Video: Why is declaring war on Mexican cartels so popular?
A growing number of Republicans have called for military action to address the fentanyl crisis. A new video from the Quincy Institute explores what is behind this idea.
The idea of going to war with Mexican cartels to address the fentanyl crisis has been growing in popularity among Republican members of Congress and GOP presidential candidates this year.
QI’s Adam Weinstein spoke to journalist and author Ioan Grillo on why the idea of declaring war on Mexican drug cartels has gained steam in Washington but why it won’t solve the crisis.
Grillo, who is the author of three books including 2021’s Blood Gun Money: How America Arms Gangs and Cartels, says those proposing military action have that right diagnosis. “They’re right when they say the fentanyl problem is a really serious, severe problem that should be at the top of the political agenda,” he says. “There is a really serious organized crime in Mexico and they are working with corrupt government officials.”
However, warns Grillo, “where they’re wrong, and very seriously wrong, is you can’t simply send in a couple drones and send in a couple American military and solve this. It just doesn’t work strategically. “
In January, Reps. Dan Crenshaw (R-Texas) and Mike Waltz (R-Fla.) introduced an Authorization for the Use of Military Force against the cartels. A number of Senators have endorsed similar proposals, with, for example, J.D. Vance (R-Ohio) telling NBC News in July that he wants to “empower the president of the United States, whether that’s a Democrat or Republican, to use the power of the U.S. military to go after these drug cartels.”
During the first primary debate of the election cycle last month, Florida Governor Ron DeSantis said that, if elected president, he would send U.S. special forces into Mexico on “day one.” Other candidates, including former president Donald Trump and Vivek Ramaswamy, have said that they, too, support a military solution to the fentanyl crisis.
Weinstein and Grillo also discuss the history of Mexico’s wars against drug cartels, how cartel violence has affected life in Mexico, and more.
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Blaise Malley is a former reporter for Responsible Statecraft. He is also a former associate editor at The National Interest and reporter-researcher at The New Republic. His writing has appeared in The New Republic, The American Prospect, The American Conservative, and elsewhere.
Vladimir Putin has been humiliated in Syria and now he has to make up for it in Ukraine.
That’s what pro-war Russian commentators are advising the president to do in response to the sudden collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, according to the New York Times this week. That sentiment has potential to derail any momentum toward negotiating an end to the war that had been gaining at least some semblance of steam over the past weeks and months.
“Mr. Putin could intensify his costly offensive in Ukraine to recover some prestige,” says the Times. And he appears poised to do just that. This week, a Pentagon spokesperson announced that the Russians are on the verge of launching its new lethal intermediate range ballistic missile on Ukraine once again, saying they’re “trying to use every weapon that they have in their arsenal to intimidate Ukraine.”
Some Russian analysts say Putin is unlikely to be influenced by outside events, and dismiss calls for him to escalate in Ukraine as “noise.” And those calling for escalating Russia’s war in Ukraine offer few details on how a depleted Russian army can achieve such maximalist aims. But, as the Times notes, “they are united in their calls for the army to step up its assaults.”
Meanwhile, however, Moscow appears to be keeping the door open to negotiations. The Kremlin said this week that Putin’s goals of preventing Ukraine from joining NATO and solidifying control of the four eastern regions it took from Ukraine will be accomplished militarily or diplomatically, with the country’s spy chief even suggesting those goals are within reach.
Regardless of whether Putin decides to escalate in Ukraine, President-elect Trump still appears determined to end the war quickly once he assumes office next month. “There should be an immediate ceasefire and negotiations should begin,” he said on his social media platform Truth Social. He also said in an interview with NBC that he would be prepared to reduce military aid to Ukraine and withdraw the United States from NATO.
And in a new interview with TIME magazine, Trump criticized the Biden administration for allowing Ukraine to use U.S. long-range missiles to attack targets inside Russia.
“I disagree very vehemently with sending missiles hundreds of miles into Russia,” he said. “Why are we doing that? We're just escalating this war and making it worse. That should not have been allowed to be done. Now they're doing not only missiles, but they're doing other types of weapons. And I think that's a very big mistake, very big mistake.”
But while Trump appears to want a quick end to the war, he apparently doesn’t want the United States to play a primary role in implementing any such resolution. The Wall Street Journal reported this week that the outlines of Trump’s plan are starting to emerge based on his trip to Europe last week: “Europe would have to shoulder most of the burden of supporting Kyiv with troops to oversee a cease-fire and weapons to deter Russia.”
Russian troops are close to taking the strategic eastern city of Pokrovsk, according to Ukraine’s top general, the New York Timesreported. Gen. Oleksandr Syrsky said “unconventional decisions” would have to be made to bolster Ukrainian defenses although he did not specify what such actions would be.
U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen announced the disbursement of a $20 billion loan to Ukraine this week. Former UK diplomat Ian Proud writes in Responsible Statecraft that “the issue of how this latest $20 billion handout to Ukraine will be paid seems entirely secondary to the point that it won’t be the end of U.S. funding to Ukraine.”
The Pentagon announced a new security assistance package for Ukraine worth nearly $1 billion this week as, according to the Associated Press, “the Biden administration rushes to spend all the congressionally approved money it has left to bolster Kyiv before President-elect Donald Trump takes office next month.”
From State Department Press Briefing on Dec. 9
Asked about U.S. pressure on Ukraine to expand the pool of eligible draftees from 25 years old to 18, spokesman Matthew Miller said, “the decisions about the composition of its military force are – those are decisions that the Ukrainians have to make for themselves. What we have made clear is that if they produce additional forces to join the fight, we and our allies will be ready to equip those forces and train those forces to enter battle.”
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Top image credit: Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, meet with governor generals from across country Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, meet with governor generals from across country, Iran, on December 09, 2024. Photo by Iranian Presidency Office. Tehran Tehran Iran, Islamic Republic of 091224_Iran_RPO_0026 Copyright: xapaimagesxIranianxPresidencyxOfficexxapaimagesx via REUTERS
For Iran, the fall of Syria’s Bashar al-Assad and what was left of his regime — together with Moscow’s decision to throw its leading Middle East ally to the winds — represents a strategic calamity. Iran’s resistance strategy rested on its alliance with Assad. To make matters worse, Iran’s leaders fear that Assad will be replaced with what they readily call “terrorists.” In this sense, the perception in Iran of the potential threat posed by new rulers in Syria echoes the view of U.S. policymakers. In Washington and Tehran, the shared worry is that the victory of a kind of “Sunni jihadism lite” could invite further fragmentation and civil war in Syria or open the door for a revival of a new version of the so-called Islamic State.
Iran’s reformists share this fear. At the same time, Assad’s fall has reshuffled the political deck in the Islamic Republic. What was widely seen as the inexorable consolidation of a new generation of hardliners now looks different. Assad’s fall has not only discredited Iran’s hardliners, it has also provided ample reason to renew diplomacy with the United States, a position long advocated by reformists. In all likelihood, they will seize on this opening in a bid to revive their fortunes both at home and abroad.
A quest for détente at home and abroad
There has always been a close relationship between the uphill struggle of reformists to put their mark on Iran’s political system and the hot-button issue of U.S.-Iran relations. Broad generalizations about a group as complicated and fractious as the “reformists” can be hazardous. Yet it’s fair to say that they do not share the intense aversion to or fear of American cultural and ideological power that animates their hardline rivals. On the contrary, many imbibed Western political thought. Echoing the eclectic nature of political thinking in Iran, the reformists drew from Marxism, old school liberalism, existentialism, and what used to be called “Third Worldism” to advance a vision of political change not by popular revolution, but by a process of hard work focused on building alliances and advocating for a more pluralistic and open politics.
Given the forces lined up against them — beginning with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and much of the leadership of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps — reformists tried to enhance their domestic political clout by advocating international engagement with the West and even with the United States. What former President Mohammed Khatami called the “dialogue of civilizations” constituted a strategic gambit in this tricky domestic and global project. Every reformist president from Khatami to Hassan Rouhani to current President Masoud Pezeshkian has advocated some version of this approach.
Moreover, former foreign minister and current Vice President Mohammad Javad Zarif played a leading role in backing all three presidents. For Zarif and his allies in the foreign ministry, universities, and wider intelligentsia, securing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015 provided the political and strategic linchpin in a struggle to deflect hardliners and gain the Supreme Leader’s acquiescence. For reformists, the JCPOA’s provisions — including its “sunset clauses” — provided a window of 10 to 15 years to restructure Iran’s economy and, reformists hoped, tie the country to the global diplomatic and economic arena.
The Obama administration made a similar bet, only to see the gambling board overturned when Donald Trump withdrew the United States from the agreement in 2018. Zarif’s sudden resignation as foreign minister in February 2019 not only mirrored his frustration with the seeming collapse of the agreement he helped to secure, it also followed a meeting between Khamenei and Assad from which Zarif had been excluded, and about which he was probably not even informed. The writing was on the wall: reformists, it seemed, had no role in the strategy of “resistance” that the hardliners were placing at the center of Iranian foreign policy. With the 2021 election of hardliner Ebrahim Raisi as president, it seemed as if the reformist project had totally collapsed.
Diplomacy and resistance
Assad’s demise may have given reformists a new lease on life. For Zarif, this not only seems to be an “I told you so” moment that echoes his previous warnings about the power of his hardline adversaries, it is also one of bittersweet justice. Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” has lost its chief ally in Damascus while its number-two ally, Hezbollah, has agreed to a ceasefire with Israel after suffering numerous blows, the most serious of which was Israel’s September 27 assassination of its Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah.
And yet it is vital to recall that from the start Iran’s resistance strategy was built around both the use or threat of force and diplomacy. While they hated the reformists, hardliners needed their entree with global leaders, as well as the reformist-dominated Foreign Ministry’s expertise. Zarif knew this when he rescinded his 2019 “resignation.”
Similarly, his August 12, 2024 resignation as vice president for strategy 11 days after Pezeshkian’s election and subsequent return to that post two weeks later telegraphed the message that reformists still have a key role abroad and at home. That Khamenei did not oppose Zarif’s return even though hardliners had prompted his short-lived exit suggests that the Supreme Leader knows that with the declining capacity of Iran to use force to defend its most vital interest — regime survival — diplomacy is essential.
Indeed, Zarif reiterated the case for diplomacy in a December 2, 2024 Foreign Affairs article in which he argued that “Pezeshkian wants stability and economic development in the Middle East…But he also wants to engage constructively with the West. His government is ready to manage tensions with the United States…Pezeshkian hopes for equal-footed negotiations regarding the nuclear deal—and potentially more.”
The reference to the future is intriguing. With Assad’s fall and Russia’s humiliating retreat from Syria, Iranian foreign policy is at a major crossroads. As the New York Times’ David Sanger recently noted, Iran can either pursue its ongoing expansion of its nuclear program — a path that as this writer has noted is fraught with peril — or opt for serious diplomacy to defend, and thus redefine, a resistance strategy that has long been based on a “no war, no peace” formula that has become increasingly hard to sustain.
Will Trump go for a new deal?
It is too early to tell how Trump will respond to any outreach by Iran — outreach that may already be unfolding, as the November 14 meeting between Elon Musk and Iran’s U.N. ambassador suggests. Every Middle Eastern leader is betting that the president-elect will deliver the diplomatic goods that Joe Biden failed to produce. On Iran, however, Trump will have to agree to the premise of a negotiated bargain that he previously rejected, namely reducing or eliminating nuclear-related sanctions in return for a new deal that imposes a tougher regime of international supervision but that allows Iran limited enrichment. Hardliners such as Brian Hook, who may again serve as Trump’s Iran point man, will argue instead for returning to “maximum pressure,” a policy that under the first Trump administration precluded any compromise on enrichment. And they will assert, as Hook has done repeatedly, that there is no real difference between Iran’s hardliners and reformists, that is, the only thing that matters is the Supreme Leader.
Trump is hardly in a position to referee a debate on Iran that will only intensify after he returns to the White House. Yet his aversion to allowing the United States to get pulled into a regional war might prompt him to resist his own hardliners and instead take advantage of potential — if still unclear — openings that no one inside or outside the Middle East anticipated only a week ago.
Top image credit: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy and European Commission President Ursula Von Der Leyen attend a joint press conference in Kyiv, Ukraine, on September 20, 2024. (Photo by Maxym Marusenko/NurPhoto)
As the war between Russia and Ukraine is framed by the ruling politicians and commentators in Europe and America as part of a purported global struggle between democracies and autocracies, the quality of democracy in the West itself has taken a hit.
The dominant voicesadvocating for Ukraine’s victory and Russia’s defeat, both defined in maximalist and increasingly unattainable terms, are intent on snuffing out more thoughtful and nuanced perspectives, thus depriving the public of a democratic debate on the existential questions of war and peace.
In a familiar pattern throughout the West, respected academics who correctly predicted the quagmire Ukraine and the West now find themselves in have been smeared and delegitimized as Kremlin mouthpieces, subjected to harassment, marginalization and ostracism.
The situation is particularly alarming in Europe. While the Ukraine debate in the U.S. is, to a worrying extent, shaped by pro-militarist think tanks, such as the Atlantic Council, hawkish politicians and neoconservative pundits, a countervailing movement consisting of pro-restraint voices has been growing. They include Defense Priorities, the CATO Institute, publications like The Nation on the left, and The American Conservative on the right, and academics like Stephen Walt, John Mearsheimer, and Jeffrey Sachs, among others. There is more space for alternative voices in American discourse.
In Europe, by contrast, foreign policy debates tend to simply echo the most hawkish voices inside Washington’s Beltway.
Sweden is a particularly telling illustration of that trend. After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Swedish government and political class swiftly moved to join NATO. Yet, as one of the leading Swedish international relations scholars Frida Stranne told me in an interview, “No proper debate was held on the key questions, like whether Russia’s aggression against Ukraine indeed was such an immediate security threat for Sweden that it had to ditch the neutral status it enjoyed even during the Cold War?” (I can testify myself, from my work as a senior foreign policy adviser in the European Parliament in early 2022, that even some members of the then-ruling Swedish social-democratic party were aghast at the government running roughshod over alternative views on NATO).
Further, in a conversation with me, Stranne, while acknowledging that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was “an egregious breach of international law,” pointed to U.S. policies since 2001, such as the invasion of Iraq, noting that they “have helped to undermine international legal principles and set the precedent for other countries acting ‘preemptively’ against perceived threats.”
In the same interview, she also warned that “a refusal to countenance a negotiated settlement to the war in Ukraine is leading the world perilously close to the brink of a major military conflict between NATO and Russia.”
While such points are routinely made by fairly mainstream scholars in the U.S., in Sweden they triggered a vicious campaign against Stranne and made her nearly untouchable by the media and in foreign policy circles. Leading media outlets vilified her as a U.S. hater and a “Putinist.”
Germany is another example of how enforced groupthink led to a marginalization of dissenting perspectives in political debates. What is particularly noteworthy is the speed and radicalism with which the hawks in think tanks, media, and political parties managed to redefine the debate in a country previously known for its now-defunct Ostpolitik, a policy of pragmatic engagement with the Soviet Union and later Russia.
One of Germany’s most prominent foreign policy experts, Johannes Varwick of the University Halle-Wittenberg, has long defied the trend and advocated for diplomacy. In December 2021, together with a number of high-ranking former military officers, diplomats and academics, he warned that a massive deterioration in relations with Russia could lead to war — due, in part, to the West’s refusal to take seriously Russia’s security concerns, chiefly related to the prospects of NATO’s eastward expansion.
Yet such views earned Varwick accusations of “serving Russian interests.” As a result, as he told me in an interview, his “ties with the political parties and ministries responsible for conducting Germany’s foreign and security policy were severed.”
Experts in neutral countries were not spared marginalization as well. Austrian Prof. Gerhard Mangott, one of the most eminent experts on Russia in the German-speaking world, pointed to a “shared responsibility” of Russia, Ukraine, and Western countries for the failure to resolve the post-2014 Ukrainian conflict peacefully. Such analysis, as Mangott told me, led to his “prompt excommunication by the German-speaking scientific community which turned quickly to political activism and became party to the war.”
The tragic irony, of course, is that these ostracized voices have proved to be correct in most respects about this war.
When, despite his warnings, the Russian invasion of Ukraine did occur, Varwick, who condemned it as illegal and unacceptable, called for further efforts to find a realistic negotiated solution to the conflict. As he told me, this should “firstly include a neutral status for Ukraine with strong security guarantees for the country. Secondly, there would be territorial changes in Ukraine that would not be recognized under international law but must be accepted as a temporary modus vivendi, and thirdly, the prospect of suspension of some sanctions in the event of a change in Russia’s behavior must be on offer.”
In March 2022, both Ukraine and Russia were close to a deal broadly along these same parameters. It did not work, because, among other reasons, the West encouraged Ukraine to believe that a military “victory” was possible. The role of then-British Prime Minister Boris Johnson in undermining the talks is now generally acknowledged. What is, however, particularly striking is that Johnson recently himself admitted that he saw the war in Ukraine as a proxy war against Russia — a claim made by Stranne and the Quincy Institute’s Trita Parsi in their 2023 book, in Swedish, “The Illusion of American Peace,” for which they were lambasted for purportedly pushing Russian narratives.
Fast forward to late 2024, and, faced with growing difficulties on the battlefield, Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky is now signaling that he could go along with some of the elements outlined by Varwick; namely, accepting some de facto territorial losses to prevent even bigger ones should the war continue.
Today, Ukraine is farther away from achieving anything remotely resembling a military victory than at any point since February 2022. Contrary to the expectations in the U.S. and EU, sanctions neither tanked Russia’s economy nor changed its policies in the ways the West sought.
In the West itself, political forces that urge negotiations to end the war are ascendant, as evidenced by the election of Donald Trump as president in the United States and the rise of anti-war parties in Germany, France and other EU countries. Public opinion surveys consistently show a preference of the majority of Europeans for a negotiated end to the war.
The reality is, irrespective of the outcome of the war in Ukraine, a modus vivendi between the West and Russia will have to be reestablished to ensure, in Varwick’s words, “their coexistence in a Cold War 2.0 without a permanent escalation.” Restoring an open democratic debate about this vital issue is long overdue.
Listening to the experts who have a proven track record of correct analysis would be a necessary first step.
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