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Poll: Most Americans would support war with China

Poll: Most Americans would support war with China

But the news isn't all bad. A vast majority want nuclear talks with Iran, and a negotiated end to the war in Ukraine.

Analysis | Washington Politics

The Eurasia Group Foundation's latest survey report, titled “Order and Disorder: U.S. Foreign Policy in a Fragmented World,” covered a range of issues from sanctions and arms sales to drone strikes and the war in Ukraine, and it contains several notable findings about how Americans perceive different aspects of U.S. global engagement.

According to the report, Americans are very open to diplomacy with hostile powers, but they are also supportive of going to war with China to a disturbing degree.

One of the chief findings is that Americans are broadly in favor of direct diplomatic engagement with adversaries and even more support negotiations with Iran on the nuclear issue. According to the poll, two-thirds of Americans favor negotiations with adversaries even if they are responsible for human rights abuses, authoritarian governments, or home to terrorist organizations, 77% support continued nuclear talks with Iran, and 58% of Americans also want the U.S. to push for a negotiated settlement to end the war in Ukraine.

Support for diplomatic solutions has majority backing of Americans from across the political spectrum, so it is remarkable how little support for those same solutions can be found among our elected representatives and policymakers in Washington.

Some of the report’s findings are unsurprising. There is a partisan divide over Ukraine policy with Democrats tending to be much more supportive of the administration approach than Republicans and Republicans are the most hawkish when it comes to China.

But perhaps one of the most surprising and significant results is the extent to which Americans of all political camps now say that they support direct intervention in a war over Taiwan.

Other surveys in recent years have found that roughly 40% of Americans back direct U.S. intervention in the event of a Chinese attack, but the EGF survey found that overall support for intervention is at 60%. That may be the result of rising tensions between China and Taiwan and the ongoing deterioration of relations between the U.S. and China over the past year since former House Speaker Pelosi’s ill-advised visit to Taipei last summer. It may be caused by the constant drumbeat of anti-China rhetoric from members of both parties. It could be some combination of all three.

Regardless, this represents a significant increase in public support for going to war over Taiwan, and that suggests that the public does not fully grasp how costly and dangerous such a war would be. Support for intervention is relatively soft with most of the supporters saying that they only “somewhat” support sending U.S. forces to help defend Taiwan, but it can’t be denied that this is a major shift in U.S. public opinion in the last ten years. It is a measure of how dominant hawkish groupthink on China policy has become if a majority of the public now says that they support waging a major war with a nuclear-armed adversary.

The public is split almost exactly in half over whether the U.S. should sell arms to other countries. Fifty-three percent believe that the U.S. should stop selling arms. The finding on arms sales is striking because the question refers only to “selling arms globally” without saying anything about the governments that are purchasing them. Most Democratic and independent respondents say that the U.S. should not continue arms sales, and even 48% of Republicans say the same.

While this opposition to arms sales is likely influenced by debates over arming Saudi Arabia and other abusive authoritarian governments, it is important to note that the respondents are rejecting all arms sales no matter where they are going.

While Americans are divided over the desirability of arms sales, most are generally fine with U.S. sanctions and for some reason believe them to be an effective policy tool. Just over 60% of Americans overall said that sanctions were “always” or “often” an effective tool, and only 39% said that they were “rarely” or “never” effective. That is somewhat surprising given the repeated failures of sanctions, especially broad sanctions, to achieve stated policy goals and the extensive humanitarian harm that they cause to target populations.

Where would so many Americans get the impression that sanctions are an effective tool when they clearly are not? It is hard to say, but perhaps one reason for this view is the constant use of sanctions as the default government response in so many different places. It could be that the public assumes that sanctions must be effective or else they wouldn’t be imposed so frequently. When they were prompted by the government’s many different reasons for imposing sanctions, perhaps the respondents concluded that the tool must be useful if it is being used to address so many issues.

The responses to the question on sanctions were among the most disheartening in the entire survey, because they are so divorced from reality and show no awareness of the terrible track record that economic sanctions have. Independent respondents were least likely to say that sanctions are an effective policy tool, but even here the pro-sanctions view narrowly prevailed. The public’s unfounded confidence in the efficacy of sanctions is not a new development, but it is another obstacle to efforts to rein in and possibly end the use of economic warfare.

One of the more encouraging results was the narrow majority support for repealing the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF). Fifty-four percent say they favor repealing the authorization, with support for repeal being strongest among Democrats (56%) and independents (62%). Two out of five Republicans agree that the authorization should be repealed. It is significant that they did not mention passing a new authorization to replace the old one. Most Americans appear to be done with the “war on terror,” and they want to get rid of the authorization that has been used to fight it.

Two years after the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, the public still has a generally negative assessment of the war. Most Americans understandably conclude that the war was a failure, and 30% believe that the war had a failed mission from the start. Another 32% say that the war should have ended following the death of Osama bin Laden. Only 13% believe that the withdrawal hurt U.S. credibility, and that shows that very few people in the country buy the bogus credibility argument that hawks have been selling all these years.

The findings in the EGF survey point to some promising areas for policy reform. There seems to be fertile ground for pursuing AUMF repeal and a major overhaul of U.S. arms sales. Unfortunately, there are other policies, including sanctions, that will require a lot more work in terms of educating the public and changing how Americans understand these issues.


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Donald Trump’s recent outburst against Vladimir Putin — accusing the Russian leader of "throwing a pile of bullsh*t at us" and threatening devastating new sanctions — might be just another Trumpian tantrum.

The president is known for abrupt reversals. Or it could be a bargaining tactic ahead of potential Ukraine peace talks. But there’s a third, more troubling possibility: establishment Republican hawks and neoconservatives, who have been maneuvering to hijack Trump’s “America First” agenda since his return to office, may be exploiting his frustration with Putin to push for a prolonged confrontation with Russia.

Trump’s irritation is understandable. Ukraine has accepted his proposed ceasefire, but Putin has refused, making him, in Trump’s eyes, the main obstacle to ending the war.

Putin’s calculus is clear. As Ted Snider notes in the American Conservative, Russia is winning on the battlefield. In June, it captured more Ukrainian territory and now threatens critical Kyiv’s supply lines. Moscow also seized a key lithium deposit critical to securing Trump’s support for Ukraine. Meanwhile, Russian missile and drone strikes have intensified.

Putin seems convinced his key demands — Ukraine’s neutrality, territorial concessions in the Donbas and Crimea, and a downsized Ukrainian military — are more achievable through war than diplomacy.

Yet his strategy empowers the transatlantic “forever war” faction: leaders in Britain, France, Germany, and the EU, along with hawks in both main U.S. parties. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz claims that diplomacy with Russia is “exhausted.” Europe’s war party, convinced a Russian victory would inevitably lead to an attack on NATO (a suicidal prospect for Moscow), is willing to fight “to the last Ukrainian.” Meanwhile, U.S. hawks, including liberal interventionist Democrats, stoke Trump’s ego, framing failure to stand up to Putin’s defiance as a sign of weakness or appeasement.

Trump long resisted this pressure. Pragmatism told him Ukraine couldn’t win, and calling it “Biden’s war” was his way of distancing himself, seeking a quick exit to refocus on China, which he has depicted as Washington’s greater foreign threat. At least as important, U.S. involvement in the war in Ukraine has been unpopular with his MAGA base.

But his June strikes on Iran may signal a hawkish shift. By touting them as a decisive blow to Iran’s nuclear program (despite Tehran’s refusal so far to abandon uranium enrichment), Trump may be embracing a new approach to dealing with recalcitrant foreign powers: offer a deal, set a deadline, then unleash overwhelming force if rejected. The optics of “success” could tempt him to try something similar with Russia.

This pivot coincides with a media campaign against restraint advocates within the administration like Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon policy chief who has prioritized China over Ukraine and also provoked the opposition of pro-Israel neoconservatives by warning against war with Iran. POLITICO quoted unnamed officials attacking Colby for wanting the U.S. to “do less in the world.” Meanwhile, the conventional Republican hawk Marco Rubio’s influence grows as he combines the jobs of both secretary of state and national security adviser.

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Nuclear deterrence rules out direct military action — even Biden, far more invested in Ukraine than Trump, avoided that risk. Instead, Trump ally Sen.Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), another establishment Republican hawk, is pushing a 500% tariff on nations buying Russian hydrocarbons, aiming to sever Moscow from the global economy. Trump seems supportive, although the move’s feasibility and impact are doubtful.

China and India are key buyers of Russian oil. China alone imports 12.5 million barrels daily. Russia exports seven million barrels daily. China could absorb Russia’s entire output. Beijing has bluntly stated it “cannot afford” a Russian defeat, ensuring Moscow’s economic lifeline remains open.

The U.S., meanwhile, is ill-prepared for a tariff war with China. When Trump imposed 145% tariffs, Beijing retaliated by cutting off rare earth metals exports, vital to U.S. industry and defense. Trump backed down.

At the G-7 summit in Canada last month, the EU proposed lowering price caps on Russian oil from $60 a barrel to $45 a barrel as part of its 18th sanctions package against Russia. Trump rejected the proposal at the time but may be tempted to reconsider, given his suggestion that more sanctions may be needed. Even if Washington backs the measure now, however, it is unlikely to cripple Russia’s war machine.

Another strategy may involve isolating Russia by peeling away Moscow’s traditionally friendly neighbors. Here, Western mediation between Armenia and Azerbaijan isn’t about peace — if it were, pressure would target Baku, which has stalled agreements and threatened renewed war against Armenia. The real goal is to eject Russia from the South Caucasus and create a NATO-aligned energy corridor linking Turkey to Central Asia, bypassing both Russia and Iran to their detriment.

Central Asia itself is itself emerging as a new battleground. In May 2025, the EU has celebrated its first summit with Central Asian nations in Uzbekistan, with a heavy focus on developing the Middle Corridor, a route for transportation of energy and critical raw materials that would bypass Russia. In that context, the EU has committed €10 billion in support of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route.

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On June 30, President Trump signed an executive order terminating the majority of U.S. sanctions on Syria. The move, which would have been unthinkable mere months ago, fulfilled a promise he made at an investment forum in Riyadh in May.“The sanctions were brutal and crippling,” he had declared to an audience of primarily Saudi businessmen. Lifting them, he said, will “give Syria a chance at greatness.”

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