The Washington Post this morning has reported that the top Democrats on the Armed Services Committees — Rep. Gregory Meeks (N.Y.), and Senator Ben Cardin (Md.) — have finally given their nod on the biggest arms sale to Israel since Oct. 7.
In fact, after holding it up for months they gave their approval "weeks ago." Now Congress will be formally notified.
The package includes 50 F-15s that won't arrive in Israel for years, along with surface-to-air missiles and Joint Direct Attack Munition kits, which retrofit unguided bombs with precision guidance, according to the paper. The package is worth $18 billion.
The two Democrats had been resistant to give their nods (the ranking Republicans gave their approval months ago) due in part to the continued blocking of aid in the strip. Meeks, according to the Post, told CNN in April that “I don’t want the kinds of weapons that Israel has to be utilized to have more deaths...I want to make sure that humanitarian aid gets in. I don’t want people starving to death, and I want Hamas to release the hostages. And I want a two-state solution.”
But we know there is enormous pressure on lawmakers who want the Biden administration to use its leverage — including $4 billion a year in military aid to pay for such weapons — to stop the civilian carnage Republicans have said that the administration is not giving the Israelis more missiles and ammo fast enough, calling it a "reprehensible" betrayal. Efforts to condition further aid have fallen largely by the wayside.
The administration has "paused" the transfer of 1,800 2,000-pound bombs and 1,700 500-pound bombs due to recent events but are already consider "unpausing." The House has already passed a bill punishing the administration for holding back the weapons in the first place.
According to the Post, Meeks told the paper that he has been in “close touch” with the White House and “repeatedly urged the administration to continue pushing Israel to make significant and concrete improvements on all fronts when it comes to humanitarian efforts and limiting civilian casualties.” Cardin's office, for its part, said the package had gone through the "regular review processes."
Kelley Beaucar Vlahos is Editorial Director of Responsible Statecraft and Senior Advisor at the Quincy Institute.
Ranking Member Gregory Meeks (D-NY) speaks during a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee hosts a roundtable with families of Americans held hostage by Hamas since October 7, 2023. (Photo by Allison Bailey/NurPhoto)NO USE FRANCE
The international community has before it two official proposals — Ukrainian and Russian — for a peace settlement to end the war in Ukraine. Both as they stand, and in present circumstances, are absurd. Diplomats and analysts should however give thought to whether they could nonetheless in the future provide the starting point for negotiations leading to an eventual compromise.
The Ukrainian government’s Ten-Point “peace plan” demands complete withdrawal of Russian forces from all the Ukrainian territory that Russia has occupied since 2014 as a precondition for holding talks at all. Presumably those talks would then deal with other Ukrainian points, including war crimes trials for the Russian leadership, and Russian compensation for the damage caused by the Russian invasion.
In addition, President Zelensky and other Ukrainian officials have declared that Ukrainian neutrality is also a priori unacceptable — though it should be noted that an invitation to join NATO is a matter not for Ukraine but for existing NATO members, and can be blocked by one national veto.
As revealed this week by The New York Times, these Ukrainian demands are radically different from Ukraine’s positions in peace talks with Russia that took place in Istanbul in the first weeks of Russia’s February, 2022 invasion. The paper quotes one of the Ukrainian negotiators, Oleksandr Chalyi: “We managed to find a very real compromise. … We were very close in the middle of April, in the end of April, to finalize our war with some peaceful settlement.”
At that point, the Ukrainian government was prepared to agree to a permanent treaty of neutrality (allowing for membership of the European Union but not for NATO) in return for security guarantees from all members of the U.N. Security Council. The Ukrainians refused to recognize the Russian annexation of Crimea or the independence of the Russian-occupied areas of the Donbas, but were prepared to leave these under de facto Russian control pending future negotiations at an indeterminate date.
There were however some serious sticking points. Russia demanded that actions by the U.N. Security Council in defense of Ukraine would have to be agreed unanimously — which would have given Russia the right of veto. Russia also demanded that Ukrainian missiles be limited to a 25-mile range, while no such limits were to be placed on Russian weapons. These conditions were obviously unacceptable to the Ukrainians. It is impossible to say whether these disagreements could have been overcome or nuanced in some way, because the Ukrainian side broke off the talks, for reasons that are hotlycontested.
If Ukrainian conditions have hardened enormously in the subsequent two years of war, so too have those of Russia. In a statement in response to the “Peace Summit” convened by the West in Switzerland, President Putin demanded that Ukraine withdraw its troops from the whole of the four Ukrainian provinces that Russia claims to have annexed since the start of the war (in addition to Crimea, annexed in 2014) — although Russia does not occupy the whole of any of them, and did not manage even to capture or hold the provincial capitals of Kherson and Zaporizhia.
Putin said that as soon as Ukraine begins to withdraw its troops, Russia would cease its military operations. However, he added that as part of a final peace settlement, Ukraine would have to recognize Russian sovereignty over these four provinces and Crimea, sign a treaty of neutrality, guarantee the rights of Russian speakers in Ukraine, and engage in “demilitarization” and “denazification,” though he did not say what these last terms would involve.
These Russian terms were naturally at once rejected out of hand by the Ukrainian government and the West.
In the end however, the terms of an end to the fighting, whether in the form of a formal peace agreement or a ceasefire pending future talks, will be determined by the military situation on the ground. From this point of view, Ukraine’s demand for complete Russian withdrawal as a precondition of talks is completely impossible. It would require the total defeat of the Russian military, which is far beyond Ukraine’s capacity at present or in any rationally foreseeable future.
Putin’s conditions for peace by contrast, while they require that Russia inflicts significant further defeats on Ukraine, do not require that these defeats be total. To achieve this position on the ground, Russia only has to capture the remainder of these four provinces, or conquer other areas and then offer to exchange them.
As sensible Russian analysts recognize, Ukraine and the West will never agree formally to recognize Russian sovereignty; but if Moscow were prepared to settle for Ukrainian and Western acceptance of de facto Russian rule, then — as in the case of the unrecognized Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus — this would not necessarily be a fatal bar to peace. Neutrality has already in effect been accepted by Western governments, since they have repeatedly stated and demonstrated that while they will support Ukraine, they will not go to war to defend it.
This rules out admitting a Ukraine that remains in a state of war with Russia, even after a ceasefire.
Even de facto acceptance of Russian rule over five Ukrainian provinces would be a most bitter pill for Ukraine and the West to swallow. However, this would still be far less than the maximalist goals of Russian hardliners, whether in terms of the subjugation of the whole of Ukraine, or annexation of all the Russian-speaking areas of the country, including Ukraine’s second city, Kharkiv, and the whole of the Black Sea coast.
If in the months and years to come, the Ukrainian army can manage to hold roughly its existing lines, then the eventual line of division between Ukraine and Russia (whether drawn in a formal peace settlement or accepted as part of an armistice) will also run along these lines. If however Ukraine is defeated and suffers much greater loss of territory, then future generations of Ukrainians may regret that Kyiv did not treat Putin’s proposal at least as a starting point for negotiation and bargaining.
For it should be remembered that while the Russian terms of March 2022 would also have been a bitter pill for Ukraine to swallow at the time, their acceptance would have saved Ukraine much territory that it now seems certain permanently to lose, much damage that may never be restored, and many human beings who can never be brought back to life.
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Russia's President Vladimir Putin meets with North Korea's leader Kim Jong Un upon his arrival in Pyongyang, North Korea June 19, 2024. Sputnik/Gavriil Grigorov/Pool via REUTERS
Russian President Vladimir Putin is currently in Pyongyang for a summit with the North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, marking their second visit in just nine months and Putin’s first trip to North Korea in 24 years.
Not just symbolic, the summit is anticipated to bring noteworthy advancements in Russia-North Korea strategic cooperation.
According to various reports, Putin and Kim will be seeking to elevate their bilateral relationship to a “comprehensive strategic partnership,” enhancing the overall military, economic, and diplomatic ties between their two countries. While the details of the summit’s agenda and outcomes remain unclear, both sides’ situational needs and interests provide some hints.
Ever since its negotiations with the United States fell through at the Hanoi summit in 2019, North Korea has prioritized meeting the necessary conditions to endure a prolonged confrontation with the United States. Pyongyang has viewed the ruptured relations between Washington and Moscow following the latter’s invasion of Ukraine, alongside the heightened geopolitical rivalry between Washington and Beijing, as opportunities to pull Moscow and Beijing closer to its side and to resist U.S.-mobilized containment.
Indeed, Pyongyang has frequently framed the current state of international relations as a “new Cold War,” emphasizing greater cooperation with Moscow and Beijing to resist Washington.
Besides attaining more Russian food and energy aid to alleviate his country’s chronic resource shortages, Kim would be particularly interested in gaining substantially greater military support from Putin. Since Beijing remains reluctant to cooperate with Pyongyang militarily — perhaps wanting to avoid provoking the U.S. and its regional allies — Kim may be especially determined to make progress with Putin in the military dimension.
As some observers have suggested, it would be ideal for Kim to get Putin to agree on a mutual defense treaty with an automatic military intervention clause. Kim would also surely want Putin’s commitment to assisting North Korea’s development of advanced military capabilities, such as reconnaissance satellites and tactical nuclear submarines.
However, it is uncertain to what extent Putin would be willing to accommodate Kim’s demands. Moscow has an interest in forging closer military ties with Pyongyang, but there are limits.
Russia is entering its third year of prosecuting what is largely an attritional war in Ukraine, characterized by heavy artillery expendage rates. Though its domestic munitions industry is outproducing the West by a considerable degree — Russian troops fire around 10,000 shells per day, which is roughly five times more than Ukraine’s shell usage — Russia’s military finds itself in constant need of rounds to maintain and potentially grow its current firepower advantage over Ukrainian forces.
It is therefore unsurprising that Moscow seeks to accompany its domestic production ramp with concerted efforts to procure munitions from willing foreign partners. According to estimates by the South Korean Defense Ministry, North Korea has provided Russia with an estimated 7,000 containers of munitions and other military equipment to date.
Putin stressed ahead of the trip that Moscow and Pyongyang are committed to fighting Western sanctions that he described as “illegal, unilateral restrictions” and to develop commercial systems “that are not controlled by the West.” These joint efforts complement Russia’s earlier efforts to degrade the international sanctions regime on North Korea, coming on the heels of Moscow’s decision to veto the renewal of a UN Panel of Experts (PoE) responsible for monitoring the enforcement of sanctions and to block the imposition of additional sanctions on North Korea over its previous ballistic missile tests.
Russia’s burgeoning relations with North Korea also provide Moscow with an opportunity to make good on Putin’s earlier threat to retaliate against the West for aiding Ukraine by supplying third parties with weapons that can be used to strike Western targets. But such a move risks upsetting Russia’s stable relationship with South Korea, which would see its core security interests suffer in the event of a North Korean strike on U.S. assets in South Korea.
Russia supplying North Korea with advanced missile and nuclear technologies, which would pose consequential threats to South Korean security, would also be considered crossing a red line for Seoul, prompting it to take actions that would undermine Russian security interests, such as providing lethal weapons to Ukraine.
Provoking Seoul in this way contradicts what has so far been the Kremlin’s approach of deepening the Russia-North Korea relationship without pushing Moscow into an overtly hostile footing with South Korea, which has refrained from directly supplying Ukraine with weapons despite Western pressure.
"Just like in our relations with Italy, we do not see any Russophobic stance when working with the South Korean government. Neither are there any weapons supplies to the conflict zone. We highly appreciate that," Putin said earlier this month.
China is North Korea’s largest economic and geopolitical partner, and does not necessarily want to see North Korea diversify its trade, diplomatic, and security portfolio in ways that reduce its influence over Pyongyang.
Moscow, which has become increasingly dependent on China in the face of continued Western sanctions and attempts at diplomatic isolation, has an interest in signaling its diplomatic clout to Beijing by engaging a traditional Chinese partner without China’s explicit approval.
But there are clear limits to this kind of posturing. Moscow is keenly aware it is in no position to overtly antagonize China, which poses an additional reason why Russia, as noted by South Korea’s Defense Minister earlier this week, is unlikely to take the step of transferring its more advanced military technologies to North Korea. Putin’s visit to Pyongyang will presumably serve to reinforce Russia and North Korea’s comprehensive strategic ties, potentially introducing new joint efforts by the two countries to cooperate on navigating their strategic challenges, including overcoming U.S.-mobilized sanctions and filling each other’s military deficiencies to some extent.
It remains to be seen if Moscow will bear the risks and costs associated with pursuing a deeper form of Russia-North Korea security cooperation, which notably include drawing Beijing’s ire. If the Kremlin goes down this path, it could pose a new regional challenge for Washington and its allies that is distinct from the China-U.S. rivalry in the Asia-Pacific and may spark calls for additional American reassurances to South Korea.
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Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy (C) attends a joint press conference during the Peace Summit in Bürgenstock, Switzerland on June 16, 2024.( The Yomiuri Shimbun via REUTERS )
Key Global South middle powers India, Indonesia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Thailand, and the United Arab Emirates declined to sign the joint communique at a summit in Switzerland on resolving the Ukraine war. (Another key middle power Brazil had decided to attend only as an observer.)
These Global South middle powers did not endorse the communique despite the text’s recitation of the importance of “sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity” and food security, both of which are key points of concern and consensus across developing countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia.
Some of these states have previously voted for U.S.-backed resolutions in the U.N. General Assembly that criticized the violations of territorial integrity by Russia and also cited food security.
These middle powers are skeptical that a summit that excluded Russia, the biggest combatant in the conflict, could achieve a peace deal to end the war. The Indian representative at the summit explained his country’s stance by stating that “only those options acceptable to both parties can lead to abiding peace.” Many of these powers, including India, Brazil, and Saudi Arabia, also have strong economic and/or security relations with Russia, which they will not easily put at risk.
U.S. and Western actions in the Middle East and elsewhere have done serious harm to the task of holding Moscow to account in what was clearly an illegal invasion of Ukraine. Many in the Global South are keenly aware of the double standards at work, and do not wish to be used instrumentally to settle Western scores with Russia.
The gap between the United States and key Global South states will likely persist unless Washington and its allies make a major course correction on two fronts. The first is to address serious deficits and violations in their vaunted “rules-based order” that will make American messaging more credible. The contrasts between the U.S. approach to transgressions of international law in Ukraine and Gaza are too glaring to wish away.
The second is to better take into account the Global South’s interests. While Washington has moved to an extent in this direction through its infrastructure and other initiatives, there is still much ground to cover to get to a more productive, non-zero sum policy toward the Global South.