Follow us on social

M23

M23 & Rwanda are trying to redraw the map and it's all about to blow

Will offers of resource wealth to the US and other powers help bring militia violence to heel in the Democratic Republic of Congo before its too late?

Analysis | Africa

In late January and early February, the M23 militia captured both Goma and Bukavu, the two most important cities in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The Rwandan-backed rebel group now controls a vast territory — comparable in size to Connecticut — where it is already establishing local administrations, making it clear that M23 and Rwanda are determined to redraw the geopolitical map of Africa’s Great Lakes region.

M23 and Rwanda

The M23 rebellion first emerged in 2012, but was defeated in 2013 — largely through international pressure on Rwanda. In theory, M23 is fighting to protect the Rwandophone community in eastern Congo, most especially its Tutsi community. But its agenda is more ambitious and closely linked with Kigali’s interests in the region. The more recent creation of the Alliance du Fleuve Congo (AFC) — also fits within this strategy; it’s the political wing of M23, which has a broader political agenda of regime change in Kinshasa.

M23 reemerged in November 2021 for a number of reasons, including the failure of the the Congolese government to abide by promises it made to the militia’s veterans, such as their integration into the national army. But the main reason was due to Rwanda’s fears that its interests in the region were under threat.

Kigali has a number of interests in eastern DRC. It considers the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) rebel group, which consists of the remnants of the mainly Hutu perpetrators of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, an existential security threat, notwithstanding their diminishing numbers. It also has economic interests: gold is Rwanda’s most important export, and it’s a well-known secret that most of that gold is mined in eastern DRC.

Moreover, with neighboring countries Uganda and Burundi expanding military operations against their own DRC-based insurgencies into territory that it considers within its own zone of influence, Rwanda felt it necessary to reactivate its armed proxy, the M23, to protect its interests there. Rwanda’s elites have long doubted Kinshasa’s ability govern eastern DRC and urged the creation of a buffer zone, which they sometimes refer to as a “Kurdistan.” M23 fits the bill in in this overall picture: trained and supplied by Kigali, the militia is also backed by Rwanda’s own forces on the ground. The U.N. estimated that between 4,000 and 7,000 Rwandan troops were inside the DRC late last year, a number that has surely increased since the takeover of Goma and Bukavu.

The M23’s offensive has exacted a heavy humanitarian price: Over the past 14 months, three million people, including hundreds of thousands who were pushed out of refugee camps, have been displaced; and thousands have been killed. A public health nightmare is also unfolding. Moreover, the risks of a bigger regional conflict have risen sharply.

Burundi

Burundians are increasingly worried about possible war with Rwanda. Tensions between Kigali and Gitega have increased rapidly, with each side accusing the other of supporting rebel forces against their governments. The border between the two countries has closed, and the U.N. has reported that Rwanda’s army has issued direct orders to target Burundian soldiers in the region. In recent weeks, the war of words has escalated: last week, Burundian President Évariste Ndayishimiye urged his citizens to prepare for war and denounced Rwanda as an “enemy of Burundi.”

Rwanda, the more powerful of the two countries, would not oppose regime change in Burundi. But how far it wants to go in redrawing the region’s geopolitical map is not yet clear.

Uganda

Like Rwanda, Uganda has a mix of political, security and economic interests in eastern DRC. Gold, for example, is also Uganda’s most important export, and most of it comes from the DRC. Kampala has a long and complicated “frenemy” relationship with Kigali: the two countries have at times collaborated in eastern DRC; at other times, they have competed for influence there.

In the current conflict, Kampala has played an ambiguous role. On the one hand, the U.N. has reported over the past 18 months that Uganda has provided some support to M23; including permitting it to recruit in Ugandan-controlled territory and even incorporating Ugandan security personnel in its ranks. On the other hand, and parallel to M23’s rapid territorial expansion over the last weeks, the Ugandan army has also expanded its presence in eastern DRC. Like Kigali, Kamapala is carving out territory in the region.

Kinshasa losing control

It is clear to all that President Felix Tshisekedi is losing control over the region. His army’s morale seems particularly low: videos of fleeing soldiers have further reduced his credibility. The withdrawal in mid-February of Burundian forces, which had been the DRC’s most important military ally, marked the collapse of Tshekedi’s military strategy.

With M23 increasingly moving its forces southward, Katanga — the center of most of DRC’s industrial mining — is increasingly coming into focus. Here the conflict takes on additional layers of complexities. In an “enemy of my enemy is my friend” logic, many Katangans are not necessarily opposed to M23/AFC; nor do they endorse or support it or Rwanda’s ambitions. But they share a resentment against the Tshisekedi government in Kinshasa: the last two presidents and the DRC’s main opposition leader all hail from Katanga and have felt excluded from power. A recent op-ed by former President Joseph Kabila lends credence to Tshisekedi’s accusations that Kabila is behind the M23/AFC coalition.

Thus, in addition to the risk of regional escalation, ethnic and political tensions within DRC are on the rise. The Congolese “radio trottoir” is filled with rumors of various groups mobilizing for possible violence. In the capital, threats against Swahili speakers, who generally hail from the east, have circulated, spreading and contributing to a vicious circle by lending credence to M23 and Rwanda’s claims that Rwandaphones are at risk.

The current situation looks strikingly similar to the early days of the Second Congolese war, which lasted five years beginning in 1998. In that conflict, neighboring countries sought to effectively partition Congo into zones of influence. The war cost millions of lives.

The importance of US pressure

When M23 first emerged in 2012, international pressure on Rwanda was decisive in ending the conflict in 2013. Donors suspended $240 million in international aid, with the U.S. played a key role, including phone calls by President Barack Obama to his Rwandan counterpart, Paul Kagame.

Isolated, Tshisekedi is desperately trying to revive international pressure on Rwanda to end its support for M23 — but with only very limited success so far.

That effort has included an appeal for military assistance to the administration of President Donald Trump in exchange for exclusive access to DRC’s vast mineral wealth by proposing “minerals for security deals.” In addition to gold, the country holds enormous stores of cobalt and produces other strategic minerals, including lithium, tantalum, and uranium. (Similar offers have reportedly been made to the United Arab Emirates and Russia.)

Acting through one lobbyist, Kinshasa has also offered Washington access to its military bases “to protect strategic resources,” as well as a major stake in a billion-dollar deep-water port project. According to a letter from Africa-USA Business Council, the Tshisekedi government is “signaling a clear desire to shift away from China’s dominant influence and strengthen economic ties with the West.”

According to our interviews, the proposal, which has been conveyed by different actors with conflicting messages, is perceived within the U.S. administration as vague, uncoordinated, and difficult to implement. If anything, the offers have underlined the fragility and desperation of the Congolese leadership.

Under former President Biden, Washington was the most outspoken of the Western powers in denouncing Rwanda’s backing for M23. Although sanctions were taken against two individuals (of the Rwandan Defense Forces, and M23), and military cooperation was further restricted, no U.S. development aid was suspended.

The more recent announcement by the Trump administration of U.S. sanctions against two Rwandan individuals — notably James Kaberebe, who, as minister of state for regional integration, is central to Rwanda’s support to M23 — marks a step in the right direction. But persuading Kigali to end its support for M23 will likely require significantly more pressure.

The window for international action is closing rapidly, with Kinshasa clearly losing control, M23/Rwanda establishing itself throughout eastern DRC, and the likelihood of a larger and even more deadly conflict in the Great Lakes region increasing rapidly.


Top image credit: An M23 officer presents Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) members to Rwandan officers at the border where they are repatriated after being captured in the Democratic Republic of Congo, at the Goma-Gisenyi Grande Barrier border crossing, March 1, 2025. REUTERS/Arlette Bashizi
Analysis | Africa
Nato-scaled
Official Opening Ceremony for NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Summit 2018 in Brussels, Belgium. (Shutterstock/ Gints Ivuskans)
Official Opening Ceremony for NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Summit 2018 in Brussels, Belgium. (Shutterstock/ Gints Ivuskans)

The 17 Ukraine war peace terms the US must put before NATO

Europe

In the run up to the NATO Summit at The Hague next week, June 24-25, President Donald Trump and his administration should present a clear U.S. plan for peace in Ukraine to the European and Ukrainian governments — one that goes well beyond just a ceasefire.

While it is understandable that Trump would like to walk away from the Ukraine peace process, given President Vladimir Putin’s intransigence and now the new war in the Middle East, he and his team need to state clearly the parameters of a deal that they think will bring a lasting peace. Walking away from the effort to end the war prematurely leaves Washington in continued danger of being drawn into a new crisis as long as the U.S. continues to supply Ukraine with weapons and intelligence.

keep readingShow less
Benjamin Netanyahu Donald Trump
Benjamin Netanyahu Donald Trump at the White House in April 2025 (White House/Flickr)

Israel is luring the US into a trap

Middle East

Joining in Israel’s aggression against Iran would hurt, not advance, U.S. interests and international security.

This should not be surprising, given that support for U.S. interests and international security was not what led to Israel’s launching of the war. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu argues that Iran’s nuclear program poses a threat to America and not just Israel, but the nuclear issue was not the main motivation behind Israel’s attack, as reflected in a target list that goes far beyond anything associated with Iran’s nuclear program.

keep readingShow less
Michael Jensen
Top image credit: April 2014 - U.S. Air Force Maj. Michael Jensen, 26th Special Tactics Squadron commander smiles after assuming command of the squadron. The 26 STS, formerly Detachment 1 of the 720th Special Tactics Group, Hurlburt Field, Fla., is a newly activated squadron based at Cannon. (U.S. Air Force photo/ Senior Airman Eboni Reece)

Former Air Force commando takes top LatAm job at NSC

Latin America

After months of speculation, Reuters reported earlier this month that retired Air Force lieutenant colonel Michael Jensen has been appointed as senior director for the Western Hemisphere at the National Security Council (NSC), according to two U.S. officials.

Jensen’s appointment marks the first time in recent memory that a president has nominated a special forces operative — let alone a career military officer — to oversee U.S. policy toward Latin America at the NSC.

keep readingShow less

LATEST

QIOSK

Newsletter

Subscribe now to our weekly round-up and don't miss a beat with your favorite RS contributors and reporters, as well as staff analysis, opinion, and news promoting a positive, non-partisan vision of U.S. foreign policy.