Monitors at the United Nations General Assembly hall display the results of a vote on a resolution condemning the annexation of parts of Ukraine by Russia, amid Russia's invasion of Ukraine, at the United Nations Headquarters in New York City, New York, U.S., October 12, 2022. REUTERS/David 'Dee' Delgado||
We're burying the rules based order. But what's next?
February 11, 2026
In a Davos speech widely praised for its intellectual rigor and willingness to confront established truths, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney finally laid the fiction of the “rules-based international order” to rest.
The “rules-based order” — or RBIO — was never a neutral description of the post-World War II system of international law and multilateral institutions. Rather, it was a discourse born out of insecurity over the West’s decline and unwillingness to share power. Aimed at preserving the power structures of the past by shaping the norms and standards of the future, the RBIO was invariably something that needed to be “defended” against those who were accused of opposing it, rather than an inclusive system that governed relations between all states.
Burying the false RBIO narrative is an important first step. It can temper the trend toward bloc formation and de-emphasize the counterproductive “democracies vs. autocracies” discourse of recent years — something that was never an accurate description of the emerging global political landscape to begin with. But this only provides a short-term fix. Discarding the RBIO should not be used as an excuse for gradually moving away from the law-centered multilateral system for which there is no comprehensive replacement.
As great power rivalry has deepened over the past decade, international law and global cooperation have suffered. If Carney’s speech serves to build momentum for a middle-power coalition dedicated to renewing and reforming multilateralism, then this would be extremely welcome. But if the purpose of this coalition is merely to pool resources to better survive an uncertain world, then we will not have fundamentally deviated from the current path toward the law of the jungle.
Carney’s remarks provide some cause for optimism. He called for Western states to act consistently by applying “the same standards to allies and rivals.” This may signal a renewed commitment to upholding international law, assuaging fears that retiring the RBIO discourse will not serve as an excuse to pursue cynical pragmatism. Carney also argued against building a “world of fortresses” and committed to pursuing forms of international cooperation that include “the vast majority of nations.”
The “fundamental values” that Carney outlined are relatively minimalistic: respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the basic principles concerning the use of force found in the UN Charter. That said, he also gave a nod to human rights and sustainable development, suggesting that the “variable geometry” — or “different coalitions for different issues” — that he called for will not be an excuse to pursue an international order based on mere coexistence rather than shared goals.
Given how often norms surrounding the use of force have been violated since the end of the Cold War, recommitting to respecting them in word and in deed is no small matter. Moreover, after many decades in which Western countries reserved for themselves the right to set the terms of international engagement and even the very standard of civilization, variable geometry can serve as a stabilizing force. In place of lecturing others through megaphone diplomacy, forging ad hoc partnerships with not always likeminded states is the new name of the game.
However, one issue that did not feature in Carney’s remarks was multilateral reform. The prime minister asserted that his vision was not “naive multilateralism” and would not rely on “diminished institutions.” But while multilateralism may have been associated with utopia building in the post-Cold War era, for many states today it is a form of realpolitik, providing the platform and protection necessary for them to secure their sovereignty and develop their societies.
Carney’s prescriptions rest on his assertion that “we are in the midst of a rupture, not a transition.” But this is only true if we believe that Western hegemony was synonymous with the postwar international order, which it never fully was.
The Soviet Union and China were among the founding powers of the United Nations. Efforts from Third World countries were responsible for the codification of norms such as human rights and self-determination. Yes, the postwar order has gone through several phases — from confrontation to détente to globalization. But the core institutional architecture of the order, centered on the United Nations, has remained in place, even if powerful actors have sometimes preferred to work around it.
As the “Alliance for Multilateralism” during Donald Trump’s first term demonstrated, rhetorical support for global cooperation cannot, on its own, arrest the trend toward international disorder. If multilateral bodies are not reformed to become more inclusive and effective — if they do not come to resemble the world of the future rather than the world of 1945 — then their legitimacy will decline and their relevance will fade away. And contrary to conventional wisdom, with sufficient creativity and political will, rendering the UN fit for the purpose of ensuring peace and security is in fact possible.
States often shy away from the topic of multilateral reform given the difficult political compromises that are inevitably involved. Reforming critical fora such as the UN Security Council — the premier body tasked with upholding international peace and security — is often viewed as a fool’s errand given the veto power that the P5 countries can exercise over any changes to the UN Charter.
But great power rivalry may actually make multilateral reform more rather than less likely, granted that middle powers form a coalition along the lines called for by Carney. In competition with one another for influence in the Global South, the United States, Russia and China may not wish to be seen as the obstacle to a more inclusive order. And if the influence of the Security Council is allowed to decline, the biggest losers will be the P5 countries that occupy a privileged position on the Council.
Rather than P5 obstructionism, one of the main obstacles to reform has been disagreement among all UN members over whether and how to expand the permanent membership of the Council. Some are wary of a scenario in which the Council becomes even more paralyzed than it is today, or where a regional rival comes to occupy a permanent seat. This could be addressed by creating a pool of countries with longer and recurring terms, aimed at compensating those states that fail to obtain a permanent seat and rendering it easier for smaller countries to get elected to non-permanent ones.
To ensure international stability, great powers will need to establish guardrails in their relations amongst themselves. But middle powers will need to make a substantive contribution of their own. They need to secure global support for a compelling vision of multilateral reform that illustrates how a reinvigorated multilateralism can work — and then rally that coalition together to place strong collective pressure on the great powers to embrace reform.
With so much uncertainty about the future, multi-alignment or “variable geometry” may be prudent statecraft. But successfully hedging your bets also requires saving the law-centered multilateral system rather than allowing it to collapse. Taking down the sign of the “rules-based order,” as Carney described it, is one thing. But little will have been achieved unless it is replaced with a better sign.
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President Donald Trump announces the creation of a critical minerals reserve during an event in the Oval Office at the White House in Washington, DC on Monday, February 2, 2026. Trump announced the creation of “Project Vault,” a rare earth stockpile to lower reliance on China for rare earths and other resources. Photo by Bonnie Cash/Pool/Sipa USA
Trump vs. his China hawks
February 11, 2026
In the year since President Donald Trump returned to the White House, China hawks have started to panic. Leading lights on U.S. policy toward Beijing now warn that Trump is “barreling toward a bad bargain” with the Chinese Communist Party. Matthew Pottinger, a key architect of Trump’s China policy in his first term, argues that the president has put Beijing in a “sweet spot” through his “baffling” policy decisions.
Even some congressional Republicans have criticized Trump’s approach, particularly following his decision in December to allow the sale of powerful Nvidia AI chips to China. “The CCP will use these highly advanced chips to strengthen its military capabilities and totalitarian surveillance,” argued Rep. John Moolenaar (R-Mich.), who chairs the influential Select Committee on Competition with China.
From this wave of criticism, a mainstream narrative has started to emerge: By pursuing deals with Beijing, Trump is abandoning the bipartisan consensus on China that he ushered in during his first term. The president, in other words, has gone soft on China.
But the reality is more complex than this narrative claims. A close examination of Trump’s second-term policies toward China suggests that the president is pursuing a realist, if disorganized, approach to Beijing, according to realist foreign policy analysts who spoke with RS. This may include some uncomfortable concessions, like reducing restrictions on AI chip sales and softening rhetoric about protecting Taiwan. But it doesn’t mean that Trump is poised to surrender Asia to Beijing’s sphere of influence, as some hawks now fear.
The reasons for this apparent shift are varied. Part of it comes down to Trump’s long-standing preference for making deals, as well as his seeming respect for China’s economic dynamism. But another factor is a genuine change in geopolitical reality. China has amassed significant leverage over the U.S., and the Trump administration has chosen to accept that fact.
By recognizing this reality, Trump has created an opportunity to pursue useful compromises with Beijing — and reduce the chances of a catastrophic conflict. “We're talking about two nuclear superpowers,” said Lyle Goldstein, the director of the Asia Program at Defense Priorities. “We want more interdependence, not less.”
Hawks off to a rocky start
When Trump started his second term, he seemed ready to double down on a hawkish approach to China. Days after taking office, the president imposed a 10% tariff on Chinese goods, which by April had ballooned to 145%.
But then, something remarkable happened: China called Trump’s bluff. Chinese officials announced that they would restrict the export to the U.S. of rare earth minerals, which are crucial for making most modern technology. Soon, American executives started to call Trump in a panic, warning that the new Chinese restrictions would force them to shut down factories, as Ford and Suzuki soon did.
“That might have been a very powerful lesson for the president,” Goldstein said. Trump seemed to be relying on advisers who believed the U.S. had “all the leverage” in the relationship with China, and that Beijing would fold under pressure. “I have to believe that the president started to have some doubts about the China advice he was getting,” Goldstein told RS.
Soon after, the president began to reshape his foreign policy team. Trump sidelined hawks like former National Security Adviser Mike Waltz and his deputy, Alex Wong. And, as part of his overall restructuring of the national security bureaucracy, he fired career China hands on the National Security Council and at the State Department.
This recalibration appears to have empowered realist thinkers in Trump’s orbit. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby survived the culling and now argues that the U.S. must avoid “needless confrontation” and pursue a “stable, peaceful relationship” with China. Andy Baker, who is considered an ideological ally of Colby’s, took Wong’s place on the National Security Council. Andrew Byers, who wrote in 2024 that the U.S. should pursue a carefully calibrated “cold peace” with China, has maintained an influential role as the deputy assistant secretary of defense for South and Southeast Asia.
With this restructured team in place, Trump has pursued a less confrontational approach. He announced that he would allow Nvidia to sell high-quality (albeit not top-of-the-line) AI chips to Chinese companies, so long as the U.S. government got a cut of the profits. The White House also slowrolled a forced sale of TikTok and walked back its threat to cancel visas for Chinese students studying at American universities, which many hawks consider a national security threat. And Trump started hyping the possibility of a “big deal” with Beijing.
China hardliners have interpreted these moves as a willingness to sell out key U.S. interests in East Asia. But their fears are overstated, according to John Mearsheimer, a prominent realist scholar at the University of Chicago. Trump “is bent on containing China,” he told RS. “That means he does not want China to dominate East Asia.”
As evidence of this commitment, Mearsheimer pointed to Trump’s National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy, both of which highlight the administration’s desire to deter a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, even if they focus first on U.S. interests in the Western Hemisphere. Trump is using “less confrontational rhetoric, which I believe is all for the good,” Mearsheimer added. “But if you look at the actual policy, nothing of any significance has changed.” (As Goldstein noted, Trump has not made any significant changes to America’s military posture in East Asia, which is largely designed to contain Chinese ambitions in the region.)
Still, there is little doubt that Republican hawks are struggling to gain sway with Trump in the early days of his second term, said Paul Heer, the former lead U.S. intelligence officer for East Asia. As Heer put it, hardliners “have no idea yet, one year in, how strong their voice is within this administration.”
A not-so-grand bargain
China hawks have framed Trump’s willingness to deal with Beijing as evidence that he is pursuing a sort of grand bargain. In the worst case, they fear that the administration will abandon Taiwan in order to facilitate a broader detente with China. These concerns have only increased in the lead-up to Trump’s expected meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping in April.
But there is scant evidence that such a deal is in the offing. As Heer pointed out, a grand bargain would require extraordinary levels of patience and persistence — two qualities that few would ascribe to Trump.
There is also a genuine divergence in American and Chinese interests in East Asia, which makes any sort of lasting detente unlikely, according to Mearsheimer. “If I were the national security adviser in Beijing, I would urge Xi Jinping to do everything he can to dominate East Asia,” he said.
“Any sort of cooperative agreements that are worked out between Xi and Trump are certainly all for the good,” Mearsheimer continued. “But you always want to remember that any cooperative agreement takes place in the shadow of an intense security competition between these two states.”
Even these limited deals can deliver concrete wins for U.S. interests. Following the Trump-Xi meeting in October of last year, for example, China agreed to crack down on the export of precursor chemicals that Mexican cartels use to make fentanyl. A continued cooling of tensions could open a path to deals that increase trade opportunities for American companies and expand channels for communication during potential crises.
In order to facilitate this cold peace, Goldstein recommended that Trump and Xi should establish a regular series of meetings in which they can discuss key issues. “This summit that's occurring in April is long overdue,” he said. “We should institutionalize a bilateral summit. This should be a very normal thing.”
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Top image credit: bluestork/shutterstock.com
Is America still considered part of the 'Americas'?
February 10, 2026
On January 7, the White House announced its plans to withdraw from 66 international bodies whose work it had deemed inconsistent with U.S. national interests.
While many of these organizations were international in nature, three of them were specific to the Americas — the Inter-American Institute for Global Change Research, the Pan American Institute of Geography and History, and the U.N.’s Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. The decision came on the heels of the Dominican Republic postponing the X Summit of the Americas last year following disagreements over who would be invited and ensuing boycotts.
These parallel developments raise important questions about how the region and the United States view their relationship. In fact, when Colombian President Gustavo Petro announced his intent to boycott the X Summit of the Americas, he not only railed against the exclusion of other countries, but also proposed an alternative — a special Summit between the United States and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, known by its Spanish acronym, CELAC. This alternative format would mirror how Latin American and Caribbean leaders engage with other external powers such as the European Union and China — both of which held such a Summit in 2025.
Given the current U.S. administration’s pushback against multilateralism and the historic proliferation of regional organizations driven by different ideological positions, leaders across the Americas have an opportunity to reexamine regional governance mechanisms. In doing so, they would also revisit a historical question of whether the United States should be understood as an integral part of the Americas, or as an external power operating within the hemisphere.
Historical context
The question of inclusion within the Americas has a long history dating back to initial discussions about regional cooperation and integration. While the Americas have a long history of Pan Americanism and efforts to integrate the hemisphere, there have been important differences between countries and their histories.
In fact, in 1826, when Simón Bolivar brought together the leaders of Latin America’s newly independent nations for the Congress of Panama, there were open debates over whether to invite the United States. Brazil and Canada, two countries with different colonial legacies, were not yet independent and thus not invited. While the United States was ultimately invited, debate persisted over its inclusion in integration efforts.
By the late 1880s, the United States viewed its position as firmly within the Americas, hosting the First Pan American Conference in 1889-1890, which would lead to the establishment of the Inter-American System and the predecessor to the Washington-based Organization of American States (OAS). However, Washington’s hemispheric commitment wavered throughout the 20th century. While there were times where the United States embraced its position within the Americas — such as during FDR’s Good Neighbor Policy — there were others when Washington would engage with Latin America and the Caribbean through the lens of great power competition rather than as a member of a shared neighborhood. The United States’ on-and-off-again relationship would lead Latin American and Caribbean to create their own alternative organizations.
Regional pushback on US influence
CELAC is often cited as the clearest example of the region’s post-hegemonic experimentation: an attempt to build a regional body that deliberately excluded the United States and Canada. Created in 2010, CELAC’s founding idea was straightforward but ambitious: strengthen regional integration through an autonomous voice for Latin America and the Caribbean.
But sustaining that vision has proved difficult. Political polarization has repeatedly undermined CELAC, which failed to hold summits from 2018 to 2020. Brazil’s withdrawal in 2020, under former President Jair Bolsonaro, reflected the discomfort of some governments sitting alongside Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua. Even after Brazil’s return under President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, internal divisions persisted.
Despite these fractures, CELAC has become a platform for Latin America and the Caribbean to engage with extra-hemispheric powers, most notably China and the European Union. The establishment of the China–CELAC Forum in 2014 opened a new channel for comprehensive cooperation and made CELAC a vehicle for negotiating with global actors outside the traditional U.S.-led architecture. But the organization’s weaknesses were again visible in the most recent EU–CELAC meeting in Colombia last November, which was overshadowed by absences on both sides, including European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and several Latin American heads of state.
CELAC’s trajectory reveals a deeper truth about regional politics in the Americas. Even in a forum created explicitly to operate in Washington’s absence, Latin America often confronts its own divisions, reflecting the unresolved question over whether the United States is part of the Americas or an external power.
Inside or outside?
Today there are more than 40 regional organizations and forums in the Western Hemisphere. These range from well-established bodies like the OAS to less formal bodies like CELAC and to specific functional groups like the Pan American Health Organization. The United States is a member of 11 organizations — including its role as a non-borrowing member in the Inter-American Development Bank — and an observer in three more.
There are advantages for both the United States and Latin America and the Caribbean in including the United States as part of the region. On the one hand, regional organizations can help channel U.S. leverage and identify shared challenges. Washington has also historically helped to fund these organizations when it sees them as part of a shared community agenda, while using these forums to shape regional integration in ways that served its interests. At the same time, it provides a forum for Washington to shape regional developments and, in some cases, counter the influence of external powers, most recently China.
However, regional organizations and forums can only do so much to bring the United States into the regional community if Washington is not consistently responsive to regional priorities. Yet, as the failure of CELAC’s 2018-2020 summits highlight, simply excluding the United States does not resolve intra-regional differences, which limit the effectiveness of collective action.
With the Trump administration pushing a more active foreign policy in the Western Hemisphere through the Trump Corollary while actively pulling away from regional and global institutions, leaders in the region are faced with a unique opportunity. While the situation poses challenges for regional integration efforts, it also poses the opportunity to rethink regional governance structures. The lack of regional cohesion spurred the proliferation of regional bodies that undermined each institution’s effectiveness.
The right-ward electoral swing in the region removes some of the ideological schisms between Latin American states while also aligning it more closely with Washington. As funding challenges the survival of many regional bodies, leaders can look at where and how they can consolidate regional bodies toward pillars that incorporate the United States and ones that promote that sub-regional cooperation more effectively — thus balancing the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion of the U.S. within the Americas.
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