There has been much hand-wringing about President Biden canceling his trip to Australia for the Quad summit and to Papua New Guinea for a meeting of Pacific leaders (though he is attending the G7 summit in Hiroshima). The domestic paralysis over the debt ceiling may be serious, but the foreign policy implications of the canceled visits are not.
The leaders of the four Quad countries (Australia, India, and Japan, apart from the United States) will still meet in Hiroshima, and thus a de facto Quad summit will take place. It won’t have the pomp of the canceled Australia event, but substantive discussions will still take place. (However, the fact that the Quad has delivered little of substance more than five years into its second wind — except a steadily deepening military exercise, officially disowned by the grouping — is a topic for another discussion.)
The Papua New Guinea visit cancellation is more consequential. The United States is reportedly about to sign a sweeping military pact with PNG, aimed at China. Biden’s visit was likely a bequeathal of status to the far poorer and weaker Asian nation. It may also have been aimed at settling any outstanding issues in the deal. That effort may be delayed but it is unlikely to die because a president doesn't go. The power asymmetry and the overweening presence of close U.S. ally Australia in the region ensures that PNG can be ably coaxed or otherwise persuaded to follow through.
In fact, more attention should be paid to the PNG military pact. An unconfirmed leak suggests that the deal will give the United States military sweeping access to ports and territory in PNG. The presence of U.S. troops there will be governed by a reportedly highly unequal Status of Forces agreement. Most likely this is why the White House followed the cancellation up with an invite to PNG prime minister James Marape to Washington later this year for a summit with Pacific island nations.
This is hardly a new experience for the Global South, of course, where power differentials have contributed to such lopsided arrangements in the past — and have sometimes created a backlash downstream which can harm U.S. interests and influence. There is currently very little debate within America of expanding the U.S. military footprint in Asia and the Pacific. If only the mainstream media spent more time covering that, than the rather inconsequential cancellation of a couple of presidential visits.
Sarang Shidore is Director of the Global South Program at the Quincy Institute, and member of the adjunct faculty at George Washington University. He has published in Foreign Affairs and The New York times, among others. Sarang was previously a senior research scholar at the University of Texas at Austin and senior global analyst at the geopolitical risk firm Stratfor Inc.
U.S. President Joe Biden, Germany's Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Britain's Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Council Charles Michel, Italy's Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, Canada's Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, France's President Emmanuel Macron and Japan's Prime Minister Fumio Kishida attend a working lunch meeting at G7 leaders' summit in Hiroshima, western Japan May 19, 2023, in this photo released by Kyodo. Mandatory credit Kyodo via REUTERS ATTENTION EDITORS - THIS IMAGE WAS PROVIDED BY A THIRD PARTY. MANDATORY CREDIT. JAPAN OUT. NO COMMERCIAL OR EDITORIAL SALES IN JAPAN
“A Navy Second to None” has been the most enduring consensus in American national defense. For more than a century, the American people and their elected leaders — Restrainers and Warhawks alike — have agreed that the U.S. Navy is, and must remain, “The Shield of the Republic.”
Yet today the Navy is in trouble. The Navy and its boosters in Congress want us to believe the problem is all about too few ships and too few facilities.
The disorder is in fact positioned in the heart of the Navy Ethos itself. The precise term-of-art — “Navy Ethos” — was first introduced in 1980, here. It signifies the core, or essence of the Navy’s sense of self: Its codification of meaning, belonging, and identity — as a society and culture.
Hence, the real story of the Navy’s roads to ruin lies in the unraveling of the Navy’s own Ethos.
Yet how to show this? The Navy's five big, and indeed, existential problems can be best showcased by highlighting the struggles of five other navies in history that were forced to confront all-or-nothing cultural crises in their own “Navy Ethos.”
The wrong war
No matter what they say, armed forces prepare for the war they want to fight. Before Pearl Harbor, the United States and Imperial Japanese navies built mirrored fleets centered around lines of battleships that would someday meet in mortal combat, which in the space of a single event — a Pacific Clash of Titans — would decide the destiny of nations.
Yet when war came, the efforts of both fleets, try as they might, could not make this happen. Alfred Thayer Mahan’s prophecy of “Seapower” mesmerized the U.S. and Japanese navies with the mutual conviction that a Pacific War could be decided by a single event: Another Tsushima or Trafalgar. Yet even if there were no way to achieve such a choreographed final fantasy, theidée fixe of decisive battle had become a way of life for both USN and IJN. This obsession with almighty battleships locked in a last battle led to the destruction of America’s prewar fleet in the first year of war, and then eventually, Japan’s.
Today, the Navy still pines for a Pacific fleet showdown, this time with China. It is still obsessing over its capital ship idée fixe (with carriers in place of battleships) — when, like 1941, its fleet is simply too small, too old, and too out of shape.
The wrong stuff
In World War II, the U.S. Navy was saved only by America’s titanic industrial power, which in 1941 was building two backup fleets: A "two ocean" armada, to be followed by and an even bigger one. That second force, 5000+ ships, was built de novo — as though out of nothing — in just four years. The Navy was saved, not by its adaptable resilience, but by American Captains of Industry.
In tragic contrast, the Imperial Japanese Navy — the most powerful fleet in the world in 1941 — had no backup. When faced with a U.S. shipbuilding monster, it was literally ground down by those 5,000 brand spanking new American hulls. In this sense, the Nihon Kaigun is very much like the U.S. Navy today. War came, and it simply could not replace ships lost.
Frankly, the Japanese actually built quite a few new ships during the war — just not enough. Likewise, there are no Captains of Industry to save the U.S. Navy today. China has 200 times the shipbuilding capacity of the United States, and fabulous repair and maintenance that serves the entire maritime world. If America cannot build, repair, and maintain even its current, “incredibly shrinking” Navy, then it is no “maritime nation.”
The wrong rule
What happens to the Navy that reaches the acme of power and success, and comes to believe that it will command the seas forever? That would be Great Britain from 1815-1914. For the Royal Navy, it meant atrophy, that invisible sclerosis hardening into an ossified way of life.
As it celebrates its always-triumphant orthodoxies, it also forgets how to think, it takes itself way too seriously, and it believes without a flicker of doubt that, to stay on top, the Fleet simply must keep doing what it has always done, in sufficient quantity and quality, of course. The Royal Navy may have survived on the basis of quantity and quality of ships.
Yet what about quality and originality of thought? A Navy Ethos that punishes new thinking, that throttles innovation, that cashiers criticism — all by the time proclaiming how it celebrates these things — is an ethos chained to its own “Rules of the Game.”
In this sort of culture, only the right people, who say the right things, and put on the right, bright face to the public can expect to move up. This is the sclerosis of success, and it is, for any society of war, the most dangerous disorder: For it cannot be cured from within. Thus, the strategic reckoning of the Royal Navy in World War I will be as nothing to what awaits its American Cousin, very soon.
The wrong team
To know the U.S. Navy’s rot at its deepest means pulling back the curtain on a seemingly unlikely historical antecedent: Namely, the ruinous inner-working of Medieval and Early Modern Muslim empires.
This is the dynamic of the "slave dynasties." Corps of "Mamluks" or "Ghilman" ("enslaved soldiers") came to rule both Arab kingdoms and Caliphate. This aggressive artifact, burrowing deep into the heart of Muslim empire, reached its peak at the Ottoman Empire’s very height, where the business of the Sultan and his Sublime Porte became the business of its Janissary Corps.
This is what happens when servants become masters. Today, the business of the Navy is the business of its prime defense contractors, which have effectively taken over their titular overlords — the old bureaus — in the Department of the Navy. Today, the ideal cursus honorum, or life passage, for a naval officer is no longer to “make flag” and command a carrier strike group, but rather to realize one’s true destiny after retirement, with a seven-figure berth at one of the Big Five.
Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, General Dynamics, RTX (formerly Raytheon), Boeing, and a few others do good work (of course), yet it is they who now define the Navy's course. Their splashy ads proclaim their loyal service, everywhere, and which also — subtly yet undeniably — proclaim that it is they who truly rule.
The wrong fate
In 1781, in the American War, the French Marine Royale was literally "Peak France" at sea. Arguably, the Bourbon Coalitions’ navies won the war. Never before or since would the French Fleet be the instrument of such historic transformation as it achieved with this “world-historical” event. Yet, however triumphant, the war had dire consequences for the victor. France quickly unraveled into bankruptcy and revolution. Political calamity cascaded into a downstream disaster for the French Navy.
The U.S. Navy — which clearly does not represent "Peak America" at sea — cannot begin to be compared to the fleet that sealed the fate of Britain’s American empire and ensured U.S. independence. Yet as surely as for the Ancien Régime of 1789, a crisis in the American constitutional order would hit the U.S. Navy hard. It would feel the savage bite of American domestic strife, as well as the crippling burden of national debt working its way into the heart of national defense. A diminished nation will also mean an even more diminished Navy.
****
The bottom line is clear: Crises faced by others in history pale in comparison to the multiple vectors of failure facing the U.S. Navy today. Yet there are still hopeful guidelines the Navy might follow to hold ruin at bay: 1) Stay out of war for at least a generation, 2) Do what you can to leverage the State to create a real merchant navy and shipbuilding base, 3) Throw off the Old Religion. Let the Prophet go, and for a few years, simply observe the world as it is, and 4) Immediately consult a physician who can diagnose your sclerosis and tell you hard truths.
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Top photo: Russian President Vladimir Putin (miss cabul/shutterstock) and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky (paparazzza/shutterstock)
The memos presented by Ukraine and Russia at their direct talks in Istanbul on Monday make it absolutely clear that, absent a strong U.S. intervention based on a detailed U.S. peace plan, there will be no peace settlement in Ukraine.
It is not just that several of the positions on both sides are completely mutually incompatible; they suggest that at present neither side is in fact interested in an early peace.
The Ukrainian memo, presented before the talks, sets a “full and unconditional ceasefire in the sky, on land and at sea as a necessary background and prerequisite for peace negotiations.” Russia has already rejected this and will continue to do so — naturally, because it would mean giving up its main point of leverage for nothing in return. Nor indeed is a fragile and unstable ceasefire in the interests of Ukraine or the West. If Ukraine is to begin the extremely challenging process of economic reconstruction and democratic reform, it needs a stable and permanent peace.
The Ukrainian memo also states that “no restrictions may be imposed on the number, deployment, or other parameters of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, as well as on the deployment of troops of friendly foreign states on the territory of Ukraine.” Russia has already stated that it will not under any circumstances accept the presence of Western troops in Ukraine since it sees this as NATO membership in all but name. European leaders have also stated that a European force could only be deployed with a U.S. guarantee of support, a condition which the Trump administration has rejected.
The Ukrainian memo continues, “some sanctions may be lifted from Russia, but in stages and only gradually, with a mechanism for resuming sanctions if necessary (snapback). Frozen Russian sovereign assets are used for reconstruction or remain frozen until reparations are paid.” Moscow will obviously not agree to a final peace without the lifting of sanctions or firm assurances that they will be lifted.
On one key point, the Ukrainian memo does leave room for compromise: “Ukraine is not forced to be neutral. It can choose to be part of the Euro-Atlantic community and move towards EU membership. Ukraine’s membership in NATO depends on consensus within the Alliance.” Russia has in fact already publicly stated that Ukraine has the sovereign right to seek EU membership. And on NATO membership, the memo is correct that this does not depend on Ukraine but on unanimous agreement (not merely “consensus”) among existing members.
The Trump administration (or any European government) is therefore in a position to block Ukrainian NATO membership without reference to Kyiv. The problem for Moscow however is that Poland and other European members of NATO continue to declare their support for Ukraine’s membership; and, if the Democrats win the U.S. elections in 2028, they could overturn Trump’s veto. The Russians therefore are insisting on a Ukrainian constitutional commitment to neutrality and/or a U.S.-Russian treaty to that effect — which Kyiv is refusing.
Meanwhile, accounts of the Russian memo presented in Istanbul, as reported by the Russian media, include reported conditions for a ceasefire that Moscow must know are totally unacceptable to the Ukrainians — though this does not in itself rule out the possibility of Russia being willing to compromise on some of them in a final settlement if it meets its goals in other areas — especially bilateral relations with Washington.
They include “complete withdrawal of the Ukrainian Armed Forces from Donbas, Kherson and Zaporizhia regions. The second option for the ceasefire is a ban on major redeployments of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the abolition of mobilization and martial law, and the cessation of supplies of foreign weapons.”
This is not going to happen, absent Russian victory on the battlefield. Ukraine will never agree to surrender territory that it still holds, nor will European countries agree to end all weapons supplies.
In return for a ceasefire, the Russian memo as reported calls for “international recognition of these regions and Crimea as part of Russia.” This is utterly pointless. It is not just that neither Ukraine nor Western countries will legally recognize the Russian annexations; China, India and South Africa have also refused this, and will continue to do so. The best that Russia can hope for (as was indeed provisionally agreed at the Istanbul talks in March 2022) is to defer the legal status of these territories for future negotiation.
As part of an eventual peace settlement, Russia is also apparently demanding that:
Kyiv must announce the date of the presidential and Rada elections, which must take place no later than 100 days after the lifting of martial law;
The size of the Ukrainian military be limited;
A legal ban on Nazi & neo-Nazi propaganda. Dissolution of "nationalist" parties & organizations;
Restoration of rights of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church;
A peace treaty between Russia and Ukraine must be approved by a legally binding resolution of the U.N. Security Council;
It is necessary to ensure the full rights, freedoms and interests of Russian speakers;
Renouncing mutual claims with Ukraine in connection with damage from military operations.
Formal endorsement of the peace treaty by the UNSC makes very good sense. The other Russian conditions however will be exceptionally difficult for Kyiv to meet under Russian pressure — not least because in several cases they would need the legal approval of the Ukrainian parliament, which is very unlikely to give it.
Only Washington can offer Russia compromises in other areas (for example on U.S. force deployments in Europe) that could persuade Moscow to reduce these conditions to reasonable levels; and only Washington could then pressure Kyiv and European capitals into accepting them. Some of the Russian conditions (including minority rights) are not only legitimate, but essential if postwar Ukraine is to progress towards eventual EU membership, but a formula has to be found whereby Ukraine can agree to them as a starting point of the EU accession process, and not as surrender to Moscow.
The Trump administration can be forgiven its exasperation with the state of the peace process. Nonetheless, it would be a mistake — from the point of view of America’s own interests — for the U.S. to walk away from it. Apart from the fact that sooner or later Washington would inevitably be dragged back in, three recent developments have highlighted how a prolonged continuation of the war will involve serious risks for the U.S.
Thus the weekend's devastating Ukrainian attack on Russia’s nuclear-capable bomber fleet undermines nuclear security between the U.S. and Russia.
The bipartisan bill to go before the U.S. Senate next week (with the encouragement of the EU presidency) proposes 500% tariffs on imports from countries that buy Russian oil and gas. Presumably the senators are thinking of China. They appear to have forgotten that it also means India (and other U.S. partners). India has no intention of bowing to a U.S. diktat that would radically increase its energy costs and undermine its economy; and the imposition of 500% tariffs on India would ruin a vital U.S. relationship in Asia.
Finally, the EU has passed a new package of sanctions against Russia including measures to target the so-called “shadow fleet” of internationally-flagged tankers transporting Russian energy exports. This is also an affront to countries like India that buy this energy — and consider that they have a perfect right to do so under international law, since Western sanctions against Russia have not been approved by the United Nations, or agreed by themselves.
Last month, an Estonian patrol boat attempted to board a tanker bound for Russia in international waters, and Moscow sent a fighter jet to warn the Estonians off. Finland and Sweden have also threatened to detain such ships. Russia in response briefly detained a Liberian-flagged Greek tanker exiting Estonia through Russian waters. Russian politicians have threatened retaliatory seizures: "Any attack on our carriers can be regarded as an attack on our territory, even if the ship is under a foreign flag," warned Alexei Zhuravlev, the deputy chairman of Russia's parliamentary defense committee.
If both sides stick to their positions, then naval clashes will be not only possible, but certain. It is also obvious that these NATO members would never engage in such wildly reckless behavior unless they believed that in the event of such clashes, the U.S. military would come to their aid. The Trump administration needs to rein them in very firmly indeed. It also however needs to continue trying to bring an end to the Ukraine War, for as long as the war continues, so will the danger of a local collision between Russia and NATO members, from which the U.S. will not be able to remain aloof.
UPDATE 6/3 8:50a.m. EST: Polls have closed in South Korea, with exit polling indicating that liberal Lee Jae-mying will win by a wide margin.
South Koreans will be heading to voting stations on Tuesday to elect their next president in the wake of Yoon Suk-yeol’s impeachment and removal from office in April.
According to the public opinion trends over the past weeks, Lee Jae-myung, the candidate from the liberal Minjoo Party, is heavily favored to win. In South Korea’s polarized two-party structure, both mainstream liberal and conservative parties have managed to build highly committed support bases that would allow each party to secure at least 30% in most elections. Consequently, the decisions of the remaining swing voters have become decisive for electoral success.
On that note, recent polls have shown the moderate-nonpartisan base’s clear preference for Lee Jae-myung over his main rival Kim Moon-soo of the conservative People Power Party. This trend is reminiscent of last year’s parliamentary election in which the swing voters tilted strongly toward the Minjoo Party, eventually handing them a landslide victory.
In shaping the favorable momentum for Lee Jae-myung and the Minjoo Party, the South Korean public’s widespread desire to punish Yoon for his December coup attempt has been seemingly decisive. Many swing voters likely find it hard to support the People Power Party, which remained supportive of Yoon throughout the impeachment saga.
However, the people’s choice of Lee and the Minjoo Party in this election would not mean continued support for them. After the election, although there would be more demand for investigations into the martial law plot and punishments for those involved, many citizens will begin to shift their attention to other important domestic and foreign policy issues.
As a government that also holds a supermajority in the parliament, the new government would face high public expectations for problem-solving.
Indeed, the South Korean public is preoccupied with an array of challenges. Among them, how the new government can manage potential differences and disagreements in the U.S.-South Korea alliance and maintain strong, mutually beneficial ties with Washington.
South Koreans are deeply worried about the Trump administration’s sweeping tariff increases and the ripple negative impacts it would have on their economy. A heavily export-dependent economy, South Korea is vulnerable to external pressures and has indeed felt the ramifications of U.S. tariffs targeting its key industries, including automobiles. Given this situation, whether the new government can successfully negotiate a smart deal with Washington will be considered extremely important.
The issue of alliance cost-sharing for U.S. Forces Korea is another big concern for South Koreans. During his first term, President Trump threatened to withdraw from South Korea if Seoul did not increase its cost-sharing contribution dramatically. While Washington and Seoul then managed to agree on a reasonable deal, Trump had indicated on multiple occasions that getting South Korea to pay a lot more remains his goal.
Last year, as a presidential candidate, Trump vowed to demand $10 billion from South Korea for stationing U.S. forces there — about nine times what the Biden administration and Seoul agreed in October 2024. Many South Koreans would presumably support paying more to maintain the current conditions, as over 90% of them believe the U.S. alliance is necessary for their security. But they would not find $10 billion or anywhere near it acceptable, and would hope the new government would find a middle ground with Washington.
When it comes to security cooperation, whether Seoul and Washington can align their objectives and priorities regarding North Korea and China is the elephant in the room. Most South Koreans perceive North Korea as the biggest security challenge and would want the U.S.-South Korea alliance’s military and diplomatic focus to remain on North Korea.
Nevertheless, it is uncertain if the Trump administration feels the same way. Several key Trump officials, including the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby, have signaled they would seek a restructuring of U.S. forces in Asia, including those in South Korea, to focus more on deterring China, particularly with a Taiwan contingency in mind.
This issue of “strategic flexibility” — allowing U.S. forces in South Korea to operate beyond the Korean Peninsula — could emerge as a source of tension in the alliance, as Seoul would be predominantly worried about dealing with North Korea and would also want to avoid a hostile relationship with Beijing.
From trade to regional security, there are difficult and sensitive issues for Seoul and Washington to address and to seek compromise, at least a mutual understanding to agree to disagree. It remains to be seen how Lee Jae-myung intends to approach these complex alliance questions. But no doubt, he will be given a very tough assignment starting day 1.
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