Follow us on social

Iran's Khamenei rebukes  candidates 'attached to America'

Iran's Khamenei rebukes  candidates 'attached to America'

Distinct world views are on display in Friday's snap election to replace the late Ebrahim Raisi

Analysis | Middle East

The race to replace Iranian president Ebrahim Raisi, who perished in a plane crash last month, is on, with snap elections taking place this Friday. There are distinct world views on display, with the two anti-Western candidates clearly favored by Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei.

This is the third time the Islamic Republic has held snap elections. The first occurred in July 1981 following the impeachment of Abulhasan Banisadr. The second snap election took place in October 1981 after the assassination of Banisadr’s successor, Mohammad Ali Rajai.

Of the 287 seven people who registered to run in the elections, the Guardian Council — a 12-body member that vets the presidential candidates — has approved six candidates. Candidate Ghazizadeh Hashemi dropped out of the race Wednesday, without endorsing any other candidate.

Five of the candidates — discussed below — are from the conservative camp and Masoud Pezeshkian is the only reformist candidate. The Council also disqualified prominent politicians namely Ali Larijani, the former speaker of Majlis, and Eshaq Jahangiri, former President Hassan Rouhani’s vice president.

So who is who in these elections and what do they stand for?

Mohammad-Bagher Qalibaf

Qalibaf Is a former commander of IRGC’s Air Force, and the Law Enforcement Forces (LEF), and a veteran of the Iran-Iraq war. He previously served as the mayor of Tehran for 12 years, and is a third-time presidential candidate.

Qalibaf who wholds a PhD in Political Geography, is currently serving as the speaker of the Iranian parliament, the Majlis. Unlike other hardliner candidates in the race, he has underscored the impact of economic sanctions on Iran, vowing to lift the sanctions in a “step-by-step” approach. Qalibaf has attempted to brand himself as a pragmatic technocrat, and the “strongman” of the race.

Some reports, though unconfirmed, suggest that his advisors have already approached European officials, suggesting that when Khamenei dies, Qalibaf can be Iran’s “strongman.” Latest polls indicate that 14.7% of voters support Qalibaf, a 5 percent drop from last week. Qalibaf remains a controversial figure, because of his role in the crackdown of student movements in the 1990s, and corruption and embezzlement.

Masoud Pezeshkian

Masoud Pezeshkian is the only reformist candidate in the presidential race. A veteran of the Iran-Iraq war, he attended medical school after the conflict, specializing in cardiac surgery.

Pezeshkian is a former minister of health under reformist president Khatami, and served as the Deputy Speaker of the parliament from 2016 to 2020. He is one of the leading contenders in this race, with 24.4% of voters supporting him. This marks an increase from last week, when his support was at 19.8%.

Pezeshkian supports the JCPOA, and has strongly criticized hardliners over the nuclear agreement with the West Former presidentMuhammad Khatami and former foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif have openly supported Pezeshkian, with the latter publicly campaigning for him.

For Pezeshkian, the greatest challenge is the issue of voter turnout, as many have boycotted the elections. Current polls indicate an upward movement with 46.0 voter participation. It is noteworthy that Iranian hardliners were historically more successful in elections when the voter turnout was low. Both Raisi and former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad won the presidency when the voter turnout was relatively low.

Mostafa Pourmohammadi

The only cleric among the contenders, Pourmohammadi is a conservative candidate who has emerged as the phenomenon of this race, often portraying himself more “reformist” than Pezeshkian. Pourmohammadi previously served as the minister of interior underAhmadinejad, and justice minister for Rouhani (2013-2017). His career is marred by his reported involvement in the mass execution of political prisoners and MEK sympathizers in 1988.

But Pourmohammadi has tried to rebrand himself as more reformist than Pezeshkian. During the debates, he openly criticized Jalili and the hardliners for their inability to prevent the passage of UN Security Resolutions against Iran. He has also expressed his support for the JCPOA, vowing to remove the sanctions, although like other candidates he has offered no specific policy solutions.

Despite his “rebranding” approach, Pourmohammadi’s polls do not look optimistic. Pourmohammadi’s odds for a win seem very low, with polls varying from 0.7% to 2% of voters supporting him. His dropout in favor of Pezeshkian could help him run against Saaed Jalili.

Saeed Jalili

Jalili is the leading hardline candidate in the race. A veteran of the Iran-Iraq war who lost part of his right leg in the conflict, he holds a PhD in Political Science from Imam Sadeq University, a key institution for educating revolutionary youth. He is a career foreign ministry official who also served as Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, and Iran’s nuclear negotiator from 2007-2013.

It was during his tenure as the negotiator that the most severe and damaging UN Security Council resolutions were adopted against Iran. Jalili is known for his philosophical monologues in negotiations, and his live debates have not been much different.

On foreign policy, Jalili has long been a strong critic of engagement with the West, which he has called a “threat,” and argues that there is much more opportunity for Iran in the non-Western world. Jalili is a strong contender and some conservative outlets have called on other hardliners to drop out to support him. Polls indicate that Jaili is trailing Pezeshkian with 24% of the votes.

Alireza Zakani

(EDITOR'S NOTE: Zakani dropped out of the race on Thursday after this article was published).

Zakani is a conservative politician who is currently serving as the conservative mayor of Tehran. He previously served as a representative of Tehran in Majlis, and chaired the Special Overview Commission on JCPOA, but remained a strong critic of the nuclear agreement.

Zakani also ran in the presidential elections of 2021 but dropped out of the race. During the televised debates, Zakani rejected the “begging diplomacy,” in dealing with foreign nations, asserting that “Iran must become self-reliant to earn international respect.”

While he has admitted to the impact of sanctions, his approach prioritizes “neutralizing” the sanctions. Zakani’s tenure as the mayor of Tehran is marred with the establishment of Hijab-Baan or the Guardians of Hijab at Tehran’s metro stations after the Mahsa Movement faded. Zakani is the second “cover candidate” who is likely going to withdraw, especially since his chances of success are very low. Polls indicate that a mere 1.7% of voters support his candidacy.

What issues will matter to voters?

The June 28 elections in Iran revolve around the economy, foreign relations, and social freedoms. In reality, this is a battle between those who wish for an outward-looking Iran that engages with the world, and those who seek an isolated Iran.

All candidates have acknowledged the severe economic problems at home, but their approach to resolving the issue is fundamentally different. While Qalibaf, Pourmohammadi, and Pezeshkian have called for nuclear diplomacy to lift the sanctions, Jalili and Zakani have openly criticized engagement, instead emphasizing domestic opportunities.

It seems, however, that Khamenei has picked his side. In an unusual move, just days before the elections, Khamenei criticized those politicians who seek relations with the U.S., saying that if they succeed in this election, they should not turn to those who pursue relations with America.

"Those who are attached to America and think that without America's favor, nothing can be achieved in the country, will not be good partners for you," he added.

Pezeshkian, who favors improved relations with the U.S., faces dire challenges of voter turnout and Khamenei’s anger, who has long been skeptical of relations with Washington. If no conservative candidate drops out and the votes are split among them, a second round between Jalili and Pezeshkian, who offer two fundamentally different worldviews, would determine the fate of the presidency.


Iranian men are standing together under a portrait of Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, while participating in a rally commemorating Eid al-Ghadir in Tehran, Iran, on June 25, 2024, during Iran's 2024 early Presidential elections campaigns rally. (Photo by Morteza Nikoubazl/NurPhoto)

Analysis | Middle East
Trump ASEAN
Top photo credit: U.S. President Donald Trump looks at Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., next to Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim when posing for a family photo with leaders at the ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, October 26, 2025. Vincent Thian/Pool via REUTERS

‘America First’ meets ‘ASEAN Way’ in Kuala Lumpur

Asia-Pacific

The 2025 ASEAN and East Asia Summits in Kuala Lumpur beginning today are set to be consequential multilateral gatherings — defining not only ASEAN’s internal cohesion but also the shape of U.S.–China relations in the Indo-Pacific.

President Donald Trump’s participation will be the first by a U.S. president in an ASEAN-led summit since 2022. President Biden skipped the last two such summits in 2023 and 2024, sending then-Vice President Harris instead.

keep readingShow less
iran, china, russia
Top photo credit: Top image credit: Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov and and Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi shake hands as Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu looks on during their meet with reporters after their meeting at Diaoyutai State Guest House on March 14, 2025 in Beijing, China. Lintao Zhang/Pool via REUTERS

'Annulled'! Russia won't abide snapback sanctions on Iran

Middle East

“A raider attack on the U.N. Security Council.” This was the explosive accusation leveled by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov this week. His target was the U.N. Secretariat and Western powers, whom he blamed for what Russia sees as an illegitimate attempt to restore the nuclear-related international sanctions on Iran.

Beyond the fiery rhetoric, Ryabkov’s statement contained a message: Russia, he said, now considers all pre-2015 U.N. sanctions on Iran, snapped back by the European signatories of the 2015 nuclear deal (JCPOA) — the United Kingdom, France, Germany — “annulled.” Moscow will deepen its military-technical cooperation with Tehran accordingly, according to Ryabkov.

This is more than a diplomatic spat; it is the formal announcement of a split in international legal reality. The world’s major powers are now operating under two irreconcilable interpretations of international law. On one side, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany assert that the sanctions snapback mechanism of the JCPOA was legitimately triggered for Iran’s alleged violations. On the other, Iran, Russia, and China reject this as an illegitimate procedural act.

This schism was not inevitable, and its origin reveals a profound incongruence. The Western powers that most frequently appeal to the sanctity of the "rules-based international order" and international law have, in this instance, taken an action whose effects fundamentally undermine it. By pushing through a legal maneuver that a significant part of the Security Council considers illegitimate, they have ushered the world into a new and more dangerous state. The predictable, if imperfect, framework of universally recognized Security Council decisions is being replaced by a system where legal facts are determined by political interests espoused by competing power blocs.

This rupture followed a deliberate Western choice to reject compromises in a stand-off with Iran. While Iran was in a technical violation of the provisions of the JCPOA — by, notably, amassing a stockpile of highly enriched uranium (up to 60% as opposed to the 3.67% for a civilian use permissible under the JCPOA), there was a chance to avert the crisis. In the critical weeks leading to the snapback, Iran had signaled concessions in talks with the International Atomic Energy Agency in Cairo, in terms of renewing cooperation with the U.N. nuclear watchdog’s inspectors.

keep readingShow less
On Ukraine and Venezuela, Trump needs to dump the sycophants
Top Photo Credit: (Official White House Photo by Molly Riley)

On Ukraine and Venezuela, Trump needs to dump the sycophants

Europe

While diplomats labored to produce the Dayton Accords in 1995, then-Secretary of Defense Bill Perry advised, “No agreement is better than a bad agreement.” Given that Washington’s allies in London, Paris, Berlin and Warsaw are opposed to any outcome that might end the war in Ukraine, no agreement may be preferable. But for President Trump, there is no point in equating the illusion of peace in Ukraine with a meaningless ceasefire that settles nothing.

Today, Ukraine is mired in corruption, starting at the very highest levels of the administration in Kyiv. Sending $175 billion of borrowed money there "for however long it takes" has turned out to be worse than reckless. The U.S. national sovereign debt is surging to nearly $38 trillion and rising by $425 billion with each passing month. President Trump needs to turn his attention away from funding Joe Biden’s wars and instead focus on the faltering American economy.

keep readingShow less

LATEST

QIOSK

Newsletter

Subscribe now to our weekly round-up and don't miss a beat with your favorite RS contributors and reporters, as well as staff analysis, opinion, and news promoting a positive, non-partisan vision of U.S. foreign policy.