In an unprecedented late-night statement that did not follow any known protocol, the UK’s foreign secretary accused Russia of plotting to topple the Ukrainian government and replace it with a puppet regime. As the Financial Times reported, the “...UK’s late-night statement came at the end of a day when Germany’s naval chief resigned after sparking a diplomatic row by saying that Vladimir Putin should be given the ‘respect he probably deserves’ and claiming that Crimea would never be returned to Ukraine."
Meanwhile, Britain has been, somewhat unusually, at the forefront of providing weapons and platforms to Ukraine, often bypassing German and Dutch airspace. “A senior British official said that [avoiding German airspace] reflected Britain’s close consultations with Denmark and Sweden and that London did not ask the Germans for permission because it would have delayed a mission that depended on speed.” reported the New York Times.
The German, and by logical alignment, the Dutch and Italian position on Ukraine, has been one of detached concern. Germany’s navy chief had to resign after speaking what everyone knows to be true, that Russian revanchism isn’t just mindless imperialism, but has some merit given their perpetual sense of betrayal and threat; an analysis, incidentally shared by the Italian government and one which caused the Ukrainians to have a public meltdown. The only outlier in Western Europe was Britain. Increasingly it feels like Britain is favoring accelerationism and brinkmanship, with support from East and Central Europe, in contrast to increasingly defensive and uncomfortable Germany, France, and to some extent U.S. To what end is a matter of speculation.
I have often wondered why Britain is so inclined to instinctive anti-Russian balancing in Europe. Process tracing is of course a difficult job, especially in fluid scenarios. But it defies immediate material or geographical logic. Britain is neither now, nor in the near future, directly threatened by Russian tanks rushing through the European low countries, or the Russian navy enjoying overwhelming superiority in the English channel. So, what might be the proximate cause?
Without being privy to the British government’s internal deliberation, there could be three possible explanations. The most plausible explanation is often the simplest as well as the most disturbing one: That the British state’s upper echelons are so cocooned, that they increasingly believe their own internationalist rhetoric. That they are more committed to Ukrainian sovereignty and borders than their own, spending blood and treasure to prop up eastern Europe while failing or refusing to stop human trafficking in the English channel. Committed and bipartisan British liberal-internationalists like Rory Stewart, Tom Tugendhat, and Tobias Ellwood, as well as the current British foreign secretary Liz Truss and Labour leader Sir Keir Starmer dominate foreign policy thinking. This is compounded by a lack of a more restrained voice in the British foreign policy establishment and media, a sad end to a once glorious legacy of narrow Tory realism from Castlereagh to Salisbury, Curzon to Lansdowne and Halifax.
But there might be some other logical reasons. In some ways, a small conflict on the eastern frontiers of the EU would consolidate the British position as a net security provider and offshore balancer in Europe. Consider the broader implications of this accelerationism. More British arms and aid will result in a security dilemma spiral that would compel Russia to counter-escalate, as well as increase the dependence of central and eastern European states on British material support. For as long as there are no British troops in the direct line of fire (and London has already indicated that it is disinclined to put active troops in combat) London can keep playing this game and upping the ante.
Germany has neither the will nor the capability to provide any security in eastern Europe, and France is ideologically opposed to further Anglo-American-hegemony and therefore is positioned against further brinkmanship with Russia. For good or for bad, it appears to central and eastern Europe that France and Germany are not reliable enough to have any further interest in militarily balancing Russia. The secondary and unsaid calculation from the British side might be that given London’s own turbulent relationship with Berlin and Brussels, a better relationship with the Baltics and the Poles will result in a favorable balance in Europe.
Another line of reasoning might be that, for all that’s worth, post-Brexit Britain is yet to find a primary international role that suits its purpose and serves its interest. While public opinion overwhelmingly opposes an EU superstate as well as an EU army, Britain is unable to leave the continent and follow America to Asia, as American retrenchment will automatically propel the Europeans to consolidate their own security architecture.
Not that it needs much effort. Even with American public opinion favoring a partial retrenchment from Europe, the American Atlanticists remain committed to European defense, to the point of advocating for a war with Russia. But London has noted the rise of American retrenchment tendencies and cautious public opinion with some concern, observable in the harsh rhetoric in the UK Parliament post-Afghanistan withdrawal.
In other words, to stop the EU from turning into an independent superstate, “keeping the Americans in, and the Germans down” is, therefore, a renewed strategic purpose in London. All the talk of “liberal internationalism” and rules-based order, with Britain increasingly sounding more Catholic than the Pope, as both the core western EU and the U.S. become detached from the old conflicts of the East, is basically a couched and clever powerplay where tying down America to the European continent serves as a historic British power enhancer. Whether it is sustainable in the long run, is anyone's guess.
Dr Sumantra Maitra (@MrMaitra) is a National-Security Fellow at the Center for the National Interest, and an elected early career historian member at the Royal Historical Society. His latest paper is titled “NATO Enlargement, Russia, and Balance of Threat”, published in the Canadian Military Journal, Dept of Defence, Canada, summer 2021. Views are his own.
On Tuesday, U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen strongly endorsed efforts to tap frozen Russian central bank assets in order to continue to fund Ukraine.
“There is a strong international law, economic and moral case for moving forward,” with giving the assets, which were frozen by international sanctions following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, to Kyiv, she said to reporters before a G7 meeting in San Paulo.
Furthermore on Wednesday, White House national security communications adviser John Kirby urged the use of these assets to assist the Ukrainian military.
This adds momentum to increasing efforts on Capitol Hill to monetize the frozen assets to assist the beleaguered country, including through the “REPO Act,” a U.S. Senate bill which was criticized by Senator Rand Paul (R-Ky.) in a recent article here in Responsible Statecraft. As Paul pointed out, spending these assets would violate international law and norms by the outright seizure of sovereign Russian assets.
In the long term, this will do even more to undermine global faith in the U.S.-led and Western-centric international financial system. Doubts about the system and pressures to find an alternative are already heightened due to the freezing of Russian overseas financial holdings in the first place, as well as the frequent use of unilateral sanctions by the U.S. to impose its will and values on other countries.
The amount of money involved here is considerable. Over $300 billion in Russian assets was frozen, mostly held in European banks. For comparison, that’s about the same amount as the entirety of Western aid committed from all sources to Ukraine since the beginning of the war in 2022 — around $310 billion, including the recent $54 billion in 4-year assistance just approved by the EU.
Thus, converting all of the Russian assets to assistance for Ukraine could in theory fully finance a continuing war in Ukraine for years to come. As political support for open-ended Ukraine aid wanes in both the U.S. and Europe, large-scale use of this financing method also holds the promise of an administrative end-run around the political system.
But there are also considerable potential downsides, particularly in Europe. European financial institutions hold the overwhelming majority of frozen Russian assets, and any form of confiscation could be a major blow to confidence in these entities. In addition, European corporations have significant assets stranded in Russia which Moscow could seize in retaliation for the confiscation of its foreign assets.
Another major issue is that using assets to finance an ongoing conflict will forfeit their use as leverage in any a peace settlement, and the rebuilding of Ukraine. The World Bank now estimates post-war rebuilding costs for Ukraine of nearly $500 billion. If the West can offer a compromise to Russia in which frozen assets are used to pay part of these costs, rather than demanding new Russian financing for massive reparations, this could be an important incentive for negotiations.
In contrast, monetizing the assets outside of a peace process could signal that the West intends to continue the conflict indefinitely.
In combination with aggressive new U.S. sanctions announced last week on Russia and on third party countries that continue to deal with Russia, the new push for confiscation of Russian assets is more evidence that the U.S. and EU intend to intensify the conflict with Moscow using administrative mechanisms that won’t rely on support from the political system or the people within them.
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Activist Layla Elabed speaks during an uncommitted vote election night gathering as Democrats and Republicans hold their Michigan presidential primary election, in Dearborn, Michigan, U.S. February 27, 2024. REUTERS/Rebecca Cook
A protest vote in Michigan against President Joe Biden’s handling of the war in Gaza dramatically exceeded expectations Tuesday, highlighting the possibility that his stance on the conflict could cost him the presidency in November.
More than 100,000 Michiganders voted “uncommitted” in yesterday’s presidential primary, earning 13.3% of the tally with most votes counted and blasting past organizers’ goal of 10,000 protest votes. Biden won the primary handily with 81% of the total tally.
The results suggest that Biden could lose Michigan in this year’s election if he continues to back Israel’s campaign to the hilt. In 2020, he won the state by 150,000 votes while polls predicted he would win by a much larger margin. This year, early polls show a slight lead for Trump in the battleground state, which he won in 2016 by fewer than 11,000 votes.
“The war on Gaza is a deep moral issue and the lack of attention and empathy for this perspective from the administration is breaking apart the fragile coalition we built to elect Joe Biden in 2020,” said Rep. Pramila Jayapal (D-Wash.), a progressive leader who has called for a ceasefire in Gaza, as votes came in last night.
Biden still has “a little bit of time to change this dynamic,” Jayapal told CNN, but “it has to be a dramatic policy and rhetorical shift from the president on this issue and a new strategy to rebuild a real partnership with progressives in multiple communities who are absolutely key to winning the election.”
Rep. Ro Khanna, a prominent Biden ally, told Semafor the vote is a “wake-up call” for the White House on Gaza.
The “uncommitted” option won outright in Dearborn, a Detroit suburb with a famously large Arab American population. The protest vote also gained notable traction in college towns, signaling Biden’s weakness among young voters across the country. “Uncommitted” received at least 8% of votes in every county in Michigan with more than 95% of votes tallied.
The uncommitted campaign drew backing from prominent Democrats in Michigan, including Rep. Rashida Tlaib (D-Mich.) and state Rep. Abraham Aiyash, who is the majority leader in the Michigan House. Former Reps. Andy Levin and Beto O’Rourke, who served as a representative from Texas, also lent their support to the effort.
“Our movement emerged victorious tonight and massively surpassed our expectations,” said Listen to Michigan, the organization behind the campaign, in a statement last night. “Tens of thousands of Michigan Democrats, many of whom [...] voted for Biden in 2020, are uncommitted to his re-election due to the war in Gaza.”
Biden did not make reference to the uncommitted movement in his victory speech, but reports indicate that his campaign is spooked by the effort. Prior to Tuesday’s vote, White House officials met with Arab and Muslim leaders in Michigan to try to assuage their concerns about the war, which has left about 30,000 Palestinians dead and many more injured. (More than 1,100 Israelis died during Hamas’s Oct. 7 attacks last year.)
The president argues that his support for Israel has made it possible for him to guide the direction of the war to the extent possible, though his critics note that, despite some symbolic and rhetorical moves, he has stopped far short of holding back U.S. weapons or supporting multilateral efforts to demand a ceasefire.
Campaigners now hope the “uncommitted” effort will spread to other states. Minnesota, which will hold its primaries next week, is an early target.
“If you think this will stop with Michigan you are either the president or paid to flatter him,” said Alex Sammon, a politics writer at Slate.
Meanwhile in the Republican primary, former President Donald Trump fended off a challenge from former South Carolina governor Nikki Haley. With 94% of votes in, Trump came away with 68% of the vote, while Haley scored around 27%.
The Russian conquest of Avdiivka is unlikely to alter the war’s basic realities. Although delays in the delivery of aid to Ukraine have raised Russian hopes, no meaningful changes on the battlefield are near. The Russians cannot drive to Kyiv; the Ukrainians cannot eject the invaders.
The first phase of the war in Ukraine is drawing to a close. Both sides are coming closer to acknowledging what has been clear to the rest of the world for quite some time: the current stalemate is unlikely to be broken in any significant way. This round of the war is going to end more-or-less along the current front lines.
The actions taken in the next few years will determine whether or not there will be a round two.
The war’s end state is now clear, even if it may take a bit more time for the combatants to accept it. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s barbaric invasion has failed, but Ukraine cannot return to the status quo ante. The only questions that remain concern the shape of the peace to come, and how best to avoid a second act in this pointless tragedy.
Loud voices in the West are already suggestingthatthe best way to avoid round two is for NATO to expand again, and bring Ukraine into the alliance. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, on Kyiv's membership to the alliance, said over the weekend, "Ukraine is now closer to NATO than ever before...it is not a question of if, but of when."
He said Nato was helping Kyiv to make its forces “more and more interoperable” with the defence alliance and would open a joint training and analysis centre in Poland. “Ukraine will join Nato. It is not a question of if, but of when,” he insisted.
If this is the path the alliance follows, future fighting is almost assured. One side’s deterrent is often the other’s provocation.
NATO expansion was a necessary condition for Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. It was not sufficient, since Putin has agency and made a catastrophically bad choice, but it was necessary. Those in the West who blame the United States for the war are as myopic as those who claim that Western policies had nothing to do with it. Putin remains a cold warrior at heart, and talked about NATO obsessively in the years leading up to the invasion.
Expanding NATO further would again provide the necessary conditions for tension and conflict. Russia will not stand by while Ukraine joins the enemy camp. A second invasion – perhaps before Ukraine formally joined the alliance, or perhaps afterwards – would be extremely likely. Those who suggest that deterrence would keep the Russians in check should listen to the rambling interview Putin just gave to Tucker Carlson. Ukraine simply matters more to the Russians than it does to us. Putin would calculate that no American president would be willing to sacrifice New York for Kyiv.
Another solution exists, one that might well assure Kyiv’s security without exacerbating Russian paranoia. Ukraine should be “Finlandized.”
During the Cold War, Finland was essentially a neutral country. It took no official positions on the pressing issues of the day, and was careful not to criticize the Soviet Union. Leaders in Helsinki made it clear to those in Moscow that they had no desire to join the West. They resisted pressure to join both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and discouraged their citizens from openly criticizing either side. Finland avoided the Soviet embrace by making it clear that it would avoid the West as well.
“Finlandization” was a forced neutrality. The term was often used in a pejorative sense during the Cold War, as a warning about what could happen to the rest of Europe if the United States was not careful. What was often overlooked at the time was just how well Finlandization worked out for the people of Finland, who managed to stay free and outside of the various Cold War crises. Perhaps it is not a coincidence that today Finns consistently rank among the world’s happiest people.
Finlandization was a recognition of geopolitical reality, and it was the best choice for a small nation with the misfortune to lie next to a superpower. Switzerland followed a similar path during the 1930s. Like the Finns, the Swiss realized that their independence and very survival depended on avoiding any perception of flirtation with the enemies of their neighbor.
Ukraine will soon find itself in a similar situation, beside an aggressive and unpredictable great power. It should make the same choice, and the United States should help it do so.
A Finlandized Ukraine would not be allowed to join the West, but neither would it come under Russia’s thumb. It would be neutral, a buffer zone between NATO and Russia, an independent state that would allow hawkish Russians to imagine that it is still part of their country. The Ukrainian people would be neutral, and therefore safe.
If Washington were to lead an effort to emphasize the enduring neutrality of Ukraine, to Finlandize it, Russia’s paranoia could be reassured rather than provoked. Finlandizing Ukraine would be the best outcome for all involved, including for the Ukrainian people. The disappointment in being excluded from NATO would be tempered by the knowledge that it puts them on their best path to peace and stability. And it would be the best way to avoid Ukrainian War Two.