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Making sense of renewed Iraq-Syria ties

The US needs to learn that, despite Bashar al-Assad’s brutality, serious regional issues cannot be addressed without him.

Analysis | Middle East

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani just traveled to Damascus to meet with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, marking the first visit paid by an Iraqi prime minister to Syria since 2010.

They reportedly discussed a host of issues impacting Iraq and Syria, including terrorism, water, drug trafficking, refugees, Israeli attacks, U.S. sanctions, and economic development. Although Iraq’s western partners do not like Arab states engaging Damascus, officials in Baghdad believe that doing so serves Iraq’s national interests against the backdrop of Damascus’s reintegration into the region’s diplomatic fold gaining momentum.

Throughout modern history, Iraqi-Syrian relations have been complicated. During the time of Saddam Hussein and Hafez al-Assad, the two states competed in the world of Ba’athist politics. Baghdad’s alleged sponsorship of terrorism in Syria, Damascus’s support for Tehran during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), and Syria’s contribution to the U.S.-led military coalition that liberated Kuwait from the Iraqi occupation in 1991 all contributed to mutual hostility. 

Although relations thawed during Saddam Hussein’s final years in power, it was the emergence of a pro-Iranian political order in post-Ba’athist Iraq that paved the way for a rapprochement. However, there have been episodes of tension, such as the 2009 car bombings in Baghdad that then-Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki blamed on the Assad government. The existential threat posed by the Islamic State to both Damascus and Baghdad, however, gave both governments common cause.

While the Islamic State threat remained serious after Haider al-Abadi was elected Iraq’s prime minister in 2014, Iraqi-Syrian relations cooled after Abadi replaced Maliki. Abadi sought greater distance from Iran than his predecessor, in part due to significant U.S. pressure

Now, with Sudani and his Tehran-aligned allies governing Iraq since October and most of the Arab world normalizing relations with Assad after isolating him beginning in 2011/12, bilateral ties between the two countries have once again improved markedly.

From Baghdad’s perspective, engaging Damascus is pragmatic. Sharing a roughly 375-mile border, many security challenges and economic and environmental problems tie the two Arab countries together. 

“There [are many] overlapping issues related to specifically the return of refugees, remnants of ISIS, and water issues,” explained Nader Hashemi, the director of the Prince Alwaleed Center for Christian-Muslim Understanding at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service, in an interview with RS. “The Middle East is disproportionately affected by climate change.”

He added that Iraq also “has economic interests in terms of extending its oil pipeline through Syrian territory to expand its economic base.”

The situation in al-Hol, a refugee camp in northeastern Syria under the control of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), worries Iraqi officials. Described as “ground zero for the ISIS-related displacement crisis,” al-Hol is home to more than 50,000 people suspected of being former ISIS fighters or otherwise linked to the group. The camp’s close proximity to Iraq, the number of displaced Iraqis there, and the violence inside the camp all pose major security challenges for Iraq for which there are no easy solutions.

The illicit Captagon trade is also relevant to Iraq’s dealings with Assad. Captagon, a highly addictive synthetic drug, has proliferated throughout the Middle East, especially in the Gulf Arab states. Most of it is currently produced in Syria and Lebanon, allegedly by the Syrian government itself, Lebanon’s Hezbollah, and anti-Assad jihadist groups. The importance of ending the trade has been cited as a major reason why key Arab governments have decided to engage Assad. 

How much his regime, which profits significantly from Captagon production and trafficking, will be willing to crack down on the trade is debatable. But the view from Baghdad and other Arab capitals is that continuing to isolate Assad will only worsen the crisis. Much of this trade transits both Iraq and Jordan. This issue will likely be a major focus in upcoming discussions between Iraqi and Syrian officials.

A New Era of Realism in the Middle East

Sudani’s trip to Damascus must be understood within the context of the Assad government’s escape from regional isolation. Now that Syria has been readmitted to the Arab League and following the visits by high-ranking officials from Gulf Cooperation Council states, Egypt, and Jordan to Damascus, Sudani’s sojourn in the Syrian capital this month provoked little controversy.

Assad’s return is “a byproduct of the new realism and latest changes in the region, [that] include the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement and Gulf Arabs reinstating Assad and Syria in the Arab League,” Nabeel Khoury, the former deputy chief of mission at the U.S. Embassy in Yemen, told RS.

“The Assad regime is still the same as it was in 2011 (i.e. unreformed in terms of its human rights record and its relationships with Russia, Iran, and Lebanese Hezbollah). The fact, however distasteful to Western countries, is that there is no current or near future alternative to the Assad regime but the issues that need to be negotiated with Syria are of mounting importance.”

Washington’s Impact 

The U.S. military maintains a presence in both Iraq and Syria, and both countries are flashpoints for U.S.-Iran hostilities and the “shadow war” between Israel and Iran. Washington does not want to see Iraq add momentum to the trend toward Syria’s full reintegration into the Arab fold. But Washington is considered unlikely to do anything to prevent it.

“The world has changed very much since the heyday of the Arab Spring. The focus of U.S. foreign policy is very much on Ukraine, Russia, and China,” said Hashemi. “They’re not going to lift a finger to oppose Assad’s reintegration into the Arab world. At most they’ll issue verbal warnings and statements against these moves. But the U.S. military presence in Iraq and Syria doesn’t fit into the picture at all.”

Nonetheless, given the U.S.’s Caesar Act sanctions imposed on Syria, Iraq and other countries — and their companies — run the risk of being targeted by secondary U.S. sanctions if they do business with government-controlled parts of Syria. As Iraq works on rebuilding following decades of warfare, occupation, terrorism, and economic devastation, officials in Baghdad are working to develop commercial, trade, and investment ties with all of Iraq’s neighbors, including Syria. 

The threat of U.S. sanctions, however, will probably limit Iraqi-Syrian economic ties. At the same time, Washington’s sanctions are unlikely to prevent the two governments from building on plans to strengthen border security, address the persistent threat of the Islamic State, and tackle water and other environmental issues.

Washington should consider not only how the Caesar Act harms ordinary Syrians, but also their neighbors. Using America’s leverage in the international financial system to prevent Syria from rebuilding so long as Assad remains in power has consequences for the wider region. A host of Arab states, such as Iraq and the United Arab Emirates, have voiced opposition to the Caesar Act, but efforts to convince Washington to abandon the sanctions have so far proven futile.

“The U.S. in particular still considers Assad a pariah but it makes no sense to punish countries with sanctions if and when they deal with the regime in Damascus,” Khoury said.

“Lebanon is one case in point where the Syrian refugee issue is of paramount importance — a crisis which the UN, U.S., and the EU seem completely clueless on how to resolve. Lebanon has no alternative but to negotiate the issue with Damascus. Iraq finds itself in the same boat: whether the U.S. likes it or not, the Iraqi prime minister’s visit is absolutely logical and needed by Iraq and the region,” said the former U.S. diplomat.


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Analysis | Middle East
Trump Zelensky
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Blob exploiting Trump's anger with Putin, risking return to Biden's war

Europe

Donald Trump’s recent outburst against Vladimir Putin — accusing the Russian leader of "throwing a pile of bullsh*t at us" and threatening devastating new sanctions — might be just another Trumpian tantrum.

The president is known for abrupt reversals. Or it could be a bargaining tactic ahead of potential Ukraine peace talks. But there’s a third, more troubling possibility: establishment Republican hawks and neoconservatives, who have been maneuvering to hijack Trump’s “America First” agenda since his return to office, may be exploiting his frustration with Putin to push for a prolonged confrontation with Russia.

Trump’s irritation is understandable. Ukraine has accepted his proposed ceasefire, but Putin has refused, making him, in Trump’s eyes, the main obstacle to ending the war.

Putin’s calculus is clear. As Ted Snider notes in the American Conservative, Russia is winning on the battlefield. In June, it captured more Ukrainian territory and now threatens critical Kyiv’s supply lines. Moscow also seized a key lithium deposit critical to securing Trump’s support for Ukraine. Meanwhile, Russian missile and drone strikes have intensified.

Putin seems convinced his key demands — Ukraine’s neutrality, territorial concessions in the Donbas and Crimea, and a downsized Ukrainian military — are more achievable through war than diplomacy.

Yet his strategy empowers the transatlantic “forever war” faction: leaders in Britain, France, Germany, and the EU, along with hawks in both main U.S. parties. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz claims that diplomacy with Russia is “exhausted.” Europe’s war party, convinced a Russian victory would inevitably lead to an attack on NATO (a suicidal prospect for Moscow), is willing to fight “to the last Ukrainian.” Meanwhile, U.S. hawks, including liberal interventionist Democrats, stoke Trump’s ego, framing failure to stand up to Putin’s defiance as a sign of weakness or appeasement.

Trump long resisted this pressure. Pragmatism told him Ukraine couldn’t win, and calling it “Biden’s war” was his way of distancing himself, seeking a quick exit to refocus on China, which he has depicted as Washington’s greater foreign threat. At least as important, U.S. involvement in the war in Ukraine has been unpopular with his MAGA base.

But his June strikes on Iran may signal a hawkish shift. By touting them as a decisive blow to Iran’s nuclear program (despite Tehran’s refusal so far to abandon uranium enrichment), Trump may be embracing a new approach to dealing with recalcitrant foreign powers: offer a deal, set a deadline, then unleash overwhelming force if rejected. The optics of “success” could tempt him to try something similar with Russia.

This pivot coincides with a media campaign against restraint advocates within the administration like Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon policy chief who has prioritized China over Ukraine and also provoked the opposition of pro-Israel neoconservatives by warning against war with Iran. POLITICO quoted unnamed officials attacking Colby for wanting the U.S. to “do less in the world.” Meanwhile, the conventional Republican hawk Marco Rubio’s influence grows as he combines the jobs of both secretary of state and national security adviser.

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Nuclear deterrence rules out direct military action — even Biden, far more invested in Ukraine than Trump, avoided that risk. Instead, Trump ally Sen.Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), another establishment Republican hawk, is pushing a 500% tariff on nations buying Russian hydrocarbons, aiming to sever Moscow from the global economy. Trump seems supportive, although the move’s feasibility and impact are doubtful.

China and India are key buyers of Russian oil. China alone imports 12.5 million barrels daily. Russia exports seven million barrels daily. China could absorb Russia’s entire output. Beijing has bluntly stated it “cannot afford” a Russian defeat, ensuring Moscow’s economic lifeline remains open.

The U.S., meanwhile, is ill-prepared for a tariff war with China. When Trump imposed 145% tariffs, Beijing retaliated by cutting off rare earth metals exports, vital to U.S. industry and defense. Trump backed down.

At the G-7 summit in Canada last month, the EU proposed lowering price caps on Russian oil from $60 a barrel to $45 a barrel as part of its 18th sanctions package against Russia. Trump rejected the proposal at the time but may be tempted to reconsider, given his suggestion that more sanctions may be needed. Even if Washington backs the measure now, however, it is unlikely to cripple Russia’s war machine.

Another strategy may involve isolating Russia by peeling away Moscow’s traditionally friendly neighbors. Here, Western mediation between Armenia and Azerbaijan isn’t about peace — if it were, pressure would target Baku, which has stalled agreements and threatened renewed war against Armenia. The real goal is to eject Russia from the South Caucasus and create a NATO-aligned energy corridor linking Turkey to Central Asia, bypassing both Russia and Iran to their detriment.

Central Asia itself is itself emerging as a new battleground. In May 2025, the EU has celebrated its first summit with Central Asian nations in Uzbekistan, with a heavy focus on developing the Middle Corridor, a route for transportation of energy and critical raw materials that would bypass Russia. In that context, the EU has committed €10 billion in support of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route.

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