudi-French process has its lacunae. First and most crucially, like Oslo, it lacks teeth. There’s no credible mechanism for enacting sanctions or penalties if Israel continues the occupation or violates the newly agreed parameters. Without cost for non-compliance, progress remains but a dim hope. This has to be addressed in the follow-up.

Second, the French-Saudi declaration makes a crucial link between the establishment of a Palestinian state and the establishment of a new security architecture for the region. This link needs to be made stronger.

The Middle East does not have an equivalent to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or any other inclusive, standing security body. By creating such a body and architecture, and offering Israel full membership IF it accepts a Palestinian state along 1967 lines, Israel will be offered the strongest incentives yet to change course and avoid permanent pariahhood. This goes beyond what Israel was offered in the Arab peace plan of 2002 (recognition) or the Abraham Accords (normalization) — this offers Israel full security integration. But only if it ends the occupation.

This will also serve U.S. interests far better than the course Washington is on right now. Not only has the absence of a security architecture contributed to the region’s perpetual instability, it also makes it difficult for the United States to engage in burden-shifting since there is no independent infrastructure to shift the security burden to. Most importantly, it would help the United States to finally free itself from the prospect of endless war in the Middle East.

At the Quincy Institute’s Better Order Project, we developed proposals along these lines in detail. You can find out more about it here and here.

This article originally appeared on Trita Parsi's Substack.


Top image credit: Frederic Legrand - COMEO / Shutterstock.com
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