While over 100 Palestinians now die of hunger every day in Gaza, Congress remains peculiarly silent.
Members of antiwar group Code Pink asked lawmakers in the halls of Congress Tuesday about how they will help, repeatedly mentioning that Gazan children are now reportedly succumbing to malnutrition in greater numbers. But the lawmakers they managed to approach in their “Stop Starving Gaza Now” emergency action seemed uninterested, or otherwise suggested Hamas should address the crisis, either by releasing hostages or negotiating with Israel.
“Release the hostages,” Rep. Randy Fine (R-Fla.) said when asked what could be done. Fine is a staunch Israel supporter who’s been accused of “unhinged, racist and Islamophobic” rhetoric by Congressional colleagues and was ratioed on X yesterday for saying “starve away” in regards to Gazan civilians. He also called reports of starvation “a lie” and "Muslim terror propaganda."
“Get in touch with my office,” said Rep. Joe Wilson (R-S.C.), a member of the House Armed Service and House Foreign Affairs committees, when asked about how the U.S. could get adequate food to dying Gazan children. “Thank you for coming by.”
“I’m talking on the phone,” another lawmaker quipped, brushing off questions altogether.
Members of Congress are in a unique position to change or otherwise challenge the current situation by leveraging the $3.3 billion in U.S. military aid to Israel per year.
But their efforts to do this have often gone belly up. Last week, for example, the House of Representatives voted 6-422 to shoot down Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene's 2026 Department of Defense Appropriations Act amendment to block $500 million in additional military assistance to Israel.
The State Department supports the Israel- and U.S.-backed Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) as a way to provide Palestinians meals, giving it $30 million toward its operations. But the IDF is accused of shooting Gazans at these centers almost every day, and humanitarian organizations say the food distributed is not nearly enough to keep 2 million people alive in this crisis situation. They are calling on the GHF to cease operations and allow the UN or other traditional NGOs to go in to do the work.
Code Pink co-founder Medea Benjamin said, “I see people starving… on purpose” when asked by one lawmaker to acknowledge that the situation takes “two sides” to negotiate.
State Department spokesperson Tammy Bruce announced yesterday that Trump envoy Steve Witkoff will go to the Middle East to work on negotiations toward a Gaza ceasefire, and for an aid corridor to open in Gaza. Israel broke a previously negotiated ceasefire earlier this spring.
President Donald Trump has announced he will meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Alaska next week to discuss ending the war in Ukraine. As of this writing there are early reports that a framework deal is shaping up that would begin with Ukraine ceding territory in the Donbas to Russia, even land it now partially controls.
Trump deserves great credit for acting to advance the end of the war. If reports today are true he has abandoned the sanctions he threatened and is still determined to seek a compromise “deal” required to end the war in Ukraine -- which has been stalemated for nearly three years and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future.
The problem is, so far, his administration has been proceeding in an ad hoc, improvised fashion, seemingly ignoring the modern history of successful U.S.-supported mediation of violent conflicts.
Beginning in February, the president and his aides proposed a month-long cease-fire. Yet enduring suspensions of hostilities are generally a result of, rather than a precondition for, peace negotiations. Recent examples include Bosnia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, Northern Ireland, and Sudan.
Trump later appeared to back off when Russian President Vladimir Putin, whose forces are on the move, posed stiff political conditions. U.S. officials have met separately with the Ukrainian and Russian leaders, spurning potentially useful collaboration with affected countries in Europe and the Global South.
Confronting the adversaries’ diametrically opposed peace plans, the administration prematurely offered its own one-page proposal and pushed three unaccompanied, unproductive meetings between Russian and Ukrainian officials — all to little or no avail.
Venting his frustration, Trump has swung from threatening to abandon his peace initiative, to pausing military and intelligence aid to Ukraine, to restoring that assistance, promising new, largely defensive weapons, and threatening 100% tariffs on countries doing business with Russia unless Putin agrees to an undefined “deal” within an unrealistic 10-12 days. As that deadline came and went, Trump is heralding his upcoming one-on-one with Putin. But Secretary of State Marco Rubio cautions that the president’s most important role will be to “come in at the end [of a negotiation] and close on it.” Yet, as of today, no negotiation process has been established.
The overall impression is one of an ill-thought out, pell-mell initiative that has a good chance of failing.
It doesn’t have to be this way. Whether because of Trump’s inexperience with peacemaking and impatience or State Department amnesia, the administration is failing to apply lessons in peacemaking bequeathed by four past presidents. As numerous scholars have detailed, under Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush the U.S. successfully promoted a dozen, enduring mediated settlements of complex, bitter internal and interstate conflicts in Bosnia, Burundi, Cambodia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, El Salvador, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Mozambique, Namibia-Angola, Northern Ireland, and Sudan. Three of these wars — in Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, and Sudan — killed more people than the up to 350,000 estimated to have died so far in Ukraine.
In every one of these cases, there was initial uncertainty — as there has been in Ukraine — that one or more parties were really ready to negotiate an end to the conflict. Yet that did not deter the peacemakers. In each instance, success was eventually achieved following the formal establishment of a unique peace-making structure (or series of structures) led by a relatively neutral third-party mediator deploying professional skills. The latter could be a regional organization, a United Nations body, one or more governments, even a non-governmental organization.
A rich literature, including many first person accounts, describes how the mediators nurtured peace agreements in conflicts that were either “ripe for resolution” — meaning the parties appeared to perceive they could not win, and the costs of continuing the war were higher than those of a potential settlement — or needed further ripening as circumstances on the ground became clearer.
What did these mediators actually do? They regularly summoned the combatants to participate in direct negotiations or “proximity talks,” listened carefully to their concerns, explicated their differences to the parties, and worked to find an even-handed middle ground. They determined how to incorporate the combatants’ sponsors and other important countries and regional groups into the discussions as “friends” of the undertaking. They arranged technical assistance to implement agreed peace plans. By gradually developing a degree of political and personal trust among the participants, they reduced their fears and gave them a sense of joint ownership of a political dialogue.
They also built an architecture for achieving consensus: ordering meeting agendas, setting target dates for decisions, determining at what point to bring up a cease-fire and when to insist that the parties accept their recommended compromise or be blamed for the collapse of the entire effort.
As the process moved forward, the mediators and their “friends” utilized various forms of leverage on the adversaries. Most often, these carrots and sticks involved economic and military resources (including the provision of neutral international peacekeepers). These incentives and threats were particularly effective because they were wielded in the context of ongoing political negotiations where the participants and their state sponsors were beginning to at least grasp the possibility of a satisfactory political alternative to continued fighting. In the absence of such talks, “tough” unilateral measures — such as the additional sanctions proposed by President Trump against Russia and its trading partners — are likely to be less impactful.
Notwithstanding this impressive diplomatic record of replacing violent conflict in sensitive regions with sustainable political arrangements, there is no guarantee that mediation will work in Ukraine. For example, it ultimately failed to achieve peace in Rwanda, Angola, and Syria. But this was largely due to flaws in the settlements or weaknesses in international cooperation or enforcement. A further caution: the negotiation process takes time, usually as at least two years, although cease-fires may be achieved well before then. Yet, this is the best model we have for treating such conflicts.
The Trump administration should move beyond its current ad hoc approach to securing a “deal” on Ukraine. Its priority should be to bring the conflict under a structured mediation led by the U.S., accompanied by key European actors and the Global South (including interested countries like Brazil, India, China, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates). Convening the combatants should not be difficult as they have met with each other several times during the course of the war.
If he could only draw some lessons from recent American history, Donald Trump might earn himself a shot at winning his coveted Nobel Peace Prize.
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Eduardo Bolsonaro (right) in front of the White House (You Tube /screenshot)
On August 1, the Trump administrationimposed a 50% tariff on Brazilian imports, sending high-volume sectors like coffee, beef, and textile companies scrambling to adjust to their new reality. The tariffs came on the back of a lobbying campaign from an unlikely source — Brazil itself. Whereas other foreign entities are lobbying the U.S. government to reduce their tariffs, allies of ex-president Jair Bolsonaro asked for more.
Eduardo Bolsonaro, financed by ex-president father Jair Bolsonaro, is the main catalyst behind the lobbying efforts. And by not registering his activities, Eduardo Bolsonaro may be running afoul of the U.S. foreign lobbying laws.
For several months, the younger Bolsonaro has been lobbying the White House and the U.S. Congress to carry out a maximum pressure campaign of tariffs and sanctions against his own country over the Brazilian authorities’ prosecution of Jair Bolsonaro. The primary target of Eduardo Bolsonaro’s campaign is Alexandre de Moraes, the Brazilian Supreme Court Justice leading the investigations into the ex-president.
The elder Bolsonaro is accused of attempting a coup in 2022 to remain in office, which allegedly included a plot to poison President Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva and assassinate Moraes. Citing a flight risk, Moraes ordered Bolsonaro to wear an ankle monitor, a move the ex-president called a “supreme humiliation." On Monday, the Brazilian Justice went a step further, placing Jair Bolsonaro under house arrest after he violated a court order prohibiting the use of social media.
Nicknamed “Number Three” by his father as if assigning ranks in a battalion, Eduardo Bolsonaro moved to the U.S. in March and quickly became the family’s chief emissary and lobbyist abroad. Alongside Paulo Figueiredo, the grandson of Brazil’s last military dictator, Eduardo Bolsonaro has metwith U.S. lawmakers, including chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee Brian Mast (R-Fla.), co-president of the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission Chris Smith (R-N.J.), and Republican Assistant Whip Rep. Maria Elvira Salazar (R-Fla.). Eduardo Bolsonaro has also bragged about his close relationship with the White House itself.
A week after a meeting on May 14 between Eduardo Bolsonaro’s entourage and Rep. Cory Mills (R-F who asked Secretary of State Marco Rubio during a hearing if he would consider sanctions against Moraes. “That is under review, and there’s a strong possibility that it could happen,” replied Rubio.
Trump seemingly took the call to action seriously, escalating the stakes far beyond targeted sanctions. On July 9, he sent a letter to President Lula announcing the tariffs. “Due in part to Brazil’s insidious attacks on Free Elections, and the fundamental Free Speech Rights of Americans, starting on August 1, 2025, we will charge Brazil a Tariff of 50% on any and all Brazilian products sent into the United States,” Trump declared.
Eduardo Bolsonaro immediately celebrated the 50% tariffs — referring to them as the “Moraes Tariff” — and responded with a video on his YouTube channel taking credit. “Over the past few months, we have maintained intense dialogue with officials from President Trump's administration, always aiming to accurately and document the reality Brazil is experiencing today,” he said. “The letter from the president of the United States only confirms our success in conveying what we have been presenting to Brazil with seriousness and responsibility.”
Days before the tariffs set in, Trump also imposedMagnitsky sanctions on Moraes, freezing any assets the Brazilian Justice has under U.S. jurisdiction and preventing him from using credit cards backed by U.S. financial companies. Once again, Eduardo Bolsonaro celebrated the decision and took credit. “When I exiled myself to the U.S., I made my intention very clear: to sanction Alexandre de Moraes,” he said. “Today, I have the feeling of a mission accomplished.”
Moraes alleges that Eduardo Bolsonaro’s campaign in the U.S. is being bankrolled by his father with the objective of “shaking the country's economy.” Jair Bolsonaro has reportedly sent around $350,000 to his son. “I put money in [Eduardo’s] hands, quite a lot,” Bolsonaro acknowledged in May, around the same time Eduardo Bolsonaro’s lobbying campaign ramped up.
To date, Eduardo Bolsonaro has not registered as a foreign agent under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), the U.S. foreign lobbying law. As an elected official to Brazil’s National Congress, Eduardo Bolsonaro could qualify for an exemption from registering as a foreign agent. However, Josh Rosenstein, a FARA expert and partner at Sandler Reiff, explained to RS that to do so, the State Department needs to recognize his role as an elected official and interpret his actions as within the scope of his duties.
A State Department spokesperson told RS in an email that the agency had not received a notification from Eduardo Bolsonaro or the Brazilian government that his lobbying actions fall under official government activity.
“Absent the form or some similar official notification to the State Department, FARA's regulations are clear that the exemption is unavailable,” explained Rosenstein. The Department of Justice, which, under the Trump administration, has reserved FARA charges only for instances of “traditional espionage,” is unlikely to ask Eduardo Bolsonaro to register as a foreign agent.
Eduardo Bolsonaro's lobbying campaign for sanctions and tariffs succeeded — perhaps too much. His political gambit could backfire, as some would-be allies are already blaming the Bolsonaros for the new tariffs, leaving the family increasingly politically isolated. A new AtlasIntel and Bloomberg poll shows Lula’s approval rating is now at over 50% for the first time since October 2024, having steadily climbed since Trump’s initial tariff threats.
Meanwhile, the Trump administration has given the cold shoulder to the actual Brazilian government.
In a recent interview with the New York Times, Lula said that it has been impossible to contact Trump about the tariffs. “I designated my vice president, my agriculture minister, my economy minister, so that each can talk to their counterpart to understand what the possibility for conversation was. So far, it hasn’t been possible…So I hope that civility returns to the Brazil-U.S. relationship.”
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Top photo credit: Armenian Prime Minister Niкol Pashinyan (wikimedia/office of President of Azerbaijan); President Donald Trump (Gage Skidmore/Flickr); President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan (wikimedia/office of President of Azerbaijan)
U.S. President Donald Trump is hoping the Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev are primed for peace when they meet Friday at the White House.
The two are expected to sign a framework agreement while Armenia and the U.S. are expected to launch a joint venture offering exclusive U.S. commercial development rights to a 43-kilometer route through Armenia’s southern Syunik region. This land route will run through Armenian territory to connect mainland Azerbaijan with its Nakhichevan exclave and Turkey and has been a main sticking point in negotiations.
Whether or not this will lead to a more peaceful, stable, and prosperous South Caucasus remains an open question. The region, flanked by Russia, Turkey, and Iran, has proven difficult for Washington to strategically maneuver in the past.
Over the last several years, Armenia and Azerbaijan have been engaged in a negotiation process to resolve their decades-long conflict. That process reached a crescendo of sorts in March when the two sides announced that they had finally worked out the text of a peace agreement, following Armenia’s acceptance of two previously unresolved articles. Nevertheless, Azerbaijan has demanded several preconditions — including changes to Armenia’s constitution — be met before signing the document.
How we got here
Azerbaijan emerged victorious, confident, and assertive after reigniting hostilities through a six-week war against the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region in late 2020. Feeling further emboldened by global developments since then, Baku has frequently pursued a coercive and maximalist agenda toward Armenia.
Complicating matters further, the Armenian government and parts of society have throughout this period become increasingly dissatisfied with Russia, their nominal ally. This crisis in relations was exacerbated as Moscow largely stood idle as Azerbaijan launched subsequent military escalations, both into internationally recognized Armenian territory (some 80 square milesof which is still occupied to this day) and against Nagorno-Karabakh, resulting in the expulsion of over 100,000 ethnic Armenians from the territory in September 2023.
Russia’s early setbacks in Ukraine and its significantly curtailed trade and energy ties with the EU due to sanctions led Moscow to become increasingly reliant on Azerbaijan and Turkey. This reliance translated into an unwillingness or inability to ward off violent pressure tactics against Armenia or to publicly condemn Azerbaijan’s actions, much to Yerevan’s displeasure.
Armenia’s subsequent Western-leaning pivot, however, has provoked strong reactions from some in Russia. The Armenian (and Azerbaijani) move to effectively sideline Russian involvement in the above-mentioned transit route further unsettled relations.
Nevertheless, while Yerevan and Moscow have engaged in combative rhetorical spats, both have remained cautious about taking any steps that would cross red lines in their relationship. Yerevan remains an official member of the CSTO and the EAEU and has only increased its trade with Russia. Moscow has not taken any significant retaliatory steps against the Armenian economy, which is heavily reliant on Russia. Importantly, Russian President Vladimir Putin has been restrained in his comments about Armenia and Pashinyan.
As Yerevan now seeks to pivot away from and reduce its critical reliance on Russia – particularly in energy and trade – there exist few alternatives but to pursue a policy aimed at unlocking its border with Turkey and thus allowing for direct trade relations with Ankara, which shut its border with Armenia in 1993.
In addition, Armenia hopes that an open border with Turkey will allow it additional opportunities to expand its ties with European and other partners.
Holding this back, however, is Ankara’s condition that its normalization process with Yerevan be linked to the signing of a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Baku, in turn, states that the already-finalized agreement will be signed with Yerevan only when its own preconditions are met, chief among them an unhindered transit route to its Nakhichevan exclave. If the deal is sealed, this route would effectively connect Turkey with Azerbaijan and across the Caspian Sea into Central Asia while avoiding passing through Russian and Iranian territory.
Armenia, which has declared its sovereignty and jurisdiction a red line, is now seeking all available means by which to resist continued Azerbaijani pressure. This has resulted in increased Armenian reliance on the U.S., EU and, paradoxically, Turkey for deterrence as Yerevan pursues its “peace agenda.”
Iran-Israel connections
For Iran, which shares a northwestern border with both Armenia and Azerbaijan, any extraterritorial schemes in Armenia’s Syunik region are viewed as a bright red line.
In late July, Ali Akbar Velayati, a senior adviser on international affairs to the Ayatollah, made strongly worded remarks on the subject and America’s potential involvement. “The main goal,” he said, “is to weaken the Resistance Axis, sever Iran’s link with the Caucasus, and impose a land blockade on Iran and Russia in the region’s south.” Velayati added that the “project is not only part of America’s strategy to shift pressures from Ukraine to the Caucasus, but is also supported by NATO and certain pan-Turkist movements.”
Iran’s foreign ministry spokesman, however, recently sounded a more pragmatic tone.
Of particular concern to Iran is Azerbaijan’s deepening relations with Israel.
Significant efforts have been underway in Washington, Tel Aviv, and Baku to bring the Shia-majority country into the Abraham Accords. Donald Trump’s Special Envoy Steve Witkoff made a quiet visit to Baku in mid-March to discuss this topic with the country’s leadership. According to a recent Reuters report, the U.S. views Azerbaijan’s conflict with Armenia as a “key sticking point” given Washington’s view that an agreement should be a “precondition” to joining the Accords.
Across the Muslim world, however, Azerbaijan-Israel relations are already some of the most advanced. Having flown relatively under the radar for many years, Baku’s offensive in 2020 exposed the prevalence of Israeli weaponry in Azerbaijan’s arsenal. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute recorded that, between 2016-2020, some 70% of Azerbaijan’s major arms imports came from Israel.
In exchange, Azerbaijan provides between 40-60% of Israel’s oil needs, and Baku is looking to expand its energy cooperation with Tel Aviv. It is also widely believed that Israelis conduct intelligence operations from Azerbaijani territory, particularly near its southern border with Iran. Indeed, following the 12-day war in June, Tehran called on Baku to investigate reports of Israeli drones using Azerbaijani airspace, a claim that Baku strongly denies.
While Iran is weakened and preparing for an anticipated future war, and Russia remains fixated on Ukraine, the U.S. and Turkey appear to see a window of opportunity to strengthen their influence and advance their interests in the South Caucasus.
Nevertheless, two questions remain: Will increased American and Turkish involvement in the region exacerbate or calm broader tensions, and what is the staying power of a U.S. commitment in the South Caucasus under the current administration?
What ongoing developments clearly signal, however, is that a reinvigorated struggle for the Caucasus is only starting to heat up.
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