According to a survey by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, only 41% of Americans support the idea of U.S. troops defending Israel, even if its neighbors attacked it. This is a decrease from 53% in 2021 and represents the lowest level of support since the the council started tracking the question in 2010.
According to the survey, 55% of Americans overall are against the idea of sending troops to defend Israel. These numbers show a decrease in support from Republicans, typically Israel’s biggest supporters, from 72% in 2021 to 55% today. Democrats went from 42% in favor of defending Israel with U.S. troops in 2021 to 35% today.
The poll was conducted online from June 21 through July 1.
Americans still believe in a peacekeeping mission, however, with 54 percent of Americans supporting sending peacekeeping troops if a deal between Israel and the Palestinians is arranged and kept, according to the survey.
The polling results come as the region is on tenderhooks over whether it will blow up into broader conflict. The United States, a stalwart partner to Israel, is at the ready if Israel is attacked by Hezbollah or Iranian allies in retaliation for high profile assassinations over the last two weeks. On the other hand, it is not clear how far Washington will go to intervene if Israel is the one to start a major conflict with Hezbollah or Iran.
But the Chicago Council’s polling shows that Americans are still unwilling to send U.S. troops into another warzone, no matter the relationship. Perhaps the political will amongst Americans is shifting towards some semblance of international realism after generations of never-ending war. Nevertheless, this should be a signal to Israel that it can only take it’s own escalations so far, that there are real limits to American support and that includes American skin in the game.
Aaron is a reporter for Responsible Statecraft and a contributor to the Mises Institute. He received both his undergraduate and masters degrees in international relations from Liberty University.
Boston, Massachusetts USA - October 09, 2023: Solidarity For Israel Rally (Arthur Mansavagw/Shutterstock)
Top photo credit: Inmates remain in their cell, during a tour in the "Terrorism Confinement Center" (CECOT) complex, which according to El Salvador's President, Nayib Bukele, is designed to hold 40,000 inmates, in Tecoluca, El Salvador October 12, 2023. REUTERS/Jose Cabezas
A cacophony of right-wing commentators now believes that El Salvador, under Nayib Bukele’s dictatorship, is the “safest” country in the Western Hemisphere. Bukele himself certainly wants us to believe it’s because he’s gone to war with the gangs.
They’re all wrong — and disastrously so.
According to El Faro, the country’s most respected investigative outlet, the relative peace in El Salvador is not the result of a decisive war on gangs, but rather, of a secret pact negotiated directly between Bukele’s own Director of Prisons Osiris Luna and his head of the Social Fabric Reconstruction Unit, Carlos Marroquín, and gang leaders, starting in late 2019. He also took on similar negotiations with gangs as a mayor of San Salvador, from 2015 to 2018.
These revelations are based on extensive access to prison intelligence, government documents, and insiders within the security apparatus and the gangs themselves.
The U.S. Treasury backed these findings in 2021, sanctioning Luna and Marroquín and other Bukele allies for offering financial incentives and prison perks to MS-13 and Barrio 18 leaders in exchange for reducing homicides and supporting Bukele’s party in elections.
Numerous Latin American leaders have gone to jail for these kinds of deals — including Salvadoran cabinet members. Politicians of all stripes, including from Bukele’s former FMLN party, have negotiated with gangs; these pacts in El Salvador go back at least two decades. Negotiated peace isn’t a new solution, Bukele’s deal just worked, for now.
These deals, coordinated through the intelligence service, have been deliberately concealed and officially denied by the administration — because acknowledging they exist within his own government would undermine his image as a no-compromise strongman engaged in a just war against narco-terrorist gangs.
Bukele’s government is jailing politicians from past governments who signed deals, but that is all part of rewriting history. He is also prosecuting critics, purging the judiciary, and aggressively going after El Faro’s journalists, to conceal the truth.
Part of Bukele’s truce is to allow gangs to run their networks within the prisons, while their wealth and power remain untouched. In exchange, they have to keep homicides and violent crimes down. The leader of Barrio 18, one of the country’s two most powerful gangs, also alleges that they helped Bukele rise to power directly.
Data suggests that drug outflows from El Salvador have not stopped increasing, including for cocaine. Peace will be kept as long as the money keeps flowing — yes, that is a narcostate.
Thousands of gang members from El Salvador’s most brutal gangs have bled into neighboring countries, bringing instability, crime, and violence to Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, and other countries. Salvadoran gangs are even reaching Chile. The crisis isn’t solved, it’s just moving zip codes.
The truce deal is quite thin; gangs seeking a better cut of the drug market or better prison conditions could, in a moment, plunge the country once again into a bloody war. This time, there will neither be security, nor democracy left.
In Bukele’s crackdown, the rule of law is completely gone, with the Supreme Court being replaced by loyalists, and no term limits or checks on Bukele’s power. He has called those who dare speak out “terrorist sympathizers”, threatening them with jail where “the only way out is in a coffin.”
Thousands of innocent people have been swept up, without a trial, access to a lawyer, or even basic necessities in prison – all while drug kingpins get special privileges. More than 400 detainees have died in extrajudicial detention from beatings, starvation, and untreated illness — their bodies returned to families with signs of torture.
Many Latin American countries, past and present, have tried Bukele’s model of suspending all rights while targeting, jailing, or killing suspected gang members. Bukelismo is now the most popular security philosophy in Latin America. The fact that you haven’t heard it working anywhere else is no accident.
At best, “Mano Dura” (hard hand) has a very mixed track record. At worst, it destroys democracy while reinforcing what social scientist Graham Denyer Willis called the “killing consensus” between the state and gangs.
In Colombia, the Peace Agreement hasn’t been fully implemented, with FARC dissidents having expanded their operations into Venezuela and Ecuador, ELN resuming their attacks in Catatumbo, and a continuing harsh military campaign only fueling further killings and displacement.
In Ecuador, Daniel Noboa’s state of exception has not decreased the homicide rate, while he has used security forces to crack down on protests and opposition. InSight Crime’s analysis points to gang reorganizing as a result.
In Honduras, Xiomara Castro also suspended all constitutional rights, including freedom of speech, association, and assembly, copying Bukele’s playbook. Yet the homicide rate is still one of the highest in the world, as are the violent crime and extortion rates, and there are countless cases of state security forces using torture, forced disappearances, and murders of political opponents.
Throughout Latin America, some of the areas with the highest rates of incarceration and police killings, continue to have some of the highest murder, crime, and violent crime rates in the world.
Almost all Latin American countries have some form of a “state of exception” with high state violence, extreme police power, a corrupt criminal justice system that favors the security state, and extreme incarceration and overcrowding rates. Full martial law won’t improve those odds.
El Salvador already tried “Mano Dura” and “Súper Mano Dura” in the 2000s, jailing tens of thousands of suspected gang members. The outcome was: Gangs grew stronger, more centralized, and more violent, operating directly from prisons.
People want revenge and quick solutions, which is understandable after decades of violence and corruption. But adopting Bukele’s vision is a fast track into a fascist abyss, where power is concentrated in the hands of a small political-criminal elite, while there are no free elections, no free speech, and no dissent.
Bukele and his allies have pushed the dangerous lie that the only way to deal with gangs is to wage war, dismantle democracy, and accept the jailing or killing of innocents as collateral damage. That is dead wrong.
The Bunker appears originally at the Project on Government Oversight and is republished here with permission.
A triple-bank shot of trouble
The Pentagon loves the number three: think of the nation’s nuclear triad (bombers, subs, and missiles) or the three major military services (Army, Navy, and Air Force). In recent days, each of those services has experienced troubles that shouldn’t have happened. While the specifics vary, the problems are all rooted in the perpetual bane of the Defense Department’s existence: poorly planned programs; too-rosy glasses; poor training and execution. Accountability will largely be MIA when it comes to assessing responsibility. Bureaucracies are far better at removing fingerprints from snafus than dusting for them.
The M10 tank goes belly up
Too bad there’s no Ozempic for U.S. Army tanks. The service blew up its M10 Booker “light” tank program May 1 after it discovered that the nearly 40-ton (!) beast would crack eight of the 11 bridges at Fort Campbell, Ky. Sure, such armor may not sound light, but it is — when compared to its bulked-up M-1 tank cousin, which tips the scales at 73 tons. The Army has long had difficulty developing Goldilocks armored vehicles — light enough to fly to the front, but beefy enough to protect the troops inside once they get there.
The Army awarded a $1.14 billion contract to General Dynamics in 2022 to build the first 96 M10s. It wanted to buy 504 (the service prefers to call such multi-ton tracked machines outfitted with 105 mm guns “armored infantry support vehicles,” but we taxpayers aren’t bound by such Pentagon nomenclatural niceties).
The M10 is “one of the Army’s top modernization priorities,” the service declared in February. Three months later, not so much. “This is not a story of acquisition gone awry,” Alex Miller, the service’s top technology officer, toldDefense One. “This is a story of the requirements process creating so much inertia that the Army couldn't get out of its own way, and it just kept rolling and rolling and rolling.”
Refreshingly, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and Army Secretary Dan Driscoll put the M10 out of its misery after GD had delivered 80 of them. “We got a heavy tank,” Driscoll conceded. “We went to the Pentagon leadership and we said, ‘we made a mistake, this didn’t turn out right. We’re going to stop.’”
It's a good start.
One reason why the new ICBM is so costly
The Pentagon has a nearly Pavlovian predilection to assume the best and buy the worst. It’s like that old adage: It’s easier to ask for forgiveness (after the screwup) than ask for permission (when the mission is Permission: Impossible). Take the Air Force effort to replace the aging nuclear-tipped Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles with new Sentinel ICBMs. The Sentinel program’s current price tag of $141 billion — an incredible 81% hike since 2020 — is so high the Pentagon said last year that it is now planning to come up with a “simpler” and “more affordable” plan sometime “around 2026.”
One way the Air Force wanted to save money was to put Sentinel missiles polka-dotted across five states into the existing 400 underground silos now housing the Minuteman IIIs. “Part of the requirements, initially — 10 years ago when this program was started — was to reuse the holes, the missile holes at the launch facilities,” Air Force General Thomas A. Bussiere said April 30. “That was believed to be more efficient, more cost effective, and quicker.” Despite decades of use, and well aware that the Air Force wanted to re-use its ICBM silos, the service recently clutched its warheads and was stunned (wink-wink) to discover they’re too decrepit for the new ICBMs. As Air Force Missileer Emily Litella might have said: “Never mind.”
“As the program continues to undergo restructuring activities, the Air Force analysis continues to confirm unacceptable risks to cost, schedule, and weapon system performance stemming from the original baseline strategy of converting Minuteman III silos,” the service said May 6. “To mitigate this and other risks, the Air Force plans to build new missile silos on predominantly Air Force-owned real estate, which means reusing the existing missile sites but not the 55-year-old silos.”
The Sentinel’s continuing problems have the Air Force considering upgrades so the Minuteman fleet can remain on duty until 2050, 11 years longer than currently planned. Other experts maintain the Pentagon’s nuclear triad can safely be turned into an atomic dyad by amputating its ICBM leg.
It turns out the Sentinel’s problems aren’t so much with the missile itself, but the rotting silos and other ground-based elements of the system, that are driving costs sky high.
Apparently, Air Force dirt ain’t dirt cheap.
Warplanes are designed to dive … but not like this
It’s been a tough tour for the USS Harry S. Truman, the 100,000-ton aircraft carrier whose F-18s have been bombing Houthi rebels in Yemen from the Red Sea. First, one of its F-18s was shot down by mistake by another U.S. warship in December. On April 28, a second F-18 fell off the flattop while it was being towed, after the carrier swerved, apparently to avoid a Houthi drone. A third F-18 ended up in the drink May 6 following a botched landing. Thankfully, there were no serious injuries, except to Navy pride.
The mishaps “have raised questions about the strain placed on the aircraft carrier’s crew,” the Washington Post’s Dan Lamothe reported. Defense Secretary Hegseth has twice extended the Truman’s stay in the region to ensure there are two U.S. carriers in the ‘hood to deal with the Houthis.
THE BOTTOM LINE
There is plenty of blame to go around for all of these snafus. But don’t go looking for finger-pointing. That tends only to happen when those allegedly culpable are no longer around to defend themselves. On May 7, a fourth military service, the U.S. Marine Corps, blamed a 2024 CH-53 helicopter crash that killed five on “fatal controlled flight into terrain.”
The House passed a bill codifying President Trump’s recent decision to change the name of the Gulf of Mexico to the Gulf of America, the Washington Examiner reported May 8.
Defense Secretary Hegseth is wielding a scalpel when it comes to his ballyhooed Pentagon spending cuts when he should be brandishing an ax, Greg Williams of the Center for Defense Information, here at the Project On Government Oversight, wrote May 7 for Just Security.
The Pentagon ordered its commanders May 9 to purge their libraries of all books promoting racial and gender diversity. Up next: an order barring all books about how the U.S. military lost its 20-year war in Afghanistan?
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President Donald Trump told reporters Monday that “very good things” are happening in his nuclear diplomacy with Iran, adding, “I think they’re being very reasonable thus far.” His optimistic tone was echoed by Iranian diplomats and Omani mediators, with Iran’s foreign minister describing the talks this weekend as “more serious” and “more detailed” than past meetings. Yet behind the upbeat rhetoric, a more complex and challenging reality is taking shape.
While earlier rounds made progress toward limiting—though not eliminating—Iran’s nuclear enrichment, even prompting parallel technical discussions, the latest round saw a slight reversal. The setback stemmed from the U.S. insistence on the unrealistic demand that Iran abandon domestic enrichment entirely.
Shutting down Iran’s more than 20,600 centrifuges is not required to achieve Trump’s stated goal of preventing an Iranian nuclear weapon. Nonetheless, it remains a long-standing demand of hardliners such as George W. Bush, Dick Cheney, Nikki Haley, Mike Pompeo, and John Bolton. Many of them understood that insisting on total Iranian capitulation was the quickest path to derailing diplomacy and laying the groundwork for war.
There are several reasons why Trump should not allow himself to be pushed into pursuing the zero-enrichment fantasy.
First, this goal has not only proven unattainable but also counterproductive, gifting Iran more time to advance its program while delaying the constraints a realistic, verification-based agreement would impose.
In 2003, Iran proposed to the U.S. a comprehensive deal aimed at resolving all major disputes, including limits on its enrichment program. At the time, Tehran had just 164 centrifuges, no stockpile of low-enriched uranium, and no capability to enrich above 3.67 percent—sufficient for civilian fuel but far below the 90 percent required for nuclear weapons.
As I describe in Treacherous Alliance, the Bush administration not only ignored the proposal but also punished the Swiss ambassador in Tehran for delivering Iran’s diplomatic overture to Washington. For Bush, nothing short of zero enrichment and regime change in Iran was acceptable.
In the absence of a deal, Iran’s nuclear program steadily expanded. By 2006, it was operating over 3,000 centrifuges. The Bush administration reluctantly agreed to support European-led talks but imposed a fatal precondition: Iran had to halt enrichment before negotiations could begin. Predictably, diplomacy stalled—and Iran’s program advanced unchecked.
By the time Barack Obama took office in 2009, Iran was operating 8,000 centrifuges and had stockpiled 1,500 kg of low-enriched uranium—enough for one nuclear weapon if further enriched. Obama’s early diplomatic efforts faltered, but by 2012, secret talks in Oman produced a breakthrough since, for the first time, the U.S. signaled it would accept enrichment in Iran in exchange for strict limits and intrusive inspections.
This breakthrough paved the way for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), commonly known as the Iran nuclear deal. By the time it was implemented, Iran had expanded its program to 19,000 centrifuges and amassed over 10,000 kg of low-enriched uranium.
Over the past two decades, the persistent demand for zero enrichment—an unachievable goal—has only resulted in a larger and more advanced Iranian nuclear program by postponing realistic, enforceable limits on enrichment.
While these delays were damaging in the past, they pose an even greater risk today amid the looming crisis over potential UN snapback sanctions. This is yet another reason why Trump should avoid falling into the zero-enrichment trap.
The snapback mechanism, created as part of the JCPOA, allows any party to the nuclear deal to swiftly reimpose UN sanctions on Iran—without the risk of a veto from any permanent member of the UN Security Council. It was designed as a deterrent, offering a fast, veto-proof path to restore sanctions if Iran violated the agreement. However, this mechanism expires in October, and the European parties—France, Germany, and the UK—are inclined to trigger it before that deadline.
Tehran has made its position clear: If snapback is invoked, it will not only withdraw from the JCPOA but also exit the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and expel all IAEA inspectors, effectively turning its nuclear program into a black box. Exiting the NPT takes 90 days, during which there remains a window to reverse course. To align these timelines, the Europeans are expected to initiate the snapback process in June, ensuring that both the NPT withdrawal and the full reimposition of sanctions converge just before October—after which Europe loses the legal ability to act.
This would create a 90-day window for high-stakes negotiations, but one Trump should avoid for several reasons. First, the starting point would be far worse than the current talks, given the escalation caused by snapback sanctions and an NPT exit. Second, it would force the Europeans back into the process, complicating matters unnecessarily. Finally, with slim chances of success, the talks would likely shift toward renegotiating the snapback deadline to prevent a complete collapse and avoid military confrontation.
As a result, valuable time that should be spent securing restrictions on Iran’s nuclear activities would instead be consumed by negotiations over a new UNSC resolution to extend the snapback deadline. These talks would face the added difficulty of aligning the interests of the Europeans, Russia, and China, all while dealing with other geopolitical conflicts (e.g., Ukraine). In essence, a tough negotiation with Iran would be swapped for a nearly impossible one with Russia and the EU.
All of these paths eventually lead to the worst-case scenario: The collapse of diplomacy and the likely shift toward military action.
Trump is wise to be skeptical of war with Iran. Contrary to the narrative pushed by Israel and its neoconservative allies, Iran’s regional setbacks do not leave it defenseless or incapable of striking U.S. bases and personnel in the event of conflict. While the weakening of Hezbollah and the loss of Syria are significant, they haven’t affected Iran’s missile program, which remains its primary means of retaliation.
Over the past year, the U.S. military has learned that Iran’s missile capabilities are far more advanced and dangerous than previously believed. Iran’s October 2024 missile retaliation against Israel was, contrary to mainstream accounts, highly effective, breaching Israel’s air defenses—from the Iron Dome to the Arrow, David's Sling, and Patriots. In response to this failure, the Netanyahu government requested that President Joe Biden deploy America’s most advanced missile defense system, the THAAD, to Israel. Biden obliged.
Privately, the success of the attack stunned Israeli officials and prompted the Pentagon to revise its casualty estimates for a potential war with Iran. Those estimates were likely adjusted again after a single Houthi missile breached both the THAAD system and Israel’s air defenses, striking Ben Gurion Airport last week. Unlike the Iranian missile barrages, in which large numbers of missiles were launched to overwhelm the defenses, the Houthis fired only one missile—and still managed to bypass both the THAAD and Israel’s own systems.
Consequently, war with Iran will not only fail to destroy its nuclear program—Israel’s proposed bombing campaign would only delay it by a year, after which the US and Israel would have to bomb it again and again—it will likely also leave scores of Americans dead and destroy Trump’s presidency, just as the Iraq war destroyed Bush’s.
All these worst-case scenarios can be avoided. Trump has a better shot at striking a strong deal with Iran than any previous president—if he avoids the mistakes of the past and the illusion of zero enrichment. While Steve Witkoff and Marco Rubio have publicly insisted on zero enrichment as the only solution, Trump has wisely been more ambiguous. In the end, it’s his word—and only his—that matters.
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