The Trump administration’s new Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) claims it’s out to cut wasteful government spending. A
new video by the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft asks: why not start with the Pentagon?
“The Pentagon is the largest government bureaucracy. It employs nearly 3 million people, has an annual budget of $850 billion — and has never once passed the audit,” says Ben Freeman, director of the Quincy Institute’s Democratizing Foreign Policy program.
Indeed, the Pentagon is infamous for wasteful projects. “At the very top is the F-35: it's the most expensive weapons program in world history. Ultimately, it's going to cost taxpayers around $1.5 trillion — and for what? It doesn't work, it’s overpriced and overdue,” explains Freeman.
And what about all that under-used and even unused space the Pentagon owns, in particular, its military bases in the U.S.?
They are ripe for cutting.
Also deserving of scrutiny are Washington's many weapons contractors, which receive about half the Pentagon’s annual budget— over $400 billion annually — through extensive congressional lobbying, and an infamous
revolving door between leaders in the weapons industry and government alike.
“We've heard too many stories about waste, fraud and abuse in Pentagon contracting. They're overcharging for spare parts, toilet seats, hammers, you name it,” Freeman says. “Taxpayers are paying too much for the things our troops need. We know there's wasteful spending at the Pentagon and we're not really doing anything about it. That costs American taxpayers money, and that makes all of us less safe.”
To learn more about how DOGE could cut the Pentagon’s wasteful spending, watch the video:
Taiwan has become a focal point for the U.S.-China conflict, with the Pentagon turning its attention towards a hypothetical conflict with China — referring to it as the “sole pacing threat” — and Chinacontinuingcombat and blockade drills around the island.
However, despite China’s demonstrations of military power, Taiwan’s unique economic niche and geographic position make it a particularly thorny target for Beijing. The Chinese Communist Party’s legitimacy rests largely on the robust economy it has built, and the direct economic repercussions of an invasion or blockade of Taiwan stand to shatter the foundations of Beijing’s domestic power.
There are three non-military conditions that make a full military assault or blockade of Taiwan a nonviable option for the CCP. First is the global importance of Taiwan’s semiconductor manufacturing base, second is the impact on trade and the shipping industry running through the Taiwan Strait and Luzon Strait, and third is China’s own less-than-favorable economic conditions.
The semiconductor issue
Taiwan is the largest manufacturer of semiconductors in the world. In the fourth quarter of 2024, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. (TSMC) —Taiwan’s largest producer of semiconductors — took a 67.1% market share of all chips globally, and produced nearly all of the most advanced chips. There is no viable replacement for Taiwan’s manufacturing in the semiconductor market; not only does the nation represent a massive share of the chip industry, its infrastructure uniquely supports the scale and quality of production.
Semiconductors represent an irreplaceable enabler of global economic activities. If Taiwan were to stop producing chips, both the American and Chinese economies — not to mention the world economy — would contract and ignite a global depression. Chips enable electrical grids, manufacturing, home utilities, automobiles, and more; they have permeated every facet of the global economy.
Semiconductors are not an end in themselves, they are a means to an end, enabling innovation and emerging technologies like AI and robotics. Taiwan’s dominance in this critical market is referred to as its “silicon shield,” which means that the U.S. and China are invested in protecting its output.
An offensive or blockade against the island nation would have a profound global economic impact. The most important global economies rely on the chips manufactured in Taiwan. With demand for chips only growing, losing Taiwan's manufacturing base could throttle global supply chains for years to come.
Inefficacy of military action
Chinese military action would disrupt the global commerce running through the Taiwan and Luzon Straits. The straits on either side of Taiwan are thoroughfares for international trade, with Taiwan’s own ports handling $586 billion in trade in 2022, and an estimated $2.45 trillion transiting the strait in the same time period. Besides Taiwan, China’s ports are most likely to be impacted, with ships diverting from the ports along China’s eastern coast.
While global shipping lanes can likely divert around a conflict zone without significantly raising prices, China’s role in maritime shipping infrastructure means that conflict would have a direct negative impact on some of China’s most lucrative ports and port cities, with ships no longer making stops along a broad swath of the coast.
Ships will not be able to access the extensive network of maintenance and repair sites along the Chinese coast, as well as cargo processing sites. The loss of access to some of these ports would have knock-on effects for the global shipping industry if there is a protracted conflict or blockade, leaving remaining ports to deal with the spillover.
Geopolitically, China would have to reckon with the Global South and BRICS nations, whose trade relies on the straits even more than the G7. Given that China is courting these nations diplomatically, impeding their trade could set off a diplomatic fiasco that Beijing would likely want to avoid.
Already poor economic conditions
China is not in a strong economic position as it has been reined in by the lingering aftereffects of its real estate crisis, subdued domestic consumption, and the impacts and uncertainty created by the trade war’s tariffs. Kicking off a global crisis would likely exacerbate the economic issues it currently faces. Furthermore, Taiwan represents up to 60% of China’s own chip imports. If China attacks Taiwan it stands to cripple its own industries by starving them of chips. Besides chips imports, the PRC is heavily dependent on trade — comprising 37% of its GDP — making it even more vulnerable to disruptions in global trade.
According to a study done by Bloomberg Economics, in the event of a blockade, global GDP would be down 5%, with China and the U.S. seeing shrinkage of 8.9% and 3.3%, respectively. And in the event of an invasion, global GDP would be down 10.2%, with South Korea, Japan, and other East Asian nations seeing the worst of the impact. The resulting $10 trillion price tag on merely the first year of the crisis incentivizes the stakeholders to avoid confrontation. If any or all of Taiwan’s foundries are destroyed, the impact would be even greater and the economic depression would last for a decade or more as nations attempt to build out their own profitable foundries. Not to mention that this would likely create a permanent rift between China and trade with the U.S. and the EU.
While both China and the U.S. attempt to relieve their respective reliance on Taiwanese chips through domestic production, Taiwan retains its most advanced nodes on its territory in order to maintain global dependence on its chips industry. Cajoling from both the U.S. and China has brought TSMC investment and factories to both nations, but these nodes do not represent a viable replacement for Taiwan’s output.
***
Given these three factors, China would have to be certain that it would be able to take Taiwan quickly, and with minimal damage to the delicate foundries and their personnel. With an ongoing purge of the PLA due to corruption concerns, it seems there is either widespread corruption or a political purge, both of which put a damper on readiness. If Xi’s generals are corrupt that means readiness isn’t where it should be, if it’s a political purge then it impacts morale and cohesion.
If Taiwan shapes itself into a high-stakes/low value target it can remain largely untouchable because of the economic structures surrounding it. These economic shields could compound if Taiwan engages in military strategies such as becoming a “porcupine,” to make itself a hard military target as well — engaging in anti-access/area denial strategies with high volumes of antiship missiles, sea mines, and air defense systems.
Taiwan's main value to China is through its nationalistic claims to the island. China’s issue with Taiwanese independence also hinges on U.S. assurances that it will not deny China access to the lagging edge chips Taiwan’s foundries export to China and that it will not separate the island from the mainland.
As long as the island does not move towards independence and continues to “porcupine,” the structural economic factors play to the island's advantage, making it easier for the Chinese to ignore the situation, for now, to maintain the favorable economic conditions of the region.
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Top photo credit: A member of Lebanon's Hezbollah holds a Lebanese flag as he stands in front of a picture depicting senior Iranian military commander General Qassem Soleimani and Iraqi militia commander Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis in the southern village of Khiam, Lebanon January 3, 2021. REUTERS/Aziz Taher
Tehran’s grip on Lebanon is loosening, and this shift was on full display during Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi’s latest visit to Beirut.
While publicly emphasizing “state-to-state” relations and “non-interference” in meetings with President Joseph Aoun, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, Foreign Minister Youssef Rajji, and Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, Araghchi’s outreach reflected Iran’s efforts to adapt as its influence wanes and Hezbollah’s power diminishes after its punishing war with Israel last fall.
The nuances of Iran's pivot were evident in Araghchi’s itinerary. His public statements avoided direct mentions of Hezbollah, a marked departure from previous speeches that celebrated its centrality to the "Axis of Resistance." He also expressed Tehran’s readiness for its companies to participate in Lebanon’s reconstruction, and, significantly, acquiesced to Beirut’s insistence that all reconstruction aid flow through state channels, hinting at Iran's adaptation to Lebanon's burgeoning state assertiveness.
Araghchi also found time for a less publicized, but highly symbolic meeting with Hezbollah's new secretary-general Naim Qassem, and laid a wreath at the grave of his predecessor, Hassan Nasrallah. Here, the rhetoric reverted to confrontation, with Araghchi proclaiming, "I am certain that the ultimate victory belongs to the people of Lebanon and the resistance, and that the Zionist regime’s defeat is an inevitable matter."
This dual approach — projecting moderation to Lebanese leadership and the international community while reaffirming unwavering ideological commitment to its key Lebanese ally — suggests a significant recalibration rather than an outright abandonment.
The catalyst for this shift is undeniably the brutal and still ongoing war between Hezbollah and Israel, which erupted following Hamas's October 7, 2023, attack on Israel and which quickly expanded into a wider conflict with Hamas-aligned groups in the region. Hezbollah has since suffered devastating losses, including the elimination of much of its weapons arsenal and the deaths of Nasrallah and his deputy, Hashem Safieddine, in Israeli airstrikes.
A particularly profound blow came with the exploding pager attacks in September 2024, which crippled Hezbollah’s communications and provided a chilling demonstration of Israel's spycraft.
Beyond military attrition, Hezbollah’s traditional logistical lifeline, the overland corridor through Syria, which Iran used to funnel weapons and cash to the group via Iraq, was severed with the collapse of the Assad regime in December 2024. In a significant shift, the new Syrian government has engaged in border demarcation and security cooperation with Lebanon, explicitly aimed at closing illegal crossings and tightening monitoring of smuggling. This Lebanese-Syrian rapprochement, notably backed by Saudi mediation, has facilitated unprecedented strategic convergence between Beirut and Damascus against Hezbollah.
Consequently, Iran's once-reliable blueprint for projecting power through covert overland arms shipments to Hezbollah is no longer viable in the same form. Compounding this, Lebanon’s new government has tightened control over Beirut’s Rafic Hariri International Airport, historically another key channel for illicit transfers to the group. Since February, Iranian flights have been indefinitely suspended, following explicit Israeli threats to target flights originating from Iran due to suspicions of them carrying cash or arms to Hezbollah.
To make matters worse, Hezbollah’s resources are severely strained, with reports of cash flow problems and delays in compensating war-affected communities in southern Lebanon and its Beirut stronghold, Dahiyeh. The group’s popularity, though still strong based on recent municipal election results, has long depended on its ability to quickly provide compensation and services, which helped pacify discontent over the hardships caused by war while reinforcing its image as both a defender of Lebanon’s sovereignty and a steadfast supporter of the Palestinian cause.
However, persistent delays in delivering aid to its constituents could raise questions about its long-term ability to maintain loyalty.
With the diminished capacity of both patron and proxy, Iran has seemingly recognized its own limits and those of Hezbollah in financing reconstruction on the scale seen after the 2006 war with Israel, when Iranian funds were channeled directly through the group, bypassing the Lebanese state.
Moreover, the emergence of a new Lebanese political leadership, backed by a unified international and regional front, further complicates Iran’s position. President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam have explicitly committed to reasserting state sovereignty and establishing a "monopoly on arms." Salam, directly eyeing Iran’s influence, declared in an interview with Sky News Arabia that "the era of exporting the Iranian revolution is over.”
Critically, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) have engaged in unprecedented, albeit indirect, cooperation with Israel, facilitated by the U.S, aimed at helping the Lebanese army locate and dismantle Hezbollah’s weapons stockpiles in southern Lebanon.
Additionally, donor countries are actively prioritizing military aid and capacity building for the LAF, making the assertion of state control the key prerequisite before disbursing large-scale reconstruction funding.
The U.S. and Gulf countries are united in demanding the dismantling of Hezbollah’s defense infrastructure, with Israel warning on June 6 that it will continue to bomb Lebanon until Hezbollah is disarmed. The intensity and unanimity of this resistance leave Iran facing formidable, if not insurmountable, obstacles to maintaining its influence in Lebanon.
Iran’s ongoing nuclear talks with the Trump administration add another layer of complexity.
Its economy faces a combustible mix of runaway inflation and declining purchasing power. Petroleum export revenues are lower than planned, with aggressive U.S. sanctions tearing through the once-discreet trading channels and shadow fleets Iran used to circumvent sanctions and ferry crude to global markets.
This situation has pushed Iran towards diplomacy as a means of alleviating its economic woes. In addition, the massive losses suffered by Hezbollah after October 7 have made Iran’s military and financial support for Hezbollah increasingly burdensome, and the traditional proxy playbook is no longer politically defensible to a domestic audience contending with intense economic pressures.
Compounding this predicament, Israel remains at Iran's throat, actively preparing for airstrikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities should diplomacy between the U.S. and Iran on a new nuclear agreement fail.
Hezbollah’s own situation closely mirrors Iran’s, simultaneously displaying defiance with one arm while extending the other towards political engagement. Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem’s defiant stance, stating, "let Israel withdraw, end its aggression, and release the captives. After that, we’ll talk," highlights that disarmament is non-negotiable without a definitive end to Israeli aggression. This position also strategically exploits a catch-22, with Israel's own withdrawal from southern Lebanon contingent on Hezbollah's disarmament.
While the group’s spiritual leadership postures aggressively, its political arm engages pragmatically within the Lebanese political system, notably by holding ministerial positions in the very cabinet that is attempting to curb its influence. Its tactical flexibility in parliament was evident in President Aoun's election: after initially casting blank ballots in protest, Hezbollah and its staunch ally, the Amal party, ultimately voted for Aoun — recognizing that continued obstruction would only prolong the crisis and risk alienating their base, which is in urgent need of reconstruction aid.
Hezbollah’s domestic weakness is closely tied to the mounting challenges of its main patron, Iran, which is being forced to rethink its approach as traditional supply channels are now severely limited or entirely disrupted. In addition to the loss of the land corridor through Syria, bank transfers are stifled by aggressive U.S. sanctions and potential measures from the Lebanese government and central bank which could target Hezbollah's financial access.
With international reconstruction aid now explicitly tied to weakening Hezbollah’s influence, there is limited space for the paramilitary-political group to restore its previous financial and operational standing.
Iran’s relationship with its “Axis of Resistance” crown jewel is thus undergoing a profound transformation, with Tehran now overtly conceding that even steadfast revolutionary ideals must yield to the harsh realities of economic survival and diminished power.
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Top photo credit: Specialists of emergency services work at the scene, after a road bridge collapsed onto railway tracks due to an explosion in the Bryansk region, Russia, June 1, 2025. REUTERS/Stringer
A little over forty years ago, while preparing for a weekly radio address, President Ronald Reagan famously cracked wise about the possibility of attacking the Soviet Union. “I have signed legislation that outlaws Russia forever,” he said. “We begin bombing in five minutes.”
Reagan had not realized that the studio microphone was recording his joke and that technical personnel preparing for the broadcast in stations across the country were already listening. His facetious remarks were leaked. The public reaction was immediate, strong, and negative. Democratic candidate Walter Mondale admonished his election opponent for ill-considered humor, and Reagan’s polling numbers took a temporary hit.
For many, the possibility of thermonuclear annihilation was no joking matter.
Within a few short years, history veered in a much more positive direction, and concerns about either superpower pressing “the button” by accident or by design began to recede. A reelected Reagan and his Soviet counterpart Mikhail Gorbachev launched a set of historic accords that greatly reduced the risk of superpower war. The Berlin Wall fell, the Cold War ended, and the USSR dissolved. For many Americans, the threat of nuclear conflict faded into distant memory.
Today, we encounter those Cold War fears primarily through history books. Fewer and fewer people recall nail-biting over the Cuban Missile Crisis or sheltering under desks in elementary schools. Many have not heard about the controversy over Reagan’s radio gaffe. Millennials and Generation Z wonder why their parents and grandparents worried about a nuclear Armageddon that never, in fact, materialized.
There may be no better illustration of our much-relaxed contemporary attitudes than the public reaction to Ukraine’s surprise attacks last week on dozens of Russian strategic bombers located at bases thousands of kilometers from Ukraine. On June 1, Ukraine used swarms of drones hidden in trucks smuggled across Russia’s border to attack one leg of its nuclear triad of missiles, submarines, and aircraft.
This time, the bombing was no joke. But the Western reaction hardly took the prospect of nuclear escalation seriously.
The operation was “a brilliant technical performance” that showed “why Ukraine will win this war,” according to French philosopher Bernard Henri-Levy writing in the Wall Street Journal. Rebecca Grant, vice president of the Lexington Institute, posted on the Fox News site that Americans should “savor Ukraine’s brilliant strike on Putin’s terror bombers. Too bad Ukraine can’t do it again. Or can they?”
The Washington Post editorialized that the operation showed that Ukrainians are “tough, determined – and right. Theirs is a fight the United States should be proud to support.” Legions of online armchair warriors praised Ukraine’s “bad-ass operation” that will “go down in history” and be “studied for years to come.”
Such reactions largely ignored the impact that such attacks might have on nuclear stability between the United States and Russia, which together hold more than 90 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons.
After former President Joe Biden authorized Ukraine’s use of American weapons for strikes into Russia in 2024, Moscow published a revised nuclear weapons doctrine last fall. No longer would it require a nuclear strike or an attack threatening Russia’s existence to trigger a nuclear response; under the new doctrine, Russia could use nuclear weapons in response to a conventional attack that simply undermined Russia’s retaliatory nuclear-strike capability. And it noted specifically that an attack by a non-nuclear state carried out with the support of a nuclear power would be considered a joint attack.
That doctrine seemed designed to deter the very kind of operation that Ukraine carried out. In crossing that redline, Kyiv confronted Russia with a vexing security conundrum. A retaliation perceived as excessively destructive might persuade Trump to reinforce Washington’s military support for Ukraine, trigger a new wave of toughened sanctions, or even draw the U.S. or NATO directly into the war. Too weak a response could signal that Russia is in practice a paper tiger, too timid to enforce its own redlines if the West were to support a sustained campaign of deep strikes into Russia or deploy European forces inside Ukraine.
That conundrum approximates the very situation that another U.S. president, John Kennedy, warned explicitly against in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis. “Nuclear powers,” he said, “must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a humiliating retreat or a nuclear war.”
Yet there have been no Greta Thunbergs railing at the irresponsibility of political leaders who flirt with the possibility of a world-shaking nuclear collision. Just the opposite. Most of the West, and most of Washington, greeted Ukraine’s attacks on Russia’s strategic bombers with the equivalent of a standing ovation.
That lack of worry has itself long been a source of concern in Moscow. Dmitry Trenin, once a leading Russian advocate of improved relations with the United States, lamented last year that “the restraining fear of the atomic bomb … is gone. Nuclear weapons are left aside. The practical conclusion from this is obvious: there is no need to be afraid of Russia’s reaction. This is an extremely dangerous misperception.”
To restore the deterrent effect of nuclear fears, another prominent Russian expert, Sergei Karaganov, has called for nuclear strikes against Ukraine and the West. Dimitri Suslov, an expert on U.S.-Russia relations at Russia’s prestigious Higher School of Economics, has called for a publicly conducted nuclear explosion in Russia to sober up the West.
So far, Putin has not accepted this advice, opting instead to use conventional drones, bombs, and missiles to strike Ukrainian airbases and military plants in response to Operation Spiderweb. President Trump’s phone call explaining that his administration had no knowledge or involvement in the Ukrainian operation probably helped temper Putin’s response, as did Trump’s insistence that he wants to continue efforts to improve bilateral relations.
But American officials have warned that Russia’s response is probably not over, and Ukraine has signaled that it has no intention of ending attacks on Russia’s strategic forces. The more Ukraine makes a show out of crossing Russian redlines, the greater will be the pressure on Putin to draw a very hard line in response.
Unlike the Reagan gaffe, such a development would hardly be a laughing matter.
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