In a new interview with Turkish TV channel, NTV, U.S. Ambassador to Ankara and Special Envoy to Syria Thomas Barrack announced that the American military would be significantly reducing its footprint in Syria.
“Our current policies toward Syria will not resemble the policies of the past 100 years, because those policies did not work,” Barrack to NTV. Additionally, Barrack confirmed that the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) were still considered an important ally for Washington.
Crucially, the ambassador gave concrete numbers regarding America’s “reconsolidation” of its presence in the country, saying, “from eight (military) bases, we will end up with just one.”
The reduction is “happening,” he added, noting that regional partners will need to take part in a new security arrangement for Syria. “It’s a matter of integration with everyone being reasonable.”
This jibes with today's news that the U.S. has already withdrawn 500 troops from the estimated 2000 it had in the country, according to Fox News.
Moreover, after his meetings last week with new Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, Barrack signaled that the U.S. was not going to try to run Syria but transition to a support role for the new Syrian government, “enabling it.” He also announced that President Trump would be removing Syria from its list of states that sponsor terror.
The Trump administration has been signaling for months that it would reduce America’s presence in the country. An unnamed Department of Defense official confirmed in February that the Pentagon was drafting plans for a potential exit. Trump also ordered all sanctions to be lifted from Syria in May to give the country “a chance at greatness.”
The Syrian Civil War that started in 2014 came to an end in December 2024 when then leader, Bashar al-Assad, was ousted and replaced with the current president, Ahmad al-Sharaa.
In addition to internal conflict, Syria has been the victim of recent Israeli attacks, as well as an invasion beyond the UN buffer zone in southern Syria. Barrack said confidently that “America’s role is simply to start having a dialogue,” when referring to Israeli-Syrian negotiations.
Aaron is a reporter for Responsible Statecraft and a contributor to the Mises Institute. He received both his undergraduate and masters degrees in international relations from Liberty University.
Top Photo: A soldier deployed to At-Tanf Garrison, Syria, fires an M3 Carl Gustaf Recoilless Rifle during a familiarization range hosted by Special Forces July 19, 2020. (US Army Photo by Spc. Chris Estrada)
On August 25, South Korean President Lee Jae-myung will be visiting the White House for his long-anticipated first summit with President Donald Trump.
Having launched his presidency only in June, Lee hopes to use the summit as an opportunity to build a positive, cooperative relationship with Trump — a crucial diplomatic counterpart with whom he must learn to work to advance the U.S.-ROK alliance and achieve shared goals in the years to come.
The new trade deal that Seoul and Washington reached late last month will likely take center stage. The deal involves lowering U.S. tariffs on South Korean goods from 25% to 15% in exchange for South Korean investments in key American sectors, most notably shipbuilding, as well as purchases of U.S. energy products and ensuring greater access to the South Korean market for American cars and agricultural products.
Lee and Trump are expected to review the various aspects of their deal and formally announce it to the public.
While the trade deal will contribute to creating a positive atmosphere, several pending complex alliance issues could raise tensions, particularly regarding how the financial and military burdens of sustaining the alliance will be shared into the future.
Trump has long suggested that America’s allies have been free-riding on Washington’s extended deterrence and has called on U.S. allies to dramatically increase their defense spending and overall financial contributions. “If they don’t pay, I’m not going to defend them,” Trump has warned in the past. South Korea has been no exception.
During his first term, in an apparent bid to press Seoul into paying significantly more for the stationing of U.S. Forces Korea, Trump ordered the Pentagon to consider withdrawing them. Trump raised the issue again during last year’s presidential campaign, suggesting that South Korea should pay up to ten times what it is paying now.
If Trump brings it up again, Lee will likely agree on the need to enhance South Korea’s financial responsibility for the alliance. Anticipating that likelihood, in advance of the summit, Seoul has been reportedly preparing a concrete plan to accommodate Trump’s demands, including a multi-year commitment to increasing South Korea’s defense spending.
Whether that proves sufficient to satisfy the U.S. president remains to be seen, although both sides should be prepared to compromise.
When it comes to burden-sharing, the more contentious issue could be whether there is agreement on the strategic priorities for U.S. forces based in South Korea. Trump’s Pentagon has stressed its intention to “prioritize” deterrence and warfighting against China and concentrate its forces on that goal. A number of the administration’s defense officials and military strategists have publicly urged shifting the operational focus of U.S. Forces Korea from North Korea to China — including responding to a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan — and placing South Korean forces predominantly in charge of deterring North Korea.
This idea of expanding the so-called “strategic flexibility” of U.S. Forces Korea is likely to draw resistance from Lee if Trump raises the issue. The concept is unpopular in South Korea for quite obvious reasons; it heightens the danger of the country being pulled into an unwanted war with China while degrading military readiness against North Korea.
A recent survey found that South Koreans would overall strongly oppose the deployment of U.S. Forces Korea for regional conflicts with China that do not directly involve South Korea. Only 6% of South Koreans supported allowing U.S. Forces Korea to be deployed for combat operations in the event of a conflict over Taiwan, and only 14% approved of U.S. Forces Korea carrying out military operations in response to China’s use of force outside Korea more broadly.
Lee himself shares this reservation. As a presidential candidate, Lee said that South Korea should not be involved in any conflict in the Taiwan Strait.
To be sure, the issue of strategic flexibility may not be entirely non-negotiable for Seoul. In the survey, 42% of South Koreans approved of U.S. Forces Korea playing a limited, non-combat support role in a Taiwan conflict, hinting at some room for compromise. However, with South Koreans first and foremost concerned about the threats posed by North Korea’s nuclear advances, conversations regarding strategic flexibility will inevitably feature disagreements.
In any case, if Trump's defense planners press the Lee administration on the issue too hard or too impatiently, they are likely to encounter serious resistance.
Instead of spending too much energy trying to get South Korea to pay an exorbitant cost for stationing U.S. troops or to subordinate its core security interests to support U.S. war-planning against China over Taiwan, the Trump administration would be wise to prioritize issues where mutual interests and strategic convergence are relatively clear. One such issue is pursuing diplomacy with North Korea.
Both Trump and Lee share a strong interest in engaging North Korea. Since entering office, Trump has repeatedly expressed his desire to resume nuclear talks with the North Korean leader, Kim Jong Un. Likewise, Lee, convinced that “peace is better than war, no matter how expensive,” is keen to pursue dialogue with Pyongyang and improve inter-Korean relations that have been severely strained in recent years, with the goal of eventually moving the regime toward nuclear disarmament.
According to a report published earlier this week, Washington and Seoul have been coordinating to demonstrate bilateral support for dialogue with North Korea in the joint statement, possibly including an endorsement of the 2018 Trump-Kim Singapore Declaration. This would be a positive first step.
That said, both Trump and Lee also face a common challenge: how to bring Pyongyang back to the negotiating table. Pyongyang has consistently rebuffed diplomatic overtures from Washington and Seoul, reiterating that it will “never” give up nuclear weapons. And time seems to be on Pyongyang’s side. Having developed an unprecedentedly tight alliance with Russia since Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Pyongyang does not appear particularly eager to engage in diplomacy with either the United States or South Korea.
Despite the overall pessimistic outlook, however, a path to diplomacy with North Korea may still exist. Pyongyang has signaled that it may be open to talks not conditioned on denuclearization. Indeed, moving away from the goal of denuclearizing North Korea will be hard for both Seoul and Washington. But it is a possibility that the Trump and Lee administrations should face and explore together, given the harsh reality that decades of efforts to denuclearize North Korea have all but failed.
While accepting that North Korea will get to keep nuclear weapons is disturbing, the alliance in fact has already been living with an increasingly nuclear-capable North Korea. Diplomacy with Pyongyang for more modest goals — aimed at preventing further nuclear buildup and promoting arms control — may be the only viable way forward, and the Trump and Lee administrations might have a lot less to lose from pursuing this path than they imagine and fear.
Members of Congress are wrapping up August recess in their home districts and preparing to return to Capitol Hill. And if public polling is any indication, they’ve been facing constituents who want to know why their taxpayer dollars are enabling the carnage in Gaza, and what Congress is doing to put an end to it.
If they are smart, lawmakers can work to end U.S. complicity by supporting the “Block the Bombs” bill, a proposal to block sales of bombs and explosive shells to Israel.
Introduced by Reps. Delia Ramirez (D-Ill.), Sara Jacobs (D-Calif.), Pramila Jayapal (D-Wash.), and Mark Pocan (D-Wis.) in May, the bill, H.R. 3565, is the best benchmark for House legislators’ commitment to stop arming atrocities in Gaza. It is the only House bill proposed to do so, and it is gaining momentum, with 30 other legislators already cosponsoring.
Block the Bombs would prohibit the U.S. government from selling Israel the weapons most implicated in the decimation of Gaza: bombs, bomb guidance kits, artillery shells, and mortar shells. When used in populated areas, these types of weapons kill civilians and destroy the vital infrastructure that keeps them alive. Extensivedocumentation by human rights groups and investigators ties these weapons to war crimes in Gaza.
The Israeli military has killed more than 55,000 Palestinians in its nearly two-year assault on Gaza. Thousands more are dying from starvation and disease caused by Israeli government restrictions on humanitarian aid and attacks on vital medical, water, and sanitation infrastructure. The latest alert from the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification — the world's leading body on hunger — warned that the “worst-case scenario of Famine is currently playing out in the Gaza Strip.”
All of this is made possible with U.S. weapons and funding. The Biden administration sent an enormous amount of weapons to the Israeli military in the first ten months of the war alone. Tens of billions of dollars in weapons sales have gone forward since, and the Trump administrationremoved the limited restrictions President Biden put in place. In February this year alone, the Trump administration notified Congress of over $11 billion more in lethal weapons to Israel.
These weapons kill and maim Palestinian civilians in Gaza. In March, the Israeli military dropped a U.S.-made bomb on a crowded cafe, killing at least 26 people. In April, Israeli forces used another American-made bomb to attack a displacement camp, killing dozens of Palestinians. U.S. weapons sales also send a clear political signal of American support for Israel’s conduct and the near total siege of Gaza.
The United States has the leverage to end this catastrophe and demand humanitarian access, the protection of civilians, and a ceasefire — but refuses to use it.
The U.S. Senate has taken multiple votes aimed at blocking arms sales to Israel using the Joint Resolution of Disapproval mechanism built into the Arms Export Control Act, the main body of legislation governing U.S. arms transfers. In July, 27 Senators voted to block a sale of rifles to Israel — the largest number of U.S. senators opposing arms to Israel to date — citing Israeli restrictions on aid as children in Gaza starve to death before our eyes.
But these sorts of votes aren’t possible in the House of Representatives due to differences in procedural rules. As a result, House members have had few clear-cut opportunities to vote to stop arms sales to Israel. A recent vote didn’t deal with the weapons used to kill civilians in Gaza, and past votes havecentered on huge funding packages covering a wide range of purposes.
Without a record of votes, the key question constituents should ask their representatives is: have you co-sponsored the Block the Bombs bill?
Sixty percent of Americans oppose the Israeli military’s actions in Gaza. If that statistic is any indication, the Block the Bombs bill has ample room to build support in the House of Representatives. Cosponsorship of the bill sends a clear message that many lawmakers have been too slow to say: as Palestinian civilians die of starvation, under gunfire, and in near-constant bombings, American weapons sales to the Israeli government cannot continue.
A majority of Senate Democrats voted last month against a major arms sale to Israel. It’s time for the House to catch up, and Block the Bombs is a way to do that.
The 12-day war between Israel and Iran in 2025 shattered long-held assumptions, thrusting U.S.–Iran relations into uncharted territory. The conflict, a dramatic escalation of decades-long tensions, has left the Middle East teetering on the edge of broader instability. As the dust settles, the United States faces a critical juncture in its approach to Iran — one that could redefine the region for decades.
Four plausible scenarios loom large, each carrying profound implications for global security, regional stability, and American foreign policy.
Escalation without end
The first scenario is mutual escalation without end: a volatile cycle of strikes, sabotage, and sanctions that has long defined U.S.–Iran relations and reached a new peak in the recent war. In this future, Iran rebuilds its nuclear and military capabilities, refusing to suspend enrichment but stopping short of weaponization. Washington and Jerusalem, viewing this as intolerable, respond with more sanctions, covert operations, or even another major strike.
This path allows leaders in all three capitals to avoid compromise and project toughness. Yet it is fraught with peril. Miscalculations — already evident in the recent conflict — could ignite a full-scale regional war, drawing in actors from Lebanon to the Persian Gulf. Escalation offers the illusion of control while courting disaster.
A deal if someone blinks
Another possibility is a return to serious negotiations, but that would require one side to yield on the core issue: uranium enrichment.
Under the 2015 nuclear deal, Iran was permitted a token enrichment program under tight constraints and the most intrusive inspections regime ever implemented in a non-nuclear weapons state. The agreement was repeatedlyvalidated by both the IAEA and U.S. intelligence.
Earlier this year, Trump’s envoy Steve Witkoff appeared open to a similar framework. But under pressure from Israel — and Trump’s drive to outdo Obama — the administrationreverted to the maximalist demand of zero enrichment, a red line Iran has refused to cross throughout the over two-decade nuclear standoff.
Even so, diplomacy wasn’t entirely dead. One creative proposal under discussion involved a regional enrichment “consortium” including Iran and U.S. partners in the Persian Gulf, designed to manage and monitor enrichment jointly. And a sixth round of talks had been scheduled, but Israel’s strike on Iran scuttled the process — cutting short what reports suggested could have been a breakthrough.
Yet structural barriers persisted. U.S. policy remains shaped by pro-Israel hawks and regime change ideologues who view diplomacy as a detour, not a solution. Indeed, even if Iran suspended enrichment, Netanyahu would likely have shifted the goalposts to missiles or regional disputes to keep hostility alive.
For Israel’s current leadership, ongoing U.S.–Iran tension has served a broader strategic purpose since the end of the Cold War: justifying Washington’s regional military presence, securing unconditional U.S. backing, sidelining the Palestinian question, and advancing a “Greater Israel” agenda rooted in conquest of Gaza, the West Bank, and other neighboring countries. In this calculus, Iran remains the indispensable scapegoat.
Could that posture shift? Analysts Ali Vaez and Danny Citrinowicz have proposed a bold Iran-Israel non-aggression pact addressing mutual threat perceptions. In theory, Trump — hungry for a “historic deal” — might see it as an opportunity. Yet under Khamenei, who distrusts Washington and views Israel as irredeemably hostile, and Netanyahu, who exploits the Iranian specter to advance his political and ideological ambitions, it remains implausible. Prudent? Certainly. Possible? Unlikely without seismic political change.
An Iranian nuclear dash
A third path sees Iran, cornered by unrelenting pressure, dashing for a nuclear weapon as its ultimate deterrent. The temptation is clear for a state facing existential threats from Israel and the U.S. But the risks are immense.
Even if Iran succeeded in building a nuclear arsenal, it would face intensified isolation, a potential regional arms race, and ongoing covert warfare.
Russia’s experience offers a cautionary tale: nuclear weapons have not shielded it from economic strain or attritional conflicts. For Iran, a bomb would not resolve its economic woes, lift sanctions, or deter sabotage. While the temptation to cross the nuclear threshold may grow, it remains a risky and likely self-defeating move.
Strategic patience and an eastward pivot
The fourth scenario is one of strategic patience. Iran maintains the status quo, engaging in tactical diplomacy without expecting breakthroughs. It rebuilds its missile and air defense systems, deepens military and economic ties with China and Russia, and fundamentally gives up on hopes of rapprochement with the U.S. and Europe. This path reflects Supreme Leader Khamenei’s long-term calculus: survive, consolidate, and wait for the global balance of power to shift as U.S. attention inevitably pivots elsewhere.
Unlike the volatility of Scenario 1, this is a strategy of endurance. Iran avoids dramatic moves and instead plays the long game — weathering sanctions, absorbing strikes, and relying on time and persistence to outlast American pressure. The lure of this option is growing, especially as Chinese military technology has shown an impressive performance in Pakistan’s recent war with India. For Tehran, which desperately needs more advanced defense capabilities, Beijing’s emergence as a reliable supplier of cutting-edge systems makes the eastward pivot even more appealing.
This drift, however, is not without costs. It entrenches Iran’s isolation from U.S. and European markets and risks over-dependence on China and Russia. Yet it remains consistent with the Islamic Republic’s post-revolutionary ethos of defiance and self-reliance — allowing Iran to survive, consolidate, and bet that a multipolar world will eventually weaken America’s grip on the Middle East.
The real question
The question U.S. and European policymakers must confront is simple: What actual choice is Iran being given? If the strategy remains regime change dressed up as “maximum pressure,” then we must be honest about where that leads. The Islamic Republic will not disappear in a puff of sanctions or airstrikes. Nor will it collapse neatly into a Western-style democracy.
The more plausible outcome is far darker: instability, fragmentation, and the specter of civil war in a nation of 90 million at the heart of the Middle East. A broken Iran would not be contained within its borders. It would send shockwaves through the Persian Gulf, Iraq, Central Asia, and the Caucasus — destabilizing an already volatile region and creating crises far worse than the nuclear program itself.
Which is why the challenge today is not simply halting Iran’s nuclear progress. It's figuring out what endgame Washington and Jerusalem are actually preparing for — and whether they are prepared to live with the consequences.
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