The military coup in Gabon this summer marked the eighth such revolt in Africa since 2020, a shocking number that is raising questions about the role and impact of US military training in these countries.
While each coup has many local dynamics and political actors, a Responsible Statecraft article by Nick Turse found that since 2008, at least 15 U.S.-trained officers have been involved in coups in West Africa and the Sahel.
Evidence suggests that Washington’s counter-terrorism, military first, strategy in West Africa and the Sahel is actually weakening African states and failing to serve African or American interests on the continent. Isn’t it time for a serious reassessment of U.S. military assistance in Africa and a change in policy that shows civilians that the U.S. can make their lives better?
Eli Clifton is a senior advisor at the Quincy Institute and Investigative Journalist at Large at Responsible Statecraft. He reports on money in politics and U.S. foreign policy.
The memos presented by Ukraine and Russia at their direct talks in Istanbul on Monday make it absolutely clear that, absent a strong U.S. intervention based on a detailed U.S. peace plan, there will be no peace settlement in Ukraine.
It is not just that several of the positions on both sides are completely mutually incompatible; they suggest that at present neither side is in fact interested in an early peace.
The Ukrainian memo, presented before the talks, sets a “full and unconditional ceasefire in the sky, on land and at sea as a necessary background and prerequisite for peace negotiations.” Russia has already rejected this and will continue to do so — naturally, because it would mean giving up its main point of leverage for nothing in return. Nor indeed is a fragile and unstable ceasefire in the interests of Ukraine or the West. If Ukraine is to begin the extremely challenging process of economic reconstruction and democratic reform, it needs a stable and permanent peace.
The Ukrainian memo also states that “no restrictions may be imposed on the number, deployment, or other parameters of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, as well as on the deployment of troops of friendly foreign states on the territory of Ukraine.” Russia has already stated that it will not under any circumstances accept the presence of Western troops in Ukraine since it sees this as NATO membership in all but name. European leaders have also stated that a European force could only be deployed with a U.S. guarantee of support, a condition which the Trump administration has rejected.
The Ukrainian memo continues, “some sanctions may be lifted from Russia, but in stages and only gradually, with a mechanism for resuming sanctions if necessary (snapback). Frozen Russian sovereign assets are used for reconstruction or remain frozen until reparations are paid.” Moscow will obviously not agree to a final peace without the lifting of sanctions or firm assurances that they will be lifted.
On one key point, the Ukrainian memo does leave room for compromise: “Ukraine is not forced to be neutral. It can choose to be part of the Euro-Atlantic community and move towards EU membership. Ukraine’s membership in NATO depends on consensus within the Alliance.” Russia has in fact already publicly stated that Ukraine has the sovereign right to seek EU membership. And on NATO membership, the memo is correct that this does not depend on Ukraine but on unanimous agreement (not merely “consensus”) among existing members.
The Trump administration (or any European government) is therefore in a position to block Ukrainian NATO membership without reference to Kyiv. The problem for Moscow however is that Poland and other European members of NATO continue to declare their support for Ukraine’s membership; and, if the Democrats win the U.S. elections in 2028, they could overturn Trump’s veto. The Russians therefore are insisting on a Ukrainian constitutional commitment to neutrality and/or a U.S.-Russian treaty to that effect — which Kyiv is refusing.
Meanwhile, accounts of the Russian memo presented in Istanbul, as reported by the Russian media, include reported conditions for a ceasefire that Moscow must know are totally unacceptable to the Ukrainians — though this does not in itself rule out the possibility of Russia being willing to compromise on some of them in a final settlement if it meets its goals in other areas — especially bilateral relations with Washington.
They include “complete withdrawal of the Ukrainian Armed Forces from Donbas, Kherson and Zaporizhia regions. The second option for the ceasefire is a ban on major redeployments of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the abolition of mobilization and martial law, and the cessation of supplies of foreign weapons.”
This is not going to happen, absent Russian victory on the battlefield. Ukraine will never agree to surrender territory that it still holds, nor will European countries agree to end all weapons supplies.
In return for a ceasefire, the Russian memo as reported calls for “international recognition of these regions and Crimea as part of Russia.” This is utterly pointless. It is not just that neither Ukraine nor Western countries will legally recognize the Russian annexations; China, India and South Africa have also refused this, and will continue to do so. The best that Russia can hope for (as was indeed provisionally agreed at the Istanbul talks in March 2022) is to defer the legal status of these territories for future negotiation.
As part of an eventual peace settlement, Russia is also apparently demanding that:
Kyiv must announce the date of the presidential and Rada elections, which must take place no later than 100 days after the lifting of martial law;
The size of the Ukrainian military be limited;
A legal ban on Nazi & neo-Nazi propaganda. Dissolution of "nationalist" parties & organizations;
Restoration of rights of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church;
A peace treaty between Russia and Ukraine must be approved by a legally binding resolution of the U.N. Security Council;
It is necessary to ensure the full rights, freedoms and interests of Russian speakers;
Renouncing mutual claims with Ukraine in connection with damage from military operations.
Formal endorsement of the peace treaty by the UNSC makes very good sense. The other Russian conditions however will be exceptionally difficult for Kyiv to meet under Russian pressure — not least because in several cases they would need the legal approval of the Ukrainian parliament, which is very unlikely to give it.
Only Washington can offer Russia compromises in other areas (for example on U.S. force deployments in Europe) that could persuade Moscow to reduce these conditions to reasonable levels; and only Washington could then pressure Kyiv and European capitals into accepting them. Some of the Russian conditions (including minority rights) are not only legitimate, but essential if postwar Ukraine is to progress towards eventual EU membership, but a formula has to be found whereby Ukraine can agree to them as a starting point of the EU accession process, and not as surrender to Moscow.
The Trump administration can be forgiven its exasperation with the state of the peace process. Nonetheless, it would be a mistake — from the point of view of America’s own interests — for the U.S. to walk away from it. Apart from the fact that sooner or later Washington would inevitably be dragged back in, three recent developments have highlighted how a prolonged continuation of the war will involve serious risks for the U.S.
Thus the weekend's devastating Ukrainian attack on Russia’s nuclear-capable bomber fleet undermines nuclear security between the U.S. and Russia.
The bipartisan bill to go before the U.S. Senate next week (with the encouragement of the EU presidency) proposes 500% tariffs on imports from countries that buy Russian oil and gas. Presumably the senators are thinking of China. They appear to have forgotten that it also means India (and other U.S. partners). India has no intention of bowing to a U.S. diktat that would radically increase its energy costs and undermine its economy; and the imposition of 500% tariffs on India would ruin a vital U.S. relationship in Asia.
Finally, the EU has passed a new package of sanctions against Russia including measures to target the so-called “shadow fleet” of internationally-flagged tankers transporting Russian energy exports. This is also an affront to countries like India that buy this energy — and consider that they have a perfect right to do so under international law, since Western sanctions against Russia have not been approved by the United Nations, or agreed by themselves.
Last month, an Estonian patrol boat attempted to board a tanker bound for Russia in international waters, and Moscow sent a fighter jet to warn the Estonians off. Finland and Sweden have also threatened to detain such ships. Russia in response briefly detained a Liberian-flagged Greek tanker exiting Estonia through Russian waters. Russian politicians have threatened retaliatory seizures: "Any attack on our carriers can be regarded as an attack on our territory, even if the ship is under a foreign flag," warned Alexei Zhuravlev, the deputy chairman of Russia's parliamentary defense committee.
If both sides stick to their positions, then naval clashes will be not only possible, but certain. It is also obvious that these NATO members would never engage in such wildly reckless behavior unless they believed that in the event of such clashes, the U.S. military would come to their aid. The Trump administration needs to rein them in very firmly indeed. It also however needs to continue trying to bring an end to the Ukraine War, for as long as the war continues, so will the danger of a local collision between Russia and NATO members, from which the U.S. will not be able to remain aloof.
UPDATE 6/3 8:50a.m. EST: Polls have closed in South Korea, with exit polling indicating that liberal Lee Jae-mying will win by a wide margin.
South Koreans will be heading to voting stations on Tuesday to elect their next president in the wake of Yoon Suk-yeol’s impeachment and removal from office in April.
According to the public opinion trends over the past weeks, Lee Jae-myung, the candidate from the liberal Minjoo Party, is heavily favored to win. In South Korea’s polarized two-party structure, both mainstream liberal and conservative parties have managed to build highly committed support bases that would allow each party to secure at least 30% in most elections. Consequently, the decisions of the remaining swing voters have become decisive for electoral success.
On that note, recent polls have shown the moderate-nonpartisan base’s clear preference for Lee Jae-myung over his main rival Kim Moon-soo of the conservative People Power Party. This trend is reminiscent of last year’s parliamentary election in which the swing voters tilted strongly toward the Minjoo Party, eventually handing them a landslide victory.
In shaping the favorable momentum for Lee Jae-myung and the Minjoo Party, the South Korean public’s widespread desire to punish Yoon for his December coup attempt has been seemingly decisive. Many swing voters likely find it hard to support the People Power Party, which remained supportive of Yoon throughout the impeachment saga.
However, the people’s choice of Lee and the Minjoo Party in this election would not mean continued support for them. After the election, although there would be more demand for investigations into the martial law plot and punishments for those involved, many citizens will begin to shift their attention to other important domestic and foreign policy issues.
As a government that also holds a supermajority in the parliament, the new government would face high public expectations for problem-solving.
Indeed, the South Korean public is preoccupied with an array of challenges. Among them, how the new government can manage potential differences and disagreements in the U.S.-South Korea alliance and maintain strong, mutually beneficial ties with Washington.
South Koreans are deeply worried about the Trump administration’s sweeping tariff increases and the ripple negative impacts it would have on their economy. A heavily export-dependent economy, South Korea is vulnerable to external pressures and has indeed felt the ramifications of U.S. tariffs targeting its key industries, including automobiles. Given this situation, whether the new government can successfully negotiate a smart deal with Washington will be considered extremely important.
The issue of alliance cost-sharing for U.S. Forces Korea is another big concern for South Koreans. During his first term, President Trump threatened to withdraw from South Korea if Seoul did not increase its cost-sharing contribution dramatically. While Washington and Seoul then managed to agree on a reasonable deal, Trump had indicated on multiple occasions that getting South Korea to pay a lot more remains his goal.
Last year, as a presidential candidate, Trump vowed to demand $10 billion from South Korea for stationing U.S. forces there — about nine times what the Biden administration and Seoul agreed in October 2024. Many South Koreans would presumably support paying more to maintain the current conditions, as over 90% of them believe the U.S. alliance is necessary for their security. But they would not find $10 billion or anywhere near it acceptable, and would hope the new government would find a middle ground with Washington.
When it comes to security cooperation, whether Seoul and Washington can align their objectives and priorities regarding North Korea and China is the elephant in the room. Most South Koreans perceive North Korea as the biggest security challenge and would want the U.S.-South Korea alliance’s military and diplomatic focus to remain on North Korea.
Nevertheless, it is uncertain if the Trump administration feels the same way. Several key Trump officials, including the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby, have signaled they would seek a restructuring of U.S. forces in Asia, including those in South Korea, to focus more on deterring China, particularly with a Taiwan contingency in mind.
This issue of “strategic flexibility” — allowing U.S. forces in South Korea to operate beyond the Korean Peninsula — could emerge as a source of tension in the alliance, as Seoul would be predominantly worried about dealing with North Korea and would also want to avoid a hostile relationship with Beijing.
From trade to regional security, there are difficult and sensitive issues for Seoul and Washington to address and to seek compromise, at least a mutual understanding to agree to disagree. It remains to be seen how Lee Jae-myung intends to approach these complex alliance questions. But no doubt, he will be given a very tough assignment starting day 1.
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Top photo credit: NORFOLK, Va. (Apr. 15, 2008) Navy Capt. Patricia Cole, director of the Tailored Maritime Operations Center (T-MOC) at the Naval Network Warfare Command, inspects fellow officers during a command-wide bi-annual uniform inspection. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Corey Lewis File# 080415-N-2147L-001
On April 30, new Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Stuart Scheller, a former Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel, announced his intent to push for military reform, echoing the frustrations that led to his 2021 court-martial for publicly criticizing the Afghanistan withdrawal.
His call for accountability resonates with my decades-long work as an advocate for transforming the broken U.S. military personnel and leadership systems and addressing the deep-rooted issues in military culture. These would include bloated bureaucracies, careerism, a lack of ethical leadership, and fossilized military doctrine — all which Scheller’s remarks brought into sharp focus.
I see Scheller’s appointment as a unique opportunity for change, but there is a lot of work to do.
A broken system
The U.S. military’s personnel system fosters a leadership culture that often serves the military-industrial complex’s interests over national security.
The “up or out” promotion model incentivizes officers to prioritize career advancement over mission success, rewarding those who avoid controversy and align with the status quo. This dynamic aligns with defense contractors’ desires for perpetual overseas operations, as prolonged conflicts drive demand for weapons, logistics, and services.
For example, the Pentagon’s reliance on costly, high-tech systems — like the $10 billion Littoral Combat Ship program, plagued by design flaws — reflects a preference for feeding contractor profits over delivering practical warfighting tools.
Similarly, the 20-year Afghanistan campaign, costing $2 trillion, enriched defense firms while strategic missteps prolonged the conflict, exposing troops to unnecessary risks. This culture not only fuels endless wars but also sidelines innovative leaders who challenge wasteful or escalatory policies, leaving servicemembers to bear the human cost.
A reformed military would prioritize mission success and troop safety over bureaucratic inertia and contractor interests. By fostering ethical, merit-based leadership and streamlining operations, the system could avoid reckless engagements and ensure servicemembers are deployed only when necessary.
My reform strategies — tested at West Point, Fort Benning, and with allies like Ukraine — offer a path forward, emphasizing four pillars: ethics, merit, transparency, and efficiency.
Ethics: Fostering moral courage
Adopting Mission Command, a decentralized leadership philosophy, empowers junior leaders to make decisions aligned with clear objectives, fostering moral courage over blind obedience.
Unlike the current zero-defects culture, which punished Scheller’s principled dissent, Mission Command would encourage leaders to prioritize duty and troop welfare, reducing reckless deployments driven by careerist or contractor pressures. For instance, ethical leaders could have questioned the prolonged Afghanistan presence, sparing lives lost in later years.
The U.S. Army War College study by Dr. Leonard Wong and Dr. Stephen J. Gerras, titled "Lying to Ourselves: Dishonesty in the Army Profession", published in 2015, examines systemic dishonesty within the U.S. Army. The study argues that the overwhelming number of administrative and training requirements imposed on officers makes it impossible to fully comply, leading to routine misrepresentation or "ethical fading."
Merit: Rewarding competence
Replacing the “up or out” system, emplaced in 1917 by the Navy, then by DoD in 1947, with a flatter, merit-based structure would promote leaders based on real-world skills — adaptability, critical thinking, and tactical innovation — rather than time served or connections. This would retain talent and ensure leaders prioritize mission success over appeasing defense contractors or chasing promotions.
Competent leaders who move up though this process are less likely to endorse unnecessary operations that endanger troops.
Transparency: Building trust
Opaque promotion and assignment processes breed distrust, as soldiers see favoritism at play. Clear, open criteria for advancement, tied to mission-relevant metrics, would rebuild confidence. Transparent assessments of force effectiveness could expose strategic errors — like those in Iraq or Afghanistan — before they escalate, preventing servicemembers from being sent into poorly planned conflicts fueled by external interests.
The 2001 Commandant of the Marine Corps Trust Study emphasized building trust through decentralized decision-making, mission command, and strong leadership ethics. If implemented in the DoD today, it could enhance operational efficiency by empowering lower-level commanders to make rapid, informed decisions, fostering agility in complex battlefields. It would strengthen unit cohesion and morale by prioritizing trust-centric leadership, aligning with modern warfare's demand for adaptability.
Additionally, it could improve public trust in the military by reinforcing ethical standards and transparency, addressing recent declines in confidence (e.g., 45% public trust in 2021 per Reagan Institute Foundation). This approach could also bolster recruitment and retention by cultivating a culture of accountability and professionalism.
Trimming ranks and headquarters
The most recent study addressing negative officer and headquarters bloat in the Department of Defense is the Congressional Research Service (CRS) report titled General and Flag Officers in the U.S. Armed Forces: Background and Considerations for Congress [R44389], updated on March 8, 2024.
This report highlights the increase in senior officer billets (3- and 4-star ranks) relative to total force size, noting that in 2023, there were 169 such billets compared to 155 during the Vietnam era, despite a significantly smaller force.
It cites concerns from the Project on Government Oversight (POGO) about the risk of creating a "military force of bureaucrats rather than warriors" and references historical warnings, such as General John Sheehan's 1998 statement about the dangers of an overly bureaucratic military staff. The report also discusses inefficiencies, such as excessive staff layers (up to 30 in some cases), which hinder decision-making and operational effectiveness.
Additionally, a 2023 article from the Epoch Times titled Top-Heavy, Bloated Command Structure Hurts US Military Effectiveness, Costs Billions (published September 26, 2023) draws on similar themes, referencing a 2017 Joint Force Quarterly study on "rank creep." It notes that the current 900 admirals and generals (including 41 four-stars) command a much smaller force than during World War II, leading to inefficiencies and higher costs without enhancing mission success.
The bloated officer corps and sprawling headquarters divert resources from combat units, slowing decisions and insulating leaders from frontline realities. Reducing general officer positions and headquarters staff, as suggested in the April 30, 2025, DoD memo, would empower frontline leaders and focus resources on troop readiness. A leaner structure would deter unnecessary overseas commitments, ensuring service members are deployed only for clear, achievable objectives.
The opportunity
The military’s failures stem from a personnel system that fuels careerism, indulges the military-industrial complex, and endangers troops. Historical missteps in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan underscore the cost of this dysfunction.
With a new DoD leadership and public support for reform, the April 30, 2025, memo’s call to cut waste and prioritize effectiveness aligns with this blueprint. By dismantling the industrial-age personnel system, the Pentagon can create a military that values ethics, rewards merit, ensures transparency, and eliminates bloat — reducing the impulse to engage in endless wars and protecting servicemembers from needless harm.
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