Reuters recently published new reporting on the story of one of the worst U.S. intelligence failures in decades. From approximately 2010 to 2013, dozens of CIA informants in China, Iran, and elsewhere were rounded up and executed, jailed, or flipped to double agents. In Iran and China, almost the entirety of the CIA’s network in two of its top-priority countries are reported to have been exposed.
Some in the U.S. government seemed to try to pin much of the blame on a betrayal by CIA officer Jerry Lee, who was later prosecuted and pleaded guilty to spying on behalf of the Chinese government. But Lee’s alleged espionage could not account for all the sources blown.
In a series of articles published by the New York Times, Foreign Policy, and Yahoo! News, another explanation emerged: an astonishing laxity of source protection at the CIA itself. The reporting outlined several lapses in basic tradecraft (which included sending new recruits to meet at locations known to be under close foreign surveillance), but most catastrophic was the (not so) secret communications system the CIA used with these sources. Even if there had not been a mole, it seems hard to believe that the slapdash system could have long evaded the sophisticated counter-intelligence capabilities of the Chinese and Iranian governments.
Essentially, the CIA had set up a system to embed a messaging function hidden in the search box of hundreds of cheaply produced fake websites. The word “hidden” should be used loosely here — the new Reuters reporting found more than three hundred of the sites and showed that a cursory look at their publicly available HTML source code revealed labels such as “message,” “compose,” and “password.” And because the agency purchased the domain names in bulk, the websites were assigned sequential IP addresses — making it almost trivially easy to identify the whole network once a few were discovered.
In other words, simply entering the correct operators into a Google search might have led to dozens of informants rounded up and executed. This level of sloppiness is deeply shocking and inexcusable for a spy service with the resources and expertise available to the CIA. But there are additional layers of hypocrisy and bitter irony that have been less discussed.
This episode coincided with the Department of Justice ramping up its war on whistleblowers. The government used “sources and methods” as a cudgel in these unprecedented Espionage Act prosecutions: they claimed to assign the gravest weight to the protection of sources — so much so that no concern of public interest, no matter how great, could ever be weighed against the secrecy. But those sources were treated as utterly disposable: the agency couldn’t even be bothered to obscure the HTML on its communications system.
In a pattern common to the intelligence community’s most catastrophic self-owns, no one seems to have yet been held accountable. Well, except one person. As you may have guessed, there was a whistleblower. In 2008, a CIA contractor named John Reidy started sounding the alarm through internal channels that these grave flaws in the system were a ticking time bomb. Reidy was fired in retaliation, and his complaint to the Inspector General went uninvestigated until well after dozens of informants had already been jailed or killed. As Reidy tried to fight the retaliation, the government even prohibited him from telling his own attorney anything about the nature of his disclosures.
At the same time when the CIA’s carelessness was burning its own assets, it became fashionable for the critics of whistleblowers who went public to condemn them for not sticking to “internal channels.” Those channels didn’t do much for John Reidy, or for the scores of intelligence sources he tried to save.
The cruel irony would surely not be lost on former CIA officer John Kiriakou, who became a whistleblower when he discussed the CIA’s torture program in a media interview at a time when the CIA was still denying it. Kiriakou was sentenced to 30 months in prison after pleading guilty to inadvertently confirming the name of one CIA officer to a journalist — even though the journalist never published the name.
Again, it’s worth stating clearly: it was not the leaks of conscientious whistleblowers that caused the sky to fall, but the intelligence community’s own chronic mismanagement, virtually guaranteed by the very secrecy it always claims to need to protect those sources.
William Neuheisel is a human rights and civil liberties advocate with the Whistleblower and Source Protection Program at ExposeFacts, which has represented Edward Snowden, Daniel Hale, John Kiriakou, Thomas Drake, and other whistleblowers criminally investigated or charged under the Espionage Act.
Top photo credit: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy (2R) is welcomed by German Chancellor Friedrich Merz (R) upon arrival in the garden of the chancellery in Berlin to join a video conference of European leaders with the US President on the Ukraine war ahead of the summit between the US and Russian leaders, on August 13, 2025. JOHN MACDOUGALL/Pool via REUTERS
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky huddled with European leaders yesterday in advance of Donald Trump’s highly touted meeting with Vladimir Putin in Alaska. The call, which Trump joined as well, was viewed as Europe and Ukraine’s final chance to influence the American president’s thinking ahead of the U.S.-Russia summit in Anchorage.
With Ukraine’s position on the battlefield progressively worsening and Trump renewing his push for a ceasefire, European leaders have begun to make concessions to reality. Most strikingly, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said yesterday that the frontline should be the starting point for territorial negotiations, echoing NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte’s recent comment that there may be a need for de facto recognition of Russian occupation of Ukrainian land.
Moreover, in response to Putin’s proposal last week to agree to a ceasefire in exchange for Ukraine’s withdrawal from the rest of Donetsk region, Europe and Ukraine have insisted that any land swaps must be reciprocal. While European leaders remain firm that the norm of territorial integrity must be upheld in principle, these moves clearly embody a shift from the more uncompromising stance they embraced through the first three years of the war.
That said, some aspects of Europe’s stance remain delusional.
Prior to their meeting with Trump yesterday, Ukraine and its European partners agreed on a series of principles for negotiations with Russia. Among these remains the long outdated notion that Russia cannot have a veto over Ukraine’s NATO accession, even though the Trump administration has already ruled this prospect out. Even Trump’s much more transatlantically friendly predecessor Joe Biden was not prepared to take any tangible steps to make Ukrainian membership in NATO a reality.
In an increasingly multipolar world — one in which the United States has limited resources to respond to multiple contingencies across several theatres — Washington cannot afford to take on an additional ironclad security commitment to a country where, unlike in Western Europe, its vital interests are not at stake. Europeans advocating that the defense of Ukraine should ultimately fall on America’s shoulders is not only morally suspect but strategically unwise, as it telegraphs that Europe remains a vassal vulnerable to American shakedowns such as the recent capitulation to Trump on trade.
Even worse, Europeans risk squandering an opportunity to focus their heft on negotiating more realistic security guarantees for Ukraine. These could include pushing for Kyiv’s right to retain a peacetime military large enough to defend itself and deter Moscow, negotiating legal commitments to maintain stockpiles of specific weapons that would be automatically released to Ukraine in case Russia invades again, and pushing Moscow to accept a regulated European military presence on Ukrainian soil that is limited to activities such as training and maintenance of weapons systems.
Europe cannot claim to be a “geopolitical actor” if, on top-table matters of war and peace, it continues to fixate on presenting principles to its superpower patron rather than negotiate difficult security issues with its neighbors and adversaries. Insisting on Kyiv’s right to join NATO as a matter of principle reflects an “end of history” mentality — one that privileges lecturing over genuine diplomacy. And doing so while simultaneously claiming the mantle of “geopolitical actorness” has, ironically, only served to damage the European Union’s reputation as a sincere and consistent normative actor.
European leaders’ concessions to reality when it comes to borders mean little when one considers that the war in Ukraine is not primarily about territory. Rather, its origins lay in Russia’s perception that it has been denied a meaningful say over the contours of Europe’s post-Cold War security order, including the geopolitical alignment of states on its border.
Failure to reckon with this issue ensures that the wider European space will remain fractured, fostering a continued sense of insecurity for both Russia and the rest of Europe. The resulting increase in military budgets, coming at the expense of social spending, will in turn fuel the ongoing rise of populism across Europe. With the far right already in power or leading in the polls in the four largest European economies, this is not a prospect that liberal-minded Europeans should welcome.
Russia’s growing shift toward illiberalism at home and assertiveness abroad in the leadup to its full-scale invasion of Ukraine convinced many Europeans that Russia was “leaving” Europe. Such views confuse the European Union with Europe writ large. The fact that the return of war to the heart of the European continent has strengthened those forces that question the value of the European project shows precisely that Mikhail Gorbachev’s vision of a “common European home” remains on the historical agenda.
European leaders are naturally seeking security guarantees for Ukraine in exchange for any territory that Kyiv agrees to give up, especially since such guarantees will underwrite the stability necessary for Ukraine’s reconstruction and E.U. accession processes to move forward. At the same time, although the road ahead remains filled with obstacles, in the weeks following the Alaska meeting Putin and Trump may prove able to agree on a broad vision for conflict resolution and ceasefire implementation that Zelensky can also be persuaded to accept, since what Kyiv risks losing outright on the battlefield it may be able to concede in exchange for something at the negotiating table.
If a sense of forward momentum does emerge from the Anchorage summit, European leaders would be foolish to retain their hardline normative posture on what the continent’s security order should look like. To do so would not only sideline them in any negotiations over that order’s future, but also damage their reputation in the eyes of the world by making it seem as though they remain the only party opposed to peace after more than three years of costly war.
Because its resources must be carefully husbanded in a multipolar world, Washington needs to craft a more pragmatic relationship with Russia, while simultaneously encouraging the rest of Europe to become a more autonomous and responsible pillar of the continental security order. The former task depends on a settlement of the war in Ukraine.
The latter requires the United States to persuade its European allies to back down from an approach that risks hollowing out the E.U., fracturing European societies, and derailing a delicate diplomatic process that is now beginning in earnest in Alaska.
In early August, Israeli energy company NewMed announced a record-breaking $35 billion deal to supply natural gas to Egypt, nearly tripling its current imports and binding Cairo’s energy future to its neighbor until at least 2040.
Though Egyptian officials were quick to frame this not as a new agreement but as an “amendment” to a 2019 deal, the sheer scale of the deal — the largest in Israel’s export history — is indicative of a deepening and dangerous dependence on its neighbor for its energy needs.
The pact is driven by the mutual, if asymmetric, political needs of two deeply entangled governments. For Egypt's President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, the deal provides the energy needed to prevent domestic unrest. For Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government, the benefits are especially outsized. The $35 billion pact provides a massive, long-term revenue stream and solidifies Israel’s status as a critical energy player in the Eastern Mediterranean. Furthermore, it delivers a strategic victory by binding the most populous Arab state into deep and lasting economic dependency.
But if the deal is a win for Israel, it is a product of desperation for Egypt. Cairo’s moves are driven by a non-negotiable domestic imperative: keeping the lights on. For the past several years, Egypt has been haunted by the specter of its own declining energy capacity. Once a net exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG), the nation has seen its production steadily fall while domestic demand, fueled by a population of over 110 million, continues to soar.
The consequences have been severe, prompting the government to make difficult political choices. Searing summer heatwaves have led to rolling blackouts, crippling businesses and fueling widespread public discontent — a dangerous echo of the grievances that preceded the 2011 uprising.
President el-Sisi's government understands that political stability is directly wired to the electrical grid, and, as Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly admitted last year, avoiding blackouts is a core imperative.
The numbers, as reported by Bloomberg and the Joint Organisations Data Initiative, paint a grim picture for Egypt: a daily gas deficit of billions of cubic feet and an energy import bill projected to climb towards $3 billion a month. Importing LNG is prohibitively expensive, and, as Egyptian officials noted, Israeli gas delivered via pipeline remains the cheapest and most reliable alternative, even with a 14.8% price hike from the previous deal.
This logic has forced the government's hand: as recently as May, a planned maintenance shutdown at Israel’s Leviathan field led to supply cuts for Egypt's vital fertilizer and petrochemical industries. The government opted to risk industrial disruption rather than face public backlash over residential power outages, a clear sign of its priorities.
This deepening energy dependency complicates Egypt’s historical role as the key Arab interlocutor on the Palestinian issue. Cairo’s ability to apply meaningful pressure on Israel is fundamentally constrained by the fact that Israel can, and has, turned off the gas tap for security and operational reasons.
This awkward dynamic was thrust into the limelight in late July. Egypt joined Saudi Arabia and Qatar in endorsing the New York Declaration, a major international framework for the "day after" in Gaza that called for Hamas to disarm and for the Palestinian Authority (PA) to assume governance. Just this week, Netanyahu publicly torpedoed this very plan, flatly rejecting any role for the PA. The move leaves Egypt, a key mediator in now-stalled talks, with minimal leverage to compel a change in policy from the nation that controls its energy supply.
As ceasefire negotiations falter, and lacking the leverage to sway either Israel or Hamas, Cairo is reduced to managing the conflict’s fallout — a task that increasingly demands a heavy-handed campaign of narrative control and political suppression at home. This was made clear in its response to a recent televised appeal by senior Hamas leader Khalil al-Hayya. Bypassing the government, al-Hayya addressed the Egyptian people directly. His plea for them to ensure "Gaza doesn't die of hunger" was widely interpreted as a thinly veiled accusation of state complicity — a calculated attempt to ignite public pressure against a regime hypersensitive to such challenges.
Cairo’s response was stern, it immediately unleashed a media counter-offensive. Diaa Rashwan, the head of Egypt’s State Information Service, condemned al-Hayya's rhetoric, calling it "a big mistake." Pro-government television hosts and newspaper columnists mobilized to denounce Hamas for its “betrayal.”
Even more telling was the state’s intervention with Al-Azhar, the world’s foremost seat of Sunni Islamic learning, based in Cairo. When its Grand Imam issued a statement condemning the “genocidal starvation” in Gaza and the “complicit” actions of states enabling it, the presidency reportedly forced its retraction.
The move exposes a deep-seated fear of any narrative remotely implicating Egypt in Gaza's suffering through its partial control of the Rafah border. Cairo officially insists it cannot act unilaterally at the crossing due to security agreements with Israel, but as the humanitarian crisis deepens, calls for Cairo to defy those protocols and rush humanitarian aid into the besieged strip grow louder.
International frustration is now spilling onto the streets globally, with protests targeting Egyptian embassies from the Hague to Tel Aviv. These demonstrations are potent symbols of the immense pressure building on Cairo, which is caught between an international public demanding it confront Israel and the reality that its own lights are kept on by that very same state.
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Stephen Cohen, 2015. (Courtesy of Katrina vanden Huevel)
Russian historian Stephen F. Cohen, who passed away five years ago this September, occupied a position in American intellectual life that has become increasingly rare: a tenured Ivy League professor with deep establishment credentials who used his considerable influence to challenge rather than echo establishment narratives.
As Ukrainian-American journalist Lev Golinkin observed, Cohen was “someone who didn’t just write about history but had dinner with it,” having briefed U.S. presidents and maintained friendships with figures like former Soviet premier Mikhail Gorbachev.
Yet the ideas he championed — warning of the perils of ignoring Russia’s security interests and the dangers posed by an unchecked security state — were unpopular, even outright dismissed as “Putin apology,” particularly at a time when allegations of extensive Russian interference in the 2016 election made Vladimir Putin public enemy number one for many Americans and rendered talk of rapprochement between the U.S. and Russia increasingly difficult in establishment circles.
Cohen’s critique of U.S. foreign policy was not rooted in sympathy for Putin, but in a sober reading of post-Cold War history. “He fully understood the foolishness of U.S. policy toward Russia since the early 1990s,” University of Chicago Professor John Mearsheimer told RS. “There would be no war in Ukraine today if Western policymakers had taken his advice on the perils of NATO expansion, especially into Ukraine.”
Now, as we approach five years since Cohen’s passing, the U.S. and NATO find themselves engulfed in the very crisis he spent decades warning against.
To his credit, President Trump will meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Alaska on Friday to discuss a resolution to the three-year-old Russia-Ukraine war, something President Joe Biden had not done during his own term. Still, bipartisan factions in Washington push for more weapons for Kyiv, thinking this war can still be won on the battlefield, despite $175 billion in aid since 2022 and Ukraine's dwindling military prospects. A Senate Appropriations Committee vote just approved another $1 billion for Ukraine with overwhelming bipartisan support (26-3) in July.
Though he did not live to see the 2022 Russian invasion, Cohen anticipated it. For decades, he argued that dismissing Russia’s legitimate security concerns — primarily Moscow’s strong opposition to NATO expansion — was not only reckless but a predictable provocation.
When a bipartisan coalition in Congress led by Sen. Chris Murphy (D-Conn.) and the late Sen.John McCain (R-Ariz.) openly celebrated their role in ousting Ukraine’s democratically elected President Yanukovych in 2014, Cohen broke with virtually everyotherestablishment opinion, criticizing the Obama administration for its “shameful” intervention, which he presciently predicted, could “provoke Russia into a war with the United States and NATO in Ukraine.”
In the more immediate term, as Cohen pointed out, U.S. support for the new Ukrainian government “created a reign of terror,” in cities like Odessa where officially sanctioned “anti-terror” squads, some with openly Neo-Nazi allegiances, violently suppressed opposition to the newly installed government.
Remembering the late Cohen, Golinkin recalls how “Steve was the only major figure in America who insisted on remembering the Russian-speaking Ukrainians,” like Golinkin’s family members who “distrusted and hated the new Kiev government. He spoke of neo-Nazi paramilitaries who fought for the U.S.-backed government committing war crimes against civilians in eastern Ukraine. He spoke the truth, regardless of how unwieldy it was.”
Beyond Cohen’s scrutiny of American meddling in Eastern Europe, he also directed his criticism toward domestic political currents that were reorienting Washington’s posture toward Moscow.
When many in Washington and beyond were claiming that Russia had worked with the Trump campaign and tipped the scales against Hillary Clinton in the 2016 election, Cohen was instantly skeptical of their charges, recognizing holes in the narratives that establishment journalists would take years to acknowledge.
While debates over the extent of Russia’s meddling in the 2016 presidential election consumed the nation’s attention, with some analysts even declaring Russia’s alleged interference an “attack on the United States” on par with Pearl Harbor, Cohen understood that the hysteria would neuter the left’s antiwar instincts. A consequence, he warned, would be a newly empowered political alliance between the liberal establishment and neoconservatives united in their drive for confrontation with Russia — a realignment that made diplomacy all but impossible and even “treasonous.”
Illustrative of that realignment, was the nascent class of what Politico termed “The Spies Who Came in to the TV Studio” — intelligence officials like James Clapper elevated to trusted cable news contributors at CNN and NBC who, “explain[ed] the methods by which the Russians recruit spies” and “entertain[ed] us with their disdain for President [Trump].”
“There was a time when liberals and progressives were deeply suspicious of the American intelligence community,” said Cohen. “How did it happen that liberals and progressives today are embracing the FBI and CIA in their war against Trump?”
In 2018, when establishment media joined together to condemn President Trump’s Helsinki Summit with Vladimir Putin, a meeting former CIA Director John Brennan labeled “treasonous,” Cohen instead praised the meeting and applauded Trump’s acknowledgement — rare for any U.S. President — that “both sides are to blame,” for poor relations between the United States and Russia.
Now, with an upcoming summit between the U.S. and Russia scheduled for August 15, an American president has finally signaled a willingness to embrace Cohen’s core lesson; that recognizing Russian security interests as legitimate isn’t “appeasement,” but the only path toward avoiding mutually assured destruction.
Predictably, a chorus of neocons and liberals have emerged to pre-emptively sabotage any attempt to reach a negotiated settlement, urging Trump to follow through on his ultimatum and levy even more sanctions against Russia. The Alaska Summit “is a great victory for Putin,” John Bolton declared on CNN. Similarly, The Financial Times cautioned that Trump’s eagerness to cut a deal —one a majority of Ukrainians now support — evokes “the ghosts of Munich and Yalta.”
But the Alaska summit offers a rare opportunity to step back from the brink. Whether U.S. leaders choose to seize it — or ignore Cohen’s lessons once again — will determine not only the future of the U.S., Russia, and Ukraine, but perhaps the survival of all nations in the nuclear age.
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