Within 24 hours, Ukraine has used drones to attack several military targets inside Russia in a move that the Washington Post described as Kyiv’s “most brazen hit on Russian territory” since the war began.
After the first two strikes hit targets deep within Russia’s borders, a top Ukrainian official suggested in a cryptic tweet that the move was an inevitable result of the Kremlin’s continued assault. “[I]f something is launched into other countries’ airspace, sooner or later unknown flying objects will return to departure point,” wrote Mykhailo Podolyak, a top advisor to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.
The United States has opposed Ukraine’s desire to hit targets within Russia since the war began, citing concerns about potential escalation. Given President Joe Biden’s strong stance, Kyiv promised Washington earlier this year that it would not strike Russian territory directly.
The Biden administration has also limited the types of weapons that it is willing to send to Ukraine, much to the chagrin of Kyiv’s most fervent supporters in Congress, who have long called on Biden to give Ukraine long-range missiles.
And new reporting indicates that the Pentagon has gone further than simply limiting the missiles and launchers that it sends to Kyiv. According to the Wall Street Journal, the Department of Defense quietly modified U.S.-made High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) such that they cannot launch long-range missiles before shipping them off to Ukraine.
The attacks "underscore the difficulty the Biden administration faces in trying to control the risks of escalation in this war," according to George Beebe of the Quincy Institute.
"Despite our efforts to manage these risks, both the Russians and the Ukrainians can take actions that escalate the war in dangerous ways and increase the chances of a direct clash between the United States and Russia," said Beebe, who previously led Russia analysis at the CIA.
The escalation comes as public support for a long-term war in Ukraine has started to slow. According to a new poll from the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 47 percent of Americans think Washington “should urge Ukraine to settle for peace as soon as possible,” a nine point increase since July. Meanwhile, 48 percent of respondents, including most Democrats, argued that the United States “should support Ukraine for as long as it takes.”
Connor Echols is the managing editor of the Nonzero Newsletter and a former reporter for Responsible Statecraft. Echols received his bachelor’s degree from Northwestern University, where he studied journalism and Middle East and North African Studies.
Top photo credit: President of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan (Shutterstock/ Mustafa Kirazli) and Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu (Salty View/Shutterstock)
As the distribution of power shifts in the region, with Iran losing relative power and Israel and Turkey emerging on top, an intensified rivalry between Tel Aviv and Ankara is not a question of if, but how. It is not a question of whether they choose the rivalry, but how they choose to react to it: through confrontation or peaceful management.
As I describe in Treacherous Alliance, a similar situation emerged after the end of the Cold War: The collapse of the Soviet Union dramatically changed the global distribution of power, and the defeat of Saddam's Iraq in the Persian Gulf War reshuffled the regional geopolitical deck. A nascent bipolar regional structure took shape with Iran and Israel emerging as the two main powers with no effective buffer between them (since Iraq had been defeated). The Israelis acted on this first, inverting the strategy that had guided them for the previous decades: The Doctrine of the Periphery. According to this doctrine, Israel would build alliances with the non-Arab states in its periphery (Iran, Turkey, and Ethiopia) to balance the Arab powers in its vicinity (Iraq, Syria, and Egypt, respectively).
But after 1991, there were no Arab states left that could pose a conventional military threat to Israel. Israel’s focus, as a result, shifted to Iran. The new threat to Israel, Israeli decision-makers decided, was no longer the Arab vicinity, but rather the Persian Periphery.
What was odd, of course, was that Iran's hostility toward Israel throughout the 1980s, was not seen by Israel as decisive, as its focus was on Iraq and the Arab states. In fact, throughout the Khomeini era, Israel sought to reestablish relations with Iran and despite getting rebuffed by the clerical regime, Israel lobbied Washington to talk to Iran, sell arms to Iran, and not pay attention to Iran's anti-Israel rhetoric because it wasn't reflective of Tehran's real policies.
Iran was at first taken by surprise by the Israeli shift. At the time, its revolutionary zeal was fast declining, and the Rafsanjani government was desperately seeking to establish better relations with the US to gain access to investments and economic opportunities. It offered the US access to Iranian oil fields and sought to participate in the major conferences aimed at establishing the region's geopolitical order. But Iran was rebuffed by Washington and excluded from the Madrid conference.
Instead, Israel convinced Washington that for Israel to make peace with the Palestinians, the U.S. needed to neutralize the new threat Israel was facing —- Iran's Islamic fundamentalism — by sanctioning and isolating Iran. As Martin Indyk told me, the more peace could be established between Israel and the Palestinians, the more isolated Iran would become. The more isolated Iran was, the more peace there could be between the Israelis and Arabs.
This is when the real Israeli-Iranian rivalry begins. Tehran responded by targeting what it viewed as the weakest link in the Israeli-American strategy to isolate Iran: The Oslo process. If the peace process was sabotaged, none of the other objectives of the US and Israel could be achieved. It was at this moment that Iran seriously began to support rejectionist Palestinian groups (its relations with Hamas remained fraught for a few more years, till Sheikh Yassin was assassinated by Israel in 2004).
The logic of this strategic rivalry has guided both states for the past three decades: Israel has sought to isolate and sanction Iran, prevent U.S.-Iran diplomacy, kill any potential U.S.-Iran deal, and push the U.S. to go to war with Iran. Tehran has challenged Israel on every front, armed and trained anti-Israel groups, and grudgingly sought to escape the isolation Israel has successfully imposed on Iran by striking a deal with the U.S.
Israel has scored several major victories: Iran's Axis of Resistance is largely shattered, and Israel is on the verge of establishing sustained air dominance over Iran. It may not succeed in doing this, but it has dramatically moved its position forward. Israel is on the offensive; Iran is on the defensive.
Even though this rivalry is far from being over, and Israel is far from being the clear victor, it has already started glancing toward the next state that needs to be subjugated in order for Israel to achieve military hegemony in the Middle East: Turkey. (Israel's doctrine is to achieve security not through balance, but through domination).
Turkey's victory in Syria pushes it deeper into Israel's focus. But Turkey is different from Iran: It is a member of NATO and the G20, its economy cannot easily be sanctioned, it is a Sunni power with stronger soft power in the broader Middle East than Shia Iran has enjoyed for the past 10-15 years. Turkey, of course, has several vulnerabilities as well, including the Kurdish separatist movement.
But as long as Israel believes its security can only come through militarily dominating all its neighbors that can pose a challenge to it — that is, those who have the capacity to do so regardless of whether they have the intent or not — then Turkey's emergence as a major power in the region will put it into Israel's crosshairs, whether it likes it or not.
The forces of geopolitics cannot be eliminated. They can at best only be tamed.
President Trump’s new National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM) on Cuba, announced on June 30, reaffirms the policy of sanctions and hostility he articulated at the start of his first term in office. In fact, the new NSPM is almost identical to the old one.
The policy’s stated purpose is to “improve human rights, encourage the rule of law, foster free markets and free enterprise, and promote democracy” by restricting financial flows to the Cuban government. It reaffirms Trump’s support for the 1996 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, which explicitly requires regime change — that Cuba become a multiparty democracy with a free market economy (among other conditions) before the U.S. embargo will be lifted.
The policy outlined in the NSPM has yet to be translated into legally binding regulations, so it’s too early to tell if restrictions on U.S. trade or travel to Cuba will tighten. But the bottom line is that Trump’s new Cuba policy is not “new” at all. It’s just the latest variation on the embargo imposed on Cuba in 1962. For the next 63 years, Washington has tried to bend the Cuban government to its will by crippling the Cuban economy, all to no avail. Cuba today is no closer to being a capitalist multiparty democracy than it was in 1962 or 1996.
As we argue in a recent Quincy Institute brief, U.S. policy toward Cuba needs a major reset, a shift toward a policy of pragmatic engagement — not as a favor to the Cuban government, but because engagement better serves the interests of the United States and the Cuban people.
Advancing U.S. interests sometimes requires setting aside old animosities and engaging with former adversaries, as President Trump has done with Syria, Russia, China, and others. The president defines his “America First” foreign policy as one that champions “core American interests” and “puts America and its interests first.” U.S. policy toward Cuba in recent years has failed that test. Sanctions have increased the risks to U.S. national security on issues that the president has identified as U.S. priorities for the Western Hemisphere: migration, narcotics trafficking, access to strategic minerals, and the rising influence of China and Russia.
Conditions in Cuba today are far different than when President Trump issued his first NSPM in 2017, so U.S. Cuba policy needs to be reconsidered. Cuba is experiencing an unprecedented economic and social crisis rooted in the government’s mismanagement of the economy, the impact of the COVID pandemic, and crippling U.S. economic sanctions. Cubans are enduring shortages of all basic necessities, deteriorating government services, and repeated electrical blackouts.
As a result. the crisis has produced the largest emigration in Cuban history—nearly a million people in the past three years, 75% of whom have come to the United States.
Cuban society is also undergoing profound social change. The legalization of private enterprises has given rise to a dynamic private sector despite restrictive government regulations. The expansion of internet access and social media has led to a more robust civil society despite government censure and intimidation.
Cuba’s crisis is rapidly raising the costs to the United States of sanctions policy by stimulating migration, opening the door to geopolitical rivals China and Russia, blocking U.S. access to Cuba’s strategic minerals, hurting U.S. relations with allies, and threatening cooperation with Cuba on issues of mutual interest, including counter-narcotics cooperation.
As internal processes of change evolve in Cuba, disengagement leaves the United States on the sidelines, unable to exercise any positive influence on the trajectory of that change.
The United States needs to take the initiative to reset U.S.-Cuban relations to safeguard U.S. interests and ease the suffering of the Cuban people. The immediate goals of a new policy should be to:
Relieve migration pressures by making immediate regulatory changes that would aid the recovery of the Cuban economy and encourage the growth of the Cuban private sector, which is among the NSPM’s stated aims. The Cuban private sector is real and growing, forming the cornerstone of a revitalized economy and civil society despite operating in an increasingly hostile business environment.
Its success is critical to the Cuban people and the Cuban economy. U.S. sanctions add another layer of obstacles for it to overcome. Tangible support requires relaxing, not tightening, restrictions on U.S. trade, investment, and financial transactions, especially with the private sector. Taken together, these measures would significantly reduce migration pressures.
Expand commercial and cultural engagement to compete with the influence of China and Russia. The United States is a natural economic partner for Cuba — a potential source of trade, tourism, and investment far beyond what Russia or China can offer. Moreover, a robust economic relationship with the United States would give Cuba an incentive to limit its military and intelligence cooperation with U.S. adversaries.
In addition, Cubans have far greater cultural affinity with the United States than with Russia or China, a comparative advantage that should be built upon by loosening, not tightening, restrictions on cultural and educational exchanges, and travel.
Reengage with the Cuban government diplomatically to advance cooperation on issues of mutual interest, reduce bilateral tensions, and address human rights and property issues. Engagement facilitates cooperation and opens diplomatic channels in hopes of finding common ground. Making unilateral demands of Cuba on contentious issues has never produced results, whereas engagement has led to successful cooperation on counter-narcotics operations, migration, and environmental protection, among other issues.
The United States should continue to voice its support for basic human rights and condemn the Cuban government when it violates them. However, demanding Cuban concessions on human rights as a precondition for improving bilateral relations has never worked. No U.S. policy can force the Cuban government to adhere to high standards of human rights, but engagement creates incentives for the Cuban government to be responsive to Washington’s concerns.
***
A policy of engagement needs to be grounded in realistic expectations. It will not erase the fundamental differences between the United States and Cuba, and it is not an alternative path to regime change.
The pace and extent of this engagement ultimately depend on the Cuban government’s interest in improving relations. But the initial steps recommended here are ones the United States can and should take unilaterally, because they advance U.S. policy interests and offer the opportunity to set U.S.-Cuban relations on a better path for the future.
keep readingShow less
Top Photo: Lars Klingbeil (l-r, SPD), Federal Minister of Finance, Vice-Chancellor and SPD Federal Chairman, and Bärbel Bas (SPD), Federal Minister of Labor and Social Affairs and SPD Party Chairwoman, bid farewell to the members of the previous Federal Cabinet Olaf Scholz (SPD), former Federal Chancellor, Nancy Faeser, Saskia Esken, SPD Federal Chairwoman, Karl Lauterbach, Svenja Schulze and Hubertus Heil at the SPD Federal Party Conference. At the party conference, the SPD intends to elect a new executive committee and initiate a program process. Kay Nietfeld/dpa via Reuters Connect
Surfacing a long-dormant intra-party conflict, the Friedenskreise (peace circles) within the Social Democratic Party of Germany has published a “Manifesto on Securing Peace in Europe” in a stark challenge to the rearmament line taken by the SPD leaders governing in coalition with the conservative CDU-CSU under Chancellor Friedrich Merz.
Although the Manifesto clearly does not have broad support in the SPD, the party’s leader, Deputy Chancellor and Finance Minister Lars Klingbeil, won only 64% support from the June 28-29 party conference for his performance so far, a much weaker endorsement than anticipated. The views of the party’s peace camp may be part of the explanation.
Why it matters
The release of the Manifesto poses a challenge to the party’s leadership that could weaken the governing coalition. Polls indicate that Germany’s Social Democratic Party commands only about 15% of public support. It remains, however, indispensable to the parliamentary majority government headed by Friedrich Merz and the CDU-CSU parties (Christian Democratic Union of Germany and Christian Social Union in Bavaria). The new leadership of SPD wants to turn the page on the Olaf Scholz era and sees its role in the Merz government as an opportunity to rebuild its electoral fortunes after its miserable 16% showing in the February elections.
To date, accommodation of CDU-CSU on a range of issues has not helped SPD’s standing with voters.
Unfortunately for Merz, his own hold on power requires the SPD not to lose much more ground. After the resounding defeat of SPD Chancellor Olaf Scholz, the much younger Klingbeil rose to party leadership and, as Deputy Chancellor and Finance Minister, supports Merz’s stance on Ukraine and the defense buildup. Important backing comes from the SPD Defense Minister Boris Pistorius.
A heretofore timid and cowed minority of SPD politicians hold onto the preference, deeply embedded in the strategic culture of post-World War II Germany, for conciliation over confrontation in resolving international crises. Unease about the prevailing stance on Ukraine may be part of the weak voter support for the SPD. Merz has played up the idea of a Russian threat to NATO as early as 2029 if Ukraine is defeated, and has built considerable public support for rearmament based on these forecasts.
The unyielding stance on the war in Ukraine draws together the parliamentary majority held by CDU-CSU and SPD, as well as the Greens, while the parliamentary opposition consists of the AfD and the Linke (left) party, both of which question continued support for Ukraine absent any diplomatic initiative. The German policy on Ukraine appears to hinge on the hope that a prolonged conflict will ultimately compel Russia to retreat from its war aims and accept a compromise acceptable to Ukraine’s leadership.
This stance, framed in moralistic and principled terms equating compromise with dishonorable appeasement, is highly resistant to any revision. The insistence on staying the course seems to be rooted also in optimism that a successor to President Trump will return the U.S. to its former role as guarantor of European security and reliable foe of Russian ambitions.
The Manifesto
The Manifesto marks a revival of the traditional foreign policy course set by Willy Brandt beginning in the late 1960s, credited in the minds of many SPD members and other Germans with producing the peaceful dissolution of the USSR and the reunification of Germany.
The two leaders of the peace camp who produced the Manifesto are Rolf Mützenich, leader of the party’s Bundestag faction until February, and Ralf Stegner, a member of the SPD Executive Committee until recently. The 100 signatories of the Manifesto include a former party chairman, several former ministers, and historian Peter Brandt, son of the former Chancellor.
The release of the Manifesto marks a departure for these signatories, most of whom supported Scholz’s Zeitenwende of 2022, which boosted aid to Ukraine and defense outlays more generally.
The authors charge that the party and the coalition are seeking peace and security by preparing for war rather than, as the authors advocate, pursuing the same aims along with, rather than against, Russia. They concede that Germany should build up its defense readiness (Verteidungsfähigkeit), but they invoke the Helsinki Final Act concept of collective security, which they say produced valuable arms control agreements and enabled the reunification of Germany.
They also call for de-escalation and mutual confidence building to accompany a carefully calibrated rearmament framed solely in a defensive mode and for supporting German and European industrial development.
The signers also endorse a European diplomatic strategy to end the war in Ukraine and oppose the stationing of U.S. medium-range missiles in Germany.
Reception of this action by SPD mainstream has been cold. The SPD defense minister, Boris Pistorius, by far the most popular SPD politician, accused the signatories of failing to face reality and exploiting the public’s desire for peace.
The disappointing showing for Klingbeil at the party conference may reflect misgivings within the party about his unreserved support for what many see as excessive bellicosity and fear-mongering on the part of Merz. The timing of the peace faction’s Manifesto release suggests they hoped to open a breach in the party ranks.
Subscribe now to our weekly round-up and don't miss a beat with your favorite RS contributors and reporters, as well as staff analysis, opinion, and news promoting a positive, non-partisan vision of U.S. foreign policy.