What if the chair of the powerful Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the committee that oversees legislation impacting war powers, treaties, troop deployments, and military aid, was illegally acting as a foreign agent of Egypt, one of the biggest recipients of U.S. aid and military sales?
That scenario is exactly what the Department of Justice alleged last month when it accused Sen. Bob Menendez (D—NJ) of using his influence to increase U.S.-taxpayer funded aid to Egypt in exchange for gold bars, a Mercedes and stacks of cash.
The Justice Department and Menendez are making history. This is the first time a sitting U.S. senator has been accused of violating the Foreign Agents Registration Act (or FARA), a law that prohibits Members of Congress from acting as an agent of a foreign principal.
The Justice Department’s FARA investigations into a high profile politician, think tank president and hip hop star sends a clear message that no one is above the law, says a new video by the Quincy Institute’s Senior Video Producer Khody Akhavi and Democratizing Foreign Policy Program Director Ben Freeman.
Eli Clifton is a senior advisor at the Quincy Institute and Investigative Journalist at Large at Responsible Statecraft. He reports on money in politics and U.S. foreign policy.
What are the Trump administration’s plans for the U.S. Army at home and abroad?
The question hung over recent House and Senate hearings with Pentagon officials about security challenges facing the United States. “The Department [of Defense (DoD)] is undergoing a global force posture review…No decisions have been made at this time,” the acting assistant secretary for international security affairs, Katherine Thompson, responded at one session when asked about the possibility of changes to the U.S. military footprint in Europe.
For those looking past official statements, however, the writing is on the wall. To meet Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s budgetary and strategic goals, the U.S. Army will have to shrink, and the number of U.S. ground forces in Europe is likely to decline sharply. The Trump administration should not apologize for these changes. Though the moves will face pushback, they are badly needed and will better align U.S. military commitments with the country’s security priorities and available resources.
Since President Donald Trump’s second term began, his national security team has set some clear priorities: ending the war in Ukraine, securing the homeland, and shedding unnecessary costs and defense burdens to focus more attention on Asia. But the administration has been vague about what these goals will mean for the size and shape of the U.S. military and its forward presence overseas, especially in Europe where some 100,000 U.S. forces are currently stationed.
When he was in Europe in February, Hegseth was emphatic that the United States could no longer serve as the continent’s primary security guarantor due to “strategic necessities” including the challenges of competing with China and protecting the southern border. Though such assertions seemed to imply a pending drawdown of U.S. military presence in Europe, the Pentagon has avoided addressing the topic directly since.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio sounded a somewhat different tune on his own trip to Europe in April. Calling media speculation “hysteria and hyperbole,” Rubio argued that the United States had no intention of pulling away from NATO but simply wanted “NATO to be stronger.” Indeed, NATO officials have heard nothing specific from the United States about changes to U.S. military presence in Europe, but their fears and questions remain.
The answers NATO allies seek do not lie on the European continent, however, but in Hegseth’s major initiatives at home: realigning the Pentagon’s massive budget to fit the administration’s national security goals and mobilizing U.S. military power in support of President Trump’s border policies.
First, there is Hegseth’s February 18 memo instructing senior military officials and DoD leaders to draw up plans to cut 8% per year from their budgets for each of the next five years. The exercise is not focused on reducing the defense budget topline, however, but identifying resources that can be reallocated to the Trump administration’s defense priorities, including 17 areas Hegseth exempted from cuts.
Hegseth’s guidance leaves those looking for cost savings with relatively few choices. The protected categories cover many of the Pentagon’s priciest budget items: U.S. operations on the southern border, munitions programs, missile defense, executable ships and nuclear submarines, and military construction in Asia, among others. Notably under-represented on the list is the Army, for instance its prized modernization programs and support to commands in Europe or the Middle East, where Army personnel play the largest role.
Unsurprisingly, then, a recent budget simulation exercise run by American Enterprise Institute found that when making cuts under a strict interpretation of Hegseth’s guidance, the Army inevitably winds up as a significant “bill payer,” meaning that it absorbs a large share of required reductions. To a person, participants in the exercise reported that they had to cut U.S. Army force structure to make the budget math work.
Military planners in the Pentagon are likely to come to the same conclusion. From a budgetary perspective, reducing the size of the Army makes sense because force structure is a major military cost driver. Fewer units mean less money spent on total salary and benefits and lower requirements for training and equipment.
From a strategic perspective, cuts to Army positions match the Pentagon’s intent to shift its focus to Asia. Though the Army would contribute to contingency operations in the Indo-Pacific, the demand for ground personnel would be much lower than the need for maritime and air forces and their warships and aircraft.
If Hegseth moves ahead with his budget realignment, then, reductions in active-duty Army positions are likely. The size and shape of these reductions is harder to predict. The Army vigorously denied reports that it was planning to axe 90,000 active-duty jobs, asserting instead that “End Strength might even go up. We are building more combat power while reducing staff and overhead.”
It is likely that some cuts will occur among Army administrative roles or to the large and redundant staff hierarchies at service and combatant commands. But this will not be enough to free up the resources Hegseth has requested. Active-duty positions will almost certainly have to be eliminated as well, including some of the Army’s brigade combat teams (BCTs) and special operations forces.
On their own, these budget-driven cuts might not affect U.S. Army force posture in Europe. But there’s a second key factor: Trump’s militarized approach to the U.S. southern border — an activity that Hegseth protected in his memo.
So far, the demands of Trump’s push to assert “100% operational control” of the border with Mexico have fallen heavily on the Army. There are now about 6,600 active-duty military personnel, most from the Army, and over 2,000 Army National Guard forces supporting border operations. Units deployed from the active-duty force include a Stryker Brigade Combat Team, aviation units, and headquarters and sustainment support troops. Some of these soldiers come from high readiness units — those intended for crisis response — that were already struggling under high operational tempo from repeated overseas missions.
According to the commander of NORTHCOM, General Gregory Guillot, the border mission will last “years not months,” extending the burden they place on Army forces. In nine months or a year, the currently deployed units will rotate home and new soldiers will take their place. If the mission lasts all four years of Trump’s term, as many as 40,000 ground forces might serve a stint on the southern border.
While operating at the border, soldiers are obviously unavailable for missions overseas, but their unavailability will extend far beyond the end of their physical deployment. Returning soldiers will need a rest and refit period and time to catch up on training and repair equipment.
Ultimately, the combined pressure of force structure cuts and a sustained border security mission will leave many fewer Army personnel available for overseas deployment at any given time. U.S. Army presence in Europe is likely to bear the brunt of this shortfall, with reductions in permanent and rotational forces — up to 10,000 or 20,000 personnel — from Germany or Poland possible and even necessary to balance competing demands. The Army— and especially a smaller Army — can only stretch so far, and Hegseth has made clear that operations on the border rank above U.S. commitments in Europe in the Trump administration’s hierarchy.
Congress will howl against such moves, but reductions in Army force structure and presence in Europe are long overdue. The number of Army BCTs and the size of the service’s special operations and combat support forces remain bloated following the end of the 20-year global war on terror, leaving plenty of room for cuts.
Likewise, U.S. Army presence in Europe has increased significantly over the past 10 years, and now far outstrips what is necessary given the current threat picture, U.S. interests in the region, and the responsibilities of allies.
The Trump administration should not be shy about its plans to right-size the U.S. Army’s force at home and in Europe. Instead, it should champion the budgetary benefits and strategic necessity of critical changes previous administrations have been too tentative to make.
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Top photo credit: Ben Gvir (Shutterstock/Barak Shacked) and Kristi Noem (Shutterstock/Maxim Elramsisy)
Few American politicians can claim to back Israel more emphatically than Rep. Ritchie Torres (D-N.Y.).
Since the Oct. 7 attacks, Torres has dedicated himself to defending Israel and striking out against those who criticize its war in Gaza, earning him the moniker of “Israel’s loudest House supporter.” These efforts have garnered high praise from Israeli leadership. “Congressman Torres reflects our extraordinary ties and true friendship,” Israel’s defense minister said last year after meeting with the lawmaker.
So it may seem odd that, when Torres heard Israel’s national security minister was visiting Washington this week, he went on the attack. “There is no universe in which I would ever grant an audience to an extremist like [Itamar] Ben Gvir,” Torres tweeted, adding that he has “nothing but contempt” for the Israeli minister.
As Torres’ comments suggest, Ben Gvir is no ordinary Israeli official. The far-right minister has become a symbol of his country’s most aggressive political currents — a reputation that he earned through decades of activism in support of Jewish Israelis accused of attacks on Palestinian civilians. This, combined with his calls for annexation of Palestinian land and his backing of violent settler groups in the West Bank, led the Biden administration to boycott Ben Gvir and even consider slapping sanctions on him despite his prominent role in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s cabinet.
Luckily for Ben Gvir, there’s a new leader in Washington. President Donald Trump, far from boycotting the Israeli minister, is reportedly ready to roll out the red carpet for him. This week, Ben Gvir will fly to the United States for his first ever official visit abroad, according to reports in Israeli media. The trip will include stops in Florida and Washington, DC, where he’s slated to meet with U.S. officials, conservative influencers, and Jewish community leaders.
The most high-profile meeting on his schedule is with Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem.
As of this writing, there is no indication as to what Noem and Ben Gvir might discuss, but there’s reason to believe the pair will hit it off. Noem portrays herself as the ultimate tough-on-crime politician. She recently posed for a controversial photo op at a notorious prison in El Salvador where the administration sent more than 230 migrants accused, without due process, of membership in a Venezuelan gang.
Ben Gvir, who runs Israel’s prison system, has advocated a more straightforward solution for dealing with unwanted detainees. “It is unfortunate that I have had to deal in recent days with whether Palestinian prisoners should receive fruit baskets,” he said last year. “They should be killed with a shot to the head.”
'I don't do it for the money'
Ben Gvir got his start in politics in the early 1990s, cutting his teeth as a teenage activist for Israel’s Kach party. At the time, the group was under threat from all angles. Israeli courts had banned it from participating in elections, and an Egyptian-American attacker had just gunned down its charismatic leader, Israeli-American Rabbi Meir Kahane.
Under Kahane, the Kach party focused largely on ensuring Jewish supremacy in Israel. The group advocated criminal penalties for intermarriage between Jews and non-Jews and called for the denaturalization of all Palestinian citizens of Israel. Among Kahane’s most controversial stances was that any Arab caught throwing stones at Israeli soldiers should be treated as a terrorist, meaning, in Kahane’s view, that the person should be killed and that their entire home village should be expelled from the country.
Back in the U.S., Kahane’s Jewish Defense League pledged to protect Jews using “whatever means necessary” and carried out a series of attacks against alleged antisemites, which eventually led the FBI to designate it as a right-wing terrorist group.
The Kach party limped along until 1994, when a Kahanist named Baruch Goldstein donned his Israeli military uniform, stormed into the Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron and opened fire on the congregation, killing 29 worshippers and injuring another 125. Kach praised Goldstein as a “hero,” leading Israeli authorities to permanently ban the group.
But this didn’t dull Ben Gvir’s enthusiasm. In a 1995 interview, the young activist brandished a hood ornament that he claimed to have taken from Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin’s car. “We got to his car, and we’ll get to him, too,” Ben Gvir said. A few weeks later, a far-right Israeli activist shot and killed Rabin, derailing the Oslo peace process. (Ben Gvir has no known connection to that attack.)
Ben Gvir spent the rest of the 1990s and the 2000s advocating for the expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank. After a few too many run-ins with the law, including multiple convictions for incitement and support for terrorism, Ben Gvir took his activism from the streets to the courts. He became a lawyer in 2012 and devoted himself to defending Jewish Israelis accused of killing Palestinians. “I don’t do it for the money,” he told Haaretz in 2016. “I truly believe I need to help these people.”
Decades after his first foray into politics, Ben Gvir remains a committed Kahanist. In 2021, he described Kahane as a “holy man, a righteous man,” who was “murdered for the sanctification of God’s name.” Ben Gvir also holds a special place in his heart for the Hebron shooter — so much so that he kept a photo of Goldstein on his living room wall until 2020.
The 'only solution'
As Ben Gvir made waves with his legal activism, he also began working his way into mainstream Israeli politics. In the early 2010s, he joined a neo-Kahanist party called Jewish Power and became an aide to one its leaders, Knesset member Michael Ben Ari. (Around that same time, the State Department banned Ben Ari from entering the United States, citing his support for Kahanism.)
The Jewish Power party remained on the fringes throughout the 2010s. In 2019, when Israeli authorities banned Ben Ari from running in Knesset elections, Ben Gvir took control of the party. Three years later, he launched it into mainstream relevance with a mix of luck and political savvy.
Israeli law says parties need only win 3.25% of the national vote to earn representation in the Knesset, which gives small parties a chance to break into the legislature. In 2021, Ben Gvir took advantage of this fact and ran on a joint list with other small far-right groups, earning him a seat in the Knesset for the first time.
The lawmaker used his new pulpit to advocate for expanded Israeli settlement on Palestinian land, including the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood of East Jerusalem, where he brandished a gun while arguing with Palestinian residents. But his real victory came in 2022, when Netanyahu, desperate to stay in power and out of jail, formed a coalition government with the Jewish Power party, and named Ben Gvir the minister of national security. The deal gave Ben Gvir extraordinary power despite his relatively small base of supporters.
Ben Gvir has relished this high-profile role, which puts him in charge of Israel’s prisons and police force. In the wake of the Oct. 7 massacres, he’s put more guns in the hands of West Bank settlers, ordered police to allow attacks on aid convoys bound for Gaza, and reduced the amount of food available to Palestinian prisoners.
Ben Gvir was often critical of the Biden administration, which he accused of supporting Hamas when it briefly paused arms transfers to Israel. (It probably didn’t help that President Biden had recently slapped sanctions on one of Ben Gvir’s closest allies in the settler movement.) But he’s seen a lot to like in President Trump’s second term. When Trump suggested removing all Palestinians from Gaza and turning the enclave into the “Riviera of the Middle East,” Ben Gvir praised the idea and said that “encouraging” Gazans to leave is the “only solution” for the war.
“Everyone knows that I was right about encouraging migration,” he said. “Today, the president of the most powerful country in the world says that.”
On March 21, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announced that U.S. shell companies and their owners can once again conceal their identities — a move critics warn could weaken national security and spur illicit financial activity that puts the American public at risk.
Treasury’s initial beneficial ownership information (BOI) disclosure requirement for all companies with less than 20 employees garnered bipartisan support and Trump’s approval during his first administration, but it was short-lived. Officially brought into force last January 2024, and then stymied by lawsuits, the requirement passed its final legal roadblock in February 2025 — only to be shelved a month later by the administration.
With the written support of Attorney General Pam Bondi and Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem, the Treasury Department announced that it would stymie the BOI register established under Corporate Transparency Act (CTA). Initially, the Act required small companies, including those based in the U.S. or registered to do business in the country, to disclose who ultimately owns and controls their company to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). When the measure passed the House in 2019, it was lauded as a measure that would “help prevent malign actors from leveraging anonymity to exploit these entities for criminal gain.”
Now, when a U.S. citizen sets up a shell company in the U.S., they do not have to disclose their identity or the identities of the company's “beneficial owners,” or the individuals who profit from the company or control its activities. American beneficial owners of foreign shell companies that register in the U.S. have been granted the same anonymity. Under the latest limited regulation, only non-American owners will be required to register with the U.S. government.
While fleeting, the Treasury Department’s original BOI requirement was the U.S.’s first attempt at catching up with similar regulations in 148 other countries.
National BOI registers are critical to ensure individuals cannot hide their finances from the law. Whether it be money laundering, sanction evasion, drug smuggling, human trafficking or illegal arms smuggling, financial secrecy facilitates illicit activities. The Treasury's 2022 National Money Laundering Risk Assessments — noted by Bessent in the announcement — even identified the “lack of timely access to BOI as a key weakness” within its anti-terrorism financing framework.
A haven for illegal arms traffickers
Arms traffickers are one of the many malicious actors who have used U.S.-based shell companies to their benefit. Victor Bout, a former Soviet intelligence officer turned “merchant of death” is the kingpin of examples. Extradited to the United States in 2010 to stand trial on terrorism charges, Bout utilized a global network of shell companies, including 12 companies incorporated in Delaware, Florida, and Texas, to facilitate weapons trafficking to armed groups in Africa, Colombia, Afghanistan, the Middle East, and elsewhere.
“Victor Bout may be the poster boy for U.S. shell companies engaged in black market arms sales, but he is only the tip of the iceberg,” explained Kathi Austin, Executive Director of the Conflict Awareness Project, in an email to Responsible Statecraft. “From a U.S. company in Maine tied to a Mauritius arms trafficking operation, to the convicted arms traffickers Sarkis Soghanalian and Charles Acelor who facilitated weapons air drops to the FARC rebels in Colombia, the shell game is what they were banking on — however unsuccessful in these instances — to hide from investigators’ eyes.”
And hide they do. U.S. shell companies have been successfully used as cover for illegal arms sales for decades. Hints of a business's true breadth and depth only emerge when a trafficker is apprehended, “such as the case of Pierre Falcone who used secret accounts in Arizona to hide his proceeds from arms trafficking to Angola” noted Austin.
Asked during his confirmation process in January if anonymous shell companies pose threats to national security and public safety, Bessent offered no specifics, only saying vaguely that he would work to “combat malign and illicit activity that threatens our national security,” while noting the risk of “undue burdens and disproportionate legal consequences on law-abiding U.S. individuals and small businesses.”
In the final ruling, Secretary Bessent cited President Trump’s Executive Order 14192, entitled “Unleashing Prosperity Through Deregulation” and the administration’s policy “to significantly reduce the private expenditures required to comply with Federal regulations to secure America's economic prosperity and national security” as the reasoning behind the ruling. While the BOI register did increase the financial reporting onus on small businesses — as companies with over 20 employees were always exempt from BOI reporting — the rule protected Americans by working to prevent misuse of corporations for criminal gain.
"Small businesses suffer when they are forced to compete with fraudulent and criminal enterprises that exploit anonymous shell corporations to evade accountability,” explained Richard Trent, Executive Director of the small business network Main Street Alliance (MSA) in a recent press release.
The U.S. BOI is non-public, unlike some European examples, thus protecting the privacy of beneficial owners. At the same time, providing the government with BOI helps detect and deter crime, ensuring that wrongdoers cannot hide behind opaque company structures. An October 2024 McLaughlin and Associates poll further indicated that the original BOI requirements enjoyed widespread public approval.
Now with only foreign nationals forced to register BOI, U.S. citizens may be used as legal fronts for international entities looking to benefit from the U.S.’s financial system and it wouldn't be the first time.
Illegally gaming the military contracting system
According to investigations conducted by the U.S. Government Accountability Office, some Pentagon suppliers have used U.S. front companies to win manufacturing bids under fraudulent pretenses. Through the use of U.S. shell companies, contractors have obscured the fact that they were making U.S. military equipment abroad, risking equipment quality as well as national security while defrauding the U.S. out of millions of dollars.
In one case, a contractor who used a U.S. shell company to hide the fact that they were secretly manufacturing safety gear for F-15 fighter jets in India while illegally exporting “technical drawings for aircraft parts, nuclear submarine torpedo systems and attack helicopters.”
In another example from the early 2000s, U.S. Lieutenant Colonel David Young illegally passed information about Pentagon projects on to Michael Taylor, president of the American International Security Corporation (AISC), and Christopher Harris, a contractor in Afghanistan. That information allowed AISC to develop the perfect bid and garner approximately $54 million worth of Army contracts between 2007 and 2011. Through this inflated deal, Young, Taylor and Harris stole more than $20 million from the DoD, covertly transferring the funds through U.S. shell companies.
Once again, financial secrecy facilitates illicit activities, including defrauding the U.S. government. By collecting and maintaining basic information about who actually owns and controls companies, the U.S. can use that information to prevent and detect crime, and safeguard its citizens.
“It is a basic principle that U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies should be able to check who is using U.S. shell companies to move money within and across our own borders,” warned Nate Sibley, fellow and director of Hudson Institute’s Kleptocracy Initiative. “America’s retreat from leading efforts to uncover these shadowy financial networks is an unforced error that enriches and empowers our worst enemies.”
According to Austin, who has spent decades working to uncover arms brokers hiding behind the cover of transporters, financial service providers, and facilitators, the main thing standing between illicit actors and accountability “continues to be shell companies which defy responsible arms control measures and have too much blood on their hands unaccounted for.”
If the Trump administration is serious about putting “America First,” Treasury Secretary Bessent should reverse this interim ruling so that the American public and the U.S. financial system can enjoy more thorough protection against criminal actors who seek to hide their activities behind opaque American shell companies.
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