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US-led naval escort to break Russian blockade could risk wider war

Calls for a 'coalition of the willing' to establish a 'maritime corridor' are designed to obfuscate the dangers that it will create.

Analysis | Europe

Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February, relatively few in the Western commentariat have been willing to call for the United States to engage in direct war against Moscow. The reasons for this caution are obvious — Russia is a nuclear state, and has a military that, its recent underperformance notwithstanding, is still vastly more formidable than any recent target of U.S. military intervention.

Yet despite — or perhaps because of — this general resistance to direct U.S. involvement, many commentators and politicians have come up with more underhanded proposals for American military intervention.

Most notably, this began with widespread calls for the United States and NATO to establish a “no-fly zone” over Ukraine early in the war. In spite of its innocuous and legalistic name, the Biden administration soundly rejected this proposal as its enforcement would rather obviously entail shooting down Russian aircraft, which in turn would lead to a wider war.

More recently, as the danger of a global food crisis made worse by the loss of grain exports from Ukraine and Russia has increased, new calls have emerged for the United States and allies to use naval power to ensure that Ukrainian grain can safely transit the Black Sea. 

Similar to demands for a no-fly zone, these ideas have been wrapped in humanitarian language. But in reality, they amount to a call for highly risky U.S.-led military action.

Versions of the proposal have been put forward by Lithuania’s foreign minister, retired U.S. military leaders including admiral James Stavridis, general Wesley Clark, and general Jack Keane, as well as Democratic representative Elissa Slotkin and the editorial boards of the Boston Globe and Wall Street Journal.

While these proposals vary in detail, all invoke the rhetoric of humanitarian intervention to justify and legitimize the action. The Wall Street Journal calls for a U.S.-led naval escort to be “planned and pitched as a humanitarian operation.” Stavridis referred to his plan as a “humanitarian grain mission” while Slotkin simply called for a “humanitarian escort.” The Boston Globe called its proposal a “human-rights mission” while the Lithuanian foreign minister deemed it a “non-military humanitarian mission.”

Most strikingly, both the Lithuanian foreign minister and the Wall Street Journal have referred to the nations participating in this hypothetical naval escort as a “coalition of the willing,” and odd choice given that phrase’s association with the U.S. war on Iraq and the Bush administration’s efforts to give a veneer of multilateral legitimacy to its illegal invasion.

Compared to the invasion of Iraq, these proposals have a much greater claim to humanitarian purpose. The growing global food crisis, exacerbated both by sanctions and the Russian blockade, threatens to cause famine and other dire consequences especially in the Middle East and North Africa. A successful effort to free up the Ukrainian grain trapped by Russia’s blockade could undoubtedly alleviate the crisis. 

A naval escort, however, would by definition require significant military forces, both to carry out demining operations and to wield a serious threat of retaliation against any Russian attacks on shipping. Wall Street Journal opinion writer Seth Cropsey was particularly explicit on this point, calling for “an overwhelming naval task force consisting of small and large surface combatants with submarine and air support.” Whatever coalition was assembled for the operation, it is likely that the United States would have to provide the bulk of these capabilities.

As with past attempts at humanitarian intervention, it is impossible to disentangle these proposals’ military means from their humanitarian ends. While this tension may have been possible to ignore when intervening in failed states or against far weaker powers with limited ability to retaliate, to do so would be far more perilous in this case.

Proponents of a naval intervention like Cropsey correctly point out that the blockade and the pain it is causing are essential parts of Russia’s war strategy, intended to put pressure on Ukraine and its allies to seek an end to the war on terms more favorable to Moscow. For Russia to allow its blockade to be broken without interference would be to give up a great deal of leverage, and may, from Russia’s perspective, risk emboldening further U.S. and NATO intervention in other areas of the conflict. Under these circumstances, Russia might find it immensely difficult not to challenge such a U.S.-led operation as the above commentators advocate. 

Furthermore, given Russia’s behavior in the war so far, its leadership is unlikely to care that such an operation has been framed as a “humanitarian action.” The presence of a Western naval flotilla in nearby waters for the expressed purpose of countering Moscow’s war strategy would no doubt be perceived as a military threat. That such a convoy would have an ultimate humanitarian objective will not negate these facts. 

Even short of Russia directly and deliberately attacking coalition ships, the risk of accidental escalation would be high, as demonstrated by the 1988 U.S. downing of an Iranian civilian airliner while conducting a similar operation to protect oil shipments through the Persian Gulf.

In the face of these conditions, the contention that the U.S. and its allies can break Moscow’s blockade “without firing a shot” is dubious at best.

There may be better ways to circumvent the blockade. Of course, a negotiated end to the war itself would accomplish this. Short of that, though, others have offered less risky proposals to export the grain. These include transporting the grain on a short overland route to a Romanian port, achieving a limited agreement on grain exports with Russia, or supporting a naval escort led by some of the non-Western countries most dependent on Ukrainian wheat. While it is unclear that the latter operation would be workable, it would have the advantage of being both credibly multilateral and, by minimizing the military role of countries which have strongly taken sides in the war, less potentially escalatory.

The global food crisis exacerbated by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine threatens disastrous consequences for political stability and human welfare worldwide. Serious efforts to mitigate this crisis, including through vigorous diplomacy, must be considered. But a mission that seeks to achieve humanitarian objectives through military means is still a military operation, carrying all the risks that that entails. Advocates of this move should not use rosy language to pretend otherwise.


Editorial credit: Gregory Gus / Shutterstock.com
Analysis | Europe
Trump Zelensky
Top photo credit: Joshua Sukoff / Shutterstock.com

Blob exploiting Trump's anger with Putin, risking return to Biden's war

Europe

Donald Trump’s recent outburst against Vladimir Putin — accusing the Russian leader of "throwing a pile of bullsh*t at us" and threatening devastating new sanctions — might be just another Trumpian tantrum.

The president is known for abrupt reversals. Or it could be a bargaining tactic ahead of potential Ukraine peace talks. But there’s a third, more troubling possibility: establishment Republican hawks and neoconservatives, who have been maneuvering to hijack Trump’s “America First” agenda since his return to office, may be exploiting his frustration with Putin to push for a prolonged confrontation with Russia.

Trump’s irritation is understandable. Ukraine has accepted his proposed ceasefire, but Putin has refused, making him, in Trump’s eyes, the main obstacle to ending the war.

Putin’s calculus is clear. As Ted Snider notes in the American Conservative, Russia is winning on the battlefield. In June, it captured more Ukrainian territory and now threatens critical Kyiv’s supply lines. Moscow also seized a key lithium deposit critical to securing Trump’s support for Ukraine. Meanwhile, Russian missile and drone strikes have intensified.

Putin seems convinced his key demands — Ukraine’s neutrality, territorial concessions in the Donbas and Crimea, and a downsized Ukrainian military — are more achievable through war than diplomacy.

Yet his strategy empowers the transatlantic “forever war” faction: leaders in Britain, France, Germany, and the EU, along with hawks in both main U.S. parties. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz claims that diplomacy with Russia is “exhausted.” Europe’s war party, convinced a Russian victory would inevitably lead to an attack on NATO (a suicidal prospect for Moscow), is willing to fight “to the last Ukrainian.” Meanwhile, U.S. hawks, including liberal interventionist Democrats, stoke Trump’s ego, framing failure to stand up to Putin’s defiance as a sign of weakness or appeasement.

Trump long resisted this pressure. Pragmatism told him Ukraine couldn’t win, and calling it “Biden’s war” was his way of distancing himself, seeking a quick exit to refocus on China, which he has depicted as Washington’s greater foreign threat. At least as important, U.S. involvement in the war in Ukraine has been unpopular with his MAGA base.

But his June strikes on Iran may signal a hawkish shift. By touting them as a decisive blow to Iran’s nuclear program (despite Tehran’s refusal so far to abandon uranium enrichment), Trump may be embracing a new approach to dealing with recalcitrant foreign powers: offer a deal, set a deadline, then unleash overwhelming force if rejected. The optics of “success” could tempt him to try something similar with Russia.

This pivot coincides with a media campaign against restraint advocates within the administration like Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon policy chief who has prioritized China over Ukraine and also provoked the opposition of pro-Israel neoconservatives by warning against war with Iran. POLITICO quoted unnamed officials attacking Colby for wanting the U.S. to “do less in the world.” Meanwhile, the conventional Republican hawk Marco Rubio’s influence grows as he combines the jobs of both secretary of state and national security adviser.

What Can Trump Actually Do to Russia?
 

Nuclear deterrence rules out direct military action — even Biden, far more invested in Ukraine than Trump, avoided that risk. Instead, Trump ally Sen.Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), another establishment Republican hawk, is pushing a 500% tariff on nations buying Russian hydrocarbons, aiming to sever Moscow from the global economy. Trump seems supportive, although the move’s feasibility and impact are doubtful.

China and India are key buyers of Russian oil. China alone imports 12.5 million barrels daily. Russia exports seven million barrels daily. China could absorb Russia’s entire output. Beijing has bluntly stated it “cannot afford” a Russian defeat, ensuring Moscow’s economic lifeline remains open.

The U.S., meanwhile, is ill-prepared for a tariff war with China. When Trump imposed 145% tariffs, Beijing retaliated by cutting off rare earth metals exports, vital to U.S. industry and defense. Trump backed down.

At the G-7 summit in Canada last month, the EU proposed lowering price caps on Russian oil from $60 a barrel to $45 a barrel as part of its 18th sanctions package against Russia. Trump rejected the proposal at the time but may be tempted to reconsider, given his suggestion that more sanctions may be needed. Even if Washington backs the measure now, however, it is unlikely to cripple Russia’s war machine.

Another strategy may involve isolating Russia by peeling away Moscow’s traditionally friendly neighbors. Here, Western mediation between Armenia and Azerbaijan isn’t about peace — if it were, pressure would target Baku, which has stalled agreements and threatened renewed war against Armenia. The real goal is to eject Russia from the South Caucasus and create a NATO-aligned energy corridor linking Turkey to Central Asia, bypassing both Russia and Iran to their detriment.

Central Asia itself is itself emerging as a new battleground. In May 2025, the EU has celebrated its first summit with Central Asian nations in Uzbekistan, with a heavy focus on developing the Middle Corridor, a route for transportation of energy and critical raw materials that would bypass Russia. In that context, the EU has committed €10 billion in support of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route.

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On June 30, President Trump signed an executive order terminating the majority of U.S. sanctions on Syria. The move, which would have been unthinkable mere months ago, fulfilled a promise he made at an investment forum in Riyadh in May.“The sanctions were brutal and crippling,” he had declared to an audience of primarily Saudi businessmen. Lifting them, he said, will “give Syria a chance at greatness.”

The significance of this statement lies not solely in the relief that it will bring to the Syrian people. His remarks revealed an implicit but rarely admitted truth: sanctions — often presented as a peaceful alternative to war — have been harming the Syrian people all along.

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