Follow us on social

Mohammed bin Salman Emmanuel Macron

How to turn recognition of Palestine into more than just symbolism

France and Saudi Arabia's initiative at the UN carries some promise, but it requires strong follow-up

Analysis | QiOSK

The decision by France, the UK, Australia, Portugal, and several other countries to recognize Palestine has been hailed by many as a watershed moment — a symbolic reversal of decades of ambivalence — and lambasted by its critics for being a hollow, theatrical flourish set against the backdrop of complicity in the genocide in Gaza.

Indeed, Western complicity— through arms sales, diplomatic cover, intelligence sharing, and the failure to enforce international law — casts a long shadow over the moral claims of state recognition. Symbolism alone cannot stem the tide of genocide.

Nevertheless, this moment can yield more than virtue signaling. The recognition lends force to the Saudi-French initiative at the United Nations for the establishment of a Palestinian state, adopted by 142 states on September 12

This initiative can help shift the grammar of the conflict away from endless negotiation toward irreversible implementation: one grounded in time-bound, tangible steps toward statehood.

With the right follow-up, it can terminate the Oslo-process fallacy — whereby the roadmap never ends, and the outcome remains deferred.

The New York Declaration calls not just for recognition but for “tangible, time-bound, irreversible steps” toward implementing a two-state solution. It also calls for a temporary international stabilization mission under U.N. Security Council mandate, and commits to support for a Palestinian state based on 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital, pending agreed land swaps.

Reaffirming this is crucial at a time when Israel is explicitly seeking to destroy any prospects for a Palestinian state.

But this reaffirmation is far from enough; the Saudi-French process has its lacunae. First and most crucially, like Oslo, it lacks teeth. There’s no credible mechanism for enacting sanctions or penalties if Israel continues the occupation or violates the newly agreed parameters. Without cost for non-compliance, progress remains but a dim hope. This has to be addressed in the follow-up.

Second, the French-Saudi declaration makes a crucial link between the establishment of a Palestinian state and the establishment of a new security architecture for the region. This link needs to be made stronger.

The Middle East does not have an equivalent to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or any other inclusive, standing security body. By creating such a body and architecture, and offering Israel full membership IF it accepts a Palestinian state along 1967 lines, Israel will be offered the strongest incentives yet to change course and avoid permanent pariahhood. This goes beyond what Israel was offered in the Arab peace plan of 2002 (recognition) or the Abraham Accords (normalization) — this offers Israel full security integration. But only if it ends the occupation.

This will also serve U.S. interests far better than the course Washington is on right now. Not only has the absence of a security architecture contributed to the region’s perpetual instability, it also makes it difficult for the United States to engage in burden-shifting since there is no independent infrastructure to shift the security burden to. Most importantly, it would help the United States to finally free itself from the prospect of endless war in the Middle East.

At the Quincy Institute’s Better Order Project, we developed proposals along these lines in detail. You can find out more about it here and here.

This article originally appeared on Trita Parsi's Substack.


Top image credit: Frederic Legrand - COMEO / Shutterstock.com
Analysis | QiOSK
Ursula von der Leyen Benjamin Netanyahu
Top image credit: miss.cabul and noamgalai via shutterstock.com

Europe finally stands up to Israel — but only halfway

Europe

In a significant and long-overdue shift, the European Commission has finally moved to recalibrate its relationship with Israel. Its proposed package of measures — sanctioning extremist Israeli ministers and violent settlers and suspending valuable trade concessions — marks the most substantive attempt by the EU to impose consequences for the Netanyahu government’s conduct in Gaza and the West Bank.

Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, who once stood accused of a pronounced pro-Israeli bias, now states unequivocally that “the horrific events taking place in Gaza on a daily basis must stop.” Her declaration that the EU remains an “unwavering champion of the two-state solution” being “undermined by the Israeli government’s recent settlement actions” is a stark admission that Brussels can no longer ignore the chasm between its stated principles and its enabling actions.

These steps are important. They signal a breaking point with an Israeli government that has dismissed, with increasing contempt, the concerns of its European partners. The proposed tariffs, reinstating Most Favored Nation rates on €5.8 billion of Israeli exports, are not merely symbolic; they are a tangible economic pressure designed to get Jerusalem’s attention. The targeted sanctions against ministers responsible for inflammatory rhetoric and policies add a necessary layer of personal accountability.

Yet, for all its heft, this package suffers from critical flaws: it is horribly late, it remains dangerously incomplete, and it is a crisis, to a large degree, of Europe’s own making.

First, the delay. For almost two years since Hamas’ attack on Israel and Israel’s military campaign in Gaza leading to the killing of more than 60,000 people the world has watched the devastating conflict unfold. The EU, “the biggest donor of humanitarian aid,” has been forced to react to a catastrophe its own trade and political support helped underwrite. This response, only now materializing after immense public and diplomatic pressure, feels less like proactive statecraft and more like a belated attempt to catch up to reality — and to the moral courage already shown by several of its own member states.

Second, and most glaringly, the package omits the most logical and legally sound measure: a full ban on trade with Israel’s illegal settlements in the occupied West Bank. This is a profound failure of principle and policy. The settlements are universally recognized under international law as illegal. They are the very engine of the occupation that von der Leyen now claims is undermining the two-state solution.

While the Commission hesitates, what the Brussels-based head of the European Middle East Project Martin Konecny calls “a domino effect” is taking hold at the national level. The Dutch government has just announced it will ban imports from Israeli settlements, becoming the fifth EU member state to do so, following recent and decisive moves by Ireland, Slovenia, Belgium, and Spain. This growing coalition underscores both the moral imperative and the political feasibility of such a measure that the Commission continues to avoid.

Furthermore, this is not merely a political choice; it is a legal obligation. The International Court of Justice (ICJ), in its landmark opinion last year, made clear that all states are required to cease trade and support that facilitates Israel’s illegal settlement regime. As a matter of EU law, a union-wide ban could — and should — be implemented by a qualified majority vote as a necessary trade measure to uphold fundamental legal principles. The continued failure to do so renders the EU complicit in perpetuating the very system it now claims to oppose.

Third, the Commission’s entire approach suffers from a crippling legal and moral loophole: its proposed measures are framed purely through a humanitarian lens, deliberately sidestepping the EU’s explicit legal obligations to prevent genocide. By focusing solely on suspending parts of the Association Agreement, the proposal ignores the most direct form of complicity — the continued flow of arms from member states to Israel.

These lethal transfers, which fall outside the Agreement’s scope, are the subject of Nicaragua’s landmark case against Germany at the ICJ, which argues that providing weapons to a state plausibly committing genocide is a violation of the Genocide Convention. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Germany alone accounted for 30% of Israel’s major arms imports in 2019-2023. Berlin continued licensing the arms exports after the outbreak of war in 2023. The Commission’s failure to even address, let alone propose to halt, this pipeline of weapons from the member states while invoking “horrific events” reveals a strategic timidity that undermines the very rule of law it claims to defend.

keep readingShow less
House seeks to expand secretive arms stockpile used in Gaza war
Israeli soldiers prepare shells near a mobile artillery unit, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian Islamist group Hamas, in Israel, January 2, 2024. (REUTERS/Amir Cohen)

House seeks to expand secretive arms stockpile used in Gaza war

Washington Politics

The House is poised to expand the use of a secretive mechanism for funneling weapons to Israel.

Hidden deep in a must-pass State Department funding bill is a provision that would allow for unlimited transfers of U.S. weapons to a special Israel-based stockpile in the next fiscal year, strengthening a pathway for giving American weapons to Israel with reduced public scrutiny. The House Foreign Affairs Committee is set to discuss the bill Wednesday morning.

keep readingShow less
Pedro Sanchez
Top image credit: Prime Minister of Spain Pedro Sanchez during the summit of Heads of State and Government of the European Union at the European Council in Brussels in Belgium the 26th of July 2025, Martin Bertrand / Hans Lucas via Reuters Connect

Spain's break from Europe on Gaza is more reaction than vision

Europe

The final stage of the Vuelta a España, Spain’s premier cycling race, was abandoned in chaos on Sunday. Pro-Palestinian protesters, chanting “they will not pass,” overturned barriers and occupied the route in Madrid, forcing organizers to cancel the finale and its podium ceremony. The demonstrators’ target was the participation of an Israeli team. In a statement that captured the moment, Spain’s Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez expressed his “deep admiration for the Spanish people mobilizing for just causes like Palestine.”

The event was a vivid public manifestation of a potent political sentiment in Spain — one that the Sánchez government has both responded to and, through its foreign policy, legitimized. This dynamic has propelled Spain into becoming the European Union’s most vocal dissenting voice on the war in Gaza, marking a significant break from the transatlantic foreign policy orthodoxy.

Sanchez’s support for the protesters was not merely rhetorical. On Monday, he escalated his stance, explicitly calling for Israel to be barred from international sports competitions, drawing a direct parallel to the exclusion of Russia over its invasion of Ukraine. “Our position is clear and categorical: as long as the barbarity continues, neither Russia nor Israel should participate in any international competition,” he said. This position, which angered Israel and Spanish conservatives alike, was further amplified by his culture minister, who suggested Spain should boycott next year’s Eurovision Song Contest if Israel participates.

More significantly, it emerged that his government had backed its strong words with concrete action, cancelling a €700 million ($825 million) contract for Israeli-designed rocket launchers. This move, following an earlier announcement of measures aimed at stopping what it called “the genocide in Gaza,” demonstrates a willingness to leverage economic and diplomatic tools that other EU capitals have avoided.

Sánchez, a master political survivalist, has not undergone a grand ideological conversion to anti-interventionism. Instead, he has proven highly adept at reading and navigating domestic political currents. His government’s stance on Israel and Palestine is a pragmatic reflection of his coalition that depends on the support of the left for which this is a non-negotiable priority.

This instinct for pragmatic divergence extends beyond Gaza. Sánchez has flatly refused to commit to NATO’s target of spending 5% of GDP on defense demanded by the U.S. President Donald Trump and embraced by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, citing budgetary constraints and social priorities.

Furthermore, Spain has courted a role as a facilitator between great powers. This ambition was realized when Madrid hosted a critical high level meeting between U.S. and Chinese trade officials on September 15 — a meeting Trump lauded as successful while reaffirming “a very strong relationship” between the U.S. and China. This outreach is part of a consistent policy; Sánchez’s own visit to Beijing, at a time when other EU leaders like the high representative for foreign policy Kaja Kallas were ratcheting up anti-Chinese rhetoric, signals a deliberate pursuit of pragmatic economic ties over ideological confrontation.

Yet, for all these breaks with the mainstream, Sánchez’s foreign policy is riddled with a fundamental contradiction. On Ukraine, his government remains in alignment with the hardline Brussels consensus. This alignment is most clearly embodied by his proxy in Brussels, Iratxe García Pérez, the leader of the Socialists and Democrats (S&D) group in the European Parliament. In a stark display of this hawkishness, García Pérez used the platform of the State of the Union debate with the EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen to champion the demand to outright seize frozen Russian sovereign assets.

This reckless stance, which reflects the EU’s broader hawkish drift on Ukraine, is thankfully tempered only by a lack of power to implement it, rendering it largely a symbolic act of virtue signaling. The move is not just of dubious legality; it is a significant error in statecraft. It would destroy international trust in the Eurozone as a safe repository for assets. Most critically, it would vaporize a key bargaining chip that could be essential in securing a future negotiated settlement with Russia. It is a case of ideological posturing overriding strategic calculation.

This contradiction reveals the core of Sánchez’s doctrine: it is circumstantial, not convictional. His breaks with orthodoxy on Israel, defense spending and China are significant, but driven, to a large degree, by the necessity of domestic coalition management. His alignment on Ukraine is the path of least resistance within the EU mainstream, requiring no difficult choices that would upset his centrist instincts or his international standing.

Therefore, Sánchez is no Spanish De Gaulle articulating a grand sovereigntist strategic vision. He is a fascinating case study in the fragmentation of European foreign policy. He demonstrates that even within the heart of the Western mainstream which he represents, dissent on specific issues like Gaza and rearmament is not only possible but increasingly politically necessary.

However, his failure to apply the same pragmatic, national interest lens to Ukraine — opting instead for the bloc’s thoughtless escalation — proves that his policy is more a product of domestic political arithmetic than coherent strategic vision. He is a weathervane, not a compass — but even a weathervane can indicate a shift in the wind, and the wind in Spain is blowing away from unconditional Atlanticism.

LATEST

QIOSK

Newsletter

Subscribe now to our weekly round-up and don't miss a beat with your favorite RS contributors and reporters, as well as staff analysis, opinion, and news promoting a positive, non-partisan vision of U.S. foreign policy.