The military coup in Gabon this summer marked the eighth such revolt in Africa since 2020, a shocking number that is raising questions about the role and impact of US military training in these countries.
While each coup has many local dynamics and political actors, a Responsible Statecraft article by Nick Turse found that since 2008, at least 15 U.S.-trained officers have been involved in coups in West Africa and the Sahel.
Evidence suggests that Washington’s counter-terrorism, military first, strategy in West Africa and the Sahel is actually weakening African states and failing to serve African or American interests on the continent. Isn’t it time for a serious reassessment of U.S. military assistance in Africa and a change in policy that shows civilians that the U.S. can make their lives better?
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Top image credit: Pope Leo XIV prays in front of Nacimiento Gaudium, a nativity scene donated by Costa Rica, in which the Madonna is represented pregnant, at the Paul VI Hall in the Vatican. (Maria Grazia Picciarella / SOPA Images via Reuters)
Earlier this month, Venezuelan Cardinal Baltazar Porras was supposed to fly to Madrid to accept his appointment as the spiritual protector of the Order of St. Lazarus, an ancient Catholic organization. But his trip ended before it really began.
When Porras arrived at the airport in Caracas, Venezuelan authorities moved quickly to detain him and take away his travel documents. The cardinal sat through two hours of questioning before being forced to sign a form acknowledging that he was now banned from leaving Venezuela because he attempted to fly on a Vatican passport. Once the interrogation ended, officials simply dropped off the elderly religious leader at the baggage claim.
The incident came amid a snowballing crisis between the Venezuelan government and the Catholic Church. Years of economic mismanagement and foreign sanctions have left the regime of President Nicolas Maduro on the verge of collapse, and Maduro has responded with a tightening crackdown on any and all forms of dissent. Local Catholic leaders have become increasingly outspoken about these abuses, and many of the faithful are now prepared to do anything to put a stop to them — even if that means accepting a U.S. military intervention.
The situation has created a profound early challenge for Pope Leo XIV. The soft-spoken clergyman, known to few outside the Vatican prior to his election in May, is grappling with what it means to be the first ever American pope just as his home nation edgescloser to open war with a majority Catholic country. So far, he has attempted to maintain a delicate balancing act, urging all parties to prioritize dialogue while avoiding any sharp critiques of the Trump administration or the Maduro regime. But this careful approach has done little to slow either Maduro’s crackdown on the church or the U.S. march toward conflict.
As the drumbeat of war grows louder, Leo may well face a consequential choice. Will he loudly condemn escalation, possibly endangering the church in Venezuela as well as his relationship with the U.S. government? Or will he maintain a relatively quiet posture — one that would better allow him to support mediation behind the scenes?
Whatever he decides could reverberate across the region, according to Massimo Faggioli, a prominent Catholic columnist and professor at Trinity College Dublin. “What happens in Venezuela could send a message to other countries where the Catholic church in Latin America is more and more under pressure by local strongmen,” Faggioli said, citing Nicaragua in particular. “If Venezuela turns [out] a certain way, that could send a different kind of message to the whole continent.”
An American pope, whether he likes it or not
It’s been a long time since the Holy See was the dominant force in Western politics. But even in the modern world, it pays to have the pope in your corner.
The Vatican may not have military or trade interests, but it retains a surprising degree of influence in international institutions, thanks in no small part to its crack corps of diplomat-priests, who receive extensive training in mediation and other useful diplomatic tactics. This skillset has helped the Holy See play a key role in deescalating conflicts, including the Cuban Missile Crisis and a civil war in South Sudan.
It doesn’t hurt that the pope retains a remarkable level of soft power, exemplified most clearly by the way in which global media still hangs on the pontiff’s every word. As Faggioli put it, “if you want to talk to the world, talking to the Vatican is a very good step.”
Leo has only begun to come to terms with the extraordinary role he now holds as a religious leader-cum-head of state. In many ways, he has followed the path of Pope Francis, urging the international community to fight the scourges of global poverty and war while offering to mediate conflicts like the war in Ukraine. Like Francis, who was Argentinian, Leo developed many of his views while serving as a clergyman in Latin America. But the similarities only go so far.
While Francis would often speak off the cuff about global affairs, Leo has leaned instead on carefully worded speeches crafted with the help of his diplomatic corps. While Francis excoriated NATO for “barking at the gates of Russia” prior to the war in Ukraine, Leo has focused his criticism on the Trump administration’s attempts to “break apart” the alliance between Europe and the U.S.
“My impression is that his view of the world is quite typical of a Catholic born in post-World War II America,” Faggioli said. Leo has a “pre-Trumpian” view of the West, he argued. “Not a neocon but very distant from Trumpism [and] also very distant from Francis' anti-Yankee and anti-North American, anti-NATO view.”
Pope Leo has tried to stay out of his home country’s politics. But differences of opinion with the Trump administration have complicated this approach. Just prior to his own election, Leo appeared to criticize JD Vance for his comments on Trump’s immigration policies in which the Vice President referenced a Catholic tenet of obligation derived from the writings of St. Augustine: “that you love your family and then you love your neighbor, and then you love your community, and then you love your fellow citizens, and then after that, prioritize the rest of the world.”
Leo responded by re-posting an article from a Catholic publication with the headline: “JD Vance is wrong: Jesus doesn’t ask us to rank our love for others.”
“He's a little bit more modest in his approach to things [than Francis was], unless it comes to something that's very close to the core of the gospel,” said Rev. David Hollenbach, a senior fellow at Georgetown University.
Despite these differences, Pope Leo could be a powerful partner for the United States, assuming that President Donald Trump is willing to work with him. The new pontiff has placed a particular emphasis on working through his professional diplomatic corps, which could provide invaluable support for Trump’s efforts to stop foreign wars (and avoid new ones, like in Venezuela).
“Now we see Pope Leo really putting some of the best people he has available in place,” said Mary Ellen O’Connell, an international law professor at Notre Dame University.
“There are so many conflicts that are in need of new talent for diplomatic solutions,” O’Connell told RS. “He can bring in people who can move [Ukraine talks] forward.”
A problem from hell
Like many Catholic problems, the crisis between Maduro and the church has played out through a debate over the saints. At an October event marking the canonization of two Venezuelan saints, Cardinal Porras lamented the state of affairs in Venezuela, citing in particular the “growth of poverty, militarization as a form of government to incite violence, corruption and lack of autonomy of public powers, and the disrespect of the people’s will.”
A few days later, back in Rome, Vatican Secretary of State Cardinal Pietro Parolin made unusually pointed remarks to a gathering that included a delegation of Venezuelan government officials in the front row. “Listen to the words of the Lord, who calls you to open unjust prisons, to break the chains of oppression, to set the oppressed free,” Parolin said. Tensions came to a head a few days later when the church suddenly cancelled a 50,000 person mass in Caracas meant to celebrate the new saints, out of fears that Maduro would turn the event into an impromptu rally for his embattled regime, according to The Pillar, a Catholic news site.
Parolin’s role highlights the careful balancing act that Pope Leo is hoping to maintain as the crisis in Venezuela deepens. Unlike Francis, Leo has collaborated closely with Parolin, who has extensive experience as a Vatican diplomat, including a stint as the Holy See’s ambassador in Venezuela. “The pope supports Parolin when Parolin says something because of course he knew that he was going to say that,” Faggioli said. “That gives more stability and more credibility. Being predictable in Vatican diplomacy is a great asset.”
As Venezuelan authorities have increased their pressure on the local church, Leo has been reluctant to take further actions, at least in public. “In secret, there's a lot going on, but in public that [pressure] limits your options,” Faggioli told RS.
This caution extends to Leo’s approach to Washington. While he has called for deescalation, he has done so infrequently and with little of the gusto that accompanied Pope Francis’ declarations on issues of war and peace. Victor Gaetan, the author of a recent book on Vatican diplomacy, said many see Leo’s comments as “rather modest and not sufficiently forceful” compared to the scale of the threat, and the possible repercussions of an invasion.
Leo has also yet to publicly offer up the Holy See as a mediator between America and Venezuela. But that doesn’t necessarily give an indication of what’s happening behind closed doors. The pope has a close relationship with the clergy in Venezuela, forged during his two decades working as a bishop in Peru. And he has a natural relationship with the U.S. given his American citizenship and popularity in the country. So he could be working to deescalate the situation and avoid war, as the church did in Panama in 1989, when it allowed President Manuel Noriega to briefly take refuge in its embassy in order to avoid further bloodshed.
All of the Vatican watchers who spoke with RS expect that Leo would sharpen his tone if the U.S. mounts a full-scale invasion. In the meantime, the American-Peruvian pontiff will have little choice but to encourage dialogue, both in and out of the public eye. The logic here is simple: The Vatican “believes that as long as you’re talking, you’re not shooting,” said Fr. Thomas Reese, a senior analyst at Religion News Service.
“The Vatican doesn’t have any magic answers for war and peace,” Reese said. “But what it does do is raise the moral issues and just beg people to try another way than war.” In other words, Pope Leo can provide an off-ramp — but only Trump and Maduro can decide whether to take it.
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Top photo credit: Tourists in China (Maysam Yabandeh/Creative Commons)
Japan’s Prime Minister, Sanae Takaichi, caused an ongoing diplomatic row with China in November when she stated that a Chinese blockade of Taiwan would likely constitute a threat to Japan's survival and require the mobilization of the Japanese Self-Defense Force.
Her statement marked a departure from the position of previous Prime Ministers, who followed a policy of strategic ambiguity on the Taiwan issue, mirroring the longstanding position of the United States.
This incident bears a strong resemblance to August 2022, when then-speaker Nancy Pelosi and five other Democrats visited Taiwan, becoming the highest-ranking member of Congress to visit the island since Newt Gingrich in 1997. China condemned the visit, with Xi Jinping warning President Biden he was playing with fire. China also carried out live fire artillery exercises in response, and there were an unprecedented number of Chinese air force intrusions across the unofficial median line separating the two sides.
Some concluded the visit created a “new normal” in cross-strait relations in which such gray zone warfare is the rule rather than the exception.
Defenders of Pelosi’s visit and Takaichi’s statements adhere to a misguided belief that strong statements and actions in support of Taiwan deter aggression. Their beliefs ultimately rest on the view that, if it could, China would attack Taiwan tomorrow, and it is only their lack of relative military power and fear of U.S. intervention that prevents them from doing so. They cite China’s increasing naval and amphibious capabilities, increased military activity in the Taiwan Strait, and U.S. intelligence assessments that point to 2027 as a potential timeline as evidence of this impending action.
While it is undeniable that China’s capabilities have improved, it is wrong to attribute increased military activity to unilateral aggression and conclude the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has a firm timeline for action. Although it is true that, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Maritime Transparency initiative, Chinese ADIZ violations increased from 69 in September 2020 to 325 by June 2024, the month-by-month data reveal an ebb and flow. Intrusions peaked at 446 in August of 2022 following the Pelosi visit. They also shrunk to near-2020 levels in late 2023 during the lead-up to Taiwan’s January 2024 presidential election.
After the more independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party won the election, intrusions ramped up almost immediately. This pattern suggests that aggressive actions in the Strait are reactive, not proactive.
The oft-cited 2027 target for invasion was dubbed the “Davidson Window” after Admiral Phil Davidson, who warned in congressional testimony that China was planning to invade Taiwan by that year. Since that hearing, Davidson’s comments have been clarified by numerous officials, including then-CIA Director William Burns, who downplayed the threat, saying the 2027 date is a readiness goal, not a deadline to act.
Meanwhile, at a high-level 2024 San Francisco meeting, one U.S. official reported that Xi himself grew exasperated at the frequent mentioning of 2027 as the target date for invasion, saying he had no knowledge of such plans.
It seems more likely that China does not want to use force to take Taiwan, but could feel compelled to do so in specific circumstances. China’s own statements on the topic of Taiwan have been remarkably consistent across the decades. China has issued three white papers on Taiwan since 1993. In each of them, they echo the same basic position: China prefers peaceful reunification but reserves the right to use force in response to perceived Taiwanese separatism or foreign interference.
Accordingly, U.S. actions and statements intended to deter China have the opposite effect, backing the Chinese government into a corner until it feels obligated to stop what it views as foreign interference.
Unfortunately, recent actions by the United States reinforce rather than dissuade the notion of likely American involvement. As Jake Werner, Director of the Quincy Institute’s East Asia Program, points out, the 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS) released in December seems to deepen, rather than walk back, U.S. commitments. Specifically, the NSS holds that Taiwan is a strategic location, implying a willingness to defend it, and that the solution to preventing conflict is a massive military buildup combined with pressuring allies to facilitate the expansion of U.S. posture in East Asia.
Actions such as these would add teeth to the provocative comments of policymakers and could be interpreted by Beijing as crossing a red line regarding foreign interference.
What should the United States do, then? For the last four decades, the U.S. has successfully had its cake and eaten it too, normalizing relations with China and preserving a free Taiwan by adhering to strategic ambiguity and avoiding firm commitments. Although not as exciting or emotionally rewarding as confronting the bully that is the CCP, it has been remarkably effective in preserving peace in the region for over 40 years, and departures from it seem to make the situation worse, not better.
The United States should continue this time-tested path, making clear to China that any attempt to unilaterally change the situation will result in severe economic consequences at the very least. Toward Taiwan, the U.S. should make clear that it is not its benefactor, will not support it in its independence efforts, and that it needs to start taking its own defense more seriously. The United States should make future arms sales contingent upon Taiwan's implementation of necessary military reforms and an increase in its defense spending.
After this, the United States could resume sales, focusing on cheap, expendable platforms that enhance asymmetric capabilities and avoiding large, expensive legacy platforms.
Having spent significant time in Taiwan, including the frontline island of Kinmen, I deeply desire to see Taiwan remain a free, independent country in practice, if not in name. I admittedly see the appeal of and feel vindicated by statements of support. And yet, there is a difference between feeling safe and being safe. Categorical statements of support for Taiwan from world leaders in recent years have made Taiwan less, not more secure.
If we continue down this path, we will bring about the very outcome we seek to avoid. For all its recent criticism, strategic ambiguity has kept peace in the region for 40 years, and reflects a smart, pragmatic foreign policy that places mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence over ideological grandstanding and Cold War mindsets. If we want to preserve the delicate peace in the region, we must return to this and resist the temptation of empty platitudes, political stunts, and commitments that we cannot back up.
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Top photo credit: Design image of future USS Defiant (Naval Sea Systems Command/US military)
President Trump announced on December 22 that the Navy would build a new Trump-class of “battleships.” The new ships will dwarf existing surface combatant ships. The first of these planned ships, the expected USS Defiant, would be more than three times the size of an existing Arleigh Burke-class destroyer.
Predictably, a major selling point for the new ships is that they will be packed full of all the latest technology. These massive new battleships will be armed with the most sophisticated guns and missiles, to include hypersonics and eventually nuclear-tipped cruise missiles. The ships will also be festooned with lasers and will incorporate the latest AI technology.
If you think you have heard this story before, you would be right. This will be the fourth time this century that the national security establishment has attempted to build a new surface combatant ship for the Navy. For those of you who may not be keeping score, the previous three attempts have been horrendous failures.
Just to refresh everyone’s memory, the Navy already attempted to build a modern version of the battleship in the early 2000’s. That was the Zumwalt-class destroyer program. Navy leaders wanted to build 32 such ships that would be armed with a futuristic gun system to support Marine amphibious assaults. The gun could never be built in a cost effective way so it was cancelled. That left the ship without a clear mission and the entire program was stopped after only three ships had been built. Each of those ships still don’t have a clear mission and now exist as $8 billion anchors around the Navy’s neck.
Less than a month before the president announced this latest shipbuilding program, the Secretary of the Navy cancelled the Constellation-class frigate program after Navy leaders sunk nearly $9 billion into it and before a single hull had been commissioned. That announcement was shocking because the Constellation frigates were intended to be a low risk replacement for the earlier, failed Littoral Combat Ship program.
The Littoral Combat Ships were supposed to be the Navy’s workhorse ships that would hunt mines and submarines, fight other surface ships, and provide security for the rest of the fleet. They were originally to employ a complicated modular design that would see each ship have mission systems swapped out in port to give them the specialized capabilities for their next deployment. The scheme failed spectacularly when modules didn’t work and cost soared. The ships also proved to be quite fractious and suffered several embarrassing mechanical breakdowns. Several Littoral Combat Ships had to be rescued at sea and towed back to port.
The Littoral Combat Ship program was expected to help the Navy increase the size of the fleet because each ship was supposed to cost a mere $220 million when the program began in 2002. By the time Navy officials gave up on the program 15 years later, the cost of each hull had grown to over $600 million.
Over the course of three major shipbuilding failures, a reasonable person would expect that those involved in the process would have learned some lessons. The first lesson that should have been learned and properly applied this time around is that the desire to build the most futuristic ship imaginable is a fool’s errand.
The Zumwalt, Littoral Combat Ship, and the Constellation-class programs all failed because the designers got too cute. Rather than building rugged ships that are stripped down to the bare essentials, they continue to create fanciful designs chock-a-block full of every conceivable gadget.
There is an uncomfortable truth the leaders of the national security establishment need to learn. That is: every gadget you add to one of these systems is one more thing that can break. When designers lack discipline, as they obviously did while sketching out this latest future boondoggle, a simple mathematical truth asserts itself. Engineers will struggle just to get all of these components to work individually.
Then there will be a terrible system integration challenge to get all of these finicky components to work together. Even if those two challenges can be overcome, the poor crews of these ships will struggle mightily to keep all of these gadgets functional while at sea. The sheer number of problems will constantly threaten the crew’s capacity to stay one step ahead of the maintenance monster the designers are now creating for them.
I take no pleasure in predicting another shipbuilding disaster. My own son is a sailor in the U.S. Navy. He and his shipmates need effective equipment to do their jobs. When politicians in Washington implement policies that place political and economic interests above military effectiveness, acquisition disasters become inevitable.
You can take this one to the bank. The Navy will spend tens of billions of dollars over the course of the next decade on the Trump-class program. At best, the Navy will receive three troublesome ships that will cost more than $10 billion each before then entire scheme is abandoned. Of course, the people who are making these decisions today will have long since passed from the scene by the time that happens and so will not have to face the consequences of their actions. It will be my son and those who come after him who will have to do that.
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