Follow us on social

Shutterstock_397543918

Wiggy data, fuzzy math, and tired DoD budget projection ruses

The only one who loses is the taxpayer —because everything is rigged to get more for the next year, and none of it is ever returned.

Analysis | Military Industrial Complex

The Biden Administration put out its new defense budget last week. The theme in Washington for analysis is the same as every year: Make the numbers add up to what you want. 

In addition to being about six weeks late, the Pentagon’s and OMB’s briefing materials for DOD are significantly inaccurate; the analysis in many news articles and commentaries is inept, and the counter-proposals from the Republicans go beyond the stratosphere. 

As usual, Congress could not be bothered to enact the previous fiscal year’s appropriations bills on time. This cycle they spit out a $1.7 trillion, 1,068 page “Consolidated Omnibus Act” for fiscal year 2022 on March 15 — five and a half months after the fiscal year started the previous October. 

When the new budget did come out last week, there was the usual mad scramble by defense journalists and think tank analysts to sort through the numbers and get something posted on the internet as quickly as possible. 

Making it more chaotic than usual were some inaccurate numbers released by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in the annual table it posts to display usually reliable past, present, and future numbers. OMB hadn’t bothered to update the data to show the  final Congressional action and instead displayed what Biden requested for 2022, all different and much lower numbers. Thus, any calculation from that table to show how the new budget differed from the old was wildly inaccurate. Some noticed the problem, some didn’t. OMB didn’t explain.

The Pentagon’s release of the numbers helped a little, but they were incomplete. DoD Comptroller Michael McCord’s printed and oral presentations did show appropriate numbers for both 2022 and 2023, enabling better informed comparisons. However, he left out significant amounts of money the Pentagon gets every year, and his math stinks. 

There are two forms of appropriations to the Pentagon. First and by far the largest are the annual “discretionary” appropriations Congress coughs up, such as in that “Consolidated Omnibus.” McCord showed what the Pentagon got in 2022 —$756.6 billion — and what it was requesting for 2023 — $773.0 billion. But the Pentagon also gets “mandatory” spending, which is best understood as permanent appropriations set by previous law.

For 2023, the Pentagon is also asking for $11 billion in this “mandatory” category  — mostly for military retirement. This extra $11 billion should be added to McCord’s presentation, along with a commensurate amount for 2022 — which is currently unknown. Including the mandatory spending to get what budget analysts call “total spending” is standard analytical practice.

A perpetual obsession in the press and among politicians is the amount of change in the defense budget from year to year. It comes in two forms: “nominal” growth, which is the simple math change from one year to the next, and “real” growth, which is the former adjusted by inflation. Thus, if the budget data showed a five percent nominal change, and inflation were two percent, the so-called “real” growth would be three percent. 

Comptroller McCord manipulated all of that data. First, he claimed DoD was getting a 4 percent nominal growth increase. But that’s not what his own numbers show: comparing  2022 ($756.6 billion) and 2023 ($773.0 billion) yields a $16.4 billion or 2.2 percent difference. Trying to impress some with the larger 4 percent, he simply ignored $14.3 billion in the 2022 column. Very few have caught the inappropriate nature of this ruse.

That $14.3 billion amount was for emergency appropriations for Afghanistan and Ukraine, and some man-made and natural disasters in 2022. The claim is that those costs are one-time only and should not be counted. But that money is just like the “one-time only” appropriations we had for the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere for the last 21 years. Including these routine supplemental add-ons is standard budget analysis, except in McCord’s case, apparently. 

His ruse worked. Article after article stated 4 percent nominal growth; one even got a little crazy with 6 percent

As every American consumer knows, inflation has been spiking. The Labor Department calculates the current Consumer Price Index at a 7.9 percent increase, and the Bureau of Economic Analysis sets the more DoD-appropriate GDP price index at 7.1 percent. However, the Biden/McCord inflation calculation magically downgrades those numbers to 2.3 percent and 2.0 percent, respectively. Using his elevated nominal growth number and his undercounted inflation number, McCord asserts 1.5 percent real growth. 

The actual nominal growth in his budget and the latest available CPI or GDP price indexes indicate a real decline of about 5 percent. 

On the other hand, Comptroller McCord correctly points out that fiscal year 2023 does not start for six months. The inflation rates will change, hopefully — but not certainly — downward. It’s his adoption of the politically-driven assumption they will dive from almost 8 percent to 2 percent — and his working use of the wiggery data to make convenient calculations — that most analysts should find risible. In a House Armed Services Committee hearing on April 5, in response to mounting questions, McCord had to explain himself on this, pleading that the only data he could use was from several months ago.

McCord also argues that a final inflation adjustment should wait until this summer to use later data. He almost has it right. Making an empirically based adjustment is clearly the right course, but attempting one this summer for the future fiscal year that runs through September 2023 is not the way to do it. A more sound inflation calculation will not be available until fiscal year 2023 actually occurs. A mid-course correction — with a supplemental appropriation, if needed — would make a far more intellectually honest adjustment. 

The Republicans are going bananas. They want to make the inflation calculation now with the highest number available, using the non-DoD analogous CPI measure, which measures civilian spending only. They want to add on top of that an additional 5 percent “real” growth. Thus, they are calling for up 12 to 13 percent more. That would calculate to almost $100 billion. They are not being shy.

The game is on. Given the current political environment with the war in Ukraine and prevailing defense budget politics, the Republicans are going to win, dragging along the great majority of Democrats who are scared silly, especially in an election year,  of being accused of unwilling to flood DoD with ever-increasing money. The only real question is how far will they go?

There is an additional dimension to this exploitation of the highest possible numbers. In the possible event that inflation in 2023 turns out to be something less than the current apogee, there will have been too much money in a contemporaneous calculation — a dividend of extra money. The extra money will not be returned to the Treasury; it will be kept in DoD’s budget and applied to additional programs. That has been the practice for years, even decades

Where will Congress put the money? The places they always do: earmarks, or what is more aptly called “pork.” The Republican plan would create an excess forecast from McCord’s underestimate, allowing for a new pork slush fund for 2023.

This is one of the many reasons why more US defense spending does not mean more military strength. Add in unaudited spending for needlessly complex weapons with everlasting cost growth, with still more to fix failures after overdue testing, and then yet more to use in the field for higher operating costs for diminished operating tempos. Appreciating this and other cost enhancement contrivances gives an entry level understanding of ever increasing defense budgets buying fewer, less maintained weapons for a shrinking force structure.  

It all starts with the chaos, incompetence, bias, and greed in assembling the Pentagon’s budget numbers — just like this year.


(El Nariz/Shutterstock)
Analysis | Military Industrial Complex
POGO The Bunker
Top image credit: Project on Government Oversight

Bombers astray! Washington's priorities go off course

Military Industrial Complex

The Bunker appears originally at the Project on Government Oversight and is republished here with permission.


keep readingShow less
Trump Zelensky
Top photo credit: Joshua Sukoff / Shutterstock.com

Blob exploiting Trump's anger with Putin, risking return to Biden's war

Europe

Donald Trump’s recent outburst against Vladimir Putin — accusing the Russian leader of "throwing a pile of bullsh*t at us" and threatening devastating new sanctions — might be just another Trumpian tantrum.

The president is known for abrupt reversals. Or it could be a bargaining tactic ahead of potential Ukraine peace talks. But there’s a third, more troubling possibility: establishment Republican hawks and neoconservatives, who have been maneuvering to hijack Trump’s “America First” agenda since his return to office, may be exploiting his frustration with Putin to push for a prolonged confrontation with Russia.

Trump’s irritation is understandable. Ukraine has accepted his proposed ceasefire, but Putin has refused, making him, in Trump’s eyes, the main obstacle to ending the war.

Putin’s calculus is clear. As Ted Snider notes in the American Conservative, Russia is winning on the battlefield. In June, it captured more Ukrainian territory and now threatens critical Kyiv’s supply lines. Moscow also seized a key lithium deposit critical to securing Trump’s support for Ukraine. Meanwhile, Russian missile and drone strikes have intensified.

Putin seems convinced his key demands — Ukraine’s neutrality, territorial concessions in the Donbas and Crimea, and a downsized Ukrainian military — are more achievable through war than diplomacy.

Yet his strategy empowers the transatlantic “forever war” faction: leaders in Britain, France, Germany, and the EU, along with hawks in both main U.S. parties. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz claims that diplomacy with Russia is “exhausted.” Europe’s war party, convinced a Russian victory would inevitably lead to an attack on NATO (a suicidal prospect for Moscow), is willing to fight “to the last Ukrainian.” Meanwhile, U.S. hawks, including liberal interventionist Democrats, stoke Trump’s ego, framing failure to stand up to Putin’s defiance as a sign of weakness or appeasement.

Trump long resisted this pressure. Pragmatism told him Ukraine couldn’t win, and calling it “Biden’s war” was his way of distancing himself, seeking a quick exit to refocus on China, which he has depicted as Washington’s greater foreign threat. At least as important, U.S. involvement in the war in Ukraine has been unpopular with his MAGA base.

But his June strikes on Iran may signal a hawkish shift. By touting them as a decisive blow to Iran’s nuclear program (despite Tehran’s refusal so far to abandon uranium enrichment), Trump may be embracing a new approach to dealing with recalcitrant foreign powers: offer a deal, set a deadline, then unleash overwhelming force if rejected. The optics of “success” could tempt him to try something similar with Russia.

This pivot coincides with a media campaign against restraint advocates within the administration like Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon policy chief who has prioritized China over Ukraine and also provoked the opposition of pro-Israel neoconservatives by warning against war with Iran. POLITICO quoted unnamed officials attacking Colby for wanting the U.S. to “do less in the world.” Meanwhile, the conventional Republican hawk Marco Rubio’s influence grows as he combines the jobs of both secretary of state and national security adviser.

What Can Trump Actually Do to Russia?
 

Nuclear deterrence rules out direct military action — even Biden, far more invested in Ukraine than Trump, avoided that risk. Instead, Trump ally Sen.Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), another establishment Republican hawk, is pushing a 500% tariff on nations buying Russian hydrocarbons, aiming to sever Moscow from the global economy. Trump seems supportive, although the move’s feasibility and impact are doubtful.

China and India are key buyers of Russian oil. China alone imports 12.5 million barrels daily. Russia exports seven million barrels daily. China could absorb Russia’s entire output. Beijing has bluntly stated it “cannot afford” a Russian defeat, ensuring Moscow’s economic lifeline remains open.

The U.S., meanwhile, is ill-prepared for a tariff war with China. When Trump imposed 145% tariffs, Beijing retaliated by cutting off rare earth metals exports, vital to U.S. industry and defense. Trump backed down.

At the G-7 summit in Canada last month, the EU proposed lowering price caps on Russian oil from $60 a barrel to $45 a barrel as part of its 18th sanctions package against Russia. Trump rejected the proposal at the time but may be tempted to reconsider, given his suggestion that more sanctions may be needed. Even if Washington backs the measure now, however, it is unlikely to cripple Russia’s war machine.

Another strategy may involve isolating Russia by peeling away Moscow’s traditionally friendly neighbors. Here, Western mediation between Armenia and Azerbaijan isn’t about peace — if it were, pressure would target Baku, which has stalled agreements and threatened renewed war against Armenia. The real goal is to eject Russia from the South Caucasus and create a NATO-aligned energy corridor linking Turkey to Central Asia, bypassing both Russia and Iran to their detriment.

Central Asia itself is itself emerging as a new battleground. In May 2025, the EU has celebrated its first summit with Central Asian nations in Uzbekistan, with a heavy focus on developing the Middle Corridor, a route for transportation of energy and critical raw materials that would bypass Russia. In that context, the EU has committed €10 billion in support of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route.

keep readingShow less
Syria sanctions
Top image credit: People line up to buy bread, after Syria's Bashar al-Assad was ousted, in Douma, on the outskirts of Damascus, Syria December 23, 2024. REUTERS/Zohra Bensemra

Lifting sanctions on Syria exposes their cruel intent

Middle East

On June 30, President Trump signed an executive order terminating the majority of U.S. sanctions on Syria. The move, which would have been unthinkable mere months ago, fulfilled a promise he made at an investment forum in Riyadh in May.“The sanctions were brutal and crippling,” he had declared to an audience of primarily Saudi businessmen. Lifting them, he said, will “give Syria a chance at greatness.”

The significance of this statement lies not solely in the relief that it will bring to the Syrian people. His remarks revealed an implicit but rarely admitted truth: sanctions — often presented as a peaceful alternative to war — have been harming the Syrian people all along.

keep readingShow less

LATEST

QIOSK

Newsletter

Subscribe now to our weekly round-up and don't miss a beat with your favorite RS contributors and reporters, as well as staff analysis, opinion, and news promoting a positive, non-partisan vision of U.S. foreign policy.